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ABSTRACT 
KIERKEGAARD IN LIGHT OF THE EAST: A CRITICAL COMPARISON OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SØREN KIERKEGAARD WITH ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN 
PHILOSOPHY AND THOUGHT 
 
 
Ágúst Ingvar Magnússon, B.A. 
 
Marquette University, 2016 
 
 
 This project presents a comparative philosophical approach to understanding key 
elements in the philosophy of Søren Kierkegaard by juxtaposing his works with the 
philosophy and theology of the Eastern Orthodox Church. The primary aim of the project 
is to look at three key areas of Kierkegaard’s philosophy that have been either 
underrepresented or misunderstood in the literature. These three areas are: Kierkegaard’s 
views on sin and salvation, Kierkegaard’s epistemology, and Kierkegaard’s philosophy of 
personhood. The dissertation ends with an epilogue that briefly explores a further area 
where this comparative approach might provide fruitful results, namely Kierkegaard’s 
views on collective worship. I argue that the revolutionary nature of Kierkegaard’s break 
with prevalent views in the Western Christian traditions (Protestantism and Roman 
Catholicism) have not always been fully appreciated due to the fact that he is most often 
read through the lens of either Western Christianity or the Western philosophical 
traditions that he came to influence (e.g. existentialism and post-modernism). Viewing 
Kierkegaard in light of the Eastern Christian tradition offers a new interpretive lens that 
highlights the extent to which Kierkegaard aimed to break free from standard Western 
accounts of sin and salvation, knowledge of God, and human personhood.  
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Chapter 1 – Setting the Stage: The Inscrutable Joy of the Melancholy 
Dane and the Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church. 
 
Even though Kierkegaard had at least cursory knowledge of many authors from the 
patristic era, his knowledge of Eastern Orthodox theology and worship was extremely 
limited.1 Kierkegaard only did a limited amount of traveling during his life and his 
cultural immersion was almost entirely limited to the social milieu of Copenhagen and 
(for a brief period of time) Berlin.2 Even though Kierkegaard had periods in his life that 
were socially active he nonetheless lived a very cloistered life, in part due to his poor 
health.3 Kierkegaard’s opportunities for exploring philosophies or religions that extended 
beyond his immediate world of 19th century Copenhagen were limited at best.  
This project, therefore, is not based on any historical connection between 
Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodoxy. It is, rather, an exercise in comparative philosophy 
and an attempt to forge a philosophical dialogue between Kierkegaard and the Eastern 
Orthodox world. There are a great many advantages to such a philosophical approach, 
many of which are especially apparent when one considers the difficulties inherent in 
interpreting Kierkegaard’s works.  
In the introduction to a collection of works on Kierkegaard’s thought and its 
relation to Japanese philosophy, James Giles writes:  
 
In comparative philosophy the philosopher attempts to loosen the grip of 
his or her culture by entering a new one. In doing so, the philosophical 
                                                 
1 Cursory references to “the Greek Church” are found in JP 1, 582 / II A 269 and JP 5, 5089 / I A 60. 
All references to Kierkegaard’s journals first give numbers in Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers 
followed by numbers in Søren Kierkegaards Papirer. 
2 Kierkegaard's trips to Berlin took place in 1841, 1843, 1845, and 1846. See Julia Watkins, 
Kierkegaard (London and New York: Continuum, 1997), 13, n. 39.  
3 See JP 2, 2096 / XI1 A 268, 277; JP 6, 6170 / IX A 74.  
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traveler is presented with new ways of understanding and new ways of 
seeing old problems. Previously unnoticed assumptions and concerns are 
often thrown into stark relief simply because the newly entered culture 
does not make them or have them. Or perhaps the culture has contrasting 
assumptions and interests. All of this can serve to give insight not only 
into one’s own and different philosophical traditions, but also into the 
problems being pursued.4  
 
These “previously unnoticed assumptions and concerns” are the driving force of 
this project. As a convert to Eastern Orthodoxy who grew up in a Scandinavian country 
(Iceland) dominated by the kind of Evangelical Lutheranism that Kierkegaard so 
vehemently critiqued, I cannot help but be struck, both personally and professionally, 
with the myriad ways in which Kierkegaard’s primary philosophical concerns and 
methods correspond with the spirituality and theology of the Eastern Orthodox church. I 
have not made it the primary goal of my project to point out exactly why this is the case, 
though I hope I have made some contribution towards uncovering some of the 
philosophical and theological goals and biases shared between Kierkegaard and many of 
the great authors of the Eastern Church. My main concern here is to illumine 
Kierkegaard’s theology in a new light, drawing out themes and issues that may heretofore 
not have received the attention they deserve in the literature.  
A recurring theme throughout this project is the contention that Kierkegaard’s 
works form a cohesive, philosophical project, the primary aim of which is to provide a 
philosophical and spiritual alternative to two different, though deeply intertwined, strands 
in Western theology and thought. These are, on the one hand, the immense influence of 
the Enlightenment project in elevating scientific knowledge as the sine qua non of human 
knowing. The second is what Kierkegaard perceived to be fundamental issues inherent in 
                                                 
4 James Giles, Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought, (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), vii-viii. 
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core elements of orthodox Lutheranism. I will be returning to these themes repeatedly 
throughout the following chapters. 
This first chapter will largely serve as an extended introduction to the project 
ahead. I will begin by providing a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s philosophical project 
with an emphasis on his view of Christianity as a response to the dehumanizing effects of 
speculative philosophy. I will then provide a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s knowledge 
(or lack thereof) of various facets of the Western Christian tradition with an emphasis on 
Kierkegaard’s reading of patristic and medieval authors. This section will not include a 
detailed discussion of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Lutheranism (or to Luther 
specifically) as this will be dealt with in some detail in chapter two. Next, I will offer a 
brief introduction of key facets of Eastern Orthodox theology and philosophy as they 
relate to Kierkegaard’s philosophy. Finally, I give a brief overview of chapters two 
through four where I offer a comparative analysis of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin and 
salvation, his epistemology, and his philosophy of personhood.    
 
1.1 - Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Project 
Kierkegaard was without a doubt a revolutionary thinker, someone who took 
direct aim at the presuppositions and prejudices of his day and age. This applies equally 
to Kierkegaard’s religious milieu as it does to the political and philosophical status quo 
against which he contended. Kierkegaard, along with Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, 
Pessoa, and a host of other luminaries, heralded the coming of post-modernism in our 
writing and thinking by critically deconstructing the failed promises of Enlightenment 
rationality that had reached its apotheosis with the writings of Hegel. In Johannes de 
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Silentio’s Fear and Trembling, we hear Kierkegaard’s scorn for the Enlightenment ideal 
of “progress” ring out in de Silentio’s mockery of the notion of “going forward” (a 
favorite phrase of Bishop Primate H.L. Martensen5), which is juxtaposed with the 
philosophical terror and awe of Abraham’s faith. Much like Dostoyevsky’s 
“Underground Man,” Kierkegaard took great joy in kicking down the dehumanizing 
edifices of modernity, the bureaucratic insistence that we all conform to formulas and 
systems that will keep us well-fed, well-analyzed, and well-entertained but that in turn 
undermine all that is profoundly human in us.  
The comparison with Dostoyevsky (and his tortured protagonist) is apt because 
even if Kierkegaard undoubtedly prefigures the post-modern project of the 20th century 
in all its deconstructionist glory and despair, he nonetheless differs significantly from 
such later figures as Sartre, Heidegger, Deleuze, and Derrida. Kierkegaard, in railing 
against the notion of blind “progress,” was not in any sense merely a conservative or 
reactionary, nor did he want to replace one notion of progress for another. He was, rather, 
a revolutionary in the most literal sense of the word, someone who sought to go back to 
the “beginning”6 in order to better move forward, crafting a philosophy that revolved 
around the axis of the human self and that sought wisdom both ancient and new that was 
always centered on the primary tenets of the Christian faith, namely that God had become 
a human being and walked among us and that our attitude towards this event constitutes 
the philosophical paradox of the human condition.  
                                                 
5 See Alastair Hannay's introduction to Fear and Trembling (hereafter F&T), 38.  
6 Prefiguring Husserl’s similar move towards seeking a ground for doing philosophy that is both 
radically new but also firmly situated in an ancient mode of knowing and being. 
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Much like Heidegger’s later clarion call that we must revisit the question of being, 
Kierkegaard saw both philosophy and religion as having lost sight of what is primary in 
our search for wisdom, namely subjectivity and inwardness. Kierkegaard’s critique of 
modernity revolves around what he, and his pseudonyms, call “speculative thinking,” an 
anemic, systematic, supposedly objective manner of looking at reality that functions in 
terms of theory, systems, and science but leaves out the lived-reality of the individual 
human person. The “detestable falsity” of modern philosophy that Kierkegaard railed 
against in Johannes Climacus was the promise that “the System” could cure what ails us, 
lift our despair, and give us happiness, contentment, and peace, simply by molding us 
into a cog in the great Wissenschaft of modernity. The falsity of this premise, of course, is 
that this molding, this assimilation of the individual into the great herd of the “they,” is 
what forms the very heart of our despair. Kierkegaard, therefore, found himself in a 
similar position to the aforementioned Johannes Climacus, whose “curious dilemma” was 
that “the books he knew did not satisfy him.”7 Climacus and Kierkegaard both found 
themselves faced with the unhappy alternatives of either being totally consumed by their 
despair or to begin to think for themselves, like Socrates had done centuries before upon 
hearing the very strange and unsettling news brought to him from the Oracle at Delphi. 
This task of thinking for oneself is encapsulated for Kierkegaard in the dictum De 
omnibus dubitandum est: Doubt everything.8     
In crafting an alternative to speculative thinking, Kierkegaard ultimately turned to 
Christianity as the primary influence for his philosophy of passionate inwardness. 
Kierkegaard had fallen away from Christianity during his student years and viewed it as 
                                                 
7 Johannes Climacus (hereafter JC), 31.  
8 Ibid., 32. 
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having been engulfed entirely in the insipid spirit of the age. In a journal entry from 1835 
Kierkegaard writes that “When I look at a goodly number of particular instances of the 
Christian life, it seems to me that Christianity, instead of pouring out strength upon 
them—yes, in fact, in contrast to paganism—such individuals are robbed of their 
manhood by Christianity and are now like the gelding compared to the stallion.”9 
Instead of correctly diagnosing and healing the spiritual malaise of the modern 
human person, namely the multitudinous neuroses, anxieties and inner despair that so 
obviously plagued the young Kierkegaard himself, Christianity seemed instead to 
exacerbate them. Yet as Kierkegaard developed as a thinker and writer, he became 
increasingly aware that the true nature of the problem was not Christianity itself but 
rather the cultural and institutional instantiation of it, the anemic nature of which had 
simply become yet another symptom of the spiritlessness of the age. In the late 1830’s 
Kierkegaard underwent a conversion experience where he returned to the faith of his 
youth.10 On July 6, 1838 Kierkegaard received communion for the first time in years and 
in August of that year he writes: “I mean to labor to achieve a far more inward relation to 
Christianity; hitherto I have fought for its truth while in a sense standing outside it.”11 A 
year later Kierkegaard writes: “Philosophy in relation to Christianity is like that of one 
who is being interrogated; face to face with his interrogator he makes up a story which 
coincides in all essential elements and yet is completely different.”12 
                                                 
9 JP 1, 417 / I A 96. 
10 Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard: A Biography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 118-
99.  
11 JP 5, 5329 / II A 232. 
12 JP 3, 3274 / II A 493.  
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Though Kierkegaard came to see Christianity as a path towards authenticity and 
spiritual healing, he nonetheless became increasingly critical of Christendom, i.e., the 
cultural manifestations of the faith, especially in relation to the Danish Evangelical 
Lutheran Church. In 1854, at the height of Kierkegaard’s vitriol against the church, he 
wrote: “Now there are Christian peoples, Christian states, Christian nations everywhere—
but Christianity understands burdens as being a millionaire, possessing or seeking to 
possess worldly goods. God in heaven, what abysmal nonsense!”13  
Kierkegaard saw this as being the great failure of Lutheranism, namely of turning 
Christianity into yet another form of “levelling” where everyone becomes a carbon copy 
of everyone else. Christianity, for Kierkegaard, had become a religion of mediocrity and 
complacency. In 1854 Kierkegaard wrote: “Luther, you do have an enormous 
responsibility, for when I look more closely I see ever more clearly that you toppled the 
Pope—and set ‘the public’ upon the throne. You altered the New Testament concept of 
‘the martyr’ and taught men to win by numbers.”14 Kierkegaard saw himself as being a 
new Luther, a reformer for the Reformation, waking Lutherans up from their dogmatic 
slumber in a similar way to the challenge Luther had put forth against a complacent 
Christianity at the Diet of Worms: “Just as Luther stepped forth with only the Bible at the 
Diet, so would I like to step forth with only the New Testament, take the simplest 
Christian maxim, and ask each individual: Have you fulfilled this even approximately—if 
not, do you then want to reform the Church?”15  
                                                 
13 JP 3, 3532 / XI1 A 19.  
14 JP 3, 2548 / XI1 A 108.  
15 JP 6, 6727 / X4 A 33.  
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Ultimately, Kierkegaard’s three-pronged attack on Christendom, enlightenment 
rationality, and the alienation of the individual in modern culture, are all deeply 
intertwined. George Pattison has pointed out that Kierkegaard’s vehement rejection of 
nineteenth century speculative theology, which was largely inspired by the philosophy of 
Hegel, was at least partly motivated by the fact that Kierkegaard understood that 
speculative theology opened up an intellectual pathway to a radical kind of atheism, one 
that had already begun to materialize in the writings of the Hegelian left.16 This was not 
simply an intellectual point of contention for Kierkegaard but a deeply existential one 
since speculative thinking and atheism ultimately find their fulfilment, according to 
Kierkegaard, in the experience of nihilism, a concern perhaps most profoundly expressed 
in The Present Age. This nihilism manifests itself most acutely in the experience of “the 
public,” not only in terms of a levelling effect where the individual must conform to 
social mores and standards (an experience that Kierkegaard worried a great deal about 
but which he did not believe to be inherently bad) but primarily in terms of the 
dispassionate speculation that Kierkegaard saw as the central tenet of the Enlightenment 
project.17 This method of speculation was not only intellectually suspect, but led to an 
inability on the part of the existing individual to passionately engage with herself, other 
people, and God. The pseudonymous authorships, with their focus on the existential 
categories of anxiety and despair, attempt to carve out the various ways in which human 
beings attempt to deal with this experience of nihilism, especially given the fact that 
                                                 
16 George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century: The Paradox and the 
Point of Contact (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 33ff.  
17 For a particularly interesting take on Kierkegaard's view on “the public” see Hubert L. Dreyfus, 
“Kierkegaard on the Internet: Anonymity versus Commitment in the Present Age,” accessed 3/19/2015, 
http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_kierkegaard.html. For a discussion of the different 
meanings of passion (Lidenskab) and passionlessness, especially in relation to the Christian notion of 
apatheia, see chapter 3, pp. 126-38. 
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religious institutions and everyday religiosity have completely failed to address the 
meaninglessness of modern existence.  
Before moving on to Kierkegaard’s understanding and appropriation of the 
Christian tradition, it is important to note that Kierkegaard’s critiques of Christendom and 
speculative philosophy are not two separate philosophical strands but rather deeply 
intertwined elements of the same critique. It is difficult to conceive of the Enlightenment 
without the influence of the Protestant Reformation.18 Along with the scientific 
revolution, the Reformation provided Descartes with both an intellectual and existential 
stimulus to develop his foundationalism. As Heidegger pointed out, Descartes provides 
an epistemological reductionism where all of reality is understood through the same 
objective, scientific methodology where the world is reduced to analyzable entities. 
Heidegger writes: “The only genuine access to [these entities] lies in knowing, intellectio, 
in the sense of the kind of the kind of knowledge we get in mathematics and physics. 
Mathematical knowledge is regarded by Descartes as the one manner of apprehending 
entities which can always give assurance that their Being has been securely grasped.”19  
Heidegger, in Being and Time, charts the development of this particular way of 
understanding reality from its inception in Greek philosophy. As Jean-Luc Marion has 
pointed out, this manner of understanding reality was already deeply infused into the 
scholastic manner of doing theology, where our understanding of God is presented as a 
sciencia and the human telos is understood as perfect cognition of God (via the beatific 
                                                 
18 See James M. Byrne, Religion and the Enlightenment: From Descartes to Kant (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), esp. 17ff.  
19 Martin Heidegger, Being and Times, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (San Francisco: 
HarperSanFrancisco, 1962), 128. 
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vision).20 Later on, the individualized sola fide of Luther, crafted as a response to the 
failures of scholastic theology and Roman Catholic practices—most notably the practice 
of indulgences—would give way to the solipsism of the Cartesian cogito. Ironically, as 
philosophers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries began to realize the existential 
implications of these developments, some looked to the philosophy of Hegel as a way to 
overcome the confusion and despair of modernity. One of these philosophers was the 
influential Danish Hegelian Johan Ludvig Heiberg whose writings would be a pivotal 
influence on the development of Kierkegaard’s thought. Heiberg, in combatting what he 
saw as the onslaught of relativism and nihilism in the modern world, viewed the 
philosophy of Hegel as the only means by which “the contemporary chaos of thought can 
be overcome.”21 
Kierkegaard, on the other hand, saw Hegel’s philosophy not as a remedy to 
nihilism but rather as its apotheosis. The Danish Hegelians believed that Hegel provided 
a way in which to make religion a central facet of the developing Wissenschaft of the 
modern world. But Kierkegaard saw this religion of the Absolute as having nothing to do 
with the faith of Abraham, and indeed believed it to be antithetical to the essential 
mystery and paradox presented in the Christian revelation of Christ’s incarnation.  
All of this is to suggest that it is no coincidence that Kierkegaard’s thought echoes 
many of the sensibilities of Eastern philosophy, whether non-Christian or Eastern-
Orthodox. Kierkegaard attempted to craft a philosophy that provided an alternative to the 
view that philosophical reflection must be inherently systematic and analytical. In 
                                                 
20 Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being (2nd ed.), trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
21 Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard’s Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 53. 
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championing paradox and absurdity—not as irrationalism but as alternative ways of 
accessing wisdom—Kierkegaard moves away from the dominant epistemology of the 
Western world and moves closer to Eastern traditions such as Buddhism and Orthodoxy. 
Both of these provide epistemological frameworks that view reducing human 
understanding to discursive reasoning with a great deal of suspicion and instead 
champion the importance of immediate, experiential, relational, and even mystical 
knowledge.   
 
1.2 - Kierkegaard’s Relations to Christianity Reconsidered 
Kierkegaard’s philosophical project is inherently religious in nature, given the 
fact that he saw Christianity as being the most powerful and truthful answer available to 
the human person to combat nihilism and despair. In this section, I discuss Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the Christian tradition, focusing on the medieval and patristic traditions 
in Christianity as well as Kierkegaard’s (admittedly limited) understanding of the Roman 
Catholic tradition. Kierkegaard’s relationship to institutionalized Christianity ranged 
between ambivalence and hostility. His understanding of Christian doctrine and tradition 
was often astoundingly idiosyncratic. Kierkegaard’s knowledge of the medieval and 
patristic traditions was lacking, at best, and his readings of important authors throughout 
Church history were often limited to a secondary literature that was colored by the 
dominant theological and philosophical prejudices of the day.  
It is nonetheless clear that one of Kierkegaard’s most formative influences was 
the writings of the Church Fathers. Kierkegaard sought spiritual comfort and solace in the 
patristic tradition and he viewed the patristic era in stark contrast with the anemic 
12 
 
Christianity of his day and age.22 That being said, Kierkegaard’s knowledge of patristic 
Christianity was often extremely limited and in some cases he misunderstood or misread 
authors from the tradition.23  
If we look at Kierkegaard’s relation to the patristic tradition, the figure of 
Augustine of Hippo immediately surfaces. Augustine was obviously a formative 
influence on the development of Kierkegaard’s thought, though it remains an open 
question to what extent Kierkegaard familiarized himself with Augustine’s works and to 
what extent these were only disseminated to him via Luther. In chapter two I will analyze 
in detail Kierkegaard’s relation to the Augustinian heritage in Lutheranism and the way 
in which Kierkegaard sought to develop an account of sin that was diametrically opposed 
to the standard Augustinian/Lutheran account. Though Kierkegaard obviously admired 
Augustine a great deal and was, both knowingly and unknowingly, mired in a Christian 
milieu that was inherently Augustinian, he directed several scathing remarks at 
Augustine, going so far as to say that Augustine had done “incalculable harm” to the 
Christian tradition.24 
Kierkegaard was somewhat familiar with the writings of John Chrysostom, the 
fourth century bishop of Constantinople and a formative figure in the development of 
Eastern Orthodox theology,25 primarily through the Johann Neander’s monograph Der 
                                                 
22 JP 1, 583 / II A 750; JP 4, 3830 / X4 A 119. 
23 The Danish theological curriculum of Kierkegaard's time provided only a very limited introduction 
to patristic writings. See Marie Mikulová Thulstrup, “The Role of Asceticism,” in The Sources and Depths 
of Faith in Kierkegaard, ed. Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mikulová Thulstrup (Copenhagen: C.A. Reitzel, 
1978), 154. 
24JP 1, 191 / XI1 A 436. See, Robert Puchniak, “Augustine: Kierkegaard's Tempered Admiration of 
Augustine,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, 
Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 
11-16. 
25 Chrysostom's influence extended throughout all of Christendom. According to John McGuckin, 
Chrysostom's liturgy is the standard rite of the Eastern Orthodox Church and his writings on justice and 
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heilige Johannes Chrysostomus.26 Kierkegaard’s twenty two references to Chrysostom in 
his journals are all rather brief and touch on a variety of issues, including ecclesiology, 
asceticism, and soteriology.27 Kierkegaard’s emphasis on poverty in Training in 
Christianity and Works of Love may have been influenced by Chrysostom’s writings on 
justice and almsgiving, though he makes no explicit mention of the bishop in this context.  
Kierkegaard was influenced by Cyprian of Carthage’s writings on martyrdom.28 
Of special interest is a reference to Cyprian in Kierkegaard’s journals where he relates the 
importance of martyrdom to the Eucharist. Referring to the ongoing debate about 
reception of the sacraments sub utraque specie, Kierkegaard calls the conflict “nonsense” 
and claims that “the covenant has more and more been forgotten.” He goes on to say: 
“How simply Cyprian solved the whole difficulty involved in the question as to whether 
or not the cup should be withheld from the laity by answering: If they are required to 
shed their blood for Christ’s sake, we dare not deny them Christ’s blood.”29 This passage 
shows that Kierkegaard viewed the sacraments as having an important significance in the 
Christian life. It also illustrates Kierkegaard’s penchant for viewing patristic authors as 
boiling Christianity down to its essentials while the medieval and modern worlds become 
mired in abstract debates about theology and dogma.30 
                                                 
almsgiving had a great influence on Western Christianity. See John McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook 
to Patristic Theology (Lousiville & London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 190.   
26 Leo Stan, “Chrysostom: Between the Hermitage and the City,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic 
and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon 
Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 53. 
27 Ibid., pp. 52-63. 
28 Jack Mulder Jr., “Cyprian of Carthage: Kierkegaard, Cyprian, and the 'urgent needs of the times,'” 
in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and 
Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 67-94. 
29 JP 2, 1924 / XI1 A 4. 
30 Which is not to say that Kierkegaard was not aware of the logical and theological complexity of 
patristic writings. Nonetheless, he saw the patristic theology as growing out of lived experience and an 
emphasis on the shocking reality of Christian life, e.g. JP 2, 1816 / XI2 A 77. 
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 Kierkegaard’s knowledge of Gregory of Nyssa and Basil of Caesarea was even 
more limited.31 Joseph Ballan notes that Kierkegaard’s only journal entry on Gregory is 
preceded by a lengthy diatribe against Martin Luther, indicating that “Kierkegaard’s 
study of the theologians of late antiquity was motivated in part by a dissatisfaction with 
Reformation Christianity and the accompanying desire for a theology that remained true 
to the experience of the early Church.”32 That being said, Kierkegaard was equally 
critical of writers from the patristic era as he was of his contemporaries and medieval 
authors. Kierkegaard’s “enthusiasm for some of the statements of Gregory and Basil is 
tempered by the recognition of the significance of Constantine’s conversion to 
Christianity and of the deleterious outcomes of this event for church life and theology.”33 
Kierkegaard similarly did not own any texts by Irenaeus of Lyons and, according 
to Cappelørn, likely never read any of the original texts.34 Nonetheless, Kierkegaard was 
likely influenced by Irenaeus’ theology via the writings of Johannes Adam Möhler and 
the preaching and writing of N.F.S. Grundtvig. In fact, Cappelørn argues that 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin and his critique of the Augustinian/Lutheran notion of 
original sin, is greatly influenced by Grundtvig whose soteriology was in turn influenced 
by Irenaeus.35 Irenaeus’ arguments against the influence of Gnosticism were aimed at 
preserving the inherent goodness of created being and especially that of the human 
                                                 
31 Joseph Ballan, “Gregory of Nyssa: Locating the Cappadocian Father,” in Kierkegaard and the 
Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. 
Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 95-102. See esp. 99, n. 23. 
Kierkegaard didn't own (nor was he likely to have ever read) any original works by either Basil or Gregory 
and the presentation of them provided by the secondary works at Kierkegaard's disposal is either severely 
lacking or astoundingly misleading. 
32 Ibid., 97. 
33 Ibid.  
34, Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, ”Gudbilledlighed og syndefald: Aspekter af Grundtvigs of Kierkegaards 
menneskesyn på baggrund of Irenæus,” Grundtvig-Studier (2004): 134-78. 
35 Ibid.  
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person, even in spite of the debilitating effects of the fall. Irenaeus’ attempt at addressing 
the tension between the imago dei and the Fall was done by making a distinction between 
the image and likeness of God in the human person (the imago dei and the similitudo dei) 
and by presenting a developmental anthropology instead of the more static notion of 
absolute corruption that became the prevalent view in post-Reformation Christianity. As I 
will argue in chapter 2, Kierkegaard develops a soteriology that in many ways resembles 
the developmental view of the human person found in patristic writers such as Irenaeus.36  
Moving to the medieval era, we see that Kierkegaard’s relationship with Roman 
Catholic Christianity is decidedly complex. Kierkegaard vehemently denied the 
rationalistic account of nature and essence that forms such a crucial aspect of scholastic 
theology.37 Even though some scholars have suggested that Kierkegaard’s increasingly 
vitriolic attacks against Lutheranism suggested that he might eventually have converted 
to Roman Catholicism had he not died at such a young age,38 this seems unlikely at best 
given his repeated and varied attacks against the Roman Church. Kierkegaard nonetheless 
harbored an obvious fascination and admiration for the ascetical (and perhaps even 
liturgical) practices of Catholicism.39  
                                                 
36 See chapter 2, pp. 69-92. 
37 See Jack Mulder Jr., Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition: Conflict and Dialogue (Bloomington, 
IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 224.   
38 For an influential example see, Erich Przywara, Das Geheimnis Kierkegaards (Munich & Berlin: R. 
Oldenbourg, 1929), 74-113. For a staunch (if somewhat improbable) defense of Kierkegaard's allegiance to 
Evangelical Lutheranism, see David R. Law, “Cheap Grace and the Cost of Discipleship in Kierkegaard's 
'For Self Examination',” in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! (International Kierkegaard 
Commentary Series, Vol. 21), ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2002), 133ff.  
39 Climacus is undoubtedly the pseudonym that best conveys Kierkegaard's conflicting views on not 
only Catholicism per se, but also specific Catholic (and Orthodox) practices and rites such as fasting, 
monasticism, and confession. See Concluding Unscientific Poscript (hereafter CUP), 199, 542, and 547 for 
examples.  
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In his notes on Erdmann’s lectures, Kierkegaard makes a direct connection 
between dogmatism and religious nihilism, as well as lambasting the inherent dangers of 
scholasticism due to its identification of the truth as the “opposite of the I,” i.e., as the 
purely abstract.40 Kierkegaard’s ambivalent reading of such figures as Anselm and 
Aquinas shows that he sometimes made a direct connection between scholastic theology 
and later developments in speculative thinking. Kierkegaard praised Anselm’s “credo ut 
intelligam” as focusing on the primacy of belief but heavily criticized the notion that faith 
must find its fulfilment in intellection.41 Climacus attacks the ontological argument 
(albeit a conflation of Anselm’s, Descartes’, and Spinoza’s variants) in both 
Philosophical Fragments and the Postscript.42 In his later journal entries, Kierkegaard 
praised Anselm’s passionate religious life and the fact that his speculative works, 
including the ontological argument, arose from experiences of asceticism and prayer.43 
Kierkegaard saw subsequent abstract theology as being “Anselmian” in many ways but 
distinct from Anselm himself, insofar as it lacked Anselm’s religious piety and passion 
while retaining the abstract and speculative character of his theology.44  
Kierkegaard’s reading of Aquinas further influenced his negative views of the 
Roman Catholic tradition as a whole and scholastic theology specifically. To say that 
Kierkegaard “read” Aquinas is perhaps a bit generous given the fact that “Kierkegaard 
did not own any of Aquinas’ books, most certainly he did not read any of them, and it is 
                                                 
40 JP 5, 5272 / II C 40 November, 1837.  
41 H.L. Martensen was, indeed, heavily influenced by Anselm, especially in Den christelige 
Dogmatik. See Lee C. Barrett, “Anselm of Canterbury: The Ambivalent Legacy of Faith Seeking 
Understanding,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: 
Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: 
Ashgate, 2008), 167-82. 
42 Philosophical Fragments (hereafter Fragments), 39-43; CUP, 333-35.  
43 JP 1, 20 / X5 A 120; JP 3, 3615 / X4 A 210. 
44 Barrett, 176. 
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quite possible that he did not know what one of them looked like.”45 Aquinas served as 
the ultimate straw-man in Danish 19th century theological circles, a view that can at least 
be partly attributed to Luther’s rabid critiques of Aquinas.46 Even though Kierkegaard’s 
studies of Luther himself were famously limited, his view of Aquinas must undoubtedly 
have been influenced by Luther’s association of Thomas himself and scholasticism with 
the spiritual failures of Roman Catholicism.47 In all of Kierkegaard’s writings there are 
only six direct references to Aquinas, bearing precious little information about 
Kierkegaard’s views on the Doctor Angelicus.48 It is not clear that Kierkegaard made a 
similar distinction between the monastic life and abstract theology of Aquinas as he did 
with Anselm.49 This may be due to the fact that, Luther aside, Kierkegaard’s primary 
exposure to Aquinas’ thought was via Martensen, who was himself critical of Aquinas 
but who was nonetheless obviously inspired by him in many ways and presented Aquinas 
as “a kind of Hegelian.”50 Kierkegaard may therefore have primarily viewed Aquinas, 
and scholastic theology as a whole, as a precursor to Hegelian speculative thought, given 
his limited exposure to original works by scholastic authors.  
                                                 
45 Benjamín Olivares Bøgeskov, “Thomas Aquinas: Kierkegaard's View Based on Scattered and 
Uncertain Sources,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: 
Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: 
Ashgate, 2008), 183.  
46 Luther viewed Aquinas as “The source and foundation of all heresy, error and obliteration of the 
Gospel.” See “…Thomas von Aquin, der born und grudsuppe aller ketzerei, iirthum und vertilgung des 
Evangelii…,” in Widder den newen Abgott (1524), Bøgeskov, 188, n. 23.   
47 Bøgeskov, 188-89.  
48 Ibid., 190. It is interesting to note that one of these references is to Aquinas' (supposed) view of 
indulgences, which Kierkegaard relates directly to (what he perceives as) Roman Catholic teachings on the 
sacrament of communion: “What was it with which the greatest thinker in the Middle Ages, Thomas 
Aquinas, used to defend 'indulgence'? It was the doctrine of the Church as a mystical body in which we all, 
as in a parlor game, participate in the Church's fideicommissum.”  
This is a particularly striking example of Kierkegaard's (willful?) misunderstanding of sacramental 
realism, i.e. associating the Eucharist in Roman Catholic theology with the institutionalism of the tradition. 
See JP 2, 1906 / X4 A 369; Bøgeskov, 200ff.  
49 Bøgeskov, 202.  
50 Ibid.  
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Kierkegaard’s attitude towards scholasticism and the “medieval” period of 
Christianity (a term that Kierkegaard often uses to refer to the Catholic Church, 
especially in relation to practices such as monasticism) is also represented by his reading 
of Peter Abelard, one of the most influential of the scholastic theologians. Kierkegaard 
owned Abelard’s Dialogus inter philosophu, judaeum et christianum, and even though he 
does not extensively discuss Abelard’s philosophy, he mentions Abelard several times in 
his journals.51 Similar to his views on Anselm, Kierkegaard disagreed with the objective 
nature of Abelard’s scholastic theology but admired the existential and spiritual aspects 
of Abelard as a person.52 Kierkegaard undoubtedly sympathized with Abelard’s plight 
since Abelard was forced to choose between his duty to the Church and his love for his 
pupil Heloise.53 
Kierkegaard’s reading of the Christian tradition—whether patristic, 
medieval/scholastic, or modern—is always grounded in this emphasis on the existential 
and subjectively lived-experience of Christianity rather than offering an abstract, 
systematic treatise of theology. All of Kierkegaard’s writings can be seen as an attack on 
any attempt to reduce Christianity to a theory or system, i.e., anything that might 
undermine its status as an existential communication (Existents-Meddelelse). Even 
though Kierkegaard was undoubtedly motivated by the intellectual debates of 19th 
century Denmark,54 his philosophical aim was much broader. Kierkegaard not only wrote 
on theological issues that were being debated around Europe but focused on issues that he 
                                                 
51 István Czakó, “Abelard: Kierkegaard's Reflections on the Unhappy Love of a Scholastic 
Dialectician,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, 
Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 
145-65. 
52 JP 5, 5609 / IV A 31.  
53 Czakó, 157; JP 5, 5703 / IV A 177. 
54 See Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel Reconsidered.  
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saw as being of universal concern, primarily sin and salvation, and how these issues had 
been shaped throughout the history of the Christian tradition.55  
The scholastic tradition largely influenced Kierkegaard in a negative fashion 
insofar as it motivated (at least in Kierkegaard’s eyes) the development of speculative 
thought. Objective (systematic, abstract) theology inspired the more reactionary elements 
of his writing and led Kierkegaard to craft an alternative vision of Christianity, one 
grounded in passionate inwardness. A more direct and positive influence on Kierkegaard 
were the writings of medieval mystics and the representatives of the Pietist tradition. In 
fact, these two strands of Christian thought were deeply interrelated for Kierkegaard 
given the influence of the mystical tradition on Pietist authors such as Johann Arndt.56 A 
particularly formative influence was the writings of Johannes Tauler,57 a Dominican 
preacher who not only influenced Arndt but also Luther himself.58 Kierkegaard 
extensively read Arndt’s True Christianity, large portions of which are a presentation of 
Taulerian theology.59 Kierkegaard viewed Arndt’s work as one of his most “treasured 
devotional readings.”60 Philipp Jakob Spener, the “Father of Pietism,” was also greatly 
                                                 
55 See Noel Adams, “Søren Kierkegaard and Carl Ullmann: Two Allies in the War Against 
Speculative Philosophy,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18, no. 5 (2010): 875-98, for an 
overview of Kierkegaard's engagement with debates outside of Denmark (especially in Germany) and the 
influence of Carl Ullmann on his thought. Adams argues that even though Kierkegaard's engagement with 
Danish Hegelians (especially Martensen) is a crucial component of his philosophical output these debates 
are not the sine qua non of Kierkegaard's philosophy. 
56 Peter Sajda, “Tauler. A Teacher in Spiritual Dietethics: Kierkegaard's Reception of Johannes 
Tauler,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, 
Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate, 2008), 
265-76.  
57 It should be noted that among these Kierkegaard counted the anonymous The Imitation of the Poor 
Life of Jesus, later proved to have not been authored by Tauler, as well as the hugely influential and 
mystagogic Theologia Deutsch. Though Kierkegaard did not believe that Tauler had written Theologia 
Deutsch, the Lutheran tradition at the time associated the work heavily with Tauler and the later Taulerian 
mystical tradition. See Sajda, 267.  
58 Sajda, 268-9.  
59 Sajda, 270; ASKB, 267-77. 
60 George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Theology of the Nineteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 114.  
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influenced by Tauler.61 Carl Ullmann, a formative influence on central themes in 
Kierkegaard’s works,62 commented in his works on the importance of Tauler’s theology 
for both Spener and Luther. Ullmann presented representatives of mysticism as 
prefiguring the Reformation, insofar as they went against the grain of institutionalism and 
bureaucracy in favor of a lived, inwardly passionate Christianity.63 Kierkegaard also read 
Carriere’s The World-View of the Reformation Period, a book that included extensive 
discussion of mysticism, including analyses of Campanella, Bruno, Tauler, and extensive 
quotations from Theologica Deutsch.64 Kierkegaard was also influenced by Georg 
Friedrich Böhringer’s The Church of Christ and its Witnesses as well as Wilhelm 
Gottlieb Tennemann’s History of Philosophy, both of which discussed mysticism.65 The 
latter undoubtedly influenced Kierkegaard’s developing critique of speculative thinking 
as it offers a view of mysticism as “an antipode to the Scholastics.”66 
The rediscovery of the theology of Meister Eckhart in the nineteenth century 
undoubtedly influenced Kierkegaard, as it did all religious scholars of the time, though 
perhaps in a rather negative fashion given the immense influence Eckhartian theology 
had on the development of Hegelian speculative theology.67 Peter Sajda has argued that 
                                                 
61 Sajda, 271. 
62 Among these were Kierkegaard's philosophy of self and meditations on personality (Personlighed) 
and his development of the transcendence-immanence relationship. See Adams, 881ff. 
63 Ullmann discusses Ruysbroeck, Eckhart, and Tauler in Reformatoren vor der Reformation, 
vornehmlich in Deutschland und den Niederlanden, accessed 3/31/2015, 
https://ia600502.us.archive.org/2/items/reformatorenvor01ullmgoog/reformatorenvor01ullmgoog.pdf.  
See Sajda, 274. 
64 Sajda, 274. The relevant excerpts from Kierkegaard's journals are in JP 3, 3012 / VIII1 A 69; JP 4, 
4598 / VIII1 A 117; JP 3, 3312 / VIII1 A 166; JP 3, 3048 / VIII1 A 118. 
65 Sajda, 275.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Peter Sajda, “Meister Eckhart: The Patriarch of German Speculation who was a Lebemeister: 
Meister Ekhart’s Silent Way into Kierkegaard’s Corpus,” in Kierkegaard and the Patristic and Medieval 
Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington, 
VT & Hamsphire, England: Ashgate 2008), 241-42.   
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Kierkegaard differentiated between the contemplative, “abstract” mysticism of Eckhart 
and the more “edifying” and praxis-oriented mysticism of figures like Tauler.68 Eckhart’s 
positive influence on Kierkegaard would have been received via Arndt and the (pseudo-) 
Taulerian literature that was popular in Denmark at the time. This may have included 
Ekchart’s emphasis on the importance of suffering and kenosis in the spiritual life.69 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy is, in many ways, profoundly apophatic in nature.70 
This is in many ways attributable to the influence of mysticism on his thought. As I will 
argue, the apophatic characteristics of Kierkegaard’s philosophy place him in close 
correlation with the Eastern Orthodox tradition in numerous ways.  
Kierkegaard’s views on the three eras of Christianity under discussion here, 
patristic, medieval, and contemporary (19th century Danish Lutheranism) is laid out in 
his work Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard obviously favors the patristic era for its 
existential focus on imitating Christ in word, deed, and thought, though Kierkegaard is 
also critical of developments in the tradition that would later lead to the kinds of 
corruptions he decried in the Medieval and contemporary eras. Kierkegaard primarily 
criticized the Medieval era for its “exaggeration” of works and its notion that merit could 
play a soteriological role. It was this exaggeration that Luther attempted to rectify with 
his emphasis on Sola Fide, but in doing so he inadvertently created a new doctrine, one 
even more anemic and divorced from true Christianity than the “monastic-ascetic” 
                                                 
68 Ibid., 246-47. Sajda also argues that Kierkegaard's later interest in asceticism was divorced from 
any interest in mysticism. In chapters three and four, I will argue that Kierkegaard's interest in mysticism 
was formative for his epistemology, which in turn was formative for his philosophy of the person 
(including his views on the importance of asceticism). See Sajda, 251, n. 86.  
69 Ibid., 250. 
70 See Simon D. Podmore, Kierkegaard and the Self Before God (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington: 2011), xiv.  
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Christianity of the patristic and medieval eras.71 The result was the most watered-down 
version of Christian life possible, namely the “professorial-scholarly Christianity” of the 
speculative philosophers.72 
In describing the commitment of the early Christians, Kierkegaard tells us that 
they differ from the later manifestations of Christendom insofar as they were able to 
venture something in their conversion. Christianity, at its purest, represents a passionate 
inwardness of supreme vulnerability where the human being can stand completely naked 
before God in full authenticity. Christ does not deliver a doctrine, a teaching, or a 
philosophy, according to Kierkegaard, but rather provides the “place” (Bestedelse or 
Topos) where inner conversion can manifest itself.73 As Kierkegaard makes clear, this 
conversion experience is achieved in the moment of absolute authenticity (“sobriety”), 
which can only be realized in and through a radical kind of self-emptying: “To become 
sober is: to come to oneself in self-knowledge and before God as nothing before him, yet 
infinitely, unconditionally engaged.”74 The venturing needed for this kind of self-
knowledge consists of “relinquishing probability,” letting go of our scheming, our 
cunning, our plans, our ego. In short, it is to venture reason, to crucify it, and let it be 
resurrected as a new way of knowing and seeing, one grounded in faith rather than 
doctrine or speculation.75 This is what the early Christians were able to do, according to 
                                                 
71 Judge For Yourself! (hereafter JFYS), 194-209. 
72 Ibid., 195. 
73 Ibid., 191.  
74 Ibid., 104.  
75 The Hongs’ translation of the Danish vovet as “venture” is not without its merit but requires some 
explanation. In JFYS, p. 191 Kierkegaard writes: “Naar du nemlig har vovet den afgjørende Handling, saa 
Du bliver ueensartet med denne Verdens Liv, ikke kan have Dit Liv deri, støder sammen dermed.” The 
Hongs’ translation reads: “When you have ventured the decisive act, you become heterogeneous with the 
life of this world, cannot have your life in it, come into collision with it.” 
 Vovet is most literally translated as “dare.” It is most commonly used as an adjective when describing 
someone as “daring.” Kierkegaard’s point is that true Christianity flies in the face of many of the primary 
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Kierkegaard, and this is what we have been losing, more and more, as we grow ever more 
confident in our abilities to master our surroundings and ourselves.  
  
1.3 - Would the Real Kierkegaard Please Stand Up: Reception and Interpretation of    
Kierkegaard 
Any interpretation or analysis of Kierkegaard’s philosophy is an incredibly 
complex undertaking. There is, first of all, the issue of the extent to which Kierkegaard’s 
writings can be viewed as a cohesive whole. The pseudonymous voices repeatedly 
contradict each other and Kierkegaard’s method of indirect communication raises 
numerous hermeneutical difficulties. Kierkegaard nonetheless clearly stated that there 
was a “total structure” (Total-Anlæg) to his writings.76 Gregor Malantschuk, writing on 
the Kierkegaardian corpus, has argued that there is a “unity pervading all these studies, 
binding together the several parts and pointing toward the recognition of man’s inner 
                                                 
drives and instincts that guide human behavior, namely self-preservation and the search for self-satisfaction 
and pleasure. The Christian must ultimately lay everything on the line, including his own life, for Christ. 
Life, from the Christian perspective, is viewed as the ultimate gamble, the ultimate “all in” where we risk 
everything for the sake of the eternal telos. The Hong’s translation of Vovet as “venture” has the advantage 
of having a certain kind of connotation with a gamble or a risky endeavor. The English word “daring” 
doesn’t quite convey the fullness of the risk that Kierkegaard wants to convey. The whole point of the 
Christian life, for Kierkegaard, is that one either wins everything (eternal happiness) or loses everything 
(eternal pain).  
Kierkegaard’s use of Vovet in the context of “venturing” reason is particularly interesting, especially 
when considered in light of the analogy with gambling. Throughout Judge for Yourself!, as well as in the 
Climacian writings, reason is often portrayed as the most difficult thing that needs to be given up in the 
name of the Christian life. Kierkegaard seems to believe that it is reason, the demand for things to make 
sense in a particular way, that keeps us from devoting our lives to true Christianity. But this does not mean 
that we abandon all thinking, nor does it indicate that Kierkegaard is advocating for some kind of 
irrationalism or fundamentalism. Rather, reason, like everything else in human life, is ventured so that it 
can be reclaimed, reborn, and resurrected. The epistemological analysis of Kierkegaard’s writings in 
chapter 3 of this project is largely devoted to the implications of what it means to “venture” reason.   
76 JP 6, 6511 / X2 A 106. It is worth noting here the important difference between the Danish words 
Anlæg and System. Anlæg can mean “talent,” “structure,” “order,” or even “propensity.” Kierkegaard does 
not have a Total-System, a closed, fixed, rigid model of understanding, but rather a more fluid and open 
method of inquiry that nonetheless is not just a random assortment of texts and points of views.  
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actuality through introspection and all the existential possibilities it contains.”77 In his 
book Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet, Louis Mackey argues that the seemingly fragmented 
viewpoints of the pseudonyms mask a unified philosophy and that they do not point to 
contradictions in Kierkegaard’s own thought: “A Kierkegaardian pseudonym is a 
persona, an imaginary person created by the author for artistic purposes, not a nom de 
plume.”78 Mackey goes on to write that: “There is some truth to be found in the mouth of 
each of the pseudonyms. In a sense the whole truth, as Kierkegaard understood it, is 
found in each of the works. But it is seen in each from a different point of view, and for 
that reason is not truth simply, but truth plus the distortion of partiality.”79 
Even if Kierkegaard’s philosophy is, indeed, a unified “project,” the thorny issue 
nonetheless remains of how we are to interpret the intention of the project. As previously 
mentioned, Kierkegaard’s reception in the philosophical and theological worlds has been 
astoundingly varied. Kierkegaard’s fragmented reception in the United States is 
indicative of the multifaceted nature of Kierkegaard scholarship in the last century and a 
half. Kierkegaard’s philosophy was initially introduced to American academia through 
Scandinavian immigrants and Lutheran seminaries.80 Walter Lowrie and Charles 
Williams presented Kierkegaard in the early 20th century as a fundamentally Christian 
thinker who was to be understood in and through his (often contentious) relation to 
Lutheran orthodoxy.81 Both the champions and critics of existentialism in the United 
States were influenced by Kierkegaard and in turn influenced his reception in American 
                                                 
77 Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Thought, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 11.  
78 Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A Kind of Poet (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1971), 247. 
79 Ibid., 261. 
80 Barrett, 230.  
81 Ibid. and Walter Lowry, Kierkegaard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938).  
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academia in the 1950’s and 60’s.82 Concurrent with and following these interpretive 
strands was a school of thought that identified Kierkegaard with the neo-orthodoxy of 
Barth and Brunner,83 perhaps most significantly via the works of Niebuhr and Tillich.84 
Lee C. Barrett has outlined how the neo-orthodox reception of Kierkegaard came to 
influence the important role Kierkegaard’s philosophy played in the development of 
certain strands of evangelical thinking.85 Early evangelical thinkers such as Edward John 
Carnell and later, post-conservative writers such as Stanley James Grenz championed 
Kierkegaard’s fideism and anti-rationalism.86 In addition to these religiously-inspired 
interpretive approaches to Kierkegaard’s works in the U.S. there are also the myriad 
thinkers from literary theory, theology, deconstructionism, and social and political 
philosophy who all seemingly aim at finding the interpretive key to unlocking the 
mysteries of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  
Kierkegaard’s reception in the Orthodox world was similarly varied. Though it 
falls outside the scope of this study to fully analyze Kierkegaardian scholarship 
throughout Eastern Europe, the Russian reception of Kierkegaard bears mention and 
some scrutiny. Kierkegaard was introduced to Russian intelligentsia as early as the late 
nineteenth century.87 Peter Emmanuel Hansen, a Dane who emigrated to Russia, 
introduced Kierkegaard’s writings to literary and academic figures such as Leo Tolstoy.88 
                                                 
82 Barrett, 231-32.  
83 Ibid., 233. 
84 Ibid., 234. See, Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Prentice Hall, 1941) 
and Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be (London and Glasgow: The Fontana Library, 1962). 
85 Barrett, 235.  
86 Ibid.  
87 Darya Loungina, “Russia: Kierkegaard's Reception through Tsarism, Communism, and Liberation,” 
in Kierkegaard's International Reception: Tome II: Southern, Central and Eastern Europe (Kierkegaard 
Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 8), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington and Farnham: Ashgate, 
2009), 247.  
88 Ibid.  
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Karl Friedrich Tiander wrote one of the first academic treatises on Kierkegaard and was 
the first to compare Kierkegaard to Dostoyevsky, a common trend in the Russian 
scholarship.89 The 1909 edition of The Orthodox Encyclopedia of Theology included a 
reference to Kierkegaard and specifically praised his devotion to asceticism, a feature of 
Christian spiritual life that the Eastern Church believed had fallen out of favor in the 
Christian West.90 After the revolution, Kierkegaard scholarship was greatly influenced by 
the writings of Lev Shestov who learned about Kierkegaard from Martin Buber and 
Edmund Husserl.91 Shestov, who emigrated to Paris, taught courses on Dostoyevsky and 
Kierkegaard as early as the 1930’s.92 His influential work Kierkegaard and the 
Existential Philosophy was not widely available until after Stalinism, due to Shestov’s 
outspoken hatred of Bolshevism. Post-perestroika writers such as Sergey Isayev and  
Aleksandrovich Podoroga later offered new translations and interpretations of 
Kierkegaard’s works.93  
Shestov’s deeply fascinating, though problematic, work Kierkegaard and the 
Existential Philosophy offers intriguing insights into Kierkegaard’s reception in the 
Orthodox world. Shestov saw Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky as sharing the exact same 
philosophical goal, namely to argue against the supremacy of gnosis over salvation, a 
trend that begins with Greek philosophy and extends throughout history to reach a 
frightening and possibly nihilistic apotheosis in the writings of Hegel.94 Shestov wrote 
                                                 
89 Ibid., 253. 
90 Ibid., 255. 
91 Ibid., 257ff. 
92 Ibid., 258. 
93 Ibid., 271-72. 
94 Lev Shestov, Kierkegaard and the Existential Philosophy, trans. Elinor Hewitt (Athens, OH: Ohio 
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that: “Both Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard (the first without realizing it, the second fully 
aware of it) saw their life work as a struggle with, and victory over, that system of ideas 
embodied in Hegelian philosophy.”95 Shestov saw both thinkers as developing an 
epistemology and soteriology that is focused on the debilitating effects of original sin. 
The path of knowledge, rationality, and systematic thought will inevitably lead human 
beings to ruin. Both Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard, Shestov claimed, saw discursive 
reasoning, especially in its manifestation as science and technology, as an attempt to 
overcome (or ignore) the effects of the Fall, an attempt that was bound to not only fail but 
to further entangle human beings in the effects of sin. Kierkegaard, Shestov said, 
“perceived that the beginning of philosophy is not wonder, as the Greeks taught, but 
despair.”96 Ignoring the existential categories of anxiety and despair, which is what 
speculation and systematic thinking attempt to do, makes us fall deeper into despair, 
creating a vicious cycle that results in perdition. Only faith, what Kierkegaard terms the 
“absurd,” allows us to break free of the closed circle of reasoning.97 Shestov claimed that 
both Dostoyevsky and Kierkegaard saw faith not as irrational but rather as supra-rational, 
a way of transcending the limits of dianoetic reasoning and to enter into a new way of 
seeing and knowing. Shestov wrote that for Kierkegaard “faith is not reliance on what has 
been told us, what we have heard, what we have been taught. Faith is a new dimension of 
thought, unknown and foreign to speculative philosophy, which opens the way to the 
Creator of all earthly things, to the source of all possibilities, to the One for Whom there 
are no boundaries between the possible and the impossible.”98  
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Shestov’s comparative approach where Kierkegaard’s philosophy is juxtaposed 
with Dostoyevsky—and, by extension, the Eastern Orthodox tradition—offers many 
fascinating insights into Kierkegaard’s works, some of which have not received a great 
deal of attention in Kierkegaard studies in the West. This is not to suggest that the “real” 
Kierkegaard was a pseudo-Orthodox thinker but rather to show that certain aspects of his 
philosophy that have heretofore received scant attention are brought into stark contrast 
when viewed through the lens of Eastern Orthodox teachings. The reasons for this are 
varied, though they all undoubtedly lead back to the fact that Kierkegaard saw himself as 
a new Luther, a revolutionary who wanted to break free from the prejudices and failings 
of Western Christendom. In doing so he unwittingly tapped into ways of thinking about 
the human person which are profoundly Eastern in nature. If Western-European and 
North-American post-industrial cultures have any defining characteristic in common, it is 
undoubtedly the deification of Enlightenment rationality. Technology, industry, 
capitalism, and science are the offspring of the speculative philosophical tradition that 
Kierkegaard so vehemently railed against and they took a much firmer foothold in the 
Western world than they did in the East. 
Which brings us back to Shestov; even though the stereotypical image of “the 
West” as being the locus of technology and science and “the East” as representing 
contemplation and mysticism has more to do with European and North-American 
colonialism than it has to do with any kind of spiritual propensity, it is nonetheless true 
that the effects of the Enlightenment, both its beauty and its horrors, were much more 
profoundly felt in the West and more heavily resisted in the East, at least initially. 
Dostoyevsky is one of the most powerful symbols of this resistance. He, along with 
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writers such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche in the West, prophetically foresaw the 
dehumanizing implications of a world where human beings are reduced to a cog in a 
speculative system. “What is man without desires, without will, and without wantings, if 
not a spring in an organ barrel?” rails Dostoyevsky’s Underground Man.99 Like 
Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky did not see reason (or science or technology) as inherently evil 
but rather pointed to the inherent limitations of reducing our perception of reality to that 
which can be systematized, analyzed, manufactured, and manipulated. “You see: reason, 
gentlemen, is a fine thing, that is unquestionable, but reason is only reason and satisfies 
only man’s reasoning capacity, while wanting is a manifestation of the whole of life—
that is, the whole of human life, including reason and various little itches.”100  
It is the “little itches,” the despair, the desire, the confusion, the brokenness, that 
Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky wanted to preserve, to safeguard the human (all too 
human) from the mechanistic philosophies of modernity. As I will show, the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition manifests a spirituality that is very much in accord with this vision. 
The surprising parallels between Kierkegaard’s thought and the Eastern Orthodox 
tradition reveal the revolutionary character of his work. The various interpretations of 
Kierkegaard that are grounded in Western philosophy and religion have often failed to 
see just how far removed from the intellectual tradition of the West he really is. Shestov 
was fundamentally right when he situated Kierkegaard alongside Dostoyevsky. 
Kierkegaard is in significant ways much closer in spirit and thought to an Eastern 
Orthodox thinker such as Dostoyevsky than he is to Western existentialism, post-
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structuralism, deconstructionism, or even perhaps to orthodox Protestantism and Roman 
Catholicism. The goal of this project is to outline the ways in which Kierkegaard’s 
thought echoes these Eastern sensibilities in an attempt to throw into sharp relief 
elements of his thought that heretofore have not received much attention in the literature.  
 
1.4 - The Orthodox Church 
In the introduction to his book The Orthodox Church John McGuckin writes that: 
“The temptation to categorize the Eastern Orthodox as romantically exotic is a powerful 
one.”101 There is, indeed, a great deal of confusion and mystification surrounding 
Orthodox practices and theology and a short introduction to the tradition is therefore in 
order.  
The Orthodox Church, much like the Roman Catholic, views itself as the one, 
holy, catholic, and apostolic Church of Christ. The teachings and theology of the church 
are grounded in worship, the seven ecumenical councils,102 apostolic succession, and the 
writings of the Fathers and Mothers of the Church.103 Much like the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Eastern Orthodox Church sees itself as representing a holy tradition, a 
spiritual lineage that begins with the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost.  
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31 
 
Tension between the Latin and Greek churches grew between the eighth and the 
eleventh centuries, for a variety of theological and political reasons, culminating in the 
great schism of 1054. The ensuing isolation of the Christian East further separated the 
Latin and Greek churches, especially after the fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman 
Turkish empire in 1453.104 Russia quickly took over as the cultural and political center of 
the Orthodox world following the decline of the Byzantine Empire.105  
The Orthodox Church is not organized according to the same kind of linear order 
that is common in the Christian West. McGuckin writes:  
 
The jurisdictional organization of the Orthodox church flows out of the 
principle of the local churches gathered under their bishops, arranged in 
larger metropolitan provincial synods, and this as eventually culminating 
in the expression of the ancient pentarchy of patriarchates which were felt 
to express an ‘international’ sense of different Christian cultures in 
harmony with the whole. The ancient pentarchy was: Rome, 
Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. To the latter four of 
this number, which remain in Orthodox communion, there are now 
included several other autocephalous Orthodox churches and other 
autonomous Orthodox churches which are still attached to their 
supervisory ‘sponsor churches’ by closer organizational ties.106 
 
The primary element of cohesion in Orthodoxy is not a particular ecclesiastical 
position or person, as in the case of the Papacy in Roman Catholicism, but rather the 
lived reality of tradition and sacramental communion. The Orthodox churches are also 
united in their adherence to the seven ecumenical councils and to the fundamental 
theological teachings outlined in the writings of the Fathers and Mothers of the church. 
Orthodox theology is based on an inseparable connection between lived spiritual 
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experience and doctrine, relying less on dogmatic proclamations and systematization than 
has been the tendency in the Latin West. Hilarion Alfeyev writes: “Dogma and mystical 
experience are two sides of the same coin, or rather, they are fundamentally one and the 
same, namely the revelation of God to the human person and the union of the human 
person with God. Mystical experience was in fact the driving force behind the theological 
reflections of the Church Fathers.”107 Vladimir Lossky echoes these sentiments: “The 
eastern tradition has never made a sharp distinction between mysticism and theology; 
between personal experience of the divine mysteries and the dogma affirmed by the 
church. […] There is, therefore, no Christian mysticism without theology but, above all, 
there is no theology without mysticism.”108 
A defining characteristic of Orthodox theology is its apophaticism. Lossky, basing 
his analysis of Orthodox theology on the works of St. Dionysius the Areopagite, writes:  
 
All knowledge has as its object that which is. Now God is beyond all that 
exists. In order to approach Him it is necessary to deny all that is inferior 
to Him, that is to say, all that which is. If in seeing God one can know 
what one sees, then one has not seen God in Himself but something 
intelligible, something which is inferior to Him. It is by unknowing 
(agnosia) that one may know Him who is above very possible object of 
knowledge.109  
 
God’s absolute transcendence—and the absolute unknowability of God’s 
essence—is juxtaposed with the immanent nature of God’s revelation of Himself to the 
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world. This revelation of God—and the experience of it—is supremely personal in 
character.  
 
Faith, then, signifies a personal relationship with God; a relationship as yet 
incomplete and faltering, yet none the less real. It is to know God not as a 
theory or an abstract principle, but as a person. To know a person is far 
more than to know facts about that person. To know a person is essentially 
to love him or her; there can be no true awareness of other persons without 
mutual love.110 
 
The dual and paradoxical focus on God’s absolute transcendence and his personal nature 
are manifest in and through the essence-energies distinction in Orthodox theology. Dating 
back to the patristic era, the doctrine received its most powerful articulation in the 14th 
century in the works of St. Gregory Palamas.111 Ware writes:  
 
By the essence of God is meant his otherness, by the energies his nearness. 
Because God is a mystery beyond our understanding, we shall never know 
his essence or inner being, either in this life or in the Age to come. If we 
knew the divine essence, it would follow that we knew God in the same 
way as he knows himself; and this we cannot do, since he is Creator and 
we are created. But, while God’s inner essence is forever beyond our 
comprehension, his energies, grace, life and power fill the whole universe 
and are directly accessible by us.112 
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The essence-energies distinction is not primarily an epistemological matter but 
rather manifests the central tenets of Orthodox anthropology and soteriology. God’s 
energeia are not created manifestations but rather the immanent presence of God himself. 
The telos of the human being is understood to be participation and union with these 
energeia. Orthodox salvation is therefore understood in terms of deification (theosis), a 
radical transformation of the entire human person: body, soul, and spirit. The 
understanding of salvation as a process of deification has its root in the Logos theology of 
the Alexandrian theologians Clement, Origen, Athanasius, and Cyril.113 Deification is 
grounded in the notion that the divine Logos became incarnate in the person of Jesus 
Christ, thereby manifesting a union between human nature and God’s divine energies. 
McGuckin writes: “Greek patristic thought conceived the incarnation as having 
reconstituted the human person as a divinely graced mystery.”114 Deification plays the 
same central role in Orthodox theology as redemption and atonement play in Western 
Christian thought.  
Orthodoxy teaches that deification occurs through the interplay of divine grace 
and human effort, the latter of which includes ascetical practices such as fasting as well 
as participation in the mysteries, i.e., the sacraments of the Church.115 The Eastern 
Church never saw the same doctrinal disputes regarding the role of human free will as the 
Latin West did following the Pelagian controversies. The interplay or synergeia of human 
will and God is understood to be a mysterion and not amenable to logical analysis. Ware 
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writes: “Our salvation results from the convergence of two factors, unequal in value yet 
both indispensable: divine initiative and human response. What God does is 
incomparably the more important, but man’s participation is also required.”116 Free will, 
a core component of the image of God in the human person, is furthermore seen in 
Orthodox thought to represent the essence of personhood:  
 
As God is free, so likewise man is free. And, being free, each human being 
realizes the divine image within himself in his own distinctive fashion. 
Human beings are not counters that can be exchanged for one another, or 
replaceable parts of a machine. Each, being free, is unrepeatable; and 
each, being unrepeatable, is infinitely precious. Human persons are not to 
be measured quantitively: we have no right to assume that one particular 
person is of more value than any other particular person, or that ten 
persons must necessarily be of more value than one. Such calculations are 
an offence to authentic personhood.117  
 
This theme of freedom and the role it plays in salvation will be at the forefront in 
chapter two, where I will discuss Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin and salvation. It is 
worth highlighting here that one of the most radical elements of Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy is his view of human freedom; an area of Kierkegaard’s philosophy that often 
differs considerably from the orthodox Lutheran position. Kierkegaard’s philosophical 
views on freedom is another point of convergence between Dostoyevsky and 
Kierkegaard. In Notes From Underground, Dostoyevsky presents a hypothetical utopian 
reality where all of man’s needs are met, where everything is safe and comfortable and 
the human person only has to fit in and play along with the system in order to “have his 
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gingerbread,”118 to bask in pleasure and entertainment. The Underground man sees this 
reality as hell, as torment, because it undermines our freedom.  
 
Shower [the human person] with all earthly blessings, drown him in 
happiness completely, over his head, so that only bubbles pop up on the 
surface of happiness, as on water, give him such economic satisfaction 
that he no longer has anything left to do at all except sleep, eat 
gingerbread, and worry about the noncessation of world history—and it is 
here, just here, that he, this man, out of sheer ingratitude, out of sheer 
lampoonery, will do something nasty. He will even risk his gingerbread, 
and wish on purpose for the most pernicious nonsense, the most 
noneconomical meaninglessness, solely in order to mix into all this 
positive good sense his own pernicious, fantastical element. […] It is 
precisely his fantastic dream, his most banal stupidity, that he will wish to 
keep hold of, with the sole purpose of conforming to himself (as if it were 
so very necessary) that human beings are still human beings and not piano 
keys, which, though played upon with their own hands by the laws of 
nature themselves, are in danger of being played so much that outside the 
calendar it will be impossible to want anything. […] The whole human 
enterprise seems indeed to consist in man’s proving to himself every 
moment that he is a man and not a sprig!119  
 
In The Sickness Unto Death Anti-Climacus, in expounding upon the various 
forms of despair, echoes these sentiments of the Underground Man: “The self is its own 
master, absolutely its own master, so-called; and precisely this is the despair, but also 
what it regards as its pleasure and delight. […] Rather than to seek help, [the person in 
despair] prefers, if necessary, to be himself with all the agonies of hell.”120  
Both Kierkegaard and Dostoyevsky see the only path to salvation as leading 
through the hell of despair. The result of the great systems of the Enlightenment is a 
cultural ethos that preaches the gospel of getting with the program, of ignoring the 
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vicissitudes and existential turmoil of being human.121 But this means that we need to 
ignore our unique individuality and our brokenness. It means that we must forego our 
freedom. Neither the institutionalized remedy of Roman Catholicism nor the 
individualized cry of the Lutheran sola fide seemed to satisfy Kierkegaard and 
Dostoyevsky as a response to this existential dilemma. Instead, they crafted a different 
response, one grounded in the notion of the absurd, of embracing a kind of divine 
madness.  
 In chapters 3 and 4, I will try to draw out various elements of Kierkegaard’s 
epistemology and philosophy of personhood that resonate especially deeply with the 
Eastern Orthodox tradition (and, by extension, the philosophical thought of 
Dostoyevsky). As a short prelude to this discussion, a few words of introduction to the 
Eastern Orthodox view of the person are in order.  
Eastern Orthodoxy understands human personhood primarily in terms of the 
Trinitarian nature of God. Kallistos Ware, echoing many of the primary philosophical 
concerns of Kierkegaard, writes:  
 
A ‘person’ is not at all the same as an ‘individual.’ Isolated, self-
dependent, none of us is an authentic person but merely an individual, a 
bare unit as recorded in the census. Egocentricity is the death of true 
personhood. Each becomes a real person only through entering into 
relation with other persons, through living for them and in them. There can 
be no man, so it has been rightly said, until there are at least two men in 
communication. The same is true, secondly, of love. Love cannot exist in 
isolation, but presupposes the other. Self-love is the negation of love.122  
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38 
 
The Trinitarian nature of God is the revelation par excellence of personhood 
understood as communion: “God the Trinity is thus to be described as ‘three persons in 
one essence.’ There is eternally in God true unity, combined with genuinely personal 
differentiation: the term ‘essence,’ ‘substance’ or ‘being’ (ousia) indicates the unity, and 
the term ‘person’ (hypostasis, prosopon) indicates the differentiation.”123  
Kierkegaard has sometimes been accused of advocating for a kind of 
individualism, of failing to fully account for the other.124 There has been an attempt to 
rectify this view in recent years, primarily by pointing to the social and political elements 
of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.125 These important contributions highlight important 
aspects of Kierkegaard’s works, though they sometimes divorce the political and 
economic dimensions of his works from the more explicitly religious and spiritual 
aspects. In chapter four I attempt to integrate them by relating Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
of personhood to the social and political dimensions of Eastern Orthodox anthropology.  
 
1.5 – A Brief Summary of the Road Ahead  
Chapter two will deal with Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin and salvation. I begin 
the chapter by analyzing the understanding of original sin in the works of Luther and the 
later Lutheran tradition, with a special emphasis on the way the writings of Augustine 
influenced this development. Kierkegaard’s pseudonymous works, especially 
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Haufniensis’ The Concept of Anxiety, develop both a critique of the Lutheran 
understanding of original sin and provide an alternative account to it, one grounded in a 
developmental model of human personhood. This analysis includes an overview of 
Kierkegaard’s contentious relationship with Luther, both as a spiritual figure as well as a 
philosopher, and highlights both the reasons why and the ways in which Kierkegaard 
sought to distance himself from Lutheran thinking on sinfulness. I end the chapter with 
an extensive discussion of Eastern Orthodox soteriology and theology of sin and offer a 
comparative analysis of Kierkegaard’s philosophy in light of the Eastern tradition.  
Chapter three covers Kierkegaard’s epistemology. I offer an extensive discussion 
of Marilyn Piety’s recent work Ways of Knowing, the first book-length project in English 
on Kierkegaard’s epistemology. Kierkegaard’s distinction between subjective and 
objective knowing is covered in detail, as is the existential category of “passionate 
inwardness.” In the chapter I focus on Kierkegaard’s use of the epistemological category 
of “acquaintance knowledge” (Bekendelse) which is rooted in the experience of 
interpersonal communion and relate this category to various elements of Eastern 
Orthodox epistemology, including the influential strand of apophaticism in that tradition. 
I will argue that Kierkegaard’s focus on paradox and “the absurd” in works such as de 
Silentio’s Fear and Trembling does not lead to an irrationalism but rather to a form of 
supra-rationalism that has its roots in Christian patristic thought.  
Chapter four develops Kierkegaard’s philosophy of personhood, especially in his 
later works such as Works of Love and the Christian discourses written under his own 
name. My primary aim is to defend Kierkegaard against the claim that his philosophy 
represents a form of individualism that is ethically deficient in fundamental ways. I show 
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that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is grounded in an understanding of human telos that 
centers on self-emptying (kenosis). In Kierkegaard’s philosophy, human “beingness,” 
understood both existentially and ontologically, is fleshed out in terms of communion. 
This has significant social and political implications, some of which I develop in detail in 
the chapter. Kierkegaard’s philosophy of the person is related to various neo-patristic 
Orthodox authors, such as John Zizioulas, who have integrated Orthodox theology and 
phenomenology in exciting ways.  
Chapter five will offer a brief examination of the most fundamental difference 
between Kierkegaard and the Eastern Orthodox tradition: the emphasis on liturgy and 
sacraments in Eastern Orthodoxy. I will offer a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s views on 
the “objective” nature of collective worship and suggest ways in which Eastern Orthodox 
liturgics can circumvent many of Kierkegaard’s primary critiques and worries.  
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Chapter 2 – For the Wages of Sin is the Sickness Unto Death: Anxiety 
and Despair in Light of the East 
 
Kierkegaard’s writings on sin reflect his dissatisfaction with the standard account of sin 
as presented in the Lutheran milieu in which he was writing. In The Sickness Unto Death 
and The Concept of Anxiety, Anti-Climacus and Vigilius Haufniensis respectively attempt 
to formulate an alternative to the common Augustinian understanding of sin as inherited 
guilt. The philosophy of sin presented in the pseudonymous authorship is in some ways 
strikingly similar to the account of sin presented in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the 
basis of which was developed in the patristic era. In this chapter I will offer an analysis of 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin. I will argue that in critiquing the Lutheran account of 
sin Kierkegaard attempted to develop an alternative model that would better fit the 
existential considerations which lie at the heart of his philosophical inquiry, namely, how 
human beings can best address the lived realities of despair, anxiety, and guilt. In doing 
so, Kierkegaard managed to formulate a philosophical theology that bridges some of the 
most contentious divides between the Christian East and West, providing as it does a 
theology of sin which is sensitive to the soteriology of Augustine, which so heavily 
influenced Luther, while also safeguarding the Eastern emphasis on human involvement 
in the process of salvation. 
The chapter will commence with a discussion of the development of the doctrine 
of original sin in Eastern and Western Christianity and how different readings of key 
biblical passages, most notably Romans 5:12, lead to different theological formulations 
of sinfulness and soteriology. Section 2.1 will include a detailed account of the patristic 
development of a doctrine of sin in the Christian East as well as an analysis of how the 
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Pelagian controversy influenced Augustine’s seminal formulation of sin and salvation in 
the Western Church. Section 2.2 offers an analysis of Augustine’s influence on 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy and the ways in which Kierkegaard attempted to explicitly 
address what he found to be the most problematic elements of Augustine’s writings on 
sin. I will address the extent to which Kierkegaard knew Augustine’s philosophy and the 
role Augustine played in Kierkegaard’s spiritual and philosophical formation. Section 2.3 
offers a brief overview of the Lutheran understanding of original sin. Section 2.4 offers 
an analysis of Kierkegaard’s reading of Luther’s doctrine of sin and the way in which this 
reading was shaped by commentaries on Luther’s writings which were widely read in 
19th century Europe. Luther was undoubtedly Kierkegaard’s primary muse when it came 
to theological writings, yet Kierkegaard saw fundamental problems with the way the 
entire Western tradition had approached the issue of sin. This section will focus on 
Kierkegaard’s critiques of Luther and the way in which Luther’s condemnation of merit 
in a soteriological context influenced Kierkegaard’s thought. Section 2.5 focuses on 
Kierkegaard’s attempt—primarily through the voice of Vigilius Haufniensis—to provide 
an alternative understanding for sin and salvation. I will argue that Haufniensis in The 
Concept of Anxiety and Anti-Climacus in Sickness Unto Death offer a developmental 
account of the human self that echoes many of the primary concerns in patristic writers 
such as Irenaeus and Athanasius, writers who would go on to provide the foundations for 
Eastern Orthodox soteriology. Section 2.6 is an analysis of Kierkegaard’s views on the 
spheres of existence in relation to his soteriology, especially as understood in relation to 
Eastern Orthodox writings on sin and salvation. Section 2.7 analyzes Kierkegaard’s 
views on free will and grace. Section 2.8 offers concluding remarks on the comparative 
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analysis of Kierkegaard’s views on sin and Eastern Orthodox views on the matter and 
looks at how teachings on the essence-energies distinction in Orthodox theology 
illuminate Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  
My primary aim throughout the chapter is to show how important (perhaps 
essential) elements of Kierkegaard’s writings on sin—elements that have heretofore not 
received due attention in the literature—can be highlighted through a comparative 
analysis with Eastern Orthodox philosophy.   
 
2.1 - The Development of the Doctrine of Original Sin in Eastern and Western 
Christianity 
The doctrine of ancestral sin in the Christian church was first developed by St. 
Irenaeus in the second century as a response to Gnostic heresies.1 Athanasius further 
developed the doctrine in De Incarnacione and “anticipated later developments by 
teaching that the chief result of the sin of Adam, which consisted in the abuse of his 
liberty, was the loss of the grace of conformity to the image of God, by which he and his 
descendants were reduced to their natural condition (eis to kata phusin) and became 
subject to corruption (phthora) and death (thanatos).”2 Ambrose conceived of Adam as 
living in a blessed state, free from physical necessity whose fall from grace primarily 
consisted of falling into a state determined by concupiscence and death.3 Ambrose greatly 
developed the Christian understanding of the “solidarity of the human race with Adam.”  4 
                                                 
1  Frank Leslie Cross, Elizabeth A. Livingstone, ed., “Original Sin,” in The Oxford dictionary of the 
Christian Church (3rd rev. ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
2 Ibid.   
3 J.N.D. Kelley, Early Christian Doctrine (San Francisco: Harper and Row 1978), 354. 
4 Bradley L. Nassif., “Toward a ‘Catholic’ Understanding of St. Augustine’s View on Original Sin,” 
Union Seminary Quarterly Review 39, no. 4 (1984): 288.   
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Ambroses’ anonymous contemporary, whom we now know was Ambrosiaster, made 
Romans 5:12 the focal point of his writings on sin.5 The passage in question reads: 
“Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came through sin, 
and so death spread to all because all have sinned.”6 Bradley Nassif, writing on 
Ambrosiaster’s interpretation of the passage, notes: “The Old Latin version which he 
used had the faulty translation ‘in whom (in quo) all sinned,’ rather than the correct one, 
‘because (eph ho) all sinned.’ He interprets the prepositional phrase to mean that all 
sinned ‘in Adam.’ Thus, all are sinners because of Adam since we all come from him.” 7 
Despite this mistranslation, it is clear that neither Ambrose nor Ambrosiaster understood 
original sin as inherited guilt but rather as a propensity towards sinful behavior largely 
caused by the facticity of death.8 Furthermore, as John Romanides has pointed out, the 
grammatical structure of the Greek (eph’ho pantes hemarton) makes it “both 
grammatically and exegetically impossible” to interpret the eph ho as referring to Adam: 
“From purely grammatical considerations it is impossible to interpret eph ho as a 
reference to any word other than thanatos.”9 This means that Paul’s phrase is best 
understood to mean that human beings sin because of death, rather than due to some 
inherited guilt passed on from Adam. This is an especially significant point considering 
that the Latin translation uses the masculine in quo instead of the gender-ambiguous eph 
ho. Given the fact that mors (death) is feminine in the Latin, this means that Western 
Christian thinkers such as Augustine read the passage quite differently from their Greek-
                                                 
5 Ibid.  
6 New Revised Standard Version. 
7 Nassif, 288. 
8 Ibid.  
9 John Romanides, “Original Sin According to St. Paul,” St. Vladimir’s Seminary Quarterly 4, nos. 1-
2 (1955): 23. See also Henri Rondet, Original Sin: The Patristic and Theological Background, trans. 
Cajetan Finegan (New York: Shannon, Ecclesia Press, 1972), 128-9. 
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speaking counterparts. From Augustine’s perspective, there is no way to understand 
Romans 5:12 except to read the “in whom” passage as referring to Adam, while the 
Greek makes it grammatically impossible to read it as referring to anything but death. As 
we shall see, these grammatical issues give rise to immensely important theological 
differences in the two traditions. David Weaver, in a series of articles, has further 
emphasized the importance of the mistranslation of Romans 5:12 in the Latin tradition 
and how it affected the differing accounts of sin, which in many ways came to define the 
divergent theologies of the East and West. Weaver writes:  
 
It is inaccurate to apply the term ‘original sin’ (originalis peccatum) to the 
ideas of the Greek-speaking authors, since this term represents a concept 
that has a well-defined content in the terms of Latin theology but does not 
have an exact parallel among the Greeks. The most critical point of 
departure is the absence among the Greeks of any notion of inherited 
culpability—i.e., inherited guilt, which was the central point of the Latin 
doctrine and which made humanity’s inheritance from Adam truly sin, 
unequivocally a sin of nature, which rendered the individual hateful to 
God and condemned him to eternal damnation prior to any independent, 
willful act. These conceptions seemed to be supported by the Latin 
translation of Romans 5:12, in which the phrase eph ho had been 
translated as in quo (in whom). This implied that all humanity had sinned 
in Adam, or in Adam’s sin. 10 
 
Weaver goes on to note that early Christian apologists such as Justin Martyr, 
Athenagoras, Tatian, Theophilius, and Irenaeus all held that “sin, properly so called, is a 
willful act that occurs in imitation of Adam’s sinfulness, and that, though there is an 
inherited mortality, there is no inheritance of a sinfully corrupt nature.”11 Weaver 
emphasizes the importance of Irenaeus’ teaching, namely that Adam and Eve were not 
                                                 
10 David Weaver, “From Paul to Augustine: Romans 5:12 in Early Christian Exegesis,” St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1983): 187.  
11 Ibid., 190ff.   
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created perfect but were rather created in a childlike state, potentially capable of 
assimilating themselves to the glory of God. It is this potentiality that they fail to 
actualize when they fall from God’s grace.12 Weaver notes that it was in the third century 
that the two traditions began to truly diverge on the issue of sin “with the 
contemporaneous emergence of the Alexandrian and North African traditions of 
theology,
 
developed by Tertullian and Cyprian in the West and Clement and Origen in the 
East.”13 Tertullian marks a break in previous thinking on the issue due to his emphasis on 
how all human beings are directly involved in Adam’s sin. Tertullian held that human 
nature had been affected by sin at least to the extent that our proclivity towards sinful 
behavior had been enormously increased.14 Despite this fact, he did not see the necessity 
of infant baptism,15 indicating that however negative Tertullian’s view on human nature 
may have been, it was a far cry from the later theological developments introduced by 
Augustine who famously saw infant baptism as a pivotal issue for the Church.16 Cyprian, 
on the other hand, emphasized infant baptism to a much greater extent, prefiguring the 
later Augustinian tradition.17  
                                                 
12 See Irenaeus' Proof of the Apostolic Preaching, trans. Joseph P. Smith (Westminster: Newman 
Press, 1951), Weaver 192 and Henry Rondet, Original Sin: The Patristic and Theological Background, 
trans. Cajetan Finegan (New York: 1972), 44. 
13 Weaver, 192. See also J.N.D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines (London: 1958), 174. 
14 Weaver, 192f.   
15 Tertullian, Homily on Baptism (London: SPCK 1964).   
16 Weaver points out that this was a pivotal issue in the Pelagian controversy. If the Pelagians were 
correct in their denial of original sin, then it was unclear why infants would need to be baptized. Augustine 
saw this as a threat to the creedal affirmation of “one baptism for the remission of sins.” Augustine cited 
Romans 5:12 as well as PS 51:5, Job 14:4, 5 Lxx, Jn 3:5, and Eph 2:3 as scriptural sources for the position 
that unbaptized infants risked eternal damnation. Weaver lists (p. 202) Augustine’s defense of his reading 
of Romans 5:12 as referring to original sin inherited from Adam in Sermons 244:15, Against Julian 6:75, 
Unfinished Work Against Julian 2:48-55, Enchiridion 45:47, On Nature and Grace 48, and Letters 157:10 
and 176:2. Furthermore, Augustine’s position may have been influenced by his neo-Platonic views on the 
pre-existence of the soul. See Robert J. O’Connell, St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of the Soul 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1989), esp. 41-45.   
17 Weaver, 193.  
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 Clement of Alexandria is a notable influence on the development of a theology of 
sin in Eastern Christianity for a number of reasons. Clement, like most of the Greek 
fathers, presupposed a distinction between the concepts of “image” and “likeness” in the 
Genesis account of the creation of humankind.18 Though there is no uniform teaching on 
this issue within the Eastern Orthodox tradition, there is a tendency to view the image 
(eikon) of God in human beings as essential characteristics ingrained in human nature—
characteristics such as freedom, rationality, and communion—while the likeness 
(homoiosis) of humans to God is understood in more dynamic terms, having to do with 
our ability to receive divine grace and thereby manifest and actualize the potential beauty 
inherent in our nature.19 Clement, along with Irenaeus, Origen, and St. Maximus 
Confessor, taught that even though the image of God in human beings might be obscured 
by sin, it could never be eradicated since the image has to do with our essential nature. 
The likeness, on the other hand, our ability to conform to the life of communion and love 
manifested by the Trinity, can be obliterated through our choice to turn away from God.20     
 The most influential figure in the theological development of the doctrine of 
original sin, aside from Augustine, is unquestionably Pelagius. Pier Franco Beatrice has 
pointed out that the debate that arose between the two camps in the fifth century, 
Pelagians on the one hand and Augustinians on the other, had a long history and that the 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 194.   
19 Kallistos Ware, “’In the Image and Likeness’: The Uniqueness of the Human Person,” in 
Personhood: Orthodox Christianity and the Connection Between Body, Mind, and Soul, ed. John T. 
Chirban (London: Bergin & Garvey, 1996), 1-16. Ware stresses the fact that the distinction is not a doctrine 
in the Eastern Orthodox tradition but that its emphasis in the theology of several important patristic authors 
indicates a certain uniform view on human nature and how that nature is ultimately affected by sinfulness. 
The primary point here is that the Eastern tradition has always resisted the notion that human nature is 
entirely corrupted by the effects of sin and that the distinction between the eikon and the homoiosis is an 
indication of this trend.  
20 Ibid., 9.  
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two positions had already been carved out well in advance of the defense given to them 
by Pelagius and Augustine.21 Much of the debate came down to the issue of infant 
baptism and how the Church’s understanding of the efficacy of the sacrament reflected 
on the competing views on the transmission of sins. Pelagius argued that humankind 
contained within itself a natural sanctity (bonum naturae). Pelagius, along with later 
advocates of the position that bore his name, such as Caelestius, based his arguments on 
an Aristotelian anthropology which emphasized the free choice of human beings.22 
Human beings are born innocent and potentially good but it is only through the 
development of a hexis, the habitual doing of good or evil actions, that the potential 
nature becomes fully actualized. Pelagius developed a remarkably astute and nuanced 
psychology of sin which he saw as a corrective to the negative appraisal of human nature 
given in the Augustinian camp. Furthermore, the metaphysical distinction between 
substance and accidents led Pelagians to believe that there was no way to metaphysically 
argue that sin could be transmitted from parents to their offspring. Given the fact that 
God creates all substances, and everything God creates is good, sin and evil must be an 
accident and accidents cannot pass from one substance to another.23  
 An essential element of Augustine’s position on sin was centered on the idea that 
there are two ways in which we can understand human nature. Beatrice writes: “On the 
one hand, it can indicate the nature of man as he was originally created, i.e. blameless. 
                                                 
21 Pier Franco Beatrice, The Transmission of Sin, trans. Adam Kamesar (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 15-38.  
22 Ibid., 25-35. 
23 Ibid., 33. Julian of Eclanum was a primary architect of this line of argument, as cited by Marius 
Mercator in Commonitorium adv. haeresim Pelagii et Caelestii 13. See Acta coniliorum oecumenicorum, 
ed. Eduard Schwarts et al. (Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter, 1914-, I/5), 13. Pelagius gives the argument in 
De natura, cited by Augustine in De natura et gratia 19:21 (Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, 
Vol. 5, accessed on New Advent on 8/25/2015, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1503.htm.  
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This is the proper meaning of the term. On the other hand, natura can indicate the 
condition in which we are all born, mortal and subject to ignorance and to the flesh. And 
this condition is the result of the punishment that the first man received when he was 
sentenced for his transgression.”24 This was Augustine’s attempt at carving out a position 
that evaded the heretical tradux peccati of the Manicheans while emphasizing the corrupt 
nature inherited via Adam’s sin. God punishes Adam for his transgression and this 
punishment enters into all of mankind and not just Adam individually. This punishment 
consists of concupiscence, ignorance, and death.25 While the Pelagians saw the sin of 
Adam as a particular event which had immense repercussions for human beings 
Augustine saw it as an ongoing condition.26 For this reason, Augustine holds that it is not 
only death which is transmitted to us via Adam’s sin but also the guilt. Daniel Haynes, in 
a comparative study of Augustine and Maximus the Confessor, claims that the transmittal 
of guilt was necessary, in Augustine’s eyes, to defend key tenets of the Catholic faith: 
“The first matter is that by not affirming original sin, and asserting free-will, you deny 
the need for a savior since you earn grace through merits; the second worry is that the 
justice of God is vindicated. If humanity only accepted the punishment of sin without 
also the commitment of the act that deserves such death, God would seem unjust to allow 
countless children to die.27” 
                                                 
24 Beatrice, 38. For Augustine’s argument, see De libero arbitrio 3.19.54 (On Free Choice of the Will, 
transl Thomas Williams (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1993)).   
25 Beatrice. 43. De libero arbitrio, 3.18.52. 
26 Allan Fitzgerald and John C. Cavadini, ed., Augustine Through the Ages (Grand Rapids: William B. 
Eerdmans, 1999), 47.  
27 Daniel Haynes, “The Transgression of Adam and Christ the New Adam: St. Augustine and St. 
Maximus the Confessor on the Doctrine of Original Sin,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 55, no. 3 
(2011): 310.  
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Augustine interpreted the effects of sin in both existential and ontological ways. 
Wiley Tatha notes that Augustine saw the immediate effects of Adam’s sin upon himself, 
and all of humankind, as “(1) death, loss of the gift of immortality; (2) ignorance, loss of 
the knowledge and intimacy with God; and (3) difficulty, loss of the ability to accomplish 
the good one wills.”28 Among the most sustained debates between the Augustinian and 
Pelagian camps was the third effect, that of the inability to accomplish good. Pelagius 
saw the effects of sin as hindering our ability to do good but not in such a way that 
overcoming sin is a metaphysical impossibility. Augustine, on the other hand, saw the 
inheritance of Adam’s sin in terms of our inability not to sin.29  There may have been 
existential reasons for Augustine’s formulation of the doctrine of original sin. Augustine 
saw his inability to accomplish the will of God in his own life as indicative of the human 
condition.30   
 The ontological dimension of Augustine’s teaching was largely derived from 
Ambrose’s reading of Romans 5:12, a reading which was, as noted earlier, largely 
determined by a faulty translation from the Greek to Latin: “Augustine conceived of all 
humankind as in Adam: When Adam sinned, all sinned.”31 John Rist notes that Augustine 
viewed the inheritance of sin quite literally, as if sin were a genetic disease spread 
                                                 
28 Tatha Wiley, Original Sin: Origins, Developments, Contemporary Meanings (New York: Paulist 
Press, 2002), 63. See esp. Augustine’s De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptism parvulorum, 1.9-
10 (Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5, accessed on New Advent on 8/25/2015, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15011.htm). 
29 Wiley, 69. This is primarily due to reason being clouded in the human being. See De Perfectionis 
Justitiae Hominis, ii, 3 and De gratia et libero arbitrio ad Valentinum XX, 41 and XIII, 40 (Nicene and 
Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5, accessed on New Advent on 8/26/2015, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1504.htm and http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1510.htm).  
30 See James J. O’Donnell, Augustine: A New Biography (New York: Ecco, 2005).  
31 Wiley, 65.  De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia 2.15. See aso De Nupt. 1.45.40; 2.5.15 and Contra Jul. 
1.3.10; 1.4.11, etc. (Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5, accessed on New Advent on 
8/26/2015, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/15072.htm). 
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through sexual procreation: “Adam’s tainted seed is thus in a sense the ‘nature’ of every 
man, and every man who generates by sexual means thus produces more tainted 
offspring. The seed is not merely the bearer of weakness and potentiality of sin; it is also 
the bearer of actual sin. All seed is Adam; hence all those who grow from seed are 
Adams, and thus guilty of the original sin of Adam.”32 
 The writings of John Chrysostom, one of the most influential figures in the 
development of Eastern Orthodox thought and a towering figure in the Eastern tradition, 
offer a striking alternative to the view on sin offered by Augustine and the later Latin 
tradition. Beatrice points out that Chrysostom found the notion of sin as inherited through 
physical conception/concupiscence senseless.33 Chrysostom, like all those who entered 
into the doctrinal debate on sin, saw the effects of the Fall as having consequences for the 
entire human race.34 The primary consequence was death, understood either as 
punishment by God or as a release from the slavery of sin, a doorway towards reunion 
with God in and through the sacrifice of Christ. Other consequences included 
“concupiscence, passion, sadness, and the other frailties that cause us to be submerged in 
the abyss of sin,” though, as Beatrice points out, these are not sins in themselves, 
according to Chrysostom: “Only when they are not held in check and are in excess do 
they cause sin.”35   
                                                 
32 John M. Rist, “Augustine on Free Will and Predestination,” in Doctrines of Human Nature, Sin, and 
Salvation, ed. Everett Ferguson et al. (New York: Routledge, 1993), 431.  
33 Beatrice, 159. 
34 Ep. ad. Olympias, 10.3, Sources chrétiennes, 13 bis, 248; Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First 
series, accessed on New Advent on 8/26/2015, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1916.htm. 
35 Beatrice, 160. Hom. In Ep. ad Rom. 13.1 (Patrologia Graeca 60.508-509; Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, First series, Vol.11, accessed on New Advent on 8/26/2015, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/210213.htm. 
52 
 
 Beatrice points out that Chrysostom clearly understood these consequences for the 
human race as a change in our existential condition, i.e., our proclivity towards 
despondency, pride, and the other major causes of sinful and destructive behavior. Yet 
these conditions are not, in and of themselves, sinful.  
 
According to Chrysostom, there is a clear-cut distinction between the sin 
of Adam and the penalties of that sin that were suffered by all of 
humanity. In no way is it possible, in such a situation, to confuse the penal 
consequences or punishment of the sin with the sin itself. The neutral 
evaluation of concupiscence distances the position of Chrysostom in a 
decisive fashion from that of Augustine, and moves it discernibly closer to 
the Pelagian position, notably that of Julian of Eclanum.36  
 
 Chrysostom also held to a position on infant baptism akin to the one held by 
Pelagian authors. The grace bestowed in baptism is not to wipe out any guilt (which only 
becomes manifest through personal, willful sinful behavior later in life) but rather to 
bestow “adoption and elevation” upon the infants.37  
 Augustine was limited by faulty translations of Chrysostom but scholars also 
indicate that he was at pains to force Chrysostom’s words to serve his theological 
purpose.38 Beatrice points out that Augustine had similarly forced interpretations of the 
testimony of other Greek fathers on sin: “The passages of Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, 
and Irenaeus say nothing other than that through the fault of Adam, humanity was driven 
                                                 
36 Beatrice, 160.   
37 Ibid., 164. See Chrysostom’s Hom. ad Neophytos 3.6 (Sources chrétiennes, Éditions du Cerf, Paris: 
1970, 50 bis. 154;). For a differing viewpoint on Chrysostom’s teachings on infant baptisms, see Harkins, 
P.W., “Chrysostom’s Sermon ad Neophytos,” Studia Patristica, vol. 10 (Berlin: Akademia-Verlag, 1970), 
112-17. 
38 See E.C. Best, An Historical Study of the Exegesis of Colossians 2,14 (Rome: 1956), 73-74, 120-
121. 
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from paradise and still suffers the painful consequences of his transgression of old. We 
pay the price of his disobedience with physical death and moral frailty.”39  
 Augustine not only attempted to use the writings of the Greek fathers to support 
his theological claims, he also attempted to influence the theological debates taking place 
in the Christian East, perhaps even attempting to commission a translation into Greek of 
his works.40 These attempts were largely unsuccessful as Augustine’s theological 
contributions remained largely unknown in the Christian East up until the thirteenth 
century when De Trinitate was finally translated into Greek.41 Eastern Orthodox 
engagement with Augustine following the thirteenth century has tended to focus on two 
primary ways in which Augustine’s theology, and the theological traditions of Roman 
Catholicism and Protestant Christianity which he so heavily influenced, deviate from 
Orthodox theology. These two elements are: 1) The understanding of original sin and the 
relationship between free will and grace, and 2) understanding knowledge of God as an 
intellectual activity.42  
 With regards to the differing views on sin, the difference in opinion between 
Augustine’s position and that of the Christian East centers on the possibility of human 
                                                 
39 Beatrice, 166-167. 
40 Josef Lössl, “Augustine in Byzantium,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History 51 (2000): 267-73. 
41 George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Augustine and the Orthodox: ‘The West’ in 
the East,” in Orthodox Readings of Augustine, ed. Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou (New York: St. 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2008), 11-40. 
42 John Romanides’ doctoral dissertation The Ancestral Sin, trans. G. Gabriel, Ridgewood (NJ:  
Zephyr Publishing, 1998) was among the first systematic analyses of how Augustine’s theology of original 
sin deviates from the Greek patristic understanding of sin. Vladimir Lossky and Christos Yannaras are two 
prominent examples who see Augustine’s theology as a diametrical opposite to the apophatism inherent in 
Eastern Orthodox thought. For Lossky see The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Crestwood, NY: 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1976) and for Yannaras see Elements of Faith: An Introduction to Orthodox 
Theology, trans. K. Schram (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991). 
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involvement in the process of salvation, or in what the Eastern writers commonly call 
theosis or deification:  
 
The eastern fathers of the late fourth century believed that the fall brought 
corruption to humanity and inaugurated a cycle of death, but they did not 
believe (as Augustine, at the end of his life, had) that the post-lapsarian 
human condition prevented the possibility of human participation in the 
process of salvation. For example, the ascetically inclined Cappadocians 
consistently taught that salvation required acts of almsgiving, fasting, and 
worship. Through ascetic discipline and active participation in the 
sacramental life of the Church, Christians united their own efforts to 
God’s grace. The Augustinian/Pelagian dichotomy between grace and free 
will was simply not part of the Cappadocians’ theological imagination. 
The same was also true of Augustine’s teaching on predestination, which 
even the western Church did not accept at the pivotal Second Council of 
Orange in 529.43    
 
 Augustine’s view, characterized by his pessimism towards the human condition, 
saw all human action as tainted by sinfulness and that goodness could be attributed to 
God’s grace alone, which itself transcends the natural order. McGuckin writes: 
 
After Augustine, many Latin church leaders tended to presume that sin 
was almost a natural proclivity of human beings and that the works of 
grace were miraculous in contrast. Eastern Christianity never adopted such 
a widespread pessimism about the extent and spread of sin. Origen and 
Athanasius, in the Alexandrian tradition, both argued strongly that even 
though humanity had fallen, the potentiality for divine vision remained 
intact within the innermost soul, and the power of the resurrection of 
Christ would shine through in abundance if the disciple gave obedience 
with generosity of heart.44  
 
 This difference in emphasis has led some Eastern Orthodox theologians to 
understand the Orthodox tradition as a kind of spiritual psychotherapy. John S. 
                                                 
43 Demacopoulos and Papanikolaou, 31-32. 
44 John McGuckin, “Sin,” in The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology, 311.  
55 
 
Romanides in his Patristic Theology writes that “Orthodoxy is a therapeutic course of 
treatment that heals the human personality.”45 Romanides, as well as Orthodox authors 
such as Ware, Lossky, and Alfeyev, all see God’s grace as an essential component in 
human salvation but also emphasize patristic writings on the participation of the human 
being through free choice in this process.46 These neo-patristic writers understand the 
effects of sin primarily in terms of a disordered mind, using the ancient Greek 
terminology of dianoia and nous. Human capacity for analytic, systematic thinking 
(dianoesis) as well as our capacity for an immediate apprehension of spiritual realities 
(noesis) become disordered in the fall as human beings lose control of their emotions and 
thought patterns (logismoi).47  The purpose of the spiritual life is understood as a 
therapeutic process whereby the logismoi are reoriented and the human self can reacquire 
the correct relationship to God. If the logismoi are not controlled through spiritual 
practice they have the potential to effectively create a “false” self, dominated by 
disordered behavior, which must be eradicated so the true self of the person can shine 
forth, a self which can only arise in and through our relationship with God. Many of the 
patristic writers, and the neo-patristic theologians in the modern Orthodox East, associate 
                                                 
45 John S. Romanides, Patristic Theology (Dalles, OR: Uncut Mountain Press, 2008), 32.  
46 See Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Way (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995). 
Hilarion Alfeyev, The Mystery of Faith (London: Darton, Longman and Todd Ltd., 2002), esp. 67-72 and 
189-99.  
47 The literature on the Greek patristic understanding of the corruptive effects of sin is immense. For 
an overview of one of the first systematic (4th c.) accounts of this analysis see Evagrius Ponticus’ The 
Praktikos & Chapters on Prayer, trans. John E. Bamberger (Kalamazoo MI: Cistercian Publications, 1981). 
Also Jeremy Driscoll, Steps to Spiritual Perfection: Studies on Spiritual Progress in Evagrius Ponticus 
(New York: The Newman Press, 2005). An overview of the patristic understanding can be found in 
Kyriacos C. Markides, The Mountain of Silence (New York: Doubleday, 2001). Ware has a body of 
literature on the effects of the logismoi on the nous. See his The Inner Kingdom, Volume 1 of the collected 
Works (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2000).  
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this “true” self with the biblical imagery of the “heart,” understood as the psychosomatic 
center of the human person.48  
 
2.2 - Kierkegaard and Augustine  
Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin, especially in the pseudonymous works 
The Sickness Unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety, shows a remarkable ability to 
traverse the gap between the theological positions of Western Augustinianism and the 
Orthodox East. Kierkegaard shares the view of the Reformation theologians, influenced 
as they were by Augustine, that grace, appropriated in and through faith, is what first and 
foremost allows human beings to overcome despair. Yet he also managed to safeguard 
the Eastern emphasis on human involvement in the process of salvation by understanding 
the self as a process, the telos of which is the ability to existentially appropriate faith. He 
thus manages to deny predestination while nonetheless holding true to many of the 
primary theological principles of both Augustine and Martin Luther. In addition to this, 
Kierkegaard’s writings on despair as a misrelation of the self to itself in The Sickness 
Unto Death shares many of the same fundamental concerns and analyses as the spiritual 
anthropology of the Greek patristic tradition.  
The extent to which Kierkegaard studied Augustine’s theology is a cause for 
debate among scholars.49 Kierkegaard’s only real engagement with Augustine in the 
                                                 
48 The most comprehensive collection of patristic writings on these issues is found in the Philokalia, a 
collection of Eastern Orthodox writings on prayer. See G.E.H. Palmer, Phillip Sherrard, and Kallistos 
Ware, ed., The Philokalia volumes 1-4 (London: Faber and Faber, 1983). For an excellent introduction to 
the notion of the “true self” and the biblical imagery of the “heart” in Eastern Orthodox writings, see 
Kallistos Ware, “How Do we Enter the Heart,” in Paths to the Heart: Sufism and the Christian East, ed. 
James S. Cutsinger (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2002), 2-23.  
49 The primary source on Kierkegaard’s relation to Augustine is Lee C. Barrett’s recent Eros and Self 
Emptying: The Intersection of Augustine and Kierkegaard (Grand Rapids, MI and Cambridge, U.K.: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2013). Barrett points out that scholarship on Augustine and 
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pseudonymous works is in Haufniensis’ The Concept of Anxiety. Augustine is mentioned 
peripherally in other works, including The Concept of Irony and Stages on Life’s Way.50 
Kierkegaard’s primary engagement with Augustine outside of The Concept of Anxiety 
appears in his journals and papers.51 Kierkegaard’s view of Augustine is in many ways 
similar to his complicated reception of Luther (of which I will have more to say in a 
moment). Kierkegaard both admires and reprimands Augustine.52 A telling passage from 
the journals is when Kierkegaard offers an ironic praise for Augustine having hit upon the 
notion of election by grace since the idea that human beings might be in some part 
responsible for their eternal salvation “is so superhumanly heavy that it will kill a man 
even more surely than a massive sunstroke (Solstik).”53 A Scandinavian writer using the 
image of a sunstroke is particularly delightful, especially in light of the searing mockery 
of not only Augustine but also Luther which follows this passage. Kierkegaard accuses 
both Augustine and Luther of having been unable to face the despair (Anfectung) of the 
religious life and that because of their panic they develop a theology of sola gratia, not 
                                                 
Kierkegaard tends to fall into two camps, those who see them as “fellow travelers” and those who see them 
as philosophical rivals. Mark C. Taylor’s Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Authorship: A Study of Time and 
the Self (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1975) argues that Kierkegaard advocated for a semi-
Pelagian position and was directly opposed to an Augustinian framework. Charles Taylor is among the 
most prominent philosophers who see Augustine and Kierkegaard as allies. See his The Sources of the Self: 
The Making of Modern Identity (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1989). See also the divergent 
views of George Pattison and Jørgen Pedersen. Pattison argues that Kierkegaard’s study of Augustine was 
minimal while Pedersen sees a great deal of Kierkegaard’s thought as explicitly “Augustinian”: George 
Pattison, Kierkegaard, Religion and the Nineteenth Century Crisis of Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 47; Jørgen Pedersen, “Augustine and Augustinianism,” in Kierkegaard and Great 
Traditions (Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, Vol. 6), ed. Niels Thulstrup and Maria Mikulova Thulstrup (C.A. 
Reitzel, Copenhagen: 1981), 54-97.  
50 Robert Puchniak, “Augustine: Kierkegaard’s Tempered Admiration of Augustine,” in Kierkegaard 
and the Patristic and Medieval Traditions (Kierkegaard Research: Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 
4), ed. Jon Stewart (Burlington and Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), 12. See also CI, 173; SLW, 147. 
51 Puchniak, 13. 
52 Ibid., 13-14.  
53 JP 3, 2551 / XI1 A 297. Interestingly, Puchniak fails to pick up on the irony in the passage and 
believes it to be an example of Kierkegaard’s praise for Augustine. See Puchniak, 14. Barrett correctly 
reads the passage and sees it as a clear condemnation of both Augustine and Luther. See Barrett, 64. 
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because such a philosophy corresponds to the truth but because the alternative simply 
seems untenable. Kierkegaard accuses Luther of serving humanity as opposed to Christ 
and that he failed to make his true “sovereign” known.54 It is obvious that Kierkegaard 
does not view the notion of election by grace favorably and that he sees both Augustine 
and Luther as having failed to accurately represent the Christian life.  
Even though Kierkegaard wrote favorably of Augustine’s passionate engagement 
with Christianity, he increasingly began to view Augustine as representative of an 
objective and systematic approach to faith, an approach which Kierkegaard unfavorably 
compares to a “true philosopher” such as Socrates.55 It is important to note that 
Augustine’s motto of “faith seeking reason” was an important inspiration for speculative 
theologians such as Martensen who increasingly became the focal point of Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical condemnation and wrath.56  
There has been a great deal of debate on the extent to which Augustine and 
Kierkegaard agree or disagree on the subject of sin. Kierkegaard has been characterized 
by various philosophers as being a staunch Augustinian, a semi-Pelagian, or an 
Arminian.57 Kierkegaard studied the Pelagian controversy and Augustine’s views during 
his theological training. During this time Kierkegaard was influenced in his reading of 
                                                 
54 Ibid. Kierkegaard’s critique of Augustine and Luther bears a striking resemblance to Dostoyevsky’s 
critique of Roman Catholicism in “The Grand Inquisitor” chapter of The Brothers Karamazov.  
55 See Barrett, 61; JP 4, 4299 / XI1 A 371.  
56 Ibid.  
57 See Niels Thulstrup, “Adam and Original Sin,” in Theological Concepts in Kierkegaard, 
Bibliotheca Kierkegaardiana, Vol. 5, ed. Niels Thulstrup and Marie Mululová (CA. Reitzels Boghandel, 
Copenhagen: 1980), 122-156; A.C. Cochrane, The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1956); Gregor Malantschuk, “Kierkegaard’s Dialectical Method,” in Soren Kierkegaard: Critical 
Assessments of Leadings Philosophers, ed. Daniel Conway (London: Routledge, 2002), 140-41; Timothy 
Jackson, “Arminian Edification: Kierkegaard on Grace and Free Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Kierkegaard, ed. Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 235-56. 
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Augustine by interpretations offered in the seminary textbooks of the day as well as H.N. 
Clausen’s lectures on Augustine.58 According to Kierkegaard’s notebooks, Clausen 
argued that a middle ground between Pelagius and Augustine was the only tenable 
theological solution to the problem of grace and free-will. Moreover, Clausen was 
extremely dissatisfied with the contradictory view in Augustine’s teachings that sin was 
both inherited, on the one hand, and involved guilt and merited our punishment, on the 
other.59  Kierkegaard was also influenced by the lectures of Philipp Marheineke and the 
works of Julius Muller.60 Both thinkers emphasized the individual and inward nature of 
sin. They also emphasized the Augustinian focus on sin and guilt as characteristics of the 
individual as such and not just specific acts performed by the individual person. Both 
Marheineke and Muller saw Augustine’s attempt to explain exactly how this sinfulness is 
inherited as largely unsuccessful and confused.61 
Kierkegaard’s primary aim, via the voice of Vigilius Haufniensis in The Concept 
of Anxiety, is to give an inward, existentially focused account of sin. Kierkegaard wants 
to maintain the Augustinian (and Lutheran) focus on the corruption and guilt that infuses 
human life while offering an alternative to the notion that this corruptibility and guilt 
should primarily be accounted for through inheritance and concupiscence. For 
Kierkegaard, the relationship of the existing individual to Adam is not important. Rather, 
the inward categories of anxiety and despair account for how sin arises in human life. 
                                                 
58 See Barrett, 218-219. The textbooks were Hase’s Huterus redivivus oder Dogmatik der 
evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, 4th ed. (Leipzig: Breitkopf und Hartel, 1839); Bretschneider’s Handbuch 
der Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, vols. 1-2, 3rd. ed., Johann Ambrosius Barth (Leipzig: 
1828); and Hahn’s Lehrbuch des chrstlichen Glaubens (Leipzig: Friedrich Christian Wilhelm Vogel, 1828).  
59 See Barrett, 219. For Kierkegaard’s notes see KJN 3, 31, KJN 3, 29 and KJN 3, 30.  
60 Barrett, 222-3. Julius Muller, Die christliche Lehre von der Sunde, 3rd ed. 2 vols. (Breslau: Josef 
Max, 1839 and 1849).  
61 Barrett., 223. 
60 
 
Haufniensis’ aim is to force the reader to engage his or her own anxiety and sinfulness 
with pathos.  
Before analyzing Kierkegaard’s account of sin in The Concept of Anxiety and The 
Sickness Unto Death—an account which stays remarkably true to the main theological 
considerations of Augustine while also echoing many of the main theological 
considerations of the Christian East—I will offer a brief overview of Luther’s 
appropriation of Augustine’s views on sin and examine how commentators on Luther 
shaped Kierkegaard’s interpretation of the Reformer.    
 
2.3 - Luther’s Understanding of Original Sin  
It is first of all worth noting that the notion of the Bondage of the Will is derived 
from Augustine, and that Luther may have used the title to identify his position with 
Augustine’s.62 Luther maintains that original sin is inherited by birth and, due to its 
effects, we are destined to sin and damnation.63 All human beings are sinners due to the 
effects of Adam’s sin.64 Furthermore, all human beings are completely and utterly sinful 
and depraved, even those whom some people would call “saints.”65 The most debilitating 
effect of sin is the fact that human beings are unaware of their own sinfulness, which is so 
epistemologically harmful that we cannot even discern the most basic truths of scripture 
which otherwise might make us cognizant of our damaged state.66 Due to the immense 
                                                 
62 Bernard Lohse, Martin Luther’s Theology: Its Historical and Systematic Development, 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 1999), 163. Augustine uses the phrase De servo arbitrio, which Luther discusses at 
P&J 142; WA 18:665.10-11; (WA: Weimarer Ausgabe; See D. Martin Luthers Werke: kritische 
Gesammtausgabe 120 vols. (Weimar: 1883-2009); P&J: The Bondage of the Will, trans. J.I. Packer & O.R. 
Johnston (Grand Rapids, MI: Fleming H. Revell, a division of Baker Publishing Group, 1959)).   
63 P&J 297-298; WA 18:773.17-18. 
64 P&J 202; WA 18:708.23-24. 
65 P&J 114; WA 18:644.4-11. 
66 P&J 286-287; WA 18:766.10-12. 
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effects of our condition, human beings are effectively ruled by Satan. Even after baptism 
and the acquisition of the Holy Spirit, the will remains utterly corrupt and tends towards 
evil and depravity.67  In the “Smalcald Articles” Luther writes: “Repentance teaches us to 
recognize sin: namely, that we are all lost, neither hide nor hair of us is good, and we 
must become absolutely new and different people.”68 
 This utterly helpless and completely corrupted state that human beings find 
themselves in is inherited through the bloodline of Adam:  
 
Where did original sin come from? The simple answer is from Adam, ‘By 
the single offence of the one man, Adam, we all lie under sin and 
condemnation.’ But that single offence now belongs to every human 
being, for, Luther inquires, ‘who could be condemned for another’s 
offence, especially in the sight of God?’ This does not mean, however, 
that each of us has committed this sin. No, we are born with it, ‘His 
offence becomes ours; not by imitation nor by any act on our part (for then 
it would not be the single offence of Adam, since we should have 
committed it, not he) but it becomes ours by birth.’69  
 
Luther never explains exactly how this transmission takes place or the exact 
nature of this metaphysical condition yet he nonetheless remains adamant that every 
single faculty of the human person, including our will, is inherently and absolutely 
corrupt. This is why Luther makes the famous analogy between God fashioning new 
human beings and a carpenter who is forced to use warped wood.70 God remains good, as 
                                                 
67 See Cameron A. MacKenzie, “The Origins and Consequences of Original Sin in Luther’s Bondage 
of the Will,” Concordia Journal 31, no. 4 (2005): 384-97. On the dominance of Satan in the human makeup 
see especially 388-90. 
68 Martin Luther, Basic Theological Writings 3rd edition, ed. William R. Russell (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 2012), 355-56. 
69 MacKenzie, 390-391. The quotations from Luther are from P&J 297-298, WA 18:773.8-16. See 
MacKenzie  391, n. 27.   
70 P&J 203, WA 18.708.31-34 
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do all of his intentions and works, yet he is nonetheless stuck with the miserably corrupt 
raw material at hand, namely the inextricably contaminated nature of human beings. 
 Luther, much like Augustine, was deeply influenced by existential concerns in 
developing a theological model of original sin. Luther’s spiritual life and his relationship 
to God was in many ways dominated by what he called Anfechtung, a deep-rooted 
despair and alienation that seemingly formed the background of all his activities and 
beliefs.71 This led Luther to develop an alternative model to the more 
humanistic/Aristotelian account formulated by the scholastics.72 Luther’s account is 
primarily centered on the need for human beings to abandon any belief in the efficacy of 
their own will or works in the process of salvation and spiritual healing. In a letter to a 
young monk in 1516 Luther proclaims: “Despair of yourself and your own works.”73 
Luther’s development of the doctrine of sola fides took shape between 1512 and 1518 
and resulted from his deep existential struggle with himself. Luther, much like Augustine, 
despaired of his inability to follow God’s will in his own life, falling into bouts of severe 
depression and self-mortification.74 Luther’s theological development provided an escape 
from this existential hell. In his biography of Luther, John M. Todd writes:  
  
                                                 
71 See, for example, the introduction to Luther's “The Freedom of a Christian” by Mark D. Tranvik, 
(Fortress Press, Minneapolis: 2008), 11-12: “[Luther's] inability to achieve salvation resulted in an intense 
trial known by the German word Anfechtung. There is no precise English equivalent, but Anfechtung can be 
described as an experience of doubt and despair that pierces the very soul—far more than a case of ‘the 
blues.’ Anfechtung points to a profound sense of being lost, alienated, and out of control.”  
72 In his treatise on the influence of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas on Luther, Karl-Heinz Zur 
Mühlen writes: “[Luther‘s approach] contradicts Aristotle and the way he is taken up in the Scholastic 
doctrine of grace, according to which righteousness is realized in good works with the help of sanctifying 
grace.” Karl-Heinz Zur Mühlen, “The Thought of Thomas Aquinas in the Theology of Martin Luther,” in 
Aquinas as Authority, ed. Paul van Geest, Harm Goris and Carlo Leget (Utrecht: Publication of the Thomas 
Instituut te Utrecht, 2002), 72. 
73  Quoted in John M. Todd, Luther: A Life (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 73.  
74 Ibid., 64-80.  
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Semper peccator, semper justus. Man was always a sinner, but always 
justified—if he only turned to Christ. It was the way of sola fides, faith 
alone, which he found through Scriptura sola, only through the words of 
Scripture, and not through Canon Law or conventions. Sola gratia, grace 
alone, and not any action of man’s part, enabled him to be a Christian, and 
to do the good works which flowed freely and strongly from a faithful 
Christian. This now provided the substance, the heart, of all Luther’s 
lecturing and preaching. It provided a solution to the problem of free will 
and grace which had bothered theologians for centuries.75  
 
The result of Luther’s own existential despair was therefore a theological account of 
human sinfulness which sees human beings as utterly and absolutely helpless to affect 
their own salvation, tossed to and fro in a continual cosmic battle between Satan and 
God, the two “riders” of the human soul.76 The only way “out” is through the “alien 
righteousness” of Christ imparted upon the believer which frees him or her from their 
own corrupt faculties: “This freedom does not lead us to live lazy and wicked lives but 
makes the law and works unnecessary for righteousness and salvation.”77 According to 
Luther, the Christian is free exactly because he or she has renounced the freedom of their 
own will for the freedom given by Christ. The believer is in no way, shape, or form 
righteous but is rather righteous only in and through Christ, her sinfulness covered with 
the “cloak” of Christ’s righteousness.  
Luther developed a spiritual anthropology that sees a clear split in the human 
person between the “inward” (soul/spirit) and “outer” (body/works) dimensions of the 
human being. The Christian path towards salvation only concerns the inner dimension, 
reducing all outward manifestations of faith to hypocrisy:  
                                                 
75 Ibid., 79.  
76 “If God rides, it wills and goes where God wills… If Satan rides, it wills and goes where Satan 
wills. Nor may it choose to which rider it will run or which it will seek; but the riders themselves fight to 
decide who shall have and hold it.” P&J 104, WA 18:635.17-22.  
77 Martin Luther, The Freedom of a Christian, 60. 
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It does not help the soul if the body wears the sacred robe of a priest or 
visits holy places or performs sacred duties or prays, fasts, and refrains 
from certain types of foods. The soul receives no help from any work 
connected with the body. Such activity does not lead to freedom and 
righteousness for the soul. The works just mentioned could have been 
done by any wicked person and produce nothing but hypocrites.78 
 
2.4 - Kierkegaard’s Reading of Luther 
Kierkegaard’s reception of Luther was immensely influenced by the theological 
milieu of 19th century Copenhagen, especially through Clausen’s influence. “As was the 
case at many Lutheran theology faculties during the early nineteenth century, few of 
Luther’s own writings were read. Clausen did, however, hold frequent lectures on the 
Augsburg Confession and SK probably attended these during 1834.”79  Kierkegaard must 
also have been influenced by the aforementioned textbooks of the day by Bretschneider 
and von Hase.   
There is considerable scholarly debate regarding the extent to which Luther 
directly influenced Kierkegaard. Thulstrup maintains that Luther had no influence on 
Kierkegaard’s developing philosophy of subjectivity.80 Podmore sees Luther’s influence 
as primarily consisting of providing the existential impetus for thinking of the self’s 
relationship to God in and through the experience of Anfechtung.81 Jaroslav Pelikan 
contends that Kierkegaard and Luther were engaged in the exact same philosophical and 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 52. 
79 Craig Quentin Hinkson, Kierkegaard’s Theology: Cross and Grace, The Lutheran and Idealist 
Traditions in His Thought, Vols. 1 and 2, Dissertation submitted to The Faculty of the Divinity School, 
Chicago University, (Chicago, IL: 1993), pp. 2-3. See also Leif Grane, “Det teologiske Fakultet 1830-
1925,” in Det teologiske Fakultet, ed. Leif Grane, vol. 5 of Kobenhavns Universitet 1479-1979, ed. Svend 
Ellehoj et al. (Copenhagen: G.E.C. Gads Forlag 1980), 330.  
80 Quoted in Thomas, J. Heywood, Subjectivity and Paradox (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957), 48.  
81 Simon D. Podmore, Kierkegaard and the Self Before God: Anatomy of the Abyss (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2011), 122-23. 
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theological pursuit, namely to offer an existential alternative to the systematic tendencies 
in the cultures in which they wrote.82 Kierkegaard did not study Luther’s own writings 
until relatively late, in 1847, and then mostly focused on Luther’s sermons.83 
Ernest B. Koenker offers an in-depth reading of Kierkegaard’s relationship to 
Luther, highlighting both the positive and negative responses Kierkegaard had to Luther’s 
theology. The positive reactions are few and far between and located mostly in the 
pseudonymous works, while the journals contain a great many entries that espouse 
negative views of Luther, especially later on in Kierkegaard’s life, as he moved further 
away from Lutheran orthodoxy.84 Positive responses to Luther focus on Lutheranism as 
being a “corrective” to the Christendom of the time (Roman Catholicism).85 Kierkegaard 
also praised Luther’s focus on the gospels.86 Luther is also praised for his emphasis on 
Christian freedom, the focus on authority as arising from faith (as opposed to institutional 
hierarchy), the way Luther’s Angst influenced his theology, and the focus on 
“inwardness” in the sermons.87  
Kierkegaard’s criticisms of Luther arise from the way in which Luther failed to 
really carry through on his revolutionary break with Roman Catholicism and how the 
                                                 
82 Jaroslav Pelikan, From Luther to Kierkegaard: A Study in the History of Theology (Missouri: 
Concordia Publishing House, Saint Louis, 1963), 113-20. 
83 Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Existence, trans. Harold Knight (London: Oliver and 
Boyd, 1959), 159.  
84 Ernest B. Koenker, “Soren Kierkegaard on Luther,” in Interpreters of Luther, ed. Jaroslav Pelikan 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968), 231-52; On Luther’s developing attitude towards Luther, see Hinkson, 
177-226. See e.g. JP 3, 2460 / VI A 108; JP 3, 2467 / IX A 11; JP 3 2481 / X1 A 154; JP 3, 2482 / X1 A 
172.    
85 Koenker, 232. JP 3, 2521 / X3 A 217. Note that Kierkegaard also saw an inherent danger in 
Luther’s emphasis as a corrective, due to its being made into a new norm, resulting in an increasing 
spiritual confusion that results in “the most refined kind of secularism and paganism.” See JP 1, 711 / XI1 
A 28.  
86 Koenker, 233. JP 3, 2547 / XI1 A 77. 
87 Koenker., 233-236. JP 3, 3724 / VII2 B 235; JP 3, 3153 / X3 A 267; JP 2, 2140 / X3 A 672; JP 3, 
2543 / XI2 A 301. More often than not, Kierkegaard adds some slight caveat or derogatory comment even 
when he is praising Luther.  
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“corrective” (Lutheranism) falls into the same traps as the status quo which it had pitted 
itself against.88 Koenker highlights Kierkegaard’s dissatisfaction with Luther’s attempts 
to reform Christianity as opposed to correcting, i.e., the tendency to offer a new 
systematic alternative as opposed to a critical, Socratic engagement with Christendom. 
Especially interesting in this regard is Kierkegaard’s complex view of monasticism, 
which he discusses in Fear and Trembling, Unscientific Postscript, and in the Journals.89 
Kierkegaard saw Luther’s criticism of monasticism as correct due to the overemphasis on 
external works and merits but that Luther went too far in his critique, overlooking the 
value and truth of asceticism and human endeavor in the spiritual life. Koenker writes:  
 
When Luther broke with the monastery—–and this is, significantly, 
Kierkegaard’s phrase—he could not clearly see the truth that lay in the 
falsely exaggerated monasticism he opposed. The false exaggeration 
obscured the actual measure of truth still present in the monastic ideal of 
forsaking the world. It was not the emphasis on asceticism that was at fault 
but the Medieval preoccupation with merits and its restriction of its ideal 
to the extraordinary individual. An example is Luther on marriage. Luther 
quite properly roused people by his marriage, but this very corrective, ‘this 
salt,’ was transformed into a norm.90  
 
Kierkegaard praised Luther for the way in which his Angst provided the basis for 
his spirituality91 but at other times he criticized Luther for not facing his Angst but instead 
turning Christianity into an anesthetic against despair. Kierkegaard maintained that the 
Lutheran doctrine of sola gratia had made Christianity too easy, a barbiturate to be 
                                                 
88 Koenker, 236-241. See e.g. JP 1, 711 / XI1 A 28; JP 2, 1901 / X4 A 340; JP 2, 1913 / X4 A 521.  
89 F&T, 125f; CUP, 401f; JP 2, 1138 / X3 A 298.  
90 Koenker, 237. 
91 JP 3, 2544 / XI2 A 303. 
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gobbled up by the masses.92 Perhaps most importantly, Kierkegaard saw the focus on 
inwardness in Luther’s sermons as corrupt, resulting in worldliness and a lack of passion:  
 
Luther established the highest spiritual principle—inwardness alone. This 
can become so dangerous that we can sink to the very lowest levels of 
paganism (yet the highest and the lowest are also alike), where sensuous 
debauchery is honored as worship. Similarly, it can come to the point in 
Protestantism where worldliness is honored and venerated as godliness. 
And that, I maintain, cannot happen in Catholicism.93  
 
Kierkegaard’s concern here indicates that he believed that Luther’s theology of 
sin and grace, influenced as it was by Augustine, could potentially lead to a resignation 
quite different from the resignation which must precede faith (as outlined by de Silentio 
in Fear and Trembling). If one is born a sinner, completely corrupt and guilty from the 
start, then why try to be good at all? Why attempt to control the passions, follow the 
commandments, or do good works? Even though Luther attempted to reconcile this 
tension in works such as The Freedom of a Christian, there are hints that Luther was 
willing to bite the bullet on this issue, to admit that the extent to which a person is a 
sinner is altogether irrelevant for salvation, in much the same way that good works are 
irrelevant. In a letter to Philip Melanchthon, Luther writes: “Be a sinner and sin boldly, 
but believe and rejoice in Christ even more boldly. For he is victorious over sin, death, 
and the world. As long as we are here we have to sin. This life is not the dwelling place 
of righteousness but, as Peter says, we look for a new heaven and a new earth in which 
righteousness dwells… Pray boldly—you too are a mighty sinner.”94  
                                                 
92 Koenker, 238. JP 3, 2481 / X1 A 154. 
93 JP 3, 3617 / XI2 A 305. Emphasis mine.  
94 Martin Luther, “Let Your Sins Be Strong,” Letter no. 99 (1. August 1521), in Dr. Martin Luther’s 
Saemmtliche Schriften, vol. 15, trans. Erika Bullmann Flores, ed. Johannes Georg Walch (St. Louis: 
Concordia Publishing House, 1880-1910), 2585-2590. 
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Kierkegaard’s concurrent praise and criticism of Luther reveal his goal as a 
thinker and writer: To continue the “corrective” work that Luther started but then failed 
to manifest when he began developing a new (systematic) alternative to the status quo he 
wished to criticize. Kierkegaard wished to become a new Luther, the true revolutionary 
who maintains the “salt” of Christianity against any and all attempts to water it down. To 
do this, Kierkegaard had to develop an existential philosophy of sin, the primary goal of 
which was to allow believers to face the reality of despair instead of running away from 
it, a flight Kierkegaard feared was the inevitable result of Augustinian and Lutheran 
theology on original sin. 
 
2.5 - Kierkegaard’s Philosophy of Sin 
Vigilius Haufniensis’ The Concept of Anxiety is an attempt to provide an 
alternative model to the standard account of sin developed in the Western Christian 
theological tradition. Haufniensis attempts to hold true to many of the primary 
considerations of both Augustine and Luther while also critiquing elements in their 
thinking of sin, which he sees as failing to adequately account for the psychological95 
reality of sinfulness. Beabout points out that Haufniensis views sin as a dogmatic concept 
that needs to be approached with passion and earnestness.96 Because sin is not susceptible 
to a purely metaphysical, ethical, or systematic treatise, it must be explored via a different 
                                                 
95 There is some debate as to exactly what Kierkegaard or the various pseudonymous authors mean by 
“psychological.” Primarily Kierkegaard is talking about an examination of human experience which is not 
reducible to the study of human behavior (like modern psychology) but which includes an examination of 
the spiritual dimensions of human reality. “Spiritual anthropology” might be a good way of understanding 
Kierkegaard’s aim. See Greg Beabout, Freedom and its Misuses: Kierkegaard on Anxiety and Despair 
(Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1996), 36, n. 2. 
96 Beabout, 36-38. For a discussion of the notion of “passion” (lidenskab) in Kierkegaard’s works, 
especially in relation to the concept of apatheia in Christian spirituality, see chapter 3, pp. 119-30. 
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method, namely an exploration of the inner life of the human individual. But The Concept 
of Anxiety is not a dogmatic work, hence it is not primarily focused on sin but rather on 
the precondition of sin, namely anxiety (angest). In fact, Haufniensis never clearly 
defines what he means by “sin,” leaving that to Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto 
Death.  
 Haufniensis’ main critique of the standard Augustinian account is that Adam97 is 
viewed as qualitively different than other human beings. He is placed “fantastically 
outside” human experience.98 Haufniensis offers a dialectical account that reverberates 
throughout all of Kierkegaard’s works, namely the tension that exists between the 
individual and the universal: “Man is individuum and as such simultaneously himself and 
the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and 
the individual in the whole race.”99  The only way to approach the issue of sin is through 
a dialectical engagement that achieves some kind of harmony between the realities of 
individuality and the universal. Traditional attempts at understanding sinfulness, 
according to Haufniensis, tend to either focus on Adam as outside the human race, 
viewing sin in an entirely abstract manner, as a reality that somehow enters into the 
human condition from “outside,” i.e., as something completely alien to the human 
experience, or they tend to emphasize an emotional inwardness, the “woe is me a sinner” 
model which completely misses the universal and historical characteristic of sin.100  
                                                 
97 Haufniensis, throughout The Concept of Anxiety (hereafter COA), usually only refers to Adam in his 
discussion of sin, as opposed to both Adam and Eve. This curious trend, is, of course, reflected in a great 
deal of Christian literature, both dogmatic and spiritual, for reasons that fall outside the boundaries of this 
current discussion, most of which have undoubtedly more to do with patriarchy than any theological 
considerations.  
98 COA, 25.  
99 Ibid., 28.  
100 Ibid., 26. See especially Haufniensis’ mocking of the Smalcald Articles: “This feeling assumes the 
role of an accuser, who with an almost feminine passion and with the fanaticism of a girl in love is now 
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 Haufniensis’ focus on anxiety therefore attempts to maintain a sensitivity towards 
both the individual and universal dimensions of human existence. All human beings, 
including Adam, are in anxiety. It is an essential element of the human experience, a 
universal category. Yet anxiety is also inherently individual. My anxiety is different from 
yours.101 Anxiety necessarily arises out of the experience of freedom and possibility, 
from the lived reality of self-determination. We are simultaneously repelled and attracted 
to the horizon of possibilities in front of us: “Anxiety is a sympathetic antipathy and an 
antipathetic sympathy.”102 Adam’s experience of anxiety is quantitively different from 
ours because he lived in innocence, in a state of “dreaming,” while we live in a reality 
suffused with sin, temptation, suffering, and pain. Yet qualitively speaking, Adam’s 
experience when confronted with God’s prohibition not to eat of the Tree of the 
Knowledge of Good and Evil is the experience of every single human being when faced 
with the reality of possibility, of “being able.”   
 What I would like to focus on here is Haufniensis’ reading of the Genesis story as 
a developmental account. Adam’s story is compared to the dawning of anxiety in a child. 
Anxiety is what makes us truly human, since only a creature that is not fully biologically 
determined could feel anxiety: “Man is a synthesis of the psychical and the physical; 
however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are not united in a third. This third is spirit. 
In innocence, man is not merely animal, for if he were at any moment of his life merely 
                                                 
concerned only with making sinfulness and his own participation in it more and more detestable, and in 
such a manner that no word can be severe enough to describe the single individual’s participation in it.”  
101 Haufniensis’ view of sin as belonging to the individual in inwardness bears no small resemblance 
to Heidegger’s analysis of death as belonging “in a distinctive sense to the Being of Dasein” in section 50 
of Being & Time (H. 250). The horizon of possibilities that gives rise to anxiety manifests itself in 
particular ways, according to each individual human being. My anxiety is always mine. At the same time, 
the experience of anxiety is a universal phenomenon among human beings, an essential part of the structure 
of human personhood.  
102 Ibid., 42. 
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animal, he would never become man. So spirit is present, but as immediate, as 
dreaming.”103 Being simultaneously drawn towards something while also being repelled 
by it is what makes us spiritual creatures, capable of both the greatest good and the 
greatest evil. Haufniensis even associates anxiety with the inherent potential in both 
individuals and whole cultures “In all cultures where the childlike is preserved as the 
dreaming of the spirit, this anxiety is found. The more profound the anxiety, the more 
profound the culture. Only a prosaic stupidity maintains that this is a disorganization. 
Anxiety has here the same meaning as melancholy at a much later point, when freedom, 
having passed through the imperfect forms of its history, in the profoundest sense will 
come to itself.”104 
 Haufniensis understands why Augustine, and later Luther, wanted to preserve the 
biblical emphasis on the fact that it was through Adam that sin entered into the world. 
The more that sin is seen as a break in time, as a qualitively different dimension in human 
behavior, the easier it becomes to show the crushing and debilitating effects this would 
have on both the individual and the race. Augustine and Luther clearly believed that if 
human beings believed they could solve the pain and suffering we face, then they would 
not turn towards God, simply because they would not see any need to do so. Kierkegaard 
was obviously sympathetic to this view, given his excoriating critique of the modern 
world, post-enlightenment rationality, and any and all systematic attempts to heal despair 
                                                 
103 Ibid., 43. 
104 Ibid., 43. The passage on melancholy is particularly fascinating. Kierkegaard seems to think that 
cultures and individuals that have a profound sense of melancholy have achieved a kind of spiritual 
maturity, a deepening of anxiety which allows us to better understand sin and perhaps to seek out ways to 
overcome despair. This is interesting in light of the stress modern culture puts on fun, entertainment, 
frivolity, and “the pursuit of happiness.” This would indicate, paradoxically, that the only way to become 
happy is to give up on the pursuit of happiness.  
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and suffering.105 Yet he is equally vary of the idea that human beings play no decisive 
role in the way they appropriate God’s grace. The last chapter of The Concept of Anxiety 
makes it clear that the correct appropriation of anxiety is fundamental to human salvation. 
“Whoever has learned to be anxious in the right way has learned the ultimate.”106 
Haufniensis points to the Gospel107 affirming that Christ was an exemplar in this 
appropriation of anxiety. Christ was “anxious unto death” as affirmed by his words on the 
cross: “My God, My God, why have you forsaken me?” Manifestations of anxiety and 
the correct appropriation of them are what make us truly human108 and they are the only 
possibility human beings have with regards to living a spiritual life, of relating correctly 
to the self and to realize one’s potential as not only a finite, biological entity but also as a 
spiritual entity, capable of entering into a relation to the absolute and infinite: “Whoever 
is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility, and only he who is educated by 
possibility is educated according to his infinitude.”109  
 This means that, according to Haufniensis, anxiety does not determine or cause us 
to sin. Christ, according to Haufniensis, being fully human, experienced anxiety, but he 
did not thereby sin. On this account, when Christ is faced with the temptations in the 
desert,110 he is truly faced with the possibility of sin, but Christ represents the “ultimate” 
potential of the human person when he overcomes these temptations.  
There are two parallels of particular interest here to the theological tradition that 
was developed in the Christian East. The first is a developmental model of Adam and Eve 
                                                 
105 See especially part III of Two Ages, 60 – 112. 
106 COA, 155.  
107 Matthew 26:37, 38; Mark 14:33, 34; John 12:27, 13:27. See COA, 155, n2.  
108 “If a human being were a beast or an angel, he could not be in anxiety.” COA, 154. 
109 Ibid., 156. 
110 Luke 4:1-13, Matthew 4:1-11, and Mark 1:12-13. 
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in paradise, where the first parents of the human race are viewed as spiritual adolescents 
who must find their own way towards spiritual maturity. This view, as we shall see, was 
expressed and developed by a number of thinkers in the Christian East. The second is the 
Orthodox teaching of theosis or deification, which represents one of the more profound 
differences between the soteriology of the Christian East and West.  
I will begin with an analysis of the developmental model of sin. In his work The 
Orthodox Church, Metropolitan Kallistos Ware writes:  
 
Humans at their first creation were therefore perfect, not so much in an 
actual as in a potential sense. Endowed with the image from the start, they 
were called to acquire the likeness by their own efforts (assisted of course 
by the grace of God). Adam began in a state of innocence and simplicity. 
[…] God set Adam on the right path, but Adam had in front of him a long 
road to traverse in order to reach his final goal.  
This picture of Adam before the fall is somewhat different from 
that presented by Augustine and generally accepted in the west since his 
time. According to Augustine, humans in Paradise were endowed from the 
start with all possible wisdom and knowledge: theirs was a realized, and in 
no sense a potential, perfection.111  
 
Irenaeus of Lyons was one of the primary proponents of the developmental view of 
humankind that would come to influence a great deal of Orthodox soteriology.112 In On 
the Apostolic Preaching Irenaeus writes: 
                                                 
111 Kallistos Ware, The Orthodox Church (London: Penguin Books, 1997), 219-20. The quote from 
Irenaeus is from Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching, 12.  
112 Though my focus here is on Irenaeus’ developmental anthropology and soteriology the specific 
issue of viewing Adam and Eve as “children” who had yet to reach maturity is also found in Theophilus 
and Clement of Alexandria. See Matthew C. Steenberg, “Children in Paradise: Adam and Eve as ‘Infants’ 
in Irenaeus of Lyons,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 12, no. 1 (2004): 1-22; John Behr, Asceticism and 
Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). There are also 
connections between larger themes in Irenaeus, including the developmental model, and the theology of 
Cyril of Jerusalem, Tertullian, and Athanasius; see: Matthew C. Steenberg, Of God and Man: Theology as 
Anthropology from Irenaeus to Athanasius (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2009). For Clement of 
Alexandria’s views on the development of human persons, see especially Paedagogus 1.1.3.3. and 
3.12.97.3; Protrepticus 11.111.1.; Clemens Alexandrinus I: Protepticus, Paedagogus, ed. O. Stählin, 3rd 
edn. (Berlin:  Rev. U. Treu, GCS 12, Akademie Verlag, 1972). For Theophilus, see To Autolycus 2.25., ed. 
and trans. R.M. Grant (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). Though this developmental model of Adam and 
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He fashioned man with His own Hands, taking the purest, the finest and 
most delicate elements of the earth, mixing with the earth, in due measure, 
His own power (dynamis); and because He sketched upon the handiwork 
His own form—in order that what would be seen should be godlike, for 
man was placed upon the earth fashioned in the image (ikon) of God—and 
that he might be alive, ‘He breathed into His face a breath of life’: so that 
both according to the inspiration and according to the formation man was 
like (homoios) God. […] Now having made the man lord of the earth, and 
of everything that is in it, He secretly appointed him as lord over those 
who were servants in it. But they, however, were in their full development, 
while the lord, that is, the man, was very little, since he was an infant, and 
it was necessary for him to reach full development by growing in this way. 
[…] And so beautiful and good was the Paradise, that the Word of God 
was always walking in it: He would walk and talk with the man 
prefiguring the future, which would come to pass, that He would dwell 
with him and speak with him, and would be with mankind, teaching them 
righteousness. But the man was a young child, not yet having a perfect 
deliberation, and because of this he was easily deceived by the seducer.113 
 
Four theological elements immediately stand out in Irenaeus’ account: First, the divine 
likeness is connected to the Holy Spirit entering into Adam and Eve, imbuing humankind 
with the potential to become godlike in their humanity. Second, the actualization of this 
potential is centered on humankind living life on earth in a particular way, i.e., as the 
caretakers of the earth. Irenaeus’ focus on the divinization of the entire human person, 
both soul and body, is immediately apparent.114 Third, the Word of God, the divine 
Logos, guides humankind toward the fulfilment of their potential. This guidance is only 
                                                 
Eve was especially important in the East it competed with the more traditional view of Adam and Eve as 
perfected adults; e.g. Gregoy of Nyssa’s On the Making of Man 2-5, 16; see Nicene and Post-Nicene 
Fathers, Second Series, Vol. 5; accessed 9/28/2015 on New Advent, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2914.htm. For Augustine’s account of Adam and Eve as perfect adults, 
which became standard in the West, see De Genesi ad litteram 1-10.  
113 Irenaeus, On the Apostolic Preaching, trans. John Behr (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary 
Press, 1997), 1.11-12, 46-47. 
114 See also the beautiful passage at 1.14 where Irenaeus describes Adam and Eve “kissing and 
embracing each other in holiness as children.” Irenaeus does not connect the Fall with any sort of 
concupiscence. Everything about the human person, including our sexual faculties, is created good and 
beautiful. The Fall is not due to sexual immorality but rather the inability of the early humans to listen to 
the Word of God and thereby divinize the entirety of human experience.   
75 
 
fully manifest when the Logos becomes human in the person of Christ, but even in the 
Garden the Word walks with Adam and Eve. Fourth, the inability of human beings to 
follow the Word and to fulfill their potential is primarily due to the imperfect state of the 
early humans who were almost infant-like in their pre-lapsarian state, a state that they 
were supposed to ultimately grow out of.115  
 There is, in addition, a clear sense in Irenaeus that the Incarnation is not primarily 
a response to the Fall but rather a foreordained and necessary part of human 
development. Irenaeus echoes here an important teaching which, as Bogdan Bucur has 
argued, is a “doctrine shared by significant early Christian and later Byzantine 
writers.”116 These include Maximus Confessor, Dionysius Areopagite, Isaac of Nineveh, 
Gregory Palamas, and Nicholas Cabasilas.117  
 Eric Osborn, in his study of Irenaeus, writes: “Human development moves 
through history and beyond; humans cannot be imprisoned in permanent categories or 
classes. Development fits, adjusts, accustoms man to God to ensure man’s progress, 
growth, maturing, and fruitfulness. While Adam is in one sense perfect, the possibility of 
further perfection is set before him.”118 This future perfection is ultimately revealed in 
Christ, the new Adam, who becomes human in order to manifest the full potential of 
                                                 
115 There is some debate on to what extent Irenaeus, as well as authors such as Theophilus and 
Clement, thought that Adam and Eve were literally children and to what extent this language is meant 
metaphorically. See Steenberg, “Children in Paradise,” 11ff.   
116 Bogdan Bucur, “Foreordained From All Eternity: The Mystery of the Incarnation According to 
Some Early Christian and Byzantine Writers,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 62 (2008): 120.  
117 Ibid. This position was also held by Scotus in the West, though the scholastic debate surrounding 
this position differed in significant ways with the development of these themes in the Orthodox East. See 
Bucur, 200. For Scotus’ position, see “The Predestination of Christ and His Mother,” in John Duns Scotus: 
Four Questions on Mary, ed. and trans. A.B. Wolter (St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Inst. Publications, 
2000), 19-29.  
118 Eric Osborn, Irenaeus of Lyons (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 85. See Against 
Heresies 3.20.2, in St. Irenaeus of Lyons Against the Heresies, trans. Dominic J. Unger & John J. Dillon 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1992).  
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human nature by assuming it.119 Due to this emphasis on human growth Irenaeus’ 
soteriology is primarily focused on the notion of recapitulation rather than justification.120 
Osborne writes:  
 
Christ came so that fallen man might be corrected to his first integrity and 
so that imperfect man might be brought to perfection. The savior includes 
all men in himself, compendiously and repeats the life of the first man, 
correcting that life at each point. […] As creator; he comes to his own 
(5.18.2) and recapitulates his own creation in himself (4.6.2.); while true 
man and true God, he is the end rather than the beginning (4.6.7.; 
1.10.3.)121  
 
Answering the question of why it is that God did not create human beings perfect, 
Irenaeus in Against Heresies writes: “It was in the power of God Himself to grant 
perfection to man from the beginning; but the man, on the contrary, was unable to receive 
it, since he was still an infant… we were not able to receive the greatness of that glory. 
Therefore, as if to infants, He who was the perfect bread of the Father offered Himself to 
us as milk, since His coming was in keeping with a man.”122 
As Steenberg notes, Irenaeus, along with writers such as Clement and Theophilus, 
emphasizes the essential needfulness of the human person in her relationship to God:  
 
The state of infancy which Irenaeus is speaking seems, above all else, to 
be a state of want: the first man is a child because he ‘falls short of the 
perfect,’ because he cannot receive perfection, because he cannot endure 
God’s greatness. There is a distinction between Adam and his creator 
which is real and ontological, not simply a state of mind or logical 
distance. This monumental gulf between Adam and God, a gulf founded 
here in Adam’s own being as newly created man, is not one of physical 
                                                 
119 Against Heresies, 4.2.4.  
120 Osborne, 97ff. Book 2 of Against Heresies is focused on this theme.  
121 Ibid., 99. Numbers in parentheses refer to Against Heresies.  
122 Against Heresies, 4.38. 
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distance nor deprivation of grace, but the natural different of being that 
exists between Creator and created. One is infinite, the other finite.123 
 
Haufniensis’ holds to a very similar view of Adam and Eve in The Concept of 
Anxiety. Adam is like a child in a “state of dreaming” before he is presented with the 
opportunity to eat (or not to eat) from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.124 
The heightening of anxiety and Adam’s awareness of freedom represents the possibility 
for spiritual growth and self-actualization.125 The primary difference, therefore, between 
the view presented by Irenaeus and Haufniensis, on the one hand, and that of Augustine, 
on the other, is between a dynamic view of the human self, versus a more static 
conception which sees Adam and Eve as having been created perfect and views sin 
primarily in terms of a juridical transgression.  
According to Haufniensis, anxiety is the concurrent repulsion and attraction that 
occurs in the experience of freedom and a necessary component in the self-realization of 
human persons.126 Both Haufniensis and Anti-Climacus understand the human person to 
be a synthesis of opposing poles of existence.127 The human person is not only an animal 
determined by biological drives and instincts but also a being capable of free choice; not 
only a finite being subject to death but also a being that is able to participate in eternity; 
not only a bodily being but equally a spiritual one. Though Kierkegaard was fully aware 
of the ontological implications of such an anthropological view, he always emphasized 
the existential experience of this reality over and beyond the metaphysical. Kierkegaard 
                                                 
123 Steenberg, “Children in Paradise,” 15.  
124 COA, 41. 
125 Ibid., 42ff. 
126 Ibid., 42. 
127 COA, 43, SUD, 29-30. For a particularly clear and well developed account of this in the secondary 
literature, see Johannes Sløk, Kierkegaard´s Universe: A New Guide to the Genius, trans. Kenneth Tindall 
(Copenhagen: The Danish Cultural Institute, 1994), chapters 4, 5, 6, and 9.  
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and the pseudonyms go to great lengths to point out that even if one is an ardent 
physicalist, one cannot escape experiencing reality in a “spiritual” manner, i.e., in terms 
of meaning, beauty, value, and so on.128 Even if one is entirely convinced that human 
beings are nothing but the outcome of a purely physical, evolutionary process, one 
nonetheless experiences oneself making free choices and relating oneself to eternity, even 
if it only occurs occasionally as one is faced with existential despair and doubt in 
moments of loss and pain.129 The synthesis of these two poles occurs in a third, which 
Haufnienis calls “spirit.”130 Beabout writes: “Spirit is the power of the will to self-
consciously relate the two poles of the synthesis to one another and hence to the self.”131 
This relation of the poles is the dynamic manifestation of the self. To be a self is to relate 
the two poles of existence, in spirit, in increasingly deeper ways.  
 Haufniensis makes it clear that it is a necessary component of being human to 
experience anxiety.132 An animal, purely driven by biological instincts and drives, is 
incapable of feeling anxiety. A human being is able to project him or herself into the 
future, to open up a horizon of possibilities, and must therefore be both simultaneously 
repelled and attracted to these possibilities.133 As Beabout writes:  
  
The person who looks over the edge of the cliff feels anxious; there is both 
the dizzying feeling that one might fall with its accompanying repulsion 
                                                 
128 Even if one were to experience life entirely as absent of such spiritual values, one is unable to 
escape the existential significance of this absence.  
129 It is, indeed, easy to surmise from Kierkegaard’s writings that the “spiritual” aspects of our 
existence only fully come to the forefront of our lives during times of suffering. That being said, 
Kierkegaard had a great deal to say about the importance of joy in human existence (the duty of joy, in 
fact). This topic will be examined more closely in chapters three and four.  
130 COA, 42 
131 Beabout, 46. 
132 CA, 42-43.  
133 Ibid., 44: “Anxiety is freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility.” This is basically the 
“What if?” moment of a decision which haunts us both before the decision is made and often continues to 
do so after we actualize the possibility.  
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and a quietly felt urge to lean out farther, to leap. Yet, Vigilius’ analysis of 
anxiety goes beyond a description of these affective states. In describing 
the human being as a synthesis of the psychical and the physical united by 
spirit, he provides an analysis of the structure of human being. Given this 
structural analysis of human being, the psychical aspect can imagine 
future possibilities based on one’s present and past (the physical aspect). 
The structural relation between one’s present and imagined future 
possibilities is a relation of anxiety. This is an ontological claim, a claim 
that the way a human being is related to the future is through the 
ambiguity of simultaneous attraction and repulsion. In this sense, anxiety 
is not a description of how one feels, but of a person’s relation to the 
future.134  
 
The development of the human person is a heightening of this anxiety, of taking 
responsibility for one’s life and understanding the implications of one’s actions. It is not 
only an ontological analysis, as Beabout points out, but equally an existential and ethical 
one. Adam and Eve’s development, as depicted in the Book of Genesis, is primarily 
focused on the manifestation of anxiety in their spiritual life and their failure to take 
responsibility for their actions. God’s order to Adam not to eat of the Tree of the 
Knowledge of Good and Evil is a test (provelse) of the highest order, much like the test 
given to Abraham when God asks him to sacrifice Isaac. It is a poetic representation of 
the test that all human beings must undergo as we attempt to become an authentic self.  
 The most important aspect of Haufniensis’ account of anxiety, an account that is 
later taken up in Anti-Climacus’ discussion of despair and sin, is the fact that anxiety is 
an essential component in our ability to open ourselves up to God. This ability to receive 
God is the central facet of Kierkegaard’s soteriology. In The Concept of Anxiety 
Haufniensis writes: “Anxiety is freedom’s possibility, and only such anxiety is through 
faith absolutely educative, because it consumes all finite ends and discovers all their 
                                                 
134 Beabout, 47-48. Emphasis mine.  
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deceptiveness. […] Whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility, and only 
he who is educated by possibility is educated according to his infinitude.”135 Anti-
Climacus in the Sickness Unto Death notes how an increasing awareness of sin opens us 
up to our complete dependence on God. It is really only by becoming aware of anxiety, of 
our existential status as free beings, that we can begin to see the nature of human 
sinfulness and it is this awareness of sinfulness that allows us the humility to open 
ourselves up to stand in God’s presence:  
 
What really makes human guilt into sin is that the guilty one has the 
consciousness of existing before God. Despair is intensified in relation to 
the consciousness of the self, but the self is intensified in relation to the 
criterion for the self, infinitely when God is the criterion. In fact, the 
greater the conception of God, the more self there is; the more self, the 
greater the conception of God. Not until a self as this specific single 
individual is conscious of existing before God, not until then is it the 
infinite self, and this self sins before God.136 
 
If sin is primarily viewed in terms of a legalistic transgression and inherited guilt then 
Kierkegaard’s view of an increasing consciousness of sinfulness seems bleak indeed. But 
as I have already noted, it is clear that Haufniensis’ primary aim in The Concept of 
Anxiety is to provide an alternative account to Augustinian notions of sin as inherited 
guilt. Anxiety represents the individual’s status as a free person, as always living in 
possibility, and it therefore makes sin possible, but it does not necessitate sin. 
Kierkegaard and his pseudonymous voices always view sin in terms of human 
development and existential possibilities.  
                                                 
135 COA, 155-156. 
136 SUD, 80. 
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 If we read the preceding passages from The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness 
Unto Death in light of Irenaeus’ soteriology, we immediately find echoes with the 
development anthropology and soteriology of Kierkegaard, Haufniensis, and Anti-
Climacus. Osborn notes that for Irenaeus  
 
Salvation is a process to perfection as the son of God, according to David, 
perfects praise from babes (4.11.3). Man could not be made perfect from 
the beginning because of what is created from the beginning must be 
inferior to and later than the creator (4.38.1). Because of human 
immaturity, the perfect son of God passed through infancy in order that 
man might be able to receive him. As a recent creature man could not have 
received perfection at the beginning (4.38.2), yet he grows to perfection in 
an ordered universe (4.38.3). He is destined to partake of the glory of God 
(4.39.2) and to become the perfect work of God (4.39.2).137  
 
Given the fact that human beings have sinned, and that death and suffering have entered 
into the world through sin, the development of the human person is intrinsically bound up 
with a correct attitude towards suffering and death. This is ultimately what Christ 
manifests. As Osborn notes, one of Irenaeus’ primary points of contention with Gnostic 
dualism is the inability of the Gnostic to relate suffering and death to our relationship 
with God. Orthodox Christianity, on the other hand, sees the only path towards salvation 
as passing through suffering and death.138  
As previously noted, Haufniensis is adamant that anxiety does not necessarily 
lead to sin. Adam and Eve did not have to sin, even though they were free beings (as 
Christ represents the possibility of a free being continuously choosing communion and 
love). But the fact is that they did sin, and this fact, the fact that all human persons live in 
a realm suffused with suffering and pain, colors every aspect of human possibility. For 
                                                 
137 Osborn, 108. Numbers in parentheses refer to Against Heresies. 
138 Ibid., 118f. 
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Kierkegaard, this means that there are ultimately only three options available to us in the 
way we relate to sin: We can attempt to ignore it, we can become engulfed by it in sorrow 
and despair, or we can pass through it and open ourselves up to the experience of 
forgiveness, an experience of standing before God in absolute love and openness. 
Kierkegaard’s edifying discourse on “The woman that was a sinner” is an especially 
profound meditation on this reality.139 The account in Luke 7:37 presents the woman as 
being deeply aware of her sins but instead of this resulting in her falling into “the sin of 
despairing over one’s sin,” as Anti-Climacus puts it,140 she is ready to receive 
forgiveness. Kierkegaard says that what we learn from this woman is to become 
“indifferent to everything else, in absolute sorrow for our sins, yet in such a way that one 
thing is important to us, and absolutely important: to find forgiveness.”141 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard, much like Irenaeus, Maximus Confessor, Gregory 
Palamas, and other seminal writers of the Eastern Orthodox tradition, saw the Incarnation 
in terms of recapitulation and reorientation, of putting the human race back on the path 
towards achieving the fulfilment of its potential, rather than as a response to a juridical 
wrong. In a journal entry from 1844, Kierkegaard writes: “The Incarnation is so very 
difficult to understand because it is so very difficult for the absolutely Exalted One to 
make himself comprehensible to the one of low position in the equality of love (not in the 
condescension of love)—in this lies the erotic profundity, which through an earthly 
misunderstanding has been conceived of as if it had occurred unto offense and 
                                                 
139 Training in Christianity, 244-54. 
140 SUD, 109. 
141 Training in Christianity, 245. 
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degradation.”142 Five years later, Kierkegaard takes this theme even further, viewing the 
Incarnation as the necessary condition for the flourishing of not only human beings but of 
all of creation (Skabelsen): 
 
Here one rightly sees the subjectivity in Christianity. Generally, the poet, 
the artist, etc. is criticized for introducing himself into his work. But this is 
precisely what God does; this he does in Christ. And precisely this is 
Christianity. Creation is really fulfilled only when God has included 
himself in it. Before Christ God was included, of course, in the creation 
but as an invisible mark, something like the water-mark in paper. But in 
the Incarnation creation is fulfilled by Gods including himself in it.143 
 
 Parallels between Kierkegaard’s developmental anthropology and that of Eastern 
Orthodox soteriology and Incarnational theology are most apparent when one examines 
Kierkegaard’s psychology of anxiety and despair in relation to Adam and Eve. Irenaeus’ 
developmental account of Adam and Eve’s state in paradise and subsequent transgression 
bears many similarities to Kierkegaard’s (and Haufniensis’ and Anti-Climacus’) account 
of the deepening consciousness of sin and despair. In Against Heresies Irenaeus describes 
Adam’s repentance over his sin as being a further manifestation of pride:  
 
[Adam] showed his repentance in deed, by means of the girdle, covering 
himself with fig-leaves; while there were many other leaves which would 
have irritated his body to a lesser degree, he, nevertheless, made a garment 
conformable to his disobedience, being terrified by the fear of God. […] 
And thus he would no doubt have retained this clothing for ever, thus 
humbling himself, if God, who is merciful, had not clothed them with 
garments of skin instead of fig-leaves.144 
                                                 
142 JP 3, 2402 / IV A 183. Emphasis mine. Note that the Hongs’ here translate the Danish word Fald 
as “degradation.” Fald is most directly translated as “fall.” Kierkegaard’s point here is strikingly clear: The 
idea that the Incarnation is a response to the Fall is the result of an “earthly misunderstanding,” a failure to 
see the “erotic profundity” (Erotik-Dybe) of God’s love. Additionally, the Danish word Dybe is most 
directly translated as “abyss.” We as human beings fail to stare into the abyss of God’s erotic yearning for 
us, which causes us to misunderstand the implications of the Incarnation.   
143 JP 2, 1391 / X1 A 605 
144 Against Heresies, 3.23.5.  
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John Behr has noted that Irenaeus’ sees Adam and Eve’s sin primarily in terms of 
their refusal to ask for and to receive forgiveness, rather than in terms of their 
transgression in eating of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.145 It was, to some 
extent, perfectly “natural” for Adam and Eve to eat of the tree, given the fact that God 
had created them as free beings and that they would experience anxiety, i.e., 
simultaneous attraction and repulsion in light of the lived reality of their possibilities. But 
after Adam and Eve sin, instead of turning to God, they devise a self-imposed penalty 
upon themselves that alienates them from God:  
 
The state of continence which Adam adopted after his act of disobedience 
is, according to Irenaeus, one which is self-imposed. Furthermore, it is one 
which Adam imposes upon himself and his wife in his state of confusion, 
in which, having lost his natural and childlike mind, he feels unworthy to 
approach and hold converse with God. As such, one might describe it as 
an adolescent reaction of the disobedient man to his new situation.146 
 
Adam and Eve were always supposed to lose their childlike mind, 
according to Irenaeus. To be able to listen to the Word and to grow in perfection 
they must mature, and this can only be done through trial and error (as any parent 
knows). The reason why the fall into sin was such a tragic event was primarily 
due to mankind’s inability to take responsibility for their actions and to learn from 
their mistakes. This theme was also developed by St. Symeon the New 
Theologian, who in his homily 66 on the creation of Adam and Eve states that if 
                                                 
145 John Behr, Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000) 118. 
146 Ibid. 
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Adam had simply said “I have sinned” in response to God’s “Where art thou?” he 
would have “redeemed all the multitude of years which he spent in hell.”147  
Irenaeus intertwines the metaphysical and existential implications of sin 
when he points to the fact that human beings, being born into a world filled with 
suffering, pain, and death, must learn to accept their fallible nature (unlike Adam 
and Eve before the Fall) and to have the humility to accept the fact that we will 
often make bad choices but that this does not condemn us to eternal damnation. 
John Behr, in a passage written on Irenaeus, but which could just as easily be 
applied to Kierkegaard, notes:  
 
One of the most noteworthy aspects of Irenaeus’ historical sense of the 
unfolding of the economy is how it places a positive value upon man’s 
experience of evil and his own weakness, which ultimately concludes in 
death. Within the framework of the progression of each individual life, 
this same perspective demands that, to become truly human, each person 
must fully engage themselves in their concrete lives and situations. One 
learns by experience. One cannot simply abstain, through a self-imposed 
continence, from anything that carries with it a risk that one might become 
ensnared thereby in apostasy. Irenaeus does not exalt a state of primal 
innocence, or exhort his readers to recapture it through an evasive 
virginity; for, as the economy has unfolded, it is through a knowledge of 
good and evil, and the consequent rejection of evil, that man becomes like 
God.148  
 
When read in the light of Irenaeus’ soteriology, Kierkegaard’s (very similar) 
views on sin and salvation, especially as expressed by Haufniensis and Anti-Climacus, do 
not represent a morbid obsession with guilt and self-condemnation but rather a 
celebration of human potential. This is not to undermine the essential role of repentance 
                                                 
147 St. Symeon the New Theologian, The First-Created Man, trans. Fr. Seraphim Rose from the 
Russian edition of St. Theophan the Recluse (Manton, CA: St. Herman of Alaska Brotherhood, 2001), 109. 
The scriptural reference is to Genesis chapter 3.   
148 Ibid., 125. 
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in both Kierkegaard’s writings on sin as well as in the Eastern Orthodox tradition.149 Yet 
repentance, for Kierkegaard, is always understood as a manifestation of love; of our love 
for God but primarily as our response to God’s love for us.150 
The developmental account of the human self is present throughout all of 
Kierkegaard’s works and is further developed in his other pseudonymous works such as 
Fear and Trembling, Stages on Life’s Way and Either/or. I will now turn to reading 
Kierkegaard’s views on the “stages” of human development in light of the kind of 
developmental soteriology that was first developed by writers such as Irenaeus, Maximus 
Confessor, and St. Symeon the New Theologian, and which became a cornerstone of 
Eastern Orthodox theology.  
 
2.6 - The Developing Self: Stages on Life’s Way 
Kierkegaard presents the struggle of becoming a self in terms of “stages” or 
“spheres” of existence. These are clearly not supposed to static, clearly delineated 
manners of living but rather a dynamic representation of the continual unfolding of the 
self. A great deal of the secondary literature on Kierkegaard focuses on the three stages or 
“selves” which Kierkegaard calls the aesthetic, ethical, and religious.151 One way of 
                                                 
149 A comprehensive overview of either Kierkegaard’s or Eastern Orthodox views on repentance 
would take a book-length project by itself. Examples of Orthodox views on repentance can be found in The 
Philokalia, Vol. 1, ed. and trans. G.E.H. Palmer, Philip Sherrard, and Kallistos Ware (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1983), 26, 70, 129, 131, 183, 189, 221, 299, and 363. For a concise overview of Kierkegaard’s views 
on the matter, see Sean Anthony Turchin, “Repentance,” in Kierkegaard’s Concepts, Tome V: Objectivity 
to Sacrifice (Kierkegaard Research, Sources, Reception and Resources, Vol. 15), ed. Steven M. Emmanuel, 
William McDonald, and Jon Stewart (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2015), 222ff. Note 
also JP 3, 2390 / III A 137: “…and you who feel so far removed from your God, what else is your seeking 
God in repentance but loving God?”  
150 JP 3, 2390 / III A 137: “…and you who feel so far removed from your God, what else is your 
seeking God in repentance but loving God?” Also, Either/or 2, 216. 
151 See, for example Clare Carlisle, Kierkegaard: A Guide for the Perplexed (London & New York: 
Continuum, 2006), 83-90, and C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 68-139. 
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reading the stages is to say that the aesthetic sphere, which Victor Eremita in Either/or 
calls the life of “immediacy,” represents a complete misrelation of the self to itself 
insofar as it shows an inability to unify the life of temporality/finitude with the life of the 
transcendent/eternal.152 Johannes Sløk, on the other hand, has provided an excellent 
argument for counting four stages. In addition to the three aforementioned stages of 
existence Sløk points out that the first stage is what Kierkegaard sometimes calls the life 
of the “philistine” (Spidsborger).153 This is the life of the person who runs away from 
anxiety and despair by any means necessary, whether via alcohol, entertainment, sex, 
travel, or whatever other means that provide one with a calm, fuzzy pleasantness by 
which one can turn away from whatever is difficult and challenging in one’s life and self. 
As Sløk points out, the reason why Kierkegaard did not devote a book to this particular 
kind of self is that it is not really a type of self at all.154 It is, rather, a kind of non-self, a 
complete failure to be a self, an implicit undercurrent in all of Kierkegaard’s writings.155   
 The aesthetic self, therefore, is the beginning stage of a person’s increasing 
awareness of his or her own anxiety and despair. The aesthete notes the despair and 
alienation so apparent in the surrounding culture and rebels against the status quo, which 
he conceives as the source of this despair. The diapsalmata at the beginning of Either/or 
paints the picture of a person in the grips of existential angst and despair, someone who is 
completely unable to happily immerse himself in everyday, bourgeois existence: “How 
empty and meaningless life is.”156 The only escape is through pleasure, excitement, 
                                                 
152 This is Beabout’s reading. See Beabout, 86-94. 
153 Sløk, 31.  
154 Ibid., 32. 
155 Kierkegaard perhaps comes closest to dealing with this particular stage of existence in Two Ages 
and Johannes Climacus.  
156 Either/or (hereafter EO), 29.  
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adventure, newness. Yet this ultimately fails us. No amount of sex, drugs, and rock n’ roll 
can satiate us. The aesthete can only cling to anticipation and the sweet promise of 
possibility that pleasure holds: “Pleasure disappoints, possibility never. And what wine is 
so sparkling, what so fragrant, what so intoxicating, as possibility.”157  
The aesthetic stage, like all of the stages, contains within itself a dialectical 
movement where there is a deepening awareness of despair. The aesthete tries to rebel 
against the despair of the philistine by abandoning the values and norms of the status 
quo.158 Yet when the aesthete realizes that satisfaction cannot ultimately be attained, he 
abandons himself to the meaninglessness of his pursuit, resigning himself to the 
emptiness of pleasure.159 But as the aesthete gets increasingly worn down from the 
pursuit of pleasure, physically and psychologically exhausted from the deleterious effects 
of incontinence, the despair deepens to a point where it becomes unbearable. As 
described in The Sickness unto Death, the misrelation of the self to itself becomes 
increasingly more pronounced. Seeking meaning and peace in immediacy alone is 
doomed to failure.160 The aesthete is not only aware of anxiety but also embraces it, due 
to the fact that he venerates the “intoxicating” elements of pure possibility (as opposed to 
the Spidsborger who doesn’t even contemplate possibility and simply goes along with 
whatever people around him are doing). But pure possibility becomes a prison if one 
                                                 
157 Ibid., 41. 
158 The aesthetic sphere is always best represented by the counterculture. In American 20th century 
popular culture this may have included such movements as the Beats, the hippies, and the punks.  
159 One is reminded here of Oscar Wilde’s remark on the delectable nature of cigarettes: “A cigarette 
is the perfect type of a perfect pleasure. It is exquisite, and it leaves one unsatisfied. What more can you 
want?” See The Picture of Dorian Gray: An Annotated, Uncensored Edition, ed. Nicholas Frankel 
(Cambridge, MA and London: Belkap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 136.  
160 See Beabout, 102-111 for a description of the different kinds of despair described in the work. The 
“despair of infinitude and possibility” most aptly describes the aesthetic self, i.e. a life which is completely 
bound up in the poetic realm of existence, of being unable to deal with the mundane nature of the everyday.  
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never ventures a choice. In the commentary preceding the Seducer’s Diary in Either/or 
we see a description of a mind in pure anxiety, perhaps not dissimilar to the anxiety that 
Adam and Eve felt preceding their fall:  
 
I can think of nothing more tormenting than a scheming mind that loses 
the thread and then directs all its keenness against itself as the conscience 
awakens and it becomes a matter of rescuing himself from this perplexity. 
The many exits from his foxhole are futile; the instant his troubled soul 
already thinks it sees daylight filtering in, it turns out to be a new entrance, 
and thus, like panic-stricken wild game, pursued by despair, he is 
continually seeking an exit and continually finding an entrance through 
which he goes back into himself.161 
 
The pain and despair of the aesthetic despair is encapsulated in the inability to 
choose, to make a commitment to something. Even though such commitments are 
painful, they are essential for the development and growth of the self. The ethical stage, 
as exemplified by Judge Vilhelm in Either/or, represents the dialectical progression of 
the self where commitment and stability are seen as meaningful and positive. The ethical 
stage is externally a mirror image of the first stage, that of the philistine, yet it differs 
from the life of the philistine because the ethical person has faced the despair and passed 
through the aesthetic. The ethical person gets married and commits to a person, for 
example, not because it is “what one should do” but rather because he or she recognizes it 
as a way to truly become a person, to truly become a self. The philistine lives a life that is 
completely unthought while the ethical person is acutely aware of the suffering and 
hardship that follows from making commitments, of having certain values and standards 
that one is willing to not only live for but also to die for. As Judge Vilhelm remarks, the 
                                                 
161 EO 1, 308. 
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life of the aesthete lacks all substance. It is the life of a shadow, of one who is not real in 
any existential manner.162 
Yet the ethical stage is not the safe harbor that it at first appears to be. As Anti-
Climacus points out, there is a heightened version of despair within the ethical stage, 
when we begin to despair over the earthly or some particular earthly thing (a job, a 
spouse, our children). Yet this despair is bringing us closer to the eternal, to manifesting 
our self in relation to the absolute: “Despair over the earthly or over something earthly is 
in reality also despair of the eternal and over oneself, insofar as it is despair, for this is 
indeed the formula for all despair.”163 If one truly makes the leap of commitment to 
another human being, for example, while fully appropriating the pain and suffering that 
comes with such a commitment instead of running away from said pain and suffering, 
one’s life becomes filled with a great deal of meaning. The ethical person has something 
concrete to live for, and to die for. Yet this something (or someone) is temporal, finite, 
mortal. My wife, no matter how much I love her, will die. My son, no matter how much I 
try to protect him, will die. And in this realization lies a despair that can only be faced in 
light of the eternal. Furthermore, this despair is ultimately a despair over oneself. 
 
First comes the consciousness of the self, for to despair of the eternal is 
impossible without having a conception of the self, that there is something 
eternal in it, or that it has had something eternal in it. If a person is to 
despair over himself, he must be aware of having a self; and yet it is over 
this that he despairs, not over the earthly or something earthly, but over 
himself. Furthermore, there is a greater consciousness here of what despair 
is, because despair is indeed the loss of the eternal and of oneself.164  
                                                 
162 See Judge Vilhelm’s remarks on Chamisso’s story about Peter Schlemihl, EO 2, 10-11. Also see 
Karsten Harris, Between Nihilism and Faith: A Commentary on Either/Or (Berlin/New York: De Gruyter, 
2010), 111-24. 
163 SUD, 60. 
164 Ibid., 62. 
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The way out of despair, which always initially leads to a heightening of despair 
(through the dialectic of the self), is via resignation. The ethical person resigns himself to 
the fact that no commitment, even to the noblest cause, can ever afford one with complete 
inner peace and happiness. We are always faced with the absurdity of ignorance, 
suffering, and death. If one seeks absolute meaning then one must define the self in 
relation to the absolute. And this is when despair becomes sin, when the misrelation of 
the self to itself is understood in terms of our relationship to God. “Sin is: before God, or 
with the conception of God, in despair not to will to be oneself, or in despair to will to be 
oneself. Thus sin is intensified weakness or intensified defiance: sin is the intensification 
of despair.”165  The movement from the ethical stage to the religious marks the realization 
that the cause of our existential suffering, our inability to truly be ourselves, lies in our 
broken relationship to God. It is only by mending that relationship that we can be healed. 
“To say that one despairs ‘before God’ means that one has a conception of a 
transcendent, personal God. When one either fails to take responsibility for oneself or 
attempts to be oneself without admitting one’s dependence on God and does either with a 
conception of a transcendent personal God, then one’s despair is sin.”166  
The central aspect of Kierkegaard’s disagreement with Luther on the issue of sin, 
as I have repeatedly noted, is Kierkegaard’s view that Luther (due to the influence of 
Augustine) does not focus on self-responsibility but rather attributes salvation entirely to 
Christ. Similarly, Luther attributed the force of sin and spiritual struggle largely to the 
                                                 
165 Ibid., 77. 
166 Beabout, 112. See SUD, 81. 
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influence of the devil,167 a claim Kierkegaard calls “childish” in his journals.168 
Kierkegaard’s developmental model, much like that of Irenaeus, views sin, struggle, and 
suffering as necessary components of human growth and development rather than as 
legalistic transgression. The theme of self-surrender to God/Christ is pivotal in Anti-
Climacus’ analysis of how human beings might overcome despair. Yet this self-surrender 
is, paradoxically, one which hinges on freedom and self-responsibility. The dialectical 
intensification of sin throughout the stages of existence reaches its culmination when the 
self can stand “transparently” before God (as Anti-Climacus puts it),169 fully immersed in 
the reality of God’s redemption and forgiveness. Yet the only way for someone to arrive 
at an existential position where this is possible is through that person taking responsibility 
for him or herself, heightening his awareness of his relationship to himself (or lack 
thereof) and how his experience of anxiety and despair separates him from God and from 
himself.  
 
2.7 - Kierkegaard on Free Will and Grace 
There are interesting parallels between Kierkegaard’s existential view of sin and 
the soteriology developed in the Christian East by Gregory of Nyssa, which then further 
evolved in the thought of Maximus the Confessor, two of the most influential figures in 
                                                 
167 See Luther, “Of the Devil and His Works,” in The Table Talk of Martin Luther, 263-65. See also 
Podmore, “The Lightning and the Earthquake: Kierkegaard on the Anfechtung of Luther”, 562-78. 
168 JP 4:4372/ Pap. X1 A 22. It should be noted that Kierkegaard did not dismiss the influence of 
demonic forces on the human person. One could interpret his criticism of Luther and Augustine as 
primarily wanting to avoid a form of dualism that creeps into their theology. See JP 4:4384 / XI2 133 for a 
further discussion of the influence of the devil, which aims to preserve the absolute sovereignty of God. 
Furthermore, Luther’s insistence that Satan is to blame for the spiritual trials of human beings is most likely 
more complex than Kierkegaard is willing to admit. See Hinkson, “Kierkegaard’s Theology: Cross and 
Grace. The Lutheran and Idealistic Traditions in His Thought,” 36-37. See also Podmore, Kierkegaard and 
the Self Before God, 129-32. 
169 SUD, 82. 
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Eastern Christian theology. What I want to highlight here is the fact that Kierkegaard’s 
primary philosophical and theological aim seems to be to develop a view of salvation 
which safeguards the self-responsibility and free will of the believer (which he feels that 
Augustine and Luther may have jeopardized due to their inability to face up to the 
despair, the Anfechtung, of their spiritual lives) while also maintaining that the inner 
psyche of the human person is the arena in which God brings about said salvation. The 
synergy between divine grace and human free will has interesting connections to the 
emphasis on the divine energies (energeia) in the writings of the Cappadocian fathers, 
especially in the works of Gregory of Nyssa. I will begin with a brief overview of 
Kierkegaard’s views on free will and grace, followed with a discussion of the Eastern 
Orthodox position on these matters.  
 The previously outlined progression between the stages of existence shows a 
parallel deepening of not only self-awareness but a concurrent awareness of our 
relationship to God, which ultimately culminates in our growing existential awareness 
of—and relationship to—the absolute paradox. As despair is heightened (through the 
effects of anxiety, which manifest itself via our free choice) we become acutely aware of 
our inner turmoil and suffering as manifesting our relationship with God. To see despair 
as sin is to begin to see the self as being constituted by God. Kierkegaard, in his discourse 
“Look at the Birds of the Air; Look at the Lily in the Field,” speaks of silence and self-
abnegation as the only correct response to this increasing awareness of God.170 Simon D. 
Podmore, in his analysis of Kierkegaard’s views on prayer and silence, notes that, for 
                                                 
170 Without Authority (hereafter WA), 7-20. See also Ettore Rocca, “Soren Kierkegaard on Silence”" in 
Anthropology and Authority: Essays on Soren Kierkegaard, ed. Poul Houe, Gordon D. Marino, and Sven 
Hakon Rossel (Amsterdam: Rodolphi, 2000), 80. 
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Kierkegaard, the prayer of silence is a prayer of unknowing, much like in the Eastern 
Orthodox contemplative tradition of hesychasm.171 Podmore writes:  
 
And so in praying one falls silent because there is nothing that one can 
say—a freely chosen silence of self-abnegation that is qualitively different 
from the imposed silence of despair… And this silence of faith’s prayer is 
a silence of unknowing in which the self esteems its capacities as nothing 
before God; the prayer of silence which, by renouncing the despair of 
human impossibility, marks the beginning of faith in divine possibility.172  
 
Kierkegaard writes that such prayer and self-knowledge can only come as one stands 
before God in “the mirror of the Word.”173 Anti-Climacus furthermore states that the self 
comes to know itself in relation to that which it stands before.174 Podmore has analyzed 
this paradoxical language of Kierkegaard’s view of the self “standing before God” in 
some detail.175 The sinful self, standing “afar from” God, as the tax collector does in the 
parable,176 faces an abyss. The gulf between the self and God seems insurmountable. Yet 
Anti-Climacus is clear on the fact that the gaze of the sinful believer is uplifted, through 
the grace of God, towards the divine forgiveness of God. The human intellect and will are 
unable to bridge the gap between the self and God and must therefore be crucified in 
unknowing and silence so that God may lift the self towards Himself.177 The resignation 
of the Knight of Faith, as described by de Silentio,178 is ultimately a description of a 
                                                 
171 See Ware, 121-124. See also Ignatius Brianchaninov, On the Prayer of Jesus, trans. Father Lazarus 
(Boston and London: New Seeds, 2006). For an overview of patristic and post-patristic sources on 
hesychasm, including the writings of St. Symeon the New Theologian, St. Gregory of Sinai, Nicephorus the 
Solitary, and Hesychius of Jerusalem, see Writings from the Philokalia: On the Prayer of the Heart, trans. 
E. Kadloubovsky and G.E.H. Palmer (London: Faber and Faber, 1979/7). 
172 Kierkegaard and the Self Before God, 149.  
173 JP 4:3902 / X4 A 412. 
174 SUD, 79.  
175 See especially Kierkegaard and the Self Before God, 151-80. 
176 See “The Tax Collector,” WA, 132. 
177 On the “crucifixion” of the understanding see CUP, 564. 
178 F&T, 50. 
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person whose self is constituted in and through his relation to God. Even though there 
seems to be no external difference between the philistine and the Knight of Faith, the 
former constitutes his self by standing before a corrupted image of himself while the 
latter constitutes his self by standing before God and “the mirror of the Word.”  
 Both Podmore and Ferreira suggest that Kierkegaard’s use of this imagery of 
standing before God, especially in The Sickness unto Death, should be understood in a 
very concrete way.179 The believer faces God and grounds him or herself in the gaze of 
God. And even though it is ultimately this gaze, constituting the forgiveness and grace of 
God that allows the believer to face despair, “it is, crucially, the subject’s free choice to 
see itself in this way.”180 Kierkegaard’s language denotes a manifestation of the divine 
where the continual resignation of the believer, deepening awareness of despair and self, 
and the facing-towards-God is understood as divine revelation.  
 Kierkegaard’s notion of the self before God raises important questions with 
regards to his conception of how human beings can come to know God. In chapter 3, I 
will examine the epistemological dimension of Kierkegaard’s works but here I would like 
to examine Kierkegaard’s view of the self standing before God in light of Kierkegaard’s 
soteriology and his views on the relationship between divine grace and free-will. 
According to Kierkegaard, human effort (human “works,” to use St. James’ 
expression) is an essential component in the process of salvation.181 Kierkegaard wanted 
                                                 
179 Kierkegaard and the Self Before God, 157. See also M. Jamie Ferreira, “Imagination and the 
Despair of Sin,” in Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, Volume 1997, edited by Heiko Schulz, Jon Stewart, and 
Karl Verstrynge (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 1997), 24. Anti-Climacus writes that one must stand 
“with the conception of God” (Forestillingen om Gud) (SUD, 77). Ferreira claims that though “conception” 
is usually understood in a more abstract manner in English, Forestillingen “calls to mind a very concrete 
apprehension.” It should be noted that forestilling can also mean a “presentation,” a “show,” or, more 
crucially, an “event.”  
180 Kierkegaard and the Self Before God, 158. 
181 JP 3, 2483 / X1 A 197.  
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to provide an alternative between the notion of salvation through merit presented in the 
“Middle Ages” (i.e., by Roman Catholicism, at least according to the standard Lutheran 
account) and the sola fide of Luther.182 Kierkegaard viewed faith in inwardness as an 
essential component of opening oneself up to God but he believed that individual striving 
and good works were necessary to achieve this inwardness.183 This striving does not 
necessarily mean that the efforts of the individual person primarily determine the 
possibility of salvation or directly cause it. Kierkegaard wholeheartedly agreed with the 
Lutheran critique of merits.184 Rather, all individual efforts (asceticism, prayer, charity, 
works of love, etc.) are ultimately means to an end, that end being the “intensification of 
the consciousness of self,” as Anti-Climacus puts it—i.e., the ability to truly have faith in 
God and His forgiveness.185 This intensification of self allows the self to become open 
and vulnerable before Christ: “The intensification of the consciousness of the self is the 
                                                 
182 JP 3, 2503 / X2 A 30; JP 3, 2522 / X3 A 218. The latter section references Kierkegaard’s critique 
of the lack of Lutheran support of the poor, at least in Kierkegaard’s time. Kierkegaard believed this to be 
due to the fact that Luther had pointed out that acts of charity are not “the highest good,” since faith in God 
is the highest good. Kierkegaard agrees with Luther on this matter but points out that even though helping 
the poor is not “the highest good,” it is nonetheless essential for a Christian life.  
183 JP 3, 2543 / XI2 A 301. This section is among Kierkegaard’s most fascinating meditations on the 
relationship between faith and works. Kierkegaard’s point is that sola fide should not be viewed as a norm 
or dogma but rather an existential orientation available only to those who have undergone an immense 
amount of spiritual struggle, which would include a certain amount of dedication to “works.” Luther was 
able to proclaim that works were useless in achieving salvation (especially in relation to the model of 
meritoriousness of medieval Roman Catholicism) only because he had lived the life of a person completely 
devoted to serving Christ in and through works. The problem with turning sola fide into a religious norm, 
according to Kierkegaard, is that most people take this to mean that one doesn’t need any struggle or effort 
in order to be a Christian. 
184 E.g. JP 2, 1485 / X4 A 419. Also see JP 3, 2503 / X2 A 30 where Kierkegaard clearly states that he 
is trying to point the way back towards an emphasis on viewing Christ as a prototype and on the importance 
of works, but not in order to return to a “medieval” focus on merits, i.e., of human beings being able to 
somehow secure salvation through their own efforts. Rather, struggle is essential for the Christian life 
because it is through works that we are able to receive the gift of Christ. It is always the gift (grace) that 
makes our salvation possible, though we are free to deny that gift. Kierkegaard is therefore trying to carve 
out some kind of middle-way in between the extremes of Luther, on the one hand, and medieval Roman 
Catholicism, on the other.  
185 SUD, 113. 
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knowledge of Christ, a self directly before Christ.”186 There is also a concurrent 
intensification of the consciousness of sin as one becomes open to the gaze of God.187 
The self-abnegation of the self, the “letting go” that occurs in the deepening of 
resignation and self-awareness (which ultimately is God-awareness), is aimed at allowing 
the believer to accept God’s forgiveness. And this, Kierkegaard claims, is the absolute 
telos of the human person: To allow God to make us as He is. “The self rests 
transparently in the power that established it,”188 writes Anti-Climacus.  This 
transparency reveals the true nature of the human person, his or her true potential. The 
self that is open to God, writes Kierkegaard, is “illumined so that it resembles God.”189  
But even though works, striving, and suffering are ultimately a means to an end, 
insofar as they allow us to become “like God,” to become divinized, the ultimate 
manifestation of this divinization is the ability to become like Christ, which ultimately 
means to become love.190 And this love is not a feeling or a state of mind but rather the 
work of love.191 “Love is the work of love,” Kierkegaard writes, and Christ’s life was this 
work of love.192 The notion of love as duty and commandment in Works of Love 
ultimately opens itself up to the notion of the believer becoming love through the 
acquisition of faith.193 
                                                 
186 Ibid.  
187 Ibid., 113-14. 
188 SUD, 14. 
189 “One Who Prays Aright Struggles in Prayer and is Victorious - in that God is Victorious,” 
Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses (hereafter EUD), 399. 
190 Kierkegaard, especially in his journals and in Works of Love, uses this language of human beings 
becoming love. Love is not just an action (much less an emotion) but rather an ontological state of being. 
See JP 3, 2447 / XI1 A 411; JP 2, 1411 / X3 A 347. 
191 JP 3, 2423 / X1 A 489.  
192 Ibid.  
193 There are, of course, interesting parallels here between Kierkegaard’s ethics and Aristotelian virtue 
ethics (or at least, a certain reading of said virtue ethics). See George J. Stack, “Aristotle and Kierkegaard’s 
Existential Ethics,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 12, no. 1 (1974): 1-19.  
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  Kierkegaard’s soteriology offers a fascinating, dialectical back-and-forth between 
divine grace and human free-will and striving.194 Kierkegaard obviously believes that 
divine grace is absolutely essential for human salvation and that it is what empowers us 
to fulfill our potential and to overcome our brokenness. But human striving is essential 
for accepting this grace, to let it energize us so that we can become who we truly are. 
God’s grace is freely given, but the human person must accept responsibility for this gift. 
In his journals, Kierkegaard writes:  
 
The fact that grace is free finds its absolutely right expression in the New 
Testament. An heir has not merit, not the remotest whatsoever. Everything 
is the bequeather’s benefaction to him.  
Now if the matter is viewed purely externally, namely, that the heir 
has the right to do whatever he likes with the inheritance, then the whole 
thing is taken in vain. In the realm of the spirit—where the inheritance is 
not something external, and ‘faith’ therefore is the condition for becoming, 
for becoming aware that one is the heir—it is essential that a person have a 
relationship of responsibility toward the inheritance. Here, again, is the 
concept of striving.195 
 
This notion of a synergy between human striving and divine grace is also a core 
component of Eastern Orthodox theology. I would now like to explore some of these 
parallels, especially in relation to Kierkegaard’s notion that much of this striving has to 
do with “resignation,” a kind of gelassenheit of the ego where the person can become 
“transparent” before God. As Climacus puts it in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
this process of acquiring faith is only possible insofar as one is able to “crucify” one’s 
understanding, i.e., one’s attempt to “get it,” to achieve holiness and salvation through 
one’s own methods and devices. Similarly, in the Life of Moses, Gregory of Nyssa writes: 
                                                 
194 JP 1, 763 / X2 A 132, where Kierkegaard complains of Christendom having ruined this dialectic by 
placing grace “too high.”  
195 JP 1, 984 / X2 A 224.  
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“For leaving behind everything that is observed, not only what sense comprehends but 
also what the intelligence thinks it sees, it keeps on penetrating deeper, until by the 
intelligence’s yearning for understanding it gains access to the invisible and the 
incomprehensible, and there it sees God. This is the true knowledge of what is sought; 
this is the seeing that consists in not seeing.”196 The resignation of the understanding in 
faith, described by Johannes de Silentio as the ultimate act of resignation and “the highest 
passion in a person”197 ultimately has to do with the self not finding rest in anything 
earthly, constantly falling deeper into despair as it seeks absolute meaning in finite 
things. Since neither pleasure (the aesthetic) nor good works fueled entirely by our own 
efforts (the ethical) can properly provide us with what we seek, we must ascend higher 
towards the ultimate beauty and meaning, but to do so we must leave behind all elements 
of the self which we have heretofore relied upon.  
 There is a distinct Platonic element to Kierkegaard’s writings on the stages of 
existence, a depiction of an erotic ascent where one attempts to find peace and happiness 
in different manifestations of the beautiful until one finally arrives at the beautiful itself. 
In the Life of Moses, Gregory of Nyssa echoes this Platonic imagery:  
 
And although lifted up through such lofty experiences, he is still 
unsatisfied in his desire for more. He still thirsts for that with which he 
constantly filled himself to capacity, and he asks to attain as if he had 
never partaken, beseeching God to appear to him, not according to his 
capacity to partake, but according to God’s true being. Such an experience 
seems to me to belong to the soul which loves what is beautiful.198  
 
                                                 
196 Life of Moses, 95. 
197 F&T, 122. 
198 Life of Moses, 114. 
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Since despair is ultimately “loss of the eternal,” as Anti-Climacus says,199 we try to infuse 
different aspects of our lives with the eternal to achieve peace and happiness. The 
philistine runs away from despair and is therefore so completely immersed in it that he is 
not even aware of his own alienation. The aesthete has become aware of despair but can 
only respond to it by seeking transcendence in pure immediacy, through pleasure, 
adventure, drink, and drugs. This works for a while but the effects of despair ultimately 
become heightened yet again as the painful repetition of addictive and self-destructive 
behaviors settles in, especially given the aesthete’s inability to choose and thereby 
constitute himself as a person. The ethical person seeks the eternal by living and dying 
for something greater than herself, yet does so only within the boundaries of what can be 
seen, understood, and planned out. This could include such diverse activities as starting a 
family, joining the military, or working for charity. Yet all things that fall within this 
category can never give us peace since they are ultimately all earthly and finite, while the 
beauty we seek is absolute. As Gregory of Nyssa writes: “The ardent lover of beauty, 
although receiving what is always visible as an image of what he desires, yet longs to be 
filled with the very stamp of the archetype. And the bold request which goes up the 
mountains of desire asks this: to enjoy the Beauty not in mirrors and reflections, but face 
to face.”200  
 This face to face encounter can only come when the individual “ventures 
everything,”201 as Abraham did when he ventured the life of his son Isaac. This is 
necessary because the telos of the human being, according to de Silentio, can only be 
                                                 
199 SUD, 62. 
200 Life of Moses, 114-115. 
201 CUP, 426. 
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found in God.202 The spiritual anthropology of Maximus the Confessor similarly 
emphasizes a human teleology that can only find its rest in God, a rest that comes about 
through a kind of infinite resignation:  
 
What is not good and lovable in itself, and does not draw all movement 
toward it simply because it is good and lovable, cannot properly be the 
beautiful. Such beauty would be incapable of satisfying the desire of those 
who find delight in it… No created thing then is at rest until it has attained 
the first and only cause (from which what exists was brought into being) 
or has possessed the ultimately desirable.203 
 
 For Luther and Augustine, this telos could only be fulfilled through the “alien 
grace” of Christ, enveloping the sinner. The emphasis is entirely on the salvific grace of 
Christ. On the other end of the spectrum lies an ethics where human action and free will 
entirely determine the possibility of salvation. Kierkegaard wants to carve out a middle 
path. He, as I have argued, wanted to develop a spiritual anthropology which respected 
both human free will as well as maintaining the Lutheran/Augustinian focus on divine 
grace and spiritual trial (Anfechtung). Similarly, Maximus the Confessor developed a 
theology of salvation which focuses on self-responsibility as self-abnegation:  
  
If the intellectual being is moved intellectually in a way appropriate to 
itself, it certainly perceives. If it perceives, it certainly loves what it 
perceives. If it loves, it certainly experiences ecstasy over what is loved. If 
it experiences ecstasy, it presses on eagerly, and if it presses on eagerly it 
intensifies it motion; if its motion is intensified, it does not come to rest 
until it is embraced wholly by the object of its desire. It no longer wants 
anything from itself, for it knows itself to be wholly embraced, and 
intentionally and by choice it wholly receives the life giving delamination. 
When it is wholly embraced it no longer wishes to be embraced at all by 
itself but is suffused by that which embraces it.204 
                                                 
202 F&T, 59.  
203 Ambiguum 7, On The Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, 47 and 49. 
204 Ibid., 51. 
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 Crucially, this self-abnegation hinges upon the active kenosis or self-emptying of 
the believer: “Do not be disturbed by what I have said. I have no intention of denying free 
will. Rather I am speaking of a firm and steadfast disposition, a willing surrender.” In 
their commentary on Ambiguum 7, Blowers and Wilken write: “Maximus wishes to say 
that when one is firmly attached to the good there is a voluntary transcending of oneself, 
a giving over of oneself… in which one passes over into the deifying activity of God. In 
this ‘willing surrender’ free will is not eliminated but reaches its proper end in God.”205  
 For Kierkegaard, our freedom primarily consists of becoming a self. As Beabout 
writes: “Freedom means self-actualization. This sense of freedom denotes being oneself, 
that is, living in right relation to oneself, (and to others), and ultimately also to God.”206 
This freedom can only be achieved in and through Christ’s grace, since it is Christ who 
bridges the unfathomable gap between the human being and God: “It sometimes happens 
that our eyes turn toward heaven, and we are astonished at the infinite distance, and the 
eye cannot find a resting place between heaven and earth—but when the eye of the soul 
seeks God and we feel the infinite distance, then it is a matter of confidence—but here we 
have a mediator.”207 The movement through the stages of existence enables us to deepen 
our awareness of anxiety, which in turn allows for a deeper awareness of self, which 
ultimately leads to an awareness of our position as sinners before God. This awareness at 
first brings nothing but dizziness and a heightened form of anxiety and despair until the 
believer makes the leap of faith in the most absolute form of resignation, when she lets go 
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of all attempts at overcoming despair through her own power, self-will or ingenuity and 
instead becomes transparent, vulnerable and open to the mercy of Christ. The moment 
(øjeblik) where this takes place is a moment of silence and unknowing, of standing face 
to face with God where our discursive faculties are crucified in self-transcendence.  
   
2. 8 - A Few Words on Essence and Energies 
Kierkegaard, in both his journals and the pseudonymous works, goes to great 
pains to try to overcome the tension so prevalent in the Western Christian tradition 
between grace and works. He does this, in part, by circumventing the issue of merits, 
agreeing with Luther that our salvation is never merited but always a free gift from God. 
But Kierkegaard does not thereby want to agree with Luther (or, at least, the 
contemporary interpretation of Luther) that this means we are saved by faith alone, 
irrespective of our own striving. Striving and suffering are essential components of the 
Christian life because they prepare us to accept grace, which, according to Kierkegaard, 
is always granted to us through the intercession of the Holy Spirit.208 Kierkegaard’s 
pneumatology indicates another point of contention with what he perceives as a standard 
account of Christian doctrine in Lutheranism, namely that the acquiring of faith in grace 
is a one-time thing. Kierkegaard believes that we need grace continually, since we 
ultimately always fall back into sin, and that this can only be accomplished by opening 
ourselves up to grace of the Holy Spirit: “Grace is the everlasting fountain—and the Holy 
Spirit the dispensator, the Comforter.”209  
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 Kierkegaard’s concepts of the indwelling of grace, the synergy of divine gift and 
human effort, and the notion that human beings are able to open themselves up to an 
experience of divine revelation (of standing “face to face” with God) point to interesting 
connections between Kierkegaard’s soteriology and the theological issue of the essence-
energies distinction in Eastern Orthodox thought. I will have much more to say on the 
epistemological and ontological implications of the essence-energies distinction in later 
chapters but I would like to conclude this discussion of Kierkegaard’s views on sin and 
salvation with a brief overview of how one could read Kierkegaard’s philosophy as 
hinting at God’s presence as a certain kind of energeia or activity within the human 
person, an activity that is made available through the deepening consciousness of sin and 
despair and the opening up of the human self to the experience of the divine.  
According to the Eastern Christian theological viewpoint, dating back to the 
patristic era, God is completely unknowable in his essence (ousia) while he can be known 
in and through his activities (energeia), which effectively are God. God is both 
completely transcendent and absolutely immanent.210  From an Eastern Orthodox 
perspective, the energeia described in these passages is not a created effect or some kind 
of “boost” that God gives to the human person. Rather, it is the manifestation of God 
                                                 
210 There is a plethora of literature on the essence/energies distinction. A good introduction to the 
issue is in Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church, pp. 67-91, and Alfeyev, pp. 14-31. See 
also Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). for a discussion 
of how the essence/energies distinction can be understood in relation to ancient Greek metaphysics. See 
also his “The Divine Energies in the New Testament,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 50 (2006): 
189-223. This stands in direct contrast to the tradition that originates with Augustine and permeates all of 
Western Christian thought, both Catholic and Protestant, which differentiates only between the divine 
substance and created things (God being reducible to His essence). See especially Augustine’s On the 
Trinity VII. 1.2. (PL 42 936; NPNF I.3, 106, also V.10.11, VI.7.8, XV.5.7-8, 13.22, 17.29. For a discussion 
of the debate in the Roman Catholic tradition with regards to divine simplicity and the opposing viewpoint 
of Eriugena, see H.F. Dondaine, “L’objet et le ‘medium’ de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du 
XIIIe siécle” Recherches de theologie ancienne et medieval 19 (1952), 60-130; and Dominic J. O’Meara, 
“Eriugena and Aquinas on the Beatific Vision,” in Eriugena Redivivus, ed. Werner Beierwaltes 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitatsverlag, 1987), 224-36. 
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Himself in and through his activity, namely his love and mercy. The human person, in 
being “energized” by God, stands before God. Furthermore, it is only in and through the 
free “striving” of the believer that there is a possibility of the energy being “energized.” 
This is not to say that human beings can “manufacture” divine revelation, but rather that 
God is “everywhere present and filling all things,” as one of the prayers of the Eastern 
Orthodox liturgy puts it. In order to receive this presence, the believer must achieve a 
certain kind of kenosis that allows the human intellect (nous) to experience the divine 
presence. 
David Bradshaw has argued that scriptural passages pertaining to the “glory” of 
God are of special importance in understanding the role of divine revelation in Christian 
soteriology.211 Western theology, both Protestant and Catholic, has always viewed these 
passages as especially problematic given the question of whether or not the divine glory 
actually is God or simply a created effect. Bradshaw and Bogdan Bucur argue that due to 
the influence of Augustine the Western Christian tradition has interpreted references to 
divine revelation in scripture as describing created effects, thereby missing important 
theological elements having to do with the synergy that occurs between God’s divine 
grace and human free will in these passages.212 The Eastern Orthodox tradition, 
especially in the writings of the Cappadocian fathers, safeguards the view of theophany 
as a revelation of God’ s energeia, and provides a more robust view of the divine-human 
cooperation in salvation. Kierkegaard’s soteriology aligns much more closely with this 
Eastern view, providing as it does an emphasis on an apophatic encounter with God that 
                                                 
211 See David Bradshaw, “The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies,” Faith and Philosophy 23, no. 3 
(2006): 279-298. 
212 See Bogdan Bucur, “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine's De Trinitate: An Eastern 
Orthodox Perspective,” Saint Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 52, no.1 (2008): 67-93. 
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is dependent upon the self-responsibility of the human agent but which nonetheless 
revolves around self-abnegation and the “crucifixion” of discursive reasoning.  
 Bradshaw outlines several scriptural passages where reference is made to the 
divine glory.213 He focuses especially on Moses’ encounter with God on Mt. Sinai (Ex. 
33:19-23).  
 
Here the divine glory is described as God’s ‘back parts,’ as opposed to His 
‘face,’ which no man can see and live. This suggests an answer to our 
question about whether the divine glory is God. It both is, and is not, as a 
man’s back parts both are him, in that they are the part of him seen from 
behind, and are not him, for he cannot be reduced or equated to them. Of 
course to speak of God’s ‘face’ and ‘back parts’ is a metaphor.214 
 
Bradshaw goes on to outline the mention of the glory of God by Jesus at the beginning of 
chapter 17 of the Gospel of John where it is presented as a relational reality. Jesus prays 
that the glory which has always existed (before the creation of the world) in the 
relationship of the Father and the Son may become manifest in the relationship Christ has 
with the disciples (“All mine are yours, and yours are mine; and I have been glorified in 
them,” John 17:10). Bradshaw notes how the language in Christ’s prayer not only 
emphasizes the dynamic and relational aspect of the glory of God but also the way in 
which it collapses the categories of time and eternity: “This is not simply a matter of 
temporal events manifesting an eternal reality. Time and eternity here interpenetrate; 
what is true eternally is true, in part at least, because of what Jesus has accomplished, and 
what the Father is accomplishing, here and now.”215 If we apply this paradigm to 
                                                 
213 “The Divine Glory and the Divine Energies,” 279-280. Passages under consideration are Ex. 16:7, 
10; Ex. 24:16-17; Ex. 40:34-35; II Chron. 5:14, 7:1-3; Ezek. 8:4, 9:3, 10:4, 19, 11:22-23; Rev. 21:11, 23. 
There are also mentions of the glory of God in Pentateuch, Isaiah, and Habbakuk.  
214 Ibid., 281. 
215 Ibid., 282. 
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Kierkegaard’s description of despair as a misrelation of the self to itself, which occurs 
when the opposing poles of time and eternity, finitude and infinitude, are not joined 
together in the correct manner in “spirit,” we can better draw out the elements of 
Kierkegaard’s writings that focus on the self “standing before God” and the indwelling of 
grace. When the self truly becomes a self, when the human person correctly relates to 
him or herself, then time and eternity intermingle in such a way that the glory of God, 
God’s love and mercy, permeates all of who we are and what we do. Despair, especially 
when understood as sin, is a form of groundlessness, a dizzying realization that we stand 
before the abyss.216 To let go of oneself via resignation, to stand naked before “the mirror 
of the Word,” is a way of grounding one’s existence. Podmore, summing up 
Kierkegaard’s views on the matter, writes: “By faith’s self-surrendering of its own 
despair, the self realizes that God has hold of it.”217 
 Bradshaw also refers to Phil. 2:12-13 where Paul exhorts the faithful to work out 
their salvation “with fear and trembling:” “For it is God which worketh in you (ho 
energon en humin) both to will and to do (energein) of his good pleasure.” Bradshaw 
emphasizes the interplay between the energeia of God and human person” “The 
Philippians are both free agents responsible for their own salvation, and the arena in 
which God works to bring about that salvation.”218 Bradshaw also refers to Col. 1:29 
where Paul speaks of “striving according to his [Christ’s] working, which worketh in me 
mightily.” The Greek focuses on the connection between energeia and energein. The 
                                                 
216 Works of Love (hereafter WOL), 276. 
217 Kierkegaard and the Self before God, 177.  
218 “Divine Glory and Images,” 282. 
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passage could therefore be rendered: “Striving according to his energy, which is being 
energized in me.”219  
 As I have pointed out, Christ’s work, according to Kierkegaard, is always the 
work of love. Striving according to Christ’s work, striving according to his energy, which 
is energized in us, is to open ourselves up to God’s love which then flows through us to 
other people. The trajectory of Kierkegaard’s writings on the stages on life’s way is 
always oriented towards kenosis, openness, and vulnerability, of becoming aware of 
one’s brokenness and in humility and love accepting that brokenness so that it can be 
transformed into something very beautiful and perhaps even divine. This “immense 
passivity, vulnerability and wounded openness,” as George Pattison has put it, stands in 
stark contrast to most modern or post-modern conceptions of the self, perhaps most 
significantly with “the post-Enlightenment pursuit of autonomy.”220 But this conception 
of the self is, as I have argued, also quite different from most standard Protestant (and 
orthodox Lutheran) accounts of the self, insofar as it does not view human sin in terms of 
transgression or guilt nor does it view salvation primarily in terms of justification or 
atonement. Rather, the view of the human self in Kierkegaard’s works is highly dynamic 
and developmental, viewing sin as a basic fact of human existence that should be 
primarily understood in terms of its existential and psychological implications, while 
salvation is seen in terms of our ability to let go of our ego, of those elements that isolate 
us from each other and from God. Kierkegaard’s language of the believer “reflecting the 
image of God” echoes significant elements of Eastern Christian theology and spirituality, 
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especially when considered in relation to the essence-energies distinction, the notion of 
divinization or theosis, and the prevalent soteriology of the East, especially as developed 
by such writers as Irenaeus and Clement. Kierkegaard’s views on prayer are also deeply 
apophatic and indicate a view of spirituality that bears a striking resemblance to Eastern 
Orthodox hesychasm. In his treatise “One Who Prays Aright Struggles in Prayer and is 
Victorious” Kierkegaard writes:  
 
Whom should the struggler desire to resemble other than God? But if he 
himself is something or wants to be something, this something is sufficient 
to hinder the resemblance. Only when he himself becomes nothing, only 
then can God illuminate him so that he resembles God. No matter how 
great he imagines his self to be, he is unable to manifest himself in God’s 
likeness; God can imprint himself in him only when he himself has 
become nothing.221 
 
Even though there are fundamental differences between Kierkegaard’s views on sin and 
that of the Eastern Orthodox Church (of which I will have more to say in chapter five) a 
comparative analysis between Kierkegaard and Orthodoxy manages to highlight 
fascinating elements of Kierkegaard’s soteriology that have perhaps not received due 
attention in the secondary literature. Kierkegaard’s philosophy of sin and salvation is 
remarkably “Eastern” insofar as it highlights many of the elements that became central to 
the soteriology of the Greek Church. As I have pointed out, this is not due to the fact that 
Kierkegaard explicitly set out to write a pseudo-Orthodox theology but rather due to his 
reactionary criticism of Augustine and Luther, especially in relation to sin. In providing 
an alternative to Augustinian and Lutheran accounts of sin and salvation, Kierkegaard 
crafted an alternative view that echoes many of the core elements in the teachings of the 
Eastern Orthodox Church.   
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Chapter 3 – The Crucifixion and Resurrection of the Understanding: 
Kierkegaard’s Epistemology in Light of the East 
 
In this chapter I will explore Kierkegaard’s epistemology, especially in light of the 
ongoing scholarly debate that centers on to the extent to which Kierkegaard believed that 
human knowledge of God was a possibility. I will highlight certain parallels in 
Kierkegaard’s epistemology with the epistemological framework that developed in the 
Christian East to provide a new interpretive framework for understanding Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy. Much as with Kierkegaard’s writings on sin, his views on human knowledge 
tend to be interpreted within the boundaries of Western (mostly Augustinian and/or 
Thomistic) Christianity which, as I will argue, Kierkegaard transgressed in numerous 
ways. My analysis will center on Kierkegaard’s focus on relational knowledge and its 
relationship to discursive (“objective”) knowledge. Much of my analysis will engage the 
recent work done by Marilyn Piety on Kierkegaard’s epistemology. Piety’s book remains 
the only major English language work to center on this subject.1  
My primary aim in this chapter is twofold: First, to argue that there are important 
similarities between Kierkegaard’s notion of subjective, relational knowledge and the 
Greek epistemological term noesis, especially as the term is used in Eastern Orthodox 
epistemological thinking, and second, to show that Kierkegaard’s epistemology makes a 
clear distinction between positive (kataphatic) and negative (apophatic) knowledge, and 
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that he believes that knowledge of God is largely negative. I will explore the difference 
between the Eastern Orthodox and Western Christian (Protestant and Roman Catholic) 
understanding of the terms kataphatic and apophatic and argue that Kierkegaard’s 
position is much more in alignment with the Eastern Orthodox understanding of negative 
theology.  
 I will begin the chapter by giving a brief overview of Piety’s analysis of 
subjective and objective knowledge in Kierkegaard’s epistemology. Section 3.1 will 
include a discussion of the Kierkegaardian categories of passion and interest (Lidenskab 
and Interesse). Section 3.2 will then offer a brief “interlude” in the analysis to address an 
important issue in the overall scheme of this project, namely to what extent the 
Kierkegaardian notion of “passionate inwardness” and the ancient Christian teaching of 
apatheia are either diametrically opposed or spiritually concomitant. I will indeed be 
arguing that Kierkegaard’s view of passionate inwardness is not a reference to any sort of 
emotional fervor but rather a state of clearing away the conceptual thought-processes that 
make us unable to enter into communion with other human beings and with God. 
Following this interlude, I will resume my discussion of Kierkegaard’ epistemology per 
se and move on to a comparative analysis of Kierkegaard’s views on knowledge and the 
ancient Greek epistemological distinction between the faculties of nous and dianoia in 
section 3.4. I will then move on to a more in-depth analysis of subjective knowledge in 
Kierkegaard, focusing on his use of the Danish words Erkjendelse and Viden in section 
3.5. The former word denotes “acquaintance knowledge,” only available to us as existing 
individuals, while the latter refers to objective knowledge. Following this section is 
another interlude, section 3.6, this time devoted to a comparative analysis of 
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Kierkegaard’s views on knowing and the Logos theology of Maximus the Confessor. The 
reason for this second interlude is that Kierkegaard seems to suggest, in various places 
throughout the corpus, that knowledge of God and self-knowledge are two sides of the 
same coin. In doing so Kierkegaard hints at a peculiar kind of essentialism that can, at 
first glance, seem out of place in his existentialist philosophy. A comparison with 
Maximus reveals that Kierkegaardian “authenticity” can be fruitfully read as a reference 
to an “essential self” but that this essential self is grounded in the individual hypostasis of 
the person rather than in any sort of universal nature. Section 3.7 focuses on the role of 
suffering in Kierkegaard’s epistemology and section 3.8 looks at to what extent 
Kierkegaard can be viewed as an “apophatic” thinker. This last section will largely be 
devoted to offering a critique of Piety’s analysis of Kierkegaard and will offer an 
alternative way to understand what Kierkegaard means by knowledge of God.   
 
3.1 - Kierkegaardian Consciousness and Interesse / Subjective and Objective 
Knowledge 
Piety argues that “there are several kinds of knowledge according to Kierkegaard 
and that they can be divided into two basic sorts: ‘objective knowledge (den objective 
Viden)’ and ‘subjective knowledge (den subjective Viden).’”2 Objective knowledge is a 
purely descriptive sort of knowledge that is “not essentially related to the existence of the 
individual knower.”3 Subjective knowledge is “essentially related to the existence of the 
individual knower.”4 An example of objective knowledge would be knowledge gained 
                                                 
2 Piety, 3. See also CUP, 169.  
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid. 
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through the natural sciences while any kind of ethical or religious knowledge would be an 
example of subjective knowledge, i.e., knowledge that has to do with how one lives one’s 
life.  
 Piety further subdivides each kind of knowledge into two categories: Objective 
knowledge can be knowledge “in the strict sense” or knowledge “in a looser sense.” The 
former has to do with “formal certainty” while the latter has to do with “probability rather 
than certainty.”5 Subjective knowledge is divided into “subjective knowledge proper,” on 
the one hand, which is associated with “certitude, or psychological certainty,” and 
“pseudo-knowledge,” which refers to “a subject’s intellectual grasp of propositions that 
are essentially prescriptive but whose substance is not reflected in the existence of the 
‘knower.’”6  The category of “pseudo-knowledge” is especially interesting since it 
denotes a kind of “hypocrisy” or inauthenticity, a purported grasping of ethical or 
religious truths that nonetheless do not affect the individual self.  
 Before digging deeper into these distinctions, it is important to analyze 
Kierkegaard’s view of consciousness that grounds his epistemology. In The Sickness 
Unto Death, Anti-Climacus writes that “generally speaking, consciousness—that is, self-
consciousness—is decisive with regard to the self. The more consciousness, the more 
self.”7 Interestingly enough, the development of consciousness parallels the growing 
acuteness of anxiety in the self. As discussed in the previous chapter, Adam and Eve in 
paradise, according to Kierkegaard, before eating of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good 
and Evil, had a consciousness which was, at least to some extent, like that of a child. It is 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 SUD, 29.  
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only after appropriating the possibility of sin, of the concurrent repulsion and attraction 
that accompanies freedom, that the human self begins to truly develop (i.e., truly 
becomes a proper self). This also makes the self vulnerable to the possibility of despair. 
In Johannes Climacus, the consciousness of a child (and non-human animals), an 
“immediate” consciousness that has “doubt outside of itself,”8  is characterized in the 
following manner: “It consists of the data that is presented directly to the sensate self 
independently of how that data are interpreted or understood. The immediate is that 
which is ‘given’ directly to the self by the self’s sensory engagement with the world; it is 
that which the self, quite independently of its volition, receives.”9  
 As with all of Kierkegaard’s writing on the self, it is important to keep in mind 
that Kierkegaard is always aiming to understand every aspect of human existence, 
including consciousness, within a dynamic spectrum rather than using fixed categories. 
The person described in The Sickness Unto Death who despairs because he refuses to 
acknowledge he is in despair10 is in a state of pure immediacy because he refuses to 
acknowledge that he has an eternal self to despair over. The aesthete—the self that Anti-
Climacus describes as falling under the category of “despair in weakness”—has come to 
realize that he is a self but is failing to fully manifest that self and therefore seeks an 
authentic existence in the earthly (or in something earthly).11 Subsequent forms of 
despair, and the deepening authentication of the self throughout the ethico-religious 
stages of existence, show a concomitant change in consciousness where the self develops 
                                                 
8 JC, 168.  
9 Patrick Stokes, “’Interest’ in Kierkegaard’s Structure of Consciousness,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly 48, no. 4, issue 192 (2008): 438. 
10 SUD, 42-47. 
11 Ibid., 49-60. 
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from a childish/animal-like consciousness which deals directly with sense-data and 
instinct to an adult (spiritually developed) consciousness which deciphers sense-data as 
experience or event, i.e., as mediated by consciousness and self-consciousness.  
  It is important to note that even though Climacus speaks of an “increase” of 
consciousness, existentially speaking, there is no way for a human being, even a very 
young child, to experience reality in a way that is not mediated by consciousness. 
Consciousness is the conceptually ordered medium by which human beings experience 
reality: “While Climacus does take the concept of raw sensibilia seriously, he nonetheless 
holds that experience is not prior to our conceptualization but rather that experience is 
conceptualization; all our experience is always already conceptually structured.”12 But 
Kierkegaard’s aim is not to analyze this conceptual structure in an abstract manner, like 
Kant does with the Categories. Rather, he seeks to understand how the lived experience 
of the individual, and the different structures of the existential self, allow human beings 
to appropriate reality in different ways. Patrick Stokes, in his study of consciousness in 
Kierkegaard, writes: “Neither immediacy nor mediacy can intelligibly exist 
independently, but they are rather always already present in any instantiation of 
consciousness. […] So consciousness, according to the formulation of Johannes 
Climacus, is the ‘collision’ of immediacy and mediacy, or as he then puts it, the collision 
of reality and ideality.”13  
                                                 
12 Stokes, 440.  
13 Ibid., 441. A detailed analysis of the incongruence between the ideal and actual falls somewhat 
outside the boundaries of this project, though it will be discussed in an ancillary manner throughout this 
chapter. Kierkegaard 
 usually refers to “actual being” with the Danish words Tilværelsen, Væren, and Realitet. Actual being 
primarily denotes temporality and change. As Piety points out, “mathematical objects [for Kierkegaard], 
have ideal being, but they do not have actual being The being of mathematical objects is purely abstract, 
which is to say that it is timeless and eternal” (p. 26). Furthermore, Kierkegaard differentiates between 
“factual being” (faktisk Væren) and “ideal being” (ideel Væren). Piety notes that factual being refers to “the 
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 In Johannes Climacus Kierkegaard writes: “Ideality and reality therefore 
collide—in what medium? In time? That is indeed an impossibility. In eternity? That is 
indeed an impossibility. In what then? In consciousness, there is the contradiction.”14 We 
can see that consciousness is where the synthesis of the opposing but correlative poles of 
existence occurs, as Anti-Climacus explains in The Sickness Unto Death.15 
Consciousness is where time and eternity, finitude and infinitude, collide.16 But it is only 
in a certain kind of consciousness where this can occur, namely a self-consciousness 
(Bevisthed).17 As Johannes Climacus makes clear, human consciousness is a “triad.”18 
“The triad here consists of the sensory impression, the consciousness of the sensory 
                                                 
being of everything that has reality in itself and not simply as an idea” (p. 21). This distinction is most 
clearly outlined by Climacus in the Fragments in the critique of Spinoza’s ontological proof for the 
existence of God (Fragments, 41-42). The problem with the ontological proof is that it circumvents the 
problem of talking about whether or not God exists, the difficulty of which is to “grasp factual being and to 
bring God’s ideality into factual being” (p. 42).  
As will become clear in the following discussion, Kierkegaard’s point is to undermine the Hegelian 
notion that ideality and actuality, mediacy and immediacy, somehow map onto each other. Human beings 
always experience reality conceptually, to some extent. There is no way for us to experience reality as it 
“truly” is, i.e., as apart from consciousness. This is not just an epistemological point but rather an 
existential/ethical/spiritual one as it has immense implications for the way in which we try to relate to God. 
Climacus, for example, asserts that the truths of science (speculation) are always just an approximation 
(CUP, 159). As Hannay notes, a “proof” for Kierkegaard is therefore always associated “with 
psychological rather than factual or logical certainty” (Hannay, 138-39).  
See Gregor Malantschuk, Nøglegreber I Søren Kierkegaards Tænkning, ed. Grethe Kjær and Paul 
Müller (Copenhagen: Reitzels Forlag, 1993), 210-12. 
14 JC, 171. 
15 SUD, 29-30. 
16 This is not to say that to have a consciousness is the same as having “Spirit,” i.e. having an 
authentic relation to oneself where the poles of existence are correctly synthesized. One’s consciousness 
must be aligned in a certain way in order for this to happen. The purpose of this chapter is to map out how 
Kierkegaard thinks this is possible. Kierkegaard’s epistemology is therefore deeply intertwined with his 
“psychology,” i.e., his writings on despair, sin, and the possible responses to these conditions.  
17 Stokes writes that the Danish word “refers more explicitly to the ‘awareness of awareness,’ i.e., 
self-reflexive consciousness, than its English or German equivalents do. Stokes references Elrod on this. 
See John W. Elrod, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard’s Pseudonymous Works (Princeton: Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1975), 50. In addition, it is worth remaking that the verb vide means “to know” while 
bevidsthed  means “awareness” or “consciousness.” Interestingly, there is no distinction made in the Danish 
between consciousness and self-consciousness, i.e., self-awareness. To be conscious of something means to 
be conscious of oneself (being conscious of the thing in question). The most immediate translation of “self-
conscious” into Danish would be genert or forlagen, as in “shy.”    
18 JC, 169. 
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impression (thus its translation into ideality), and the I that holds these together.”19 As 
Stokes points out, the “I” posits itself in relation to the mis-relation of the ideal and the 
actual, which is what creates doubt. C. Stephen Evans furthermore writes that the “I” is 
not only the “event” of this dichotomy (the real and the ideal) being put into a dynamic 
relation but that it is furthermore the “event” of moving past them, meaning that the 
individual consciousness enables reflection (and hence doubt) but that it also enables us 
to put a halt to reflection and to make a decision.20  
Kierkegaard’s examination of consciousness differs a great deal from a Cartesian 
or Kantian analysis of consciousness. As Schrag points out, Kierkegaard’s intention is to 
analyze “a pre-cognitive level of experience which undercuts the subject-object 
dichotomy and which is characterized by an existential intentionality… Kierkegaard 
speaks of the priority of the ethically existing self over the thinking self.”21 In Johannes 
Climacus this is expressed in the identification of consciousness with interest (interesse): 
“Reflection is the possibility of the relation. This can also be stated as follows: Reflection 
is disinterested. Consciousness, however, is the relation and thereby is interest, a duality 
that is perfectly and with pregnant double meaning expressed in the word ‘interest 
(interesse [being between].’”22 Note that this means that for Kierkegaard, ideality 
(Idealitet) denotes not just the conceptual framework by which we experience reality but 
also the value-laden interesse that directs that consciousness. Stokes, arguing against 
Roberts and Westphal, argues that it is important to demarcate between interest and 
                                                 
19 Stokes, 443. 
20 C. Stephen Evans, “Where There’s a Will There’s a Way: Kierkegaard’s Theory of Action,” in 
Writing the Politcs of Difference, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York: SUNY Press, 2007), 5-33.  
21 Craig O. Schrag, Existence and Freedom (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1961), 22.  
22 JC, 170. 
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passion (lidenskab) in this regard.23 Interest is the essential characteristic of human 
consciousness. We cannot help but be interested in the world around us. We are not pure 
reflection, nor could we ever be. The purported “objective” analysis of the Hegelian 
scholar or the scientist is ultimately a ruse. “Interest is a characteristic of vision, a seeing 
of our relationship to what we see. Interest here constitutes the non-neutrality of the 
conscious subject, not simply in its reflection, but in its apprehension. We see the world 
as already value-laden.”24 Even though reflection is a necessary condition of 
consciousness, we always reach a point where we existentially engage with that which we 
reflect upon, which ultimately means making a decision: “[To choose is] becoming 
decisively interested. It is allowing one’s interest or attraction to win out, to take 
precedence, i.e. to engage us decisively.”25 The scientist or scholar who takes up a 
position of disinterested analysis takes up that position as if it is humanly possible to 
view reality in a purely objective manner, even though it is not.  
It must be repeatedly emphasized that Kierkegaard is not arguing against 
scientific/Hegelian/scholarly analysis per se. He is, rather, trying to point out the limits of 
such an endeavor, both due to the fact that such a method can never give us absolute 
                                                 
23 Stokes, 450-452. See Robert C. Roberts, “Passion and Reflection,” in International Kierkegaard 
Commentary: Two Ages, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon GA: Mercer University Press, 1984), 88. See also 
Merold Westphal, Becoming a Self: A Reading of Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript (West 
Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1996), 51.  
24 Stokes, 453. See also M. Jaime Ferreira, Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in 
Kierkegaardian Faith (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1991), 125-26. 
25 Ferreira, 127. The connection between interest and desire is never explicitly developed by 
Kierkegaard but it is an underlying theme of the pseudonymous works. The analysis of sin and despair in 
The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death shows that our interested engagement with the world 
is often heavily influenced by our desires. The aesthete, for example, engages with the world in a highly 
interested manner (as opposed to the speculative thinker) but this interest is largely dominated by his 
desires, many of which fail to provide any satisfaction. The development through the ethico-religious 
stages shows how our interest can be directed towards things that provide us with more lasting peace and 
satisfaction than what we seek in the aesthetic sphere. This primarily has to do with our growing awareness 
of the absolute-telos that is an essential element of what it means to be human i.e., the fact that this world 
will never fully satisfy us.  
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certainty, even though it may sometimes seem to do so, and also because it betrays the 
existential intentionality that grounds all human thinking and understanding. The scientist 
must ultimately make an interested decision in her analysis since reality can only be 
understood in terms of probability and not certainty, since the ideal and the actual can 
never map onto each other perfectly.  
Interest, therefore, is always a part of consciousness, even in so-called 
“disinterested” thinking. Passion, on the other hand, can be entirely lacking in our 
engagement with the world. Passion is the full awareness of interest, the appropriation of 
it, where our solicitude for the world around us becomes a part of an authentic existence, 
a taking up of the mantle of understanding the world in a manner that is fully engaged 
with it. A passionate engagement with the world (which ultimately means a passionate 
engagement with our own self) is authentic insofar as it is true to the telos of our 
consciousness: “Thought that is pervaded by a non-thetic sense of self-involvement is 
truer to the self’s status as a concrete being that finds itself ‘between’ ideality and 
actuality than disinterested thought that never refers back to the condition of the 
thinker.”26 Again it is worth remind ourselves that even though Kierkegaard clearly views 
a lack of passionate engagement with the world as inauthentic and potentially dangerous, 
spiritually speaking, he nonetheless clearly believed that the “disinterested” point of view 
could be a fruitful one,27 at least in certain circumstances. That being said, Kierkegaard’s 
concern about the inauthentic nature of the (supposedly) disinterested stance is not just 
                                                 
26 Stokes, 457-58. Notice again the play of “interest” in the Danish interesse (literally inter-esse, the 
act of being in-between reality and ideality).  
27 See JP 1, 197 / IV C 100, where Kierkegaard suggests that the various sciences should be  “ordered 
according to the different ways in which they accent being and how the relatonship to being provides 
reciprocal advantage.” In a later journal entry, though, Kierkegaard suggests that there is an inherent danger 
in all scientific (disinterested) thinking, claiming that “In the end all corruption will come from the natural 
sciences” (JP 3, 2809 / VII1 A 186.  
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epistemological but rather ethical/religious. In his study of Kierkegaard and Paul 
Feyerabend, Ian James Kidd writes:  
 
Both argue that ‘scientistic’ objectivity is not just philosophically 
incoherent but also detrimental to human wellbeing, since it radically 
devalues human capacities for self-development. This is why Feyerabend 
expresses alarm at the devaluation of ‘personal connections,’ and why he 
echoes Kierkegaard’s warning that our ‘activity as an objective observer 
of nature’ will diminish our capacity to be a ‘human being.’28  
 
The connection in Kierkegaard’s writings between ethics and epistemology arise 
from his view that an authentic existence largely hinges upon self-knowledge. The 
combined force of The Sickness Unto Death and The Concept of Anxiety describes an 
increase in self-consciousness which empowers the human being to increasingly face 
despair and to potentially overcome it. When the scientist or (“Hegelian”) scholar takes 
on the position of a disinterested observer as if this was an actual possibility they are, in 
effect, taking on a position which is essentially dehumanizing and inauthentic to the 
human condition (given the fact that all human consciousness is interested and 
inextricably bound up with a lidenskab which engages with the world in a personal 
manner). Even though there may be obvious advantages to this point of view insofar as it 
allows us to further develop technology and affords us an understanding about our place 
in the natural world, it is nonetheless fraught with danger, especially as it ceases to be 
viewed as a performative act which stands in opposition to our “natural” engagement 
with the world and becomes an all-encompassing, totalizing manner of knowing and 
seeing. In The Concluding Unscientific Postscript Climacus writes that the objective 
                                                 
28 Ian James Kidd, “Objectivity, abstraction, and the individual: The influence of Soren Kierkegaard 
on Paul Feyerabend,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 42 (2011): 126.  
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scientist/scholar “disappears from himself”29 and that this disappearance threatens to 
become the default mode by which human beings attempt to understand themselves and 
the world around them: “To be a human being has been abolished, and every speculative 
thinker confuses himself with humankind.”30  
 
3.2 - Orthodox Writings on Consciousness and Thinking  
Before further exploring Kierkegaard’s epistemology, especially his writings on 
subjective knowledge, I would like to begin to map out important ways in which the 
Eastern Orthodox spiritual tradition parallels many of the primary philosophical issues at 
stake in Kierkegaard’s writings on knowledge. A great deal of Orthodox spiritual thought 
is focused on the distinction made in ancient Greek epistemology between discursive, 
systematic thinking (dianoia) and an intuitive grasp of first principle (noesis). The 
distinction is famously made in the divided line passage in Plato’s Republic (505a - 511e) 
and is further developed in Aristotle’s De Anima, especially the notorious III.4 and III.5. 
For Plato and Aristotle, dianoia denotes discursive, systematic thinking, which 
encompasses what Plato calls “mathematicals” (510b-511e), where the soul is “forced to 
investigate from hypotheses, proceeding not to a first principle but to a conclusion. […].” 
Noesis, on the other hand, proceeds “from a hypothesis but without the images used in 
the previous subsection, using forms themselves and making its investigation through 
them.” Noesis grasps first principles in a direct, intuitive manner. Given that these first 
principles are the forms (eidei) of reality, nous is an experiential faculty, which allows for 
an immediate apprehension of the highest spiritual realities. Seeing as how the divided 
                                                 
29 CUP, VII, 42, 56.  
30 Ibid., VII, 102, 124.  
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line maps onto the cave allegory, the philosophers, trained in dialectic, are able to see 
reality for what it truly is without the use of any “shadows,” i.e. images, theories, or 
systematic attempts at rationally analyzing reality.  
Though it falls outside the scope of this project to fully address the extent to 
which Plato and Aristotle are referring to what might be called a “mystical” apprehension 
of reality, this is certainly the way in which the Eastern Christian tradition understood 
this terminology. The writings of Gregory of Nyssa and Evagrius Ponticus form some of 
the earliest attempts at systematically appropriating this epistemological distinction and 
relating it to the specific religious and philosophical context of Christian revelation. 
Nyssa especially emphasized the notion of the nous as constituting the unity of human 
consciousness, likening it to ineffable nature of the godhead.31 Nyssa furthermore 
emphasizes the connection of the nous to the body and the way in which the body and the 
spiritual intellect must be harmonized in order for the believer to acquire true wisdom, 
i.e. knowledge of God.32 This is the beginning of a long epistemological tradition in the 
Christian East, which emphasizes the relationship between the nous and the figurative as 
well as literal imagery of the human “heart,” which represents both the physical and 
spiritual center of the human person.33 The object of mystical prayer is to center the nous 
in the heart and to overcome the influx of distracting thoughts and emotions (logismoi). 
                                                 
31 Gregory of Nyssa, “Making of Man”, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 5, accessed 8/24/2015, 
http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/2914.htm, 10 [152-153] and 11 [153-156] 
32 Nyssa, “Great Catechism,” 8[33], “Making of Man,” 12-15 [160-177], “Soul and Resurrection” [45-
48].  
33 The function of the nous as it enters the heart in the Eastern Orthodox tradition is to enable us to 
have knowledge (or awareness) of a person rather than a form or essence. As I will illustrate in section 3.5, 
such relational knowledge is a central aspect of Kierkegaard’s epistemology. This theme will also be 
revisited in section 4.2 in chapter 4. For now, my goal is to focus on the importance of the nous/dianoia 
distinction in relation to Kierkegaard’s critique of the kind of speculative thinking that wants to reduce 
human knowing to dianoetic reasoning.  
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St. Neilos the Ascetic, a fifth century contemplative writer, notes the nous/dianoia 
distinction in his Ascetic Discourse: “The intellect (nous) in each of us resides within like 
a king, while the reason (dianoia) acts as door-keeper of the senses. When the reason 
occupies itself with bodily things… the enemy without difficulty slips past unnoticed and 
slays the intellect.”34   
Epistemology in Eastern Orthodox thought is also directly linked to the 
development of the human psyche and to specific spiritual practices such as asceticism 
and prayer. This is especially apparent in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, who 
understood the concept of nous not only in epistemological terms but also as having 
enormous ethical and existential implications. In his analysis of Nyssa’s writings, Donald 
L. Ross writes:  
 
There are two further characteristics of the human nous according to 
Gregory. First, because the human nous is created in the image of God, it 
possesses a certain ‘dignity of royalty‘(to tes basileias axioma) that is 
lacking in the rest of creation. For it means that there is an aspect of the 
human person that is not of this world. Of no other organism can that be 
said. The souls of other species are totally immanent in their bodies. They 
have only energies, in other words. Only the human nous has a 
transcendent nature in addition to its energies. But that more than anything 
else is what makes us like God. Now God is of supreme worth. 
Consequently human beings have an inherent ‘dignity of royalty’ just by 
virtue of being human.  
Second, the nous is free. In an early work Gregory argues strenuously 
against astral determinism. In his more mature reflections, Gregory derives 
the freedom of the nous from the freedom of God. For God, being 
dependent on nothing, governs the universe through the free exercise of 
will; and the nous is created in God’s image.35 
  
                                                 
34 Philokalia, St. Neilos the Ascetic, “Ascetic Discourse,” in The Philokalia: The Complete Text, Vol. 
1, 210. For a discussion of the translation of nous and dianoia and their respective meanings in the context 
of the Philokalia, see 362 and 364.  
35 Donald L Ross., “Gregory of Nyssa,” The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, accessed: 8/8/2014, 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/gregoryn/. See Patrologia Graeca, Vols. 44-46, 132-36 and 145–73.  
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Evagrius Ponticus, similarly, sees the nous as representing the ultimate telos of the 
human person, namely the “communion of the intellect with God.”36 Some commentators 
have wanted to argue that a split occurs in early Eastern mysticism in the Christian church 
between writers who focus on the role of the intellect (nous) in communion with God and 
those who focus on the role of the heart.37 Others, such as Kallistos Ware, see the two as 
being intrinsically connected. Ware argues that in texts such as the “Macarian Homilies,” 
which emphasize the role of the kardia in the relationship between human beings and God, 
the heart does not simply represent the affective elements of the human person but rather 
“the moral and spiritual centre of the human person considered as an integral unity; it is 
the seat not only of the feelings but of intelligence, conscience and wisdom.”38 Ware also 
emphasizes the fact that in dianoia “the thinker is conscious of the object of his thought as 
being ‘other than himself, but in noesis the subject-object distinction disappears, and the 
nous is identified with that which it apprehends. Dianoia admits of error, but noesis does 
not.”39  
The Eastern Orthodox writings on the nous and how it is differentiated from 
systematic thinking is well summed up by Kallistos Ware: 
 
With his soul (psyche) man engages in scientific or philosophical inquiry, 
analyzing the data of his sense-experience by means of the discursive 
reason. With his spirit (pneuma), which is sometimes termed nous or 
spiritual intellect, he understands eternal truth about God or about the 
logoi or inner essences of created things, not through deductive reasoning, 
but by direct apprehension or spiritual perception—by a kind of intuition 
that St Isaac the Syrian calls ‘simple cognition.’ The spirit or spiritual 
                                                 
36 Evagrius, “On Prayer,” The Philokalia: The Complete Text, Vol. 1, 57. 
37 Irénée Hauser, “Les Grands Courants de la Spiritualité orientale,” Orientalia Christiania Periodica, 
I (1935): 121-28.    
38 Kallistos Ware, “Nous and Noesis in Plato, Aristotle and Evagrius of Pontus,” Diotima 13 (1985): 
159. 
39 Ibid., 160. 
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intellect is thus distinct from man’s reasoning powers and his aesthetic 
emotions, and superior to both of them.40 
 
 In the previous chapter, I outlined the ways in which Kierkegaard’s understanding 
of human freedom and the development of the self connect to his understanding of sin 
and salvation. If we situate Kierkegaard’s philosophical and theological concerns as 
paralleling those of Eastern Orthodox writers, we can now see how these issues all 
interrelate with Kierkegaard’s highly nuanced epistemology. The kenosis described by 
Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto Death where the self stands “transparent before 
God” is perhaps not best understood in terms of an irrationalism or extreme skepticism 
but rather as a description of a kind of noesis where the self stands naked before “the 
mirror of the Word.”41   
 There are good reasons to view Kierkegaard’s epistemology as a continuation of 
the patristic project. As previously stated, Kierkegaard’s view of human consciousness is 
triadic, i.e., consisting of the object of our experience, the consciousness of that object 
and the “I” that holds these together (or rather, holds the misrelation of these two things 
together). As Evans points out in his contention that the “I” also constitutes the “event” 
by which this misrelation is “overcome,”42 Kierkegaard saw our engagement with the 
world as an immersive one. The “dispassionate,” analytic reasoning of the systematic 
thinker holds subject and object apart, thereby killing all passionate engagement with the 
object in question. Yet passionate engagement is essential when it comes to ethical and 
religious categories, which means that the division between subject and object must be 
                                                 
40 Ware, The Orthodox Way, 48. 
41 JP 4, 3902 / X4 A 412; SUD, p. 79. 
42 See Evans, 5-33. 
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broken down. The reality of the ethical/religious cannot be analyzed or systematized but 
must rather be lived. The reason for why passion is so integrally connected to the ethical 
and religious is that these subjective categories—which have to do with our 
“inwardness,” i.e., our lived, individual reality—ultimately correspond to objective 
uncertainty. As Climacus writes in the Postscript: 
 
An objective uncertainty, held fast through appropriation with the most 
passionate inwardness, is the truth, the highest truth there is for an 
existing person. At the point where the road swings off (and where that is 
cannot be stated objectively, since it is precisely subjectivity), objective 
knowledge is suspended. Objectively he then has only uncertainty, but this 
is precisely what intensifies the infinite passion of inwardness, and truth is 
precisely the daring venture of choosing the objective uncertainty with the 
passion of the infinite.43  
 
 It is precisely because the truths of existing individuals, i.e., subjective truths, are 
not certain that we feel passionately about them. If God’s existence could be objectively 
proved, we would not feel one way or another about the fact that God either does or does 
not exist (whichever the case would be). As Climacus points out: “In a mathematical 
proposition, for example, the objectivity is given, but therefore its truth is also an 
indifferent truth.”44 Subjective truth differs from objective truth primarily in the way that 
it can deeply affect who we are as human beings. Truths of logic and mathematics have 
no bearing, on the other hand, on who we are as individuals.45 Ethical and religious 
truths, on the other hand, shape our understanding of ourselves and thereby shape how we 
choose to live in the world. This is why the truths of ethics and religion must be ventured. 
                                                 
43 CUP, 203. 
44 Ibid., 204. 
45 This is not to say that they don't provide us with important information. They simply provide to tell 
us anything about the self, i.e., who I am and what it means to live my life. 
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They involve a risk, precisely because we could be wrong. A good example of this is 
when our partner in a romantic relationship tells us for the first time that he or she loves 
us. When the woman who is now my wife told me for the first time that she loved me I 
was terrified because I had to respond, and my response would reflect something 
fundamental about who I am as a human being. But there was no way for me to 
objectively know whether or not I loved her or if she, in fact, actually loved me. There is 
no formula, equation, or system that can reveal such truths. This is why speculation must 
be brought to a halt by our self-awareness, the awareness of the “I” that is the “event” (to 
use Evans’ term) of our consciousness. There is no absolute, precise, sure answer to love, 
or to any ethical/religious truth, for that matter. This is why we must resign ourselves to 
the fact that there is no objective truth that applies in such a scenario and instead turn 
towards inwardness, passion, and subjective truth.  
 
3.3 - Interlude: Passion in Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodoxy 
Before continuing with my analysis of how the nous/dianoia distinction in 
Eastern Orthodoxy relates to Kierkegaard’s epistemology I would like to address the 
concept of passion(s) in Kierkegaard’s philosophy and the Eastern Orthodox tradition.46 
In some ways, Kierkegaard’s lidenskab resembles the use of pathē as it is used in the 
Greek philosophical tradition and its later appropriation in the Christian tradition, i.e., as 
denoting emotion and desire. Yet there are also important differences between the two. It 
is especially important to have conceptual clarity in the case of these terms since 
                                                 
46 Portions of this section were originally developed in a paper submitted for a class on Monastic 
Theology at Marquette University in the fall of 2009. I owe a debt of gratitude to Bishop Alexander 
Golitzin for his comments and insights during the course.   
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lidenskab is an essential element of not only Kierkegaard’s epistemology but his entire 
philosophy, and apatheia is a core spiritual principle in the Eastern Orthodox tradition. 
On the face of it, it might seem that Kierkegaard’s call for “passionate inwardness” 
contradicts the Eastern Orthodox notion of “passionlessness,” of overcoming our unruly 
desires and emotions. I will argue that this is not necessarily the case. There is an 
important strain of thought in the Eastern Orthodox tradition that holds that apatheia, 
correctly understood, does not mean overcoming the passions (our desires and emotions) 
but rather transfiguring them in a way that allows us to direct them towards communion 
and love rather than selfish gratification. I will argue that the same ethical dimension 
informs Kierkegaard’s notion of lidenskab, especially when it is understood in light of the 
“stages on life’s way.”  
The Stoic concept of apatheia has a long history in Christian spirituality, dating 
back to the first century with Ignatius of Antioch who used the concept to describe Christ 
himself.47 It was later appropriated by Clement of Alexandria and subsequently by the 
developing monastic tradition in the fourth century.48 The use of the concept met with 
some resistance, especially in the Western part of the church, with Jerome critiquing 
Evagrius’ use of the term and Cassian choosing to replace it with the concept “purity of 
heart.”49 Apatheia nonetheless gained increasing popularity in Christian literature. A 
prime reason for this may have been the fact that a core component of the Stoic use of the 
word was its relation to askesis. Apatheia was considered to be a techné, the art of living 
                                                 
47 Ignatius of Antioch, The Epistles of St Clement of Rome and St Ignatius of Antioch, trans. James A. 
Kleist (Westminster: The Newman Bookshop, 1946), 63. 
48 John McGuckin, “Apatheia,” in The Westminster Handbook to Patristic Theology, 18.  
49 See C. Joest, “Die Bedeutung von acedia und apatheia bei Evagrios Pontikos,” Studia Monastica, 
35 (1993): 7-53; Antoine Guillaumont, Les “Kephalaia Gnostica” d'Evagre le Pontique et l'histoire de 
l'origenisme chez les Grec et les Syriens (Paris: Editions Du Seuil, 1962). 
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one’s life in a way that most conducive to eudaimonia.50 Apatheia was juxtaposed with 
purely abstract, metaphysical concepts that were in and of themselves not conducive to 
happiness. Zeno, whose primary philosophical influence was Socrates, saw philosophy as 
a way of life and apatheia as a core component of the philosophical path.51 Apatheia 
revolved around the ability to address our incorrect responses to external circumstances 
over which we have no control. The Stoics did not believe that human beings could 
achieve a state of complete passionlessness, i.e. of being completely immutable or 
unmoved by external reality, but rather that we could overcome our enslavement to 
emotional states that often seem out of our control. Human beings are able to control their 
passions because they have reason (logos) which is the mark of the divine in them.52 
Stoic theology and anthropology were deeply intertwined, with human happiness 
primarily understood in terms of our ability to form a blessed (makaria) relationship with 
the divine. The telos of human existence is therefore to align the human logos with the 
divine Logos that permeates the universe, a state of being that the Stoics described as 
being “in accordance with nature” (kata phusin).53  
 As Christian writers began using the concept more seriously, especially following 
the influence of Clement, apatheia began to evolve from its Stoic origins. A primary 
element of this evolution was the Christian emphasis that the state of apatheia was not 
one where emotions and desire were extinguished54 but rather as a state where harmony is 
                                                 
50 See John Sellars, Stoicism (UK: Acumen Publishing Ltd., 2006), 27-30. 
51 Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions of the Philosophers, ed. Tiziano Dorandi (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 2013), 7.2-3. 
52 Willem S. Vorster, Speaking of Jesus: Essays on Biblical Language, Gospel Narrative and the 
Historical Jesus, ed. Botha, J. Eugene (Boston: Brill, 1999), 116. 
53 Sellars, Stoicism, 81-106. 
54 As previously noted, this was also not the case for the majority of Stoic writers, though the concept 
was often mischaracterized in this way, especially by critics such as Jerome. See n. 47 above. 
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achieved between the affective faculties and the human nous. In his introduction to 
Evagrios’ Praktikos, John Baumberger writes: “Clement does not go so far as to convey 
that all emotion is extinguished in the man who possesses this state of harmony. Rather, 
he sees it as the full possession, under the influence of divine contemplation, of the 
affective faculties, so that disordered passions are resolved into a state of abiding calm.”55  
 Clement also made an important contribution to the Christian appropriation of 
apatheia when he coupled the concept with agape. Clement saw apatheia as being a form 
of kenosis where the ego-self is transcended and the true self of the human person 
materializes in her relationship with God. Apatheia, for Clement, was an essential 
component in contemplation, deification, and the union of the human soul with God.56  
 Evagrius Pontikos combined elements of Clement’s use of the term with elements 
of Origen. For Evagrius, apatheia can never have the connotation of permanent 
impassibility. It is, rather, a dynamic state, nourished by love, humility, and repentance.57 
Evagrius was clear on the fact that human beings will continue to struggle throughout 
their earthly life, even if they achieve a state of apatheia. Far from seeing this as a bad 
thing, Evagrius saw it as a sign of the deeply personal nature of human love, a love that 
ultimately reflects the divine love of God for human beings. Apatheia, for Evagrius, was 
not a levelling out of emotions but rather a state where the passions no longer inhibit the 
manifestation of love in the human heart.58   
                                                 
55 John Bamberger, The Praktikos & Chapters on Prayer (Michigan: Cisterciana Publications, 1981), 
lxxxiii. 
56 Louis Bouyer, The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers (Paris: Desclee Company, 
1960), 274. 
57 Baumberger, lxxxv 
58 See Jeremy Driscoll, Steps to Spiritual Perfection: Studies on Spiritual Progress in Evagrius 
Ponticus (New Jersey: The Newman Press, 2005), 79; Praktikos 35 and 36; and Baumberger, lxxxv. 
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 Evagrius’ writings on apatheia reveal the most fundamental difference between 
the Stoic use of the concept and the later Christian appropriation, namely the divergent 
understandings of noesis in these traditions. The function of the nous in the Greek 
philosophical tradition was an immediate grasp of the highest principles of reality. The 
nous in the Christian tradition, especially in the Greek speaking world, was understood in 
much more personal terms. The purpose of spiritual askesis was for the nous to descend 
into the heart (the spiritual and physical center) of the human person and to thereby allow 
the human person to be transfigured by God’s energeia, which are always understood in 
personal terms.59   
This distinction is readily apparent in Evagrius’ distinction between the two levels 
of contemplation: Contemplation of nature (theoria phusike) and the “higher” 
contemplation of the Trinity (thelogia). The former bears some resemblance with the 
Stoic notion of living kata phusin, in accordance with nature, of being able to 
contemplate the fundamental nature of reality. The latter level of contemplation, on the 
other hand, achievable only through apatheia, does not represent an intellectual activity 
but rather spiritual transformation where the human soul becomes a “mirror of God.”60 In 
achieving this state, the human person becomes the place (topos) of God, a manifestation 
of divine love. Evagrios writes: “When the spirit has put off the old man to replace him 
with the new man, created by charity, then he will see that his own state at the time of 
prayer resembles that of a sapphire; it is as clear and bright as the very sky. The 
                                                 
59 See Kallistos Ware, “Nous and Noesis in Plato, Aristotle and Evagrius of Ponticus,” Diotima 13 
(1985): 158-163. 
60 Baumberger, xci. 
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Scriptures refer to this experience as the place of God which was seen by our ancestors, 
the elders, at Mount Sinai.”61 
The role of apatheia in this process is related to Evagrius’ epistemology, which 
was highly influenced by the Stoic philosophers. According to Columba Stewart, 
Evagrius distinguished between “thoughts” (logismoi) and “concepts” or “depictions” 
(noemata).62 The former is an external suggestion of some sort (sometimes demonic in 
nature) and the latter is “the means by which the mind processes information.”63 
Evagrius’ epistemology, influenced as it was by both Stoic and Aristotelian philosophy, 
understood the function of the mind in terms of these noemata, of impressions or 
depictions made on the mind from external sources. 
 As Stewart notes, these noemata can bear “positive, neutral, or negative moral 
valence.”64 The noemata are simply the functioning processes of the mind, and the extent 
to which they influence us is entirely up to how we react to the “impressions” made upon 
us through our experiences. True prayer, for Evagrius, consists largely in the ability to set 
these noemata aside. This is essential due to the fact that God has no form or image, nor 
is he a concept to be grasped by the mind. Stewart writes that: “According to Evagrius, 
‘pure prayer’ is the move beyond all sensory knowledge (and corresponding mental 
impressions) to the God who is without form or body.”65  
Apatheia, therefore, is the “letting go” of conceptual thinking, the clearing away 
of the noemata (whether they be “good” or “bad” in nature). Theologia, according to 
                                                 
61 Baumberger, xci, n. 281.  
62 Columba Stewart, “Imageless Prayer and the Theological Vision of Evagrius Ponticus,” Journal of 
Early Christian Studies 9, no. 2 (2001): 173-204. 
63 Ibid., 187. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 190. 
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Evagrius, is a state of pure receptivity where the human being stands completely open 
and vulnerable to God, where the love of god flows freely through us to the world around 
us. Agape is, therefore, reveled to be a state of being rather than an affective state. This 
does not mean that one becomes unfeeling or impassible but that one’s emotional and 
intellectual faculties are opened up to an experience that transcends both. 
  A great deal of Evagrius’ understanding of apatheia and imageless prayer would 
become core components of Eastern Orthodox spirituality. Gregory Palamas, quoting 
Solomon in the Triads, speaks of prayer as “a sensation intellectual and divine.” He goes 
on to say: “By adding those two adjectives, [Solomon] urges his hearer to consider it 
neither as sensation nor as an intellection, for neither is the activity of the intelligence a 
sensation, nor that of the sense an intellection. The ‘intellectual sensation’ is thus 
different from both. Following the great Denys, one should perhaps call it union, and not 
knowledge.”66 Palamas also followed Evagrius in coupling apatheia with agape and 
promoting the notion that the passions were not, in and of themselves, corruptive 
influences and that they harm us only insofar as we let them control us. In fact, Palamas 
went so far as to speak of “the blessed passions,” speaking of “common activities of body 
and soul, which, far from nailing the spirit to the flesh, serve to draw the flesh to a dignity 
close to that of the spirit, and persuade it too to tend towards what is above.”67  
                                                 
66 Gregory Palamas, The Triads, ed. John Meyendorff , trans. Nicholas Gendle (New York: Paulist 
Press, 1983), I. iii. 20, p. 37.   
67 Ibid., II. ii. 20, p. 51. It should be noted that the view expressed here concerning the role of passions 
in the spiritual life, though influential, was not the sole view expressed in Eastern Christian spirituality. 
Gregory of Nyssa, for example, viewed all passions as corrupt activities of the mind brought about by the 
fall and that the purpose of the spiritual life is the eradication of the passions and not their transfiguration. 
Maximus the Confessor, on the other hand, expressed a view that was very much in agreement with 
Evagrios and Palamas, i.e., that the passions are to be transfigured rather than eradicated. See J. Warren 
Smith, Passion and Paradise: Human and Divine Emotion in the Thought of Gregory of Nyssa (New York: 
The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2004) and Adam G. Cooper, The Body in St. Maximus the Confessor: 
Holy Flesh, Wholly Deified (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). See also Kallistos Ware, “The 
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Kierkegaard’s views on the passions appear throughout the corpus, though 
perhaps most prominently in the Climacian writings. In the Postscript, Climacus writes: 
“In relation to an eternal happiness as the absolute good, pathos does not mean words but 
that this idea transforms the whole existence of the existing person.”68 A core element of 
this transformative power of the passions is a distinction that is made between two kinds 
of pathos: Esthetic and existential: “Esthetic pathos expresses itself in words and can in 
its truth signify that the individual abandons himself in order to lose himself in the idea, 
whereas existential pathos results from the transforming relation of the idea to the 
individual’s existence.”69 Esthetic passion is the passion of the poet, philosopher, or 
scientist, an abstract idea that one can become obsessed with in an intellectual fashion. 
The Kierkegaardian notion of an esthetic passion in many ways corresponds to the 
Eastern Orthodox notion of logismoi, thought-patterns that begin as abstract entities but 
which begin to affect the person in different ways according to their nature. When these 
thoughts take root, so to speak, they begin to have a transformative effect and thereby 
become existential passions. Both of these categories are morally neutral, since the 
esthetic and existential passions can seemingly be either positive or negative. The 
existential passions are based on action while esthetic passion is based on 
disinterestedness.70 Existential passion is always ethico/religious, i.e., belonging to either 
the ethical sphere, focused on the Sittlickheit, the common good, or the religious sphere, 
where it is focused on the existing individual.71 Existential passion, religiously speaking, 
                                                 
Passions: Enemy or Friend?” In Communion 17 (1999), accessed: 5/26/2015, 
http://www.incommunion.org/2004/10/18/the-passions-enemy-or-friend/. 
68 CUP, 387. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 388f. 
71 Climacus' writings on “the ethical” differ in subtle ways from Johannes de Silentio's analysis of the 
category in Fear and Trembling. The two categories are much more separate for de Silentio due to the fact 
135 
 
is also always oriented towards the telos of the individual person, which is eternal 
happiness: “The pathos that corresponds to and is adequate to an eternal happiness is the 
transformation by which the existing person in existing changes everything in his 
existence in relation to that highest good.”72 This passion for the eternal affects 
everything in how one lives one’s life. It is impossible to truly seek after the eternal 
unless one significantly alters one’s relationship to finite goods. Religious passion is only 
possible by developing apatheia towards things of this world: “Existence is composed of 
the infinite and the finite; the existing person is infinite and finite. Now, if to him an 
eternal happiness is the highest good, this means that in his acting the finite elements are 
once and for all reduced to what must be surrendered in relation to the eternal 
happiness.”73 
The transformative elements of religious pathos find their fulfilments in works of 
love. Kierkegaard is not only advocating an individualistic asceticism in saying that the 
finite elements of our lives must be “surrendered,” though individual asceticism plays a 
pivotal role in the process. Our ability to overcome our passions is only a means to an end 
that finds its fulfilment in a religious passion that is always oriented outwards towards the 
other. In Works of Love Kierkegaard talks about the eternal “transforming” our love for 
one another due to the fact that it is no longer delimited by what is finite and contingent: 
“‘You shall love.’ Only when it is a duty to love, only then is love eternally secured 
                                                 
that he cannot begin to fathom what is meant by the religious (even though he admires it). Climacus, on the 
other hand, seems to have at least one foot in the religious (religiousness A). Both agree, though, that the 
primary difference between the ethical and the religious is the orientation of the self towards a telos. The 
ethical telos is that which is communicable to the crowd, e.g. the values of family, citizenship, and human 
rights. The religious telos is not communicable in the same manner and can only be fully made manifest 
through works of love. As I discuss in chapter 4, the religious manner of living does not preclude political 
or systematic action, but it is at the same time not reducible to such categories. 
72 Ibid., 389. 
73 Ibid., 391.  
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against every change, eternally made free in blessed independence and happily secured 
against despair.”74 The commandment of love is not a categorical imperative but rather a 
reorientation of the mind that allows us to enter into agape, an unconditional love. The 
love of the ethical person, though noble and beautiful, is always contingent upon finite 
categories (“I will love you as long as…,” “I will love you if…”) while the love of the 
religious person, grounded as it is in a passion towards the eternal, is completely 
unbounded and overflowing. The ethical person bases her love on notions of worthiness, 
measuring out her love in accordance with the extent to which the object of her love 
conforms to certain finite standards. The religious person, on the other hand, loves 
unconditionally. As Kierkegaard makes clear, religious love is always a kind of 
forgiveness: “Let the judges appointed by the state, let the detectives labour to discover 
guilt and crime; the rest of us are enjoined to be neither judges nor detectives—God has 
rather called us to love, consequently, to the hiding of the multiplicity of sins with the 
help of a mitigating explanation.”75 
I will have more to say about both the Kierkegaardian and Eastern Orthodox 
notions of love and communion in chapter four. It is immediately obvious that there are 
many discrepancies between what Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodoxy say about love, on 
the one hand, and our common, everyday perceptions of the phenomenon, on the other. Is 
it not, after all, unrealistic to claim unconditional love as a human possibility? Is it even 
something we should be seeking after in the first place? Must love not be tempered by 
rationality? And what of unconditional forgiveness? Should we forgive those who harm 
                                                 
74 WOL, 44. 
75 Ibid., 272. 
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us or others, hiding their “multiplicity of sin”? Must love, after all, not be combined with 
justice? 
Good questions, all, many of which I cannot even begin to address. The most 
important thing to consider as we move towards a deeper understanding of these issues is 
to realize that, for both Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodoxy, there is a very clear and 
important distinction made between love as an emotion and love as a state of being. The 
“love” of the musical-erotic, so beautifully described in Either/or, is a love that is pure 
affectivity, pure pathe. It is a passion that is beautiful and true but also dangerous in its 
intensity. The pathos of Don Juan is often astoundingly selfish and sometimes results in 
great harm to both himself and other people. The love of the ethical person, on the other 
hand, is grounded in a careful consideration of other people. But this love is always 
tempered by rational or emotional boundaries. The great ethical theories of Western 
philosophy, virtue ethics, deontology, and utilitarianism, are systematized expressions of 
our attempt to care for one another in the ethical sphere.  
Religious passion and religious love, on the other hand, seemingly describe a state 
of being that transcends affectivity, even though it most certainly includes the affective 
dimension of the human person. In Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov the Elder Zosima 
describes Christian love in the following way: 
 
Brothers, do not be afraid of men’s sins, love man also in his sin, for this 
likeness of God’s love is the height of love on earth. Love all of God’s 
creation, both the whole of it and every grain of sand. Love every leaf, 
every ray of God’s light. Love animals, love plants, love each thing. If you 
love each thing, you will perceive the mystery of God in things. Once you 
have perceived it, you will begin tirelessly to perceive more and more of it 
every day. And you will come at last to love the whole world with an 
entire, universal love.76  
                                                 
76 The Brothers Karamazov, 318–19. 
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It is obvious that Zosima’s description is not (only) of an emotional state. It is 
hard to see how one could have strong feelings for “every grain of sand.” Similarly, 
Kierkegaard’s demand in Works of Love that our love be free of all preference cannot be 
applied to our feelings towards one another. It is not only natural but also good that we 
have stronger (preferential) feelings for those closest to us than complete strangers. But 
both Zosima and Kierkegaard seem to believe that our ultimate telos lies in our ability to 
love not only when it makes us feel good (as in the aesthetic sphere) or to love people 
based on abstract principles (as in the ethical sphere) but to love the poor, suffering 
individual right in front of us no matter what particular feelings they might invoke in us. 
This is especially important in relation to our dealings with the outcasts in society, the 
poor, the homeless, the mentally ill. These people often evoke feelings of contempt or 
even disgust in people, but Kierkegaard claims that Christian love lies in achieving a kind 
of apatheia in relation to such thoughts and emotions and to love our neighbors no matter 
how little we feel we may have in common with them. This does not mean that we ignore 
the wrongs that people commit.77 We must hold people fully accountable for their 
actions. Nevertheless, at the same time, we can manifest true love in our relations to 
people based not solely on our emotions (fickle as they may be) or our adherence to 
abstract principles but rather because we realize that our telos is to become love.78 All 
existential passion, and religious passion in particular, is a way of clearing away the 
                                                 
77 This is particularly dangerous in cases of emotional or physical abuse. The point here is that even 
though we hold people accountable for their wrongdoings (or “sins”) we do not reduce them to this 
behavior through the kind of categorization that occurs through the operations of the noemata in the human 
mind.  
78 See p. 94, n. 190. 
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noemata, the conceptual slicing and dicing by which we normally operate in the world. It 
is to achieve a state of egolessness and receptivity where we are not dominated by our 
emotions but rather incorporate them in a healthy, holistic manner into our dealing with 
other people.79 
Given Kierkegaard’s characterization of the Christian life in Works of Love, I 
would contend that there is a great deal of overlap between his thoughts on the subject 
and the Eastern Christian views on apatheia. The fundamental distinction in 
Kierkegaard’s writings between pathos as emotion (most often associated with the 
aesthetic sphere) and as a transformative power that enables us to fully love our 
neighbors is in many ways descriptive of the relationship between agape and apatheia in 
Eastern writers such as Evagrios. It is at least clear that what Kierkegaard means by 
“passion” is not reducible to pathe, as described in Christian and Stoic thought. 
Kierkegaard is not advocating for emotional fervor but rather for a kind of peace, perhaps 
most profoundly manifest in the evocative description of the Knight of Faith in de 
Silentio’s Fear and Trembling. As de Silentio notes: “Faith is no aesthetic emotion, but 
something far higher, exactly because it presupposes resignation; it is not the immediate 
inclination of the heart but the paradox of existence.”80 The resignation in question is a 
form of apatheia, a state of letting go of those thought patterns and emotions that inhibit 
our love, which is the true pathos of the human person.81  
                                                 
79 We might, for example, deeply love a person, but see through the clarity of apatheia that we need to 
distance ourselves from him or her.  
80 F&T, 76. 
81 The literature on Kierkegaard’s writings on the subject of love is incredibly varied. C. Stephen 
Evans reads Kierkegaard’s writings on love largely in light of Kierkegaard’s (supposed) divine command 
ethic in Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, a reading that I fundamentally disagree with, as should be apparent 
from the preceding analysis. Sharon Krishek analyzes Kierkegaard’s views on love in light of his writings 
on faith and attempts to safeguard the importance of romantic (preferential) love in his works. The 
collection Ethics, love, and faith in Kierkegaard provides a variety of views on Kierkegaard’s views on 
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3.4 - Crucifying the Understanding 
I return now to a discussion of how Kierkegaard’s epistemology parallels 
elements of the nous/dianoia distinction in patristic thought. One advantage to this 
approach is that it allows us to tackle the specter of irrationalism which has haunted 
readings of Kierkegaard since he was first introduced in the Anglo-American 
philosophical world.82 If Kierkegaard is indeed working with a distinction similar to the 
nous/dianoia distinction, operating in both ancient Greek and Eastern Christian 
epistemology, he is obviously not working within any framework that could be termed 
“irrationalist.” If this were the case then one would have to label Plato and Aristotle as 
“irrationalists,” which hardly seems like an intellectually defensible assessment.  
 If we view Kierkegaard’s epistemology in relation to the nous/dianoia distinction 
then Climacus’ claim that we must “crucify” the understanding83 takes on interesting 
dimensions.  Climacus always describes this process of “crucifixion” as a kind of kenosis, 
a self-emptying of the ego: “Dare to become nothing at all.”84 But this daring self-
emptying is ultimately to “become what one is.”85 Self-emptying is self-discovery, to 
                                                 
love, many of which focus on the tension between love as a duty/commandment and more traditional 
Christian views of love as agape. 
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Cambridge University Press, 2009); Edward F. Mooney, ed., Ethics, Love, and Faith in Kierkegaard, 
Philosophical Engagements (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).  
82 See C. Stephen Evans, “Is Kierkegaard an Irrationalist: Reason, Paradox, and Faith,” Religious 
Studies 25, no. 3 (1989): 347-62. MacIntyre, Blanshard, and Hannay are examples of thinkers who 
understand Kierkegaard's epistemology, especially the Climacian writings on “paradox,” as being 
irrationalist. See Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (2nd ed.) (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 
Notre Dame, 1984), 36-50; Brand Blanshard, “Kierkegaard on Faith,” in Essays on Kierkegaard, ed. Jerry 
Gill (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1969), 113-25; Alastair Hannay, Kierkegaard (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 106-8.   
83 CUP, 98-106, 559. 
84 Ibid., 149. 
85 Ibid., 130. 
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become a person, a “spirit,” as Anti-Climacus puts it. This is a highly difficult task 
because “every human being has a strong natural desire and drive to become something 
else and more.”86 Climacus relates this “something more” to the concept of the “world-
historical.” This means that instead of seeking one’s true self through inwardness one 
instead formulates one’s self-identity in terms of the world, in terms of how one is 
situated in relation to other people. As Climacus points out, to view oneself in terms of 
the “world-historical” is to undermine the meaning of one’s life as it relates to one’s 
individual existence: “The way of objective reflection turns the subjective individual into 
something accidental and thereby turns existence into an indifferent, vanishing 
something.”87 The irony in human existence is that we want to make our mark on the 
world, to stand out, to solidify our place in the universe, to become real. Yet we do this 
by trying to cling to external (“objective”) factors such as career, wealth, success, and 
fame which are ultimately accidental categories in relation to our true nature. The 
wealthiest, most talented, most successful human being can just as easily fall into despair 
(perhaps even more easily) than one who has not achieved the same objectively 
measurable qualities in life.88  
 There are interesting parallels between the Climacian analysis of the self and the 
writings of the historical John Climacus (John of the Ladder89) on the relationship 
                                                 
86 Ibid., 130. 
87 Ibid., 193. 
88 Kierkegaard is, of course, not saying that there is anything wrong with pursuing success or talent or 
even wealth. His point, most forcefully expressed in the Climacian texts, is that these things ultimately have 
no bearing on one’s inner life or the state of one's soul. The primary problem Climacus and Anti-Climacus 
return to again and again in their analysis of despair is the illusion of self-sufficiency; the notion that the 
human self is constituted primarily in relation to things it can control and master. The opposite turns out to 
be true. The human self only fully becomes real (becomes “spirit”) when it stands naked before that which 
it has no control over, that which it can never understand, that which it can never master, namely God.  
89 For simplicity’s sake I will refer to the Kierkegaardian pseudonym as “Climacus” and the historical 
John Climacus as “John of the Ladder.”  
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between nous and personhood (prosopon).90 John Chryssavgis, in his analysis of John of 
the Ladder, writes: “There is some evidence in John’s writings that he identifies nous 
with prosopon… It is clear that nous is that which corresponds most nearly to the notion 
of the human person.”91 Yet John of the Ladder also makes a distinction between 
personhood as the “true self,” most clearly represented by the nous and our ability to 
commune with the divine, and the fallen aspects of our nature, what in some Eastern 
Orthodox literature is called “the ego self.”92 This is not to say that John of the Ladder, or 
Kierkegaard’s Climacus, advocate any sort of dualism where the body is the locus of 
appetites and desires and the intellect needs to be somehow detached from care of the 
body.93 Rather, the relationship between the intellect and the body needs to be calibrated 
correctly through asceticism and contemplation. The intellect, according to John of the 
Ladder and the Eastern Orthodox tradition, can become distorted or “restless” because it 
becomes directed towards things that are unnatural to its true function (telos), namely 
gratification of our desires and appetites. The potentiality of the nous is only actualized in 
our relation to the divine. If the nous lies at the heart of human personhood, as John of the 
                                                 
90 This is not to say that Kierkegaard was deliberately developing a philosophy of personhood in line 
with Climacus, or any other patristic writer. Kierkegaard’s first mention of Climacus, the 7th century monk 
and abbot of the Saint Catherine monastery in the Sinai, was in the autumn of 1839. These original entries 
compare Hegel to Climacus, mockingly referring to Hegel’s system as a modern version of the “ladder” to 
paradise (see Hannay, Kierkegaard,128-9). Kierkegaard was at least somewhat familiar with Climacus’ 
original The Ladder of Divine Ascent as portions of it appeared in a theological textbook used in Danish 
seminaries (de Wette, W.M.L., Lærebog i den christelige Sædelære og sammes Historie, Copenhagen: 
1835). See also Timothy Dalrymple, “The Ladder of Sufferings and the Attack Upon Christendom,” in 
Kierkegaard’s Late Writings, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, Hermann Deuser, and K. Brian Söderquist 
(Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 325-6. There is no indication that Kierkegaard’s knowledge or 
interest in the historical Climacus extended beyond his cursory readings of the Ladder in textbooks.  
91 John Chryssavgis, Ascent to Heaven: The Theology of the Human Person according to Saint John 
of the Ladder (Brookline MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1989), 104. 
92 See Ware, The Orthodox Way, 59-62; Hieromonk Damascene, Christ the Eternal Tao (Platina, CA: 
Saint Herman Press, 2004), 279-82.  
93 This is, of course, the standard Neo-Platonic scheme, which, indeed, greatly influenced both 
Western and Eastern Christian writers in manifold ways. For an excellent analysis of the Plotinian heritage 
in Christianity see Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West. 
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Ladder proclaims, then its primary functions represents the ultimate function, purpose, 
goal, and passion of human existence.  
The issue of directing the nous towards its proper function brings us back to 
Kierkegaard’s views on lidenskab. To reiterate, the main difference between aesthetic 
pathos and ethical/religious pathos is that the former is focused on an external object or 
idea (e.g. a pleasure, system, or philosophy) while the latter is focused on the individual’s 
existence: “If the absolute telos [end, goal] does not absolutely transform the individual’s 
existence by relating to it, then the individual does not relate himself with existential 
pathos but with esthetic pathos.”94  
 For both Kierkegaard, as well as Eastern Christian writers such as John of the 
Ladder, a great deal of the spiritual life is centered on the notion of silence, which again 
can be fruitfully understood in light of the nous/dianoia distinction. In Eastern Christian 
spirituality, much of contemplative and ascetic spirituality revolves around gaining 
discernment over one’s emotional states and discursive thoughts (nepsis – “awareness”) 
and then reaching beyond these categories by entering into a state of stillness 
(hesychia).95 Much emphasis is put on overcoming negative thought patterns, called 
logismoi, which can lead people into harmful behaviors.96 Kierkegaard’s triadic view of 
consciousness similarly emphasizes the importance of shutting down constant reflection 
as it leads the human person farther and farther away from herself. The “I” that is the 
event of the relation between our thoughts (ideality) and the world around us (reality) 
                                                 
94 CUP, 387. 
95 For introductory texts on these issues see Markides, The Mountain of Silence, 115-31 and 194-212; 
Ware, The Orthodox Way,105-32. Neptic spirituality is well covered in the Philokalia, see esp. Writings 
From the Philokalia: On Prayer of the Heart. See also the Russian spiritual classic The Way of a Pilgrim, 
trans. Olga Savin (Boston & London: Shambhala Classics, 2001).  
96 E.g. The Mountain of Silence, 124-29. 
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must also be the event of overcoming the tension between these two realities. This 
happens when the “I” (the human self) stops trying to understand (analyze, systematize, 
philosophize) and instead simply receives.97 This is why the “wise” person98 has such a 
difficult time acquiring subjective knowledge, as Climacus points out in the Postscript. 
The learned, the scholars and the intellectuals (the “systematic thinkers”) are unable to let 
go of their systems, their calculations, and their philosophies. But this is precisely what 
they must do in order to understand themselves:  
 
The more the wise person thinks about the simple (that there can be any 
question of a longer preoccupation with it already shows that it is not so 
easy after all), the more difficult it becomes for him. Yet he feels gripped 
by a deep humanness that reconciles him with all of life: that the 
difference between the wise person and the simplest person is this little 
evanescent difference that the simple person knows the essential and the 
wise person little by little comes to know that he knows it or comes to 
know that he does not know it, but what they know is the same. Little by 
little—and then also the wise person’s life comes to an end—so when was 
there time for the world-historical interest?99  
  
The parallels between Kierkegaard’s epistemology and philosophy of personhood 
with those of Zen Buddhist philosophy have been well noted.100 Much like in Zen 
Buddhism, Kierkegaard sees the primary aim of the spiritual life as the reclaiming of our 
“original mind,” the mind that pristinely reflects the world around us instead of trying to 
break it apart via analysis and systematization, which ultimately creates discord and 
                                                 
97 All of chapter II of CUP is centered on this theme: That subjective knowledge, which only occurs 
in inwardness, is a kind of emptiness where objective knowledge (theories, plans, systems) recede and 
ultimately fade away. This is not to say that they have no value. There are plenty of times when we 
absolutely have to rely on objective knowledge (science, academic endeavors such as writing dissertations). 
Yet these endeavors tell us nothing about how to live, how to even approach the existential categories of 
anxiety, despair, and joy. There is no figuring life out. One simply has to live it, which, as Kierkegaard 
points out, is a task for a lifetime. 
98 The term is used ironically by Climacus. 
99 CUP, 160. 
100 Giles, Kierkegaard and Japanese Thought. 
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despair within our consciousness. Interestingly, much less attention has been paid to the 
parallels between Kierkegaard’s writings on these matters and the Eastern Christian 
patristic tradition that provides a similar emphasis on overcoming thought-patterns and 
entering into a more immersive and intuitive relationship with the world around us, other 
people, ourselves, and God. The tradition of hesychasm in Eastern Orthodoxy emphasizes 
interior prayer that quiets discursive thoughts, images, and emotional responses101 and 
aims at a kind of positive emptiness where the believer is able to receive God:  
 
Be at peace and rest assured that until now you have been tested in the 
cooperation of your will with God’s calling and have been granted to 
understand that neither the wisdom of this world nor mere superficial 
curiosity can attain to the divine illumination of unceasing interior prayer. 
On the contrary, it is the humble, simple heart that attains to such prayer, 
through poverty of the spirit and a living experience of it.102   
 
 In Kierkegaard’s sermon “The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air,” 
published under his own name in 1849, Kierkegaard offers a view of contemplation that 
is astoundingly similar to the hesychast tradition. Kierkegaard sees the beauty of the lily 
and the bird in the fact that they keep silent in the face of suffering and despair. 
Everything in life undergoes trials and pain. Yet the suffering of animals and plants does 
not seem nearly as horrendous as that of human beings because they do not obsess over 
it. Our ability to reason, to speak, to cry out, is an element of the transcendent and divine 
within us, but it is also the cause of our deepest pain:  
 
Do not think that it is just a bit of duplicity on the part of the bird that it is 
silent when it suffers, that it is not silent in its innermost being however 
silent it is with others, that it complains over its fate, accuses God and 
humanity, and lets ‘the heart in sorrow sin.’ No, the bird is silent and 
                                                 
101 Which are, as previously stated, qualitively different from a passionate response. 
102 The Way of a Pilgrim, 5.  
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suffers. Alas, the human being does not do that. But why is it that human 
suffering, compared with the bird’s suffering, seems so frightful? Is it not 
because the human being can speak? No, not for that reason, since that, 
after all, is an advantage, but because the human being cannot be silent. It 
is, namely, not as the impatient person, or even more intensely, the 
despairing person, thinks he understands it when he says or cries (and this 
is already a misunderstanding of speech and voice), ‘Would that I had a 
voice like the voice of the storm so that I could voice all my suffering as I 
feel it!’ Ah, that would be only a foolish remedy; to the same degree he 
will only feel his suffering the more intensely. No, but if you could be 
silent, if you had the silence of the bird, then the suffering would certainly 
become less.103  
 
The silence in question is the ultimate form of worship, of prayer: “And just 
because this silence is veneration for God, is worship, as it can be in nature, this silence is 
so solemn. And because this silence is solemn in this way, one is aware of God in 
nature.”104 In speech, in trying to analyze and understand our suffering, our place in the 
universe, human beings fall into despair because they distance themselves from 
themselves and from God. “Out there with the lily and the bird you are aware that you 
are before God, something that usually is entirely forgotten in speaking and conversing 
with other human beings.”105  
We should be careful not to misunderstand Kierkegaard’s intentions here. His 
appeal to the nature imagery of the gospels is not romanticism. Human beings are not 
lilies or birds. We are reason-endowed creatures who cannot help but wonder and worry. 
As Kierkegaard says, it is not the fact that we can speak (reason) that causes us despair, 
but rather the fact that we cannot keep silent. What the bird and the lily have to teach us 
                                                 
103 In WA, 15. 
104 Ibid., 16. 
105 Ibid., 17. 
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is a sense of reverence and awe, a receptivity towards the essential mystery of things that 
cannot be reduced to analysis or systematization.  
 Noesis, as described in patristic literature and in Eastern Orthodox spiritual 
writings up to this day, is not primarily understood as a way to intellectually grasp the 
eidos of something but rather as a kind of communion, a receptive attitude towards the 
other that constitutes an intuitive, immediate, and experiential knowledge that supersedes 
any kind of objective knowledge available to us. The reason why we are normally unable 
to do this is because our emotions, appetites (“passions”), and thought patterns 
(logismoi), largely consisting of the functions of the dianoetic faculty, lead the nous 
astray. The patristic writers see this as an unnatural state of affairs, a result of the Fall. 
Gregory of Sinai, the fourteenth century theologian and teacher of hesychasm, writes:  
 
None who are wise in words have ever had pure reason, because, from 
birth, they let their reasoning powers be corrupted by unseemly thoughts. 
The sensory and prolix spirit of the wisdom of this age, so rich in words, 
which creates the illusion of great knowledge but actually fill one with the 
wildest thoughts, has its stronghold in this prolixity, which deprives man 
of essential wisdom, true contemplation and the knowledge of the one and 
indivisible.106  
 
The achievement of hesychia is centered on stilling the mind. Nicopherus the 
Solitary writes: “Let us return to ourselves […] for it is impossible for us to become 
reconciled and united with God, if we do not first return to ourselves, as far as it lies in 
our power, or if we do not enter within ourselves, tearing ourselves […] from the whirl of 
the world with its multitudinous vain cares and striving constantly to keep attention on 
                                                 
106 “Texts on commandments and dogmas, warnings and promises; also on thoughts, passions and 
virtues; as well as on silence and prayer,” Writings from the Philokalia, 17.  
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the kingdom of heaven which is within us.”107 Chryssavgis points out that the practices of 
contemplative prayer (meditation) and ascetic discipline are always seen in patristic 
literature, including the works of John of the Ladder, as working in conjunction with the 
grace of God:  
 
There is no way of concentrating on God, of looking upwards towards 
God, while at the same time subsiding into worldly cares. […] The 
intellect is ‘pure’ (katharos) only when it beholds God. By purifying the 
intellect we see God, but also accept in humility that God’s grace alone 
can purify it. Total concentration is, in fact, a mutual, personal relationship 
with God; the intellect speaks to God, in prayer, ‘face to face’ into his 
ear.108 
  
Kierkegaard, much like the writers of the hesychast tradition, sees contemplation 
as being directly linked to our moral being. Our emotions and thought-patterns make it 
impossible for us to approach the other as other, to love the human being in front of us 
instead of an idol: “[Kierkegaard] noes that we are prone to love the image we want to 
have of the other person, but this is not loving the other at all.”109 In Works of Love 
Kierkegaard writes: “In loving the actual individual person it is important that one does 
not substitute an imaginary idea of how we think or could wish that this person should 
be. The one who does this does not love the person he sees but again something unseen, 
his own idea or something similar.”110 This issue of loving the concrete, actual individual 
in front of us, instead of an abstract image or idea, is treated repeatedly in several works 
                                                 
107 “A most profitable discourse…,” Writings from the Philokalia, 23.  
108 Chryssavgis, Ascent to Heaven, 105.  
109 M. Jamie Ferreira, “Moral Blindness and Moral Vision in Kierkegaard's Works of Love”, in 
Kierkegaard Revisited: Proceedings form the Conference "Kierkegaard and the Meaning of Meaning It" 
Copenhagen, May 5-9 1996, ed. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn & Jon Stewart (Berlin & New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1997), 219. Ferreira's article does an excellent job of delineating the fine line Kierkegaard toes in 
Works of Love between love as manifest in particularity versus love that is focused on what is universal and 
shared. Ferreira convincingly argues that Kierkegaard synthesizes these two concerns successfully.  
110 WOL, 164. 
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by Dostoyevsky, whose primary spiritual influence was the Eastern Orthodox tradition.111 
In The Brothers Karamazov, Ivan Karamazov, who represents dianoia run amok, the 
complete dominance of speculative thinking and neurotic despair, claims that he finds the 
Christian commandment of “Love thy neighbor” to be not only impossible but also 
absurd. “I could never understand how one can love one’s neighbors. It’s just one’s 
neighbors, to my mind, that one can’t love, though one might love people at a distance. 
[…] A man must be hidden for anyone to love him, for as soon as he shows his face, love 
is gone.”112 This juxtaposition between the blindness that results from speculative 
(dianoetic) thinking and the “seeing” that takes place in noesis, an intuitive and 
immediate apprehension of the other as other, is the primary and essential theme of 
Works of Love. In Eastern Christian spirituality, the same emphasis is expressed in 
myriad ways in literature on prayer, askesis, and even the role of icons in worship. In 
Orthodox iconography, the focus is always on the face of the person depicted. Yet it is 
not the “face” of a purely material, earthly life, but rather a face that represents a life 
transfigured in spirit.  In his work The Icon: Window on the Kingdom, Michel Quenot 
writes:  
 
An icon is certainly not the image of disincarnate world in the sense that it 
would refuse creation. Rather, it is the image of a world transformed, 
transfigured, rendered transparent by a spiritualization which embraces the 
entire cosmos. The icon of Christ, ‘The Image not made by hands,’ is the 
basic model for every other representation of the human face. This face of 
God-become-man sanctifies the faces of all humanity.113 
  
                                                 
111 See Richard Pevear’s introduction to the Vintage Classics edition of The Brother’s Karamazov, xi-
xviii. 
112 “Rebellion,” The Gospel in Dostoyevsky (Maryknoll NY: Orbis Books, 2003), 43. 
113 Michel Quenot, The Icon: Window on the Kingdom (Crestwood NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary 
Press, 1991), 147 
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In chapter four I explore in detail Kierkegaard’s philosophy on personhood and its 
relationship to the Eastern Orthodox tradition. It is worth mentioning here, in the context 
of his epistemology, that Kierkegaard’s emphasis on seeing the “face” (the Otherness) of 
the person in front of you, and that it is only via this seeing that love can occur, is very 
closely aligned to patristic writings on personhood (prosopon). Bruce V. Foltz offers the 
following analysis of the contribution made by the Cappadocian fathers114 to the evolving 
philosophy of personhood in the Christian church:  
 
What is revolutionary, then, in Cappadocian theology, is first the insight 
that what underlies (hypostasis) the Divine Being is not some prior and 
given nature (physis) but rather the very facing (prosopon) itself – i.e. their 
understanding that God is not first of all a self-same, fixed substance who 
subsequently enters into relations with others, but rather that the divine 
substance or being (ousia) itself derives from and is constituted by, the 
very event of relating or facing. And the second revolutionary character of 
this understanding of the person is just as surprising: it is that human 
beings, whom scripture had already described as created in the image 
(eikon) of God, possess this same radically relational character, and 
possess it just because – and realize it just to the extent that – they stand in 
relation to – find themselves defined by – the divine “facing that is carried 
on eternally, ‘unto ages of ages.’115 
 
 This view of personhood aligns with Kierkegaard’s insistence in Works of Love 
that we need to quiet the judgmental thoughts that invade our mind because they make us 
unable to see the person in front of us (i.e., his or her “face”). Kierkegaard’s insistence on 
neighborly love as “universal” is not meant to point to some underlying, abstract essence 
but rather to the necessity that we still the discursive mind and emotions that lead us to 
                                                 
114 Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Nazianzen and Basil the Great. 
115 Bruce V. Foltz, “Being as Communion,” in Byzantine Incursions (New York: Springer, 
forthcoming). 
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focus only on difference and preference. Jamie Ferreira, in his analysis on Kierkegaard’s 
views on love, writes:  
 
A sense of kinship and solidarity or connectedness is not achieved by 
imagining an identity that does not actually exist, but, rather, by not 
making those distinctions which alienate one from another. Such 
distinctions do more than particularize – they particularize in ways which 
disconnect us. Distinctions which merely particularize can thus be 
contrasted with distinctions which damage the soul.116  
 
Our ability to see the “face” of the person, for Kierkegaard, primarily consists in our 
ability to accept a person’s defects and shortcomings: “As soon as the relationship is 
made equivocal, you do not love the person you see; then it is indeed as if you demanded 
something else in order to be able to love. On the other hand, when the defect or the 
weakness makes the relationship more inward, not as if the defect should now become 
entrenched but in order to conquer it, then you love the person you see.”117  
 To see a person’s true face, therefore, is to accept them even in their brokenness, 
but it does not mean that we excuse or ignore their moral failures. Rather, it is a loving 
response to a person in the grips of anxiety, pain, and despair. Kierkegaard’s Works of 
Love provide a fascinating alternative to the philosophy of love presented by ancient 
Greek philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, or to more modern (and post-modern) 
philosophies of the self. Plato’s eros and Aristotle’s philia both fail to provide a way for 
us to love the person him or herself, especially when the brokenness of their nature is 
taken into account. Eros, as described in the Symposium, lifts us up towards the 
transcendent and abstract, i.e., ideality, while philia, though more sensitive to 
                                                 
116 Ferreira, 214-15. See WOL, 69, 71, 74, and 85.  
117 WOL, 167. 
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particularity, nonetheless only gives an account of love as a correct response to the 
manifestation of the beautiful (to kalon) in a person. As Foltz notes: “According to 
Aristotle, we are only to love the loveable.”118 Christian love, on the other hand, 
proclaims that we are to love everyone. Kierkegaard’s epistemology and philosophy of 
personhood and sin are always aimed at emphasizing and, to some extent, explaining this 
difference. It is not that Kierkegaard sees agape as an alternative to eros or philia, but 
rather a transfiguration of every kind of love. Agape, according to Works of Love, is 
ultimately a challenge, a call to love people in a certain way, namely selflessly and in a 
manner that embraces the brokenness of the human condition.  
 As we repeatedly see throughout his writings, Kierkegaard’s epistemology is 
always centered on the breakdown between ideality and actuality.119 Objective thought 
attempts to harmonize the two by achieving some kind of absolute, systematic truth,120 
which is nonetheless unattainable because speculative thinking always has to leave 
something out of the picture, namely the poor, existing individual. At best, then, objective 
truth amounts to probability, which is ultimately the only thing that academic and 
scientific pursuits afford us. They give us the possibility to predict certain behaviors (e.g. 
of material properties) and to understand them in the context of whatever system, natural 
                                                 
118 “Being as Communion.”  
119 One can draw a direct line from Kierkegaard's analysis of sin in Concept of Anxiety and The 
Sickness Unto Death to the epistemological analysis of the dissonance between actuality and ideality in 
works such as Concluding Unscientific Postscript. The category of anxiety described by Haufniensis 
manifests itself primarily in this dissonance, i.e. the inability to synthesize the ideal and the actual. Adam 
and Eve in Paradise seem to live in pure actuality, or, rather, in the harmonious togetherness of the actual 
and ideal. This is due to the fact that they live in perfect communion with themselves, and with God, who 
presents himself as both perfect ideality and actuality (the “I Am He Who Is” in the burning bush as well as 
the cloud of darkness that envelops Mt. Sinai, both of which appear in Exodus). The serpent's whisper to 
Adam and Eve is to create an ideality that is separate from their actuality (“You could be like gods”), an 
ideality which engulfs their consciousness after they eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.  
This creates resentment, which ultimately leads to despair, a misrelation of the self to itself.  
120 Hegel is, of course, Kierkegaard's prime example of someone seriously attempting this.  
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law, or theory best explains them. Yet this manner of thinking precludes the possibility of 
any ethical or religious engagement. In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard writes that “Here 
is the infinite difference from the essentially Christian, since Christianly, indeed even just 
religiously, the person who never relinquished probability never became involved with 
God. All religious, to say nothing of Christian, venturing is on the other side of 
probability, is by way of relinquishing probability.”121  
 The infinite resignation described by Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling 
as well as the crucifixion of the understanding described by Climacus in Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript ultimately find their fulfilment in the “venture” described in 
Works of Love. It is important to synthesize Kierkegaard’s epistemology and ethical 
philosophy correctly lest we see him advocating either a divine-command ethic or an 
irrationalist relativism, both of which he goes to great pains to argue against in these 
works. In Fear and Trembling, for example, de Silentio makes it explicit that the point of 
Abraham’s resignation must be love, and nothing but love. If it is not, Abraham becomes 
monstrous: “The absolute duty can then lead to what ethics would forbid, but it can by no 
means make the knight of faith have done with loving.”122 Christ is, of course, the 
paradigmatic case for this approach, going against the Sittlickheit of the Law, understood 
by the Pharisees as a fixed, static, and absolute moral theory, and instead promoting an 
ethic of love which engages with the human beings as existing individuals. Socrates, as 
he is related to Christian ethics in For Self-examination, is another representative of this 
                                                 
121 JFY,, 99-100. This theme would, of course, become the central philosophical concern of de 
Silentio's Fear and Trembling, where the “relinquishing of possibility” takes place in light of the absurd. In 
section 3.5 I will detail how this does not mean that Kierkegaard is advocating for irrationalism and that his 
epistemology, rather, points towards relational knowledge and modes of knowing that extend beyond the 
purely rational. 
122 F&T, 101. 
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way of life.123 Both Christ and Socrates represent a kind of unknowing, a letting go of 
dogma and legalism and an embrace of the brokenness of the human condition. This is 
ultimately only possible through a kind of self-knowledge. In Judge for yourself! 
Kierkegaard describes objective knowledge as a kind of drunkenness, relating it to the 
escape from reality sought after by the alcoholic who turns towards the bottle whenever 
life becomes too complicated, too difficult, too much. Right after critiquing an approach 
to ethics based on systematic, objective thinking grounded in probability (which in 
modern philosophy is perhaps best exemplified by Utilitarianism) Kierkegaard writes: “A 
person becomes physically dizzy precisely when he has forgotten himself in strong drink; 
and he becomes spiritually dizzy when he has lost himself in a knowing of another kind, 
or, as he says, in objective knowing—call to him, and you will see that he will seem to be 
awakening from a dream; just like a drunk man, he must, so to speak, rub his eyes, collect 
himself, remember his name.”124  
 Kierkegaard’s approach to an ethics of love is ultimately a contemplative one. 
The only way to truly see the face of the Other, the only way to hear the soft, quiet 
whisper of God in the gospels, is by achieving silence within. To achieve silence is to 
awaken: “Would that in silence you might forget your will, your self-will, in order in 
silence to pray to God: ‘Your will be done!’ Yes, if you could learn from the lily and the 
                                                 
123 For Self-Examination (hereafter FSE), 9-12. 
124 JFY, 105. It is worth noting the parallels between Kierkegaard's critique of a systematic, utilitarian 
ethic and the famous critique later offered by Bernard Williams. Williams' main point is to show that the 
individual person has no place in the utilitarian calculus, qua individual. The calculus gobbles up individual 
human beings and spits out an impersonal cost-benefit analysis that misses the point of ethical thinking 
altogether. See J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1973).  
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bird to become completely silent before God, in what then would the Gospel not be able 
to help you! Then nothing would be impossible for you.”125  
Similarly, in the writings of the fourth century Christian ascetics known as the 
Desert Fathers and Mothers, many of whom form the backbone of Eastern Christian 
spirituality, we find the connection laid out between stillness and love. In The Sayings of 
the Desert Fathers we read of the ascetic Abba Poemen, who said: “Someone may seem 
to be silent, but if in the heart one is condemning others, then one is babbling ceaselessly. 
And there may be another who talks from morning till evening, and yet in the heart that 
person is truly silent. That person says nothing that is not profitable.”126 As Kierkegaard 
notes, our inability to keep silent, to quiet the workings of the rational mind with its 
incessant need to analyze and judge, leads us to reproach others instead of engaging them 
with love. But the point of the Gospels, Kierkegaard notes, is to present a way of life for 
people to follow, and this can only be achieved through inner stillness. Echoing this 
sentiment is the following story from The Sayings of the Desert Fathers: “Some of the 
fathers questioned Abba Poemen saying: ‘If we see a brother in the act of committing a 
sin, do you think that we ought to reprove him?’ The old man said to them: ‘For my part, 
if I have to go out and see someone committing a sin, I pass on my way without 
reproving him.’”127 
  Silence, unknowing (the overcoming of dianoetic reasoning), and love are all 
intrinsically connected in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, much as they are in patristic 
writings. In chapter four I explore in an in-depth manner both the Kierkegaardian and 
                                                 
125 WA, 19. 
126 Benedicta Ward, ed., The Sayings of the Desert Fathers, The Alphabetical Collection (Kalamazoo, 
MI: Cistercian Publication, 1975), 27. 
127 Ibid., 113. 
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Eastern Orthodox views on personhood and communion. At this stage, it is worth noting 
that for both Kierkegaard and the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the focus on silence and 
contemplation is always tied to a sense of harmony and oneness. As previously noted, 
Eastern Orthodox epistemology often analyzes the function of the human mind in the 
ancient Greek terms of dianoia and nous. The human mind uses a conceptual schema, the 
noemata, to make sense of the world around it. In so doing, we are often assaulted by 
thought-patterns and emotions (logismoi) that affect us in various ways. One of the 
primary effects of these logismoi is to create fragmentation within the human soul, to set 
at war the discursive, intuitive, and affective elements of the human psyche.128 The 
purpose of the spiritual life is to harmonize the various elements of the soul and to 
achieve oneness, which is only possible when the nous is directed towards God.  
For Kierkegaard, a crucial element of despair and anxiety is our tendency towards 
“double-mindedness” (Tvesindethed). In the Upbuilding Discourses, Kierkegaard notes 
the subtle nature of this phenomenon, how we may aim to do the good but that we are 
continually being led astray in various ways by our selfish inclinations. Kierkegaard 
writes: “If it is to be possible for a person to be able to will one thing, he must will the 
good, because only the good is this unity (Eenhed); but if it is to become actual that he 
wills only one thing, he must will the good in truth.”129 Kierkegaard gives various 
examples of people who will the good but who also will various other things (reward, 
wealth, fame, etc.). This will inevitably create despair since it creates a further mis-
                                                 
128 See The Mountain of Silence, esp. 118ff, and Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos, Orthodox 
Pyschotherapy (Greece: Birth of Theotokos Monastery, 2005). It is also worth noting that Dostoyevsky's 
protagonist in Crime & Punishment is named Raskolnikov, from the Russian raskolnik, meaning 
fragmented and divided.  
129 Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits (hereafter UD), 36. 
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relation between the finite and the infinite. This is why resignation is such a crucial 
element for Kierkegaard (especially as described by Johannes de Silentio). We have to 
give up the world in order to reclaim it, to give up on our obsessions, desires, plans, and 
schemes. If we do not do this, then we are constantly at war with ourselves. 
  Kierkegaard claims that his discourse takes the form of a question: “Are you 
living in such a way that you are conscious of being a single individual?”130 To be a 
“single individual” is to  have harmony and oneness:  
 
This consciousness is the fundamental condition for willing one thing in 
truth, because the person who even to himself is not a unity, is even to 
himself not something altogether definite, the person who exists only in an 
external sense—as long as he lives a number in the crowd, a fraction in a 
worldly complex—indeed, how would it even occur to such a person to 
occupy himself with the thought: to will one thing in truth!131 
 
There is a fundamentally ethical dimension to Kierkegaard’s notion of oneness, of being 
able to achieve the “survival within the community” spoken of by the desert fathers. 
Double-mindedness is an internal struggle that inevitably manifests itself externally. To 
achieve peace and oneness within oneself is to begin to make peace with one’s neighbors. 
Kierkegaard writes:  
 
Are you now living in such a way that you are aware as a single 
individual, that in every relationship in which you relate yourself 
outwardly you are aware that you are also relating yourself to yourself as a 
single individual, that even in the relationship we human being so 
beautifully call the most intimate you recollect that you have an even more 
intimate relationship, the relationship in which you as a single individual 
relate yourself to yourself before God?132 
 
                                                 
130 Ibid., 127. 
131 Ibid. 
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For Kierkegaard, true goodness does not arise from Sittlickheit, from morals or 
customs or laws. These are, rather, reflections in the ethical sphere of our devotion to the 
good. The good must first and foremost be sought in our relationship to ourselves, in 
achieving authenticity and oneness, which is only possible in and through our 
relationship to the eternal.  
Kierkegaard may not have explicitly set out to form a Christian ethic based on 
patristic or Eastern Orthodox writings, but in crafting an approach to Christian living that 
offered an alternative to the anemic Christendom of his age, Kierkegaard unknowingly 
tapped into a spiritual and contemplative tradition that dates back to the earliest days of 
Christianity. Even though Kierkegaard never used such technical terminology as nous or 
dianoia, he nonetheless offers an epistemology that makes many of the same fundamental 
distinctions as the epistemological tradition of the early church, especially with regards to 
the distinction made between systematic, rational analysis and the immediate, 
experiential knowing that allows us to respond to the suffering of those around us.  
 All of this still leaves open the question of what exactly Kierkegaard meant by 
“subjective truth,” and how it relates to his existential analysis of human consciousness. 
In the next section I will compare Kierkegaard’s approach to the apophatic theology of 
the Eastern Church and examine the important question about the extent to which 
Kierkegaard believed in the possibility of us having knowledge of God.  
 
3.5 - Subjective Knowledge in Kierkegaard 
As previously stated, Marilyn Piety argues that both objective and subjective 
knowledge in Kierkegaard’s writings take two forms. In the case of objective knowledge, 
there is knowledge “in the strict sense,” which Piety argues is knowledge of “immanent 
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metaphysical reality” primarily expressed in ontology and mathematics.133 The 
knowledge of ontological categories (more on these in a moment) and mathematics is 
certain, which means that ideality and actuality match up in some way. The problem is, 
though, that they can only match up hypothetically. Piety writes: 
 
Ontological knowledge and mathematical knowledge are hypothetical for 
Kierkegaard. That is, they determine what thought says about how things 
must be if they have a reality that transcends thought reality, but not that 
they are real in that way. It may be, for example, that the idea of God 
includes perfection. That is, it may be that the idea of God and the idea of 
perfection are related in such a way that, if there were a God, then he 
would have to be perfect. But logic alone could never compel one to 
accept that there was a God.134   
  
As we can see, ontological knowledge for Kierkegaard corresponds with logic.135 
2+2=4, the Pythagorean theorem, and the law of non-contradiction are all certain, 
according to Kierkegaard, yet only hypothetically so because we can cannot ascertain via 
any objective method whether or not they correspond to actuality, i.e., the reality that 
existing individuals inhabit. As Piety notes, certain kinds of objective knowledge can 
ultimately come to have subjective meaning for us (e.g. the question of whether or not 
God is perfect) but this can only come about by a kind of transference that occurs in 
human consciousness where the focus shifts from a purely subject/object relationship 
(between “the thinker” and the “object of thought”) to a union of the two (which 
manifests itself as a potential change in the knower). If treated as purely theoretical or 
philosophical issues, the objects of objective knowledge can never affect the thinker in 
                                                 
133 Piety, 63-70. 
134Ibid., 67. 
135 Ibid., 66. See also Gregor Malantschuk, “Søren Kierkegaard and Poul Martin Møller,” 
Kierkegaardiana 3 (1959): 105. 
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any significant way.136 The famous ontological proof for the existence of God is a good 
example of the distinction Kierkegaard is emphasizing. Even though we can study the 
proof with great interest, devoting many hours in thinking and writing on it, we can do so 
in a purely abstract, academic fashion, where the issue at stake never affects who we are. 
Even though we could logically prove that there is, indeed, a God, this ultimately doesn’t 
matter one iota, because this is a purely hypothetical knowledge, and therefore 
completely lacking in passion and inwardness.137 It is therefore not surprising, and 
entirely justified, that “so what?” is a perfectly justifiable—and not at all uncommon—
response from people who have studied the ontological proof and are convinced of its 
logical soundness.  
 Objective knowledge “in the loose sense” primarily relates to what is studied in 
the natural- and social sciences,138 or anything having to do with what Climacus calls 
“world-historical” knowledge. Because such knowledge attempts to relate ideality to 
actuality (individual lived experience) it can never provide us with certainty, but rather 
only probability, given the fact that ideality and actuality can never match up perfectly. 
This means that objective knowledge of this sort is always provisional.  The quality of a 
scientific theory is largely based on its ability to predict certain behaviors and to explain 
                                                 
136 It is worth reminding the reader that interest (interesse) is always present in the form of a 
intentionality, i.e. a conscious engagement with the object in question. But this does not mean that passion 
is necessarily involved. Passion is a category of inwardness, where the thinker attempts to appropriate the 
truths being investigated in some way.  
137 The different approach taken by medieval scholars towards Anselm's version of the ontological 
proof and modern considerations of it provides another interesting example of Kierkegaard's point. 
Anselm’s works were not only intellectually scrutinized in monastic communities in the medieval Latin 
Church, they were meditated upon as religious texts. Modern philosophers of religion, on the other hand, 
usually teach and study the proof as a purely objective, abstract issue. See Thomas H. Bestul, 
“Antecedents: The Anselmian and Cistercian Contributions,” in Mysticism and Spirituality in Medieval 
England, ed. William F. Pollard and Robert Boenig (Suffolk, UK and Rochester, NY: D.S. Brewer, 1997), 
3ff. 
138 Piety, 71-94. 
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certain material phenomena but it can always be replaced by a competing theory that 
performs these functions in a superior manner.139 The same provisional, probabilistic 
criterion applies to the truths of history, anthropology, and even philosophy (at least as it 
is practiced in its modern, academic form).140  
 As Piety points out: “All knowledge is interested according to Kierkegaard […] 
and all knowledge thus has a subjective element.”141 Yet passionate inwardness only 
arises when a shift occurs in consciousness from an object of knowledge as an external 
(“third”) thing and the interesse of consciousness focuses instead on the knower herself 
who becomes transformed (or transfigured) by her relationship to the object of thought.142   
 Even though Kierkegaard emphasizes the importance of a subjective 
appropriation of knowledge, he never goes so far as to argue for anything remotely 
resembling relativism. “There is, for Kierkegaard, a single ethical and religious reality in 
the sense that there is one set of eternally valid ethical norms for human behavior and one 
God who requires of every human being that he actualize these norms in his 
                                                 
139 Kierkegaard almost always directs his critiques against scientism, as opposed to the natural 
sciences per se. Kierkegaard's primary worry with regards to the rising cultural influence of the natural 
sciences is that the “crowd” will begin to believe that science can give us absolute knowledge and that it 
will thereby become a new religion.  
See JP 2, 2821 / X2 A 362 and Piety, 80-81. 
140 Kierkegaard's position on objective knowledge “in the loose sense” probably explains the tendency 
to situate him within one skeptical tradition or another. Indeed, with regards to the possibility for objective 
(systematic) knowledge Kierkegaard is most definitely a skeptic, meaning that he did not believe that 
anything can be known with absolute certainty. It is worth remembering in this context that the ancient 
skeptical tradition often viewed itself as a corrective against an increasingly dogmatic and speculative 
philosophical tradition, which of course corresponds exactly with Kierkegaard's view of himself in relation 
to both academic philosophy as well as institutionalized religion. That being said, Kierkegaard's views on 
subjective knowledge, which obviously have no parallel in classical skepticism, differentiate his 
epistemology substantially from much of philosophical skepticism.  
See Richard Popkin, “Kierkegaard and Skepticism,” in Kierkegaard: A collection of Critical Essays, 
ed. Josiah Thompson (Garden City NY: Doubleday, 1972), 342-72; Terence Penelhum, “Skepticism and 
Fideism,” in The Skeptical Tradition, ed. Myles F. Burnyeat (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1983), 287-318. 
141 Piety, 95. 
142 Ibid., 96. 
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existence.”143 The difference between objective and subjective knowledge lies not 
primarily in the justification of the knowledge in question (which in both cases has to do 
with the immediate relation between the knower and the object of knowledge) but rather 
in the difference between knowledge that is purely descriptive (objective knowledge) and 
knowledge which is prescriptive (subjective knowledge).144 Subjective knowledge is a 
call, or a challenge, which becomes revealed to the knower in a moment of self-
knowledge and which can only become fully actualized when the knower responds to that 
call by living his life in a certain way, namely according to the ethical/religious truths 
made manifest to him.  
Truth, as defined by Kierkegaard, is “agreement between thought and being.”145 
With regards to objective truth, this agreement is only fully possible with regards to 
“immanent metaphysical truth,” i.e., the categories of mathematics and ontology 
(meaning primarily logical truths). Objective knowledge of actuality, the domain of 
science and the humanities, can at best give us probability, since thought (ideality) never 
fully maps on to reality (actuality). Similarly, with subjective truth, dealing as it does 
with the way in which ethical and religious prescriptions affect the life of the human 
person, full harmony between actuality and ideality remains impossible.146 Piety writes: 
“Ethical, or religious, prescriptions are thus actualized not in the sense that a person 
succeeds in conforming his ‘historical externality’ (CUP, 382) to these prescriptions but 
in the sense that he has truly willed such a correspondence.”147 In Training in 
                                                 
143 Ibid., 96. 
144 Ibid., 97. 
145 Ibid.  
146 St. Paul raises this issue in a very “existential” manner, so to speak, in Romans 7:19: “For I do not 
do the good I want to do, but the evil I do not want to do—this I keep on doing.”  
147 Piety, 101.  
163 
 
Christianity, Anti-Climacus writes that “No man, with the exception of Christ, is the 
truth; in the case of every other man the truth is something endlessly higher than he is.”148 
This occurs most markedly with regards to what Piety terms “pseudo-knowledge,” which 
is a category of subjective knowledge where the knower understands the ethical/religious 
truths in question in an entirely abstract manner and does not allow them to become 
actualized in his or her actions. Religious and moral hypocrisy is a common example of 
this phenomenon.  
Subjective knowledge that falls under the heading of “pseudo-knowledge” is 
similar, then, to objective knowledge in the “loose” sense since it represents a lack of 
passion and inwardness in a subject’s relationship to the object of thought. It forms the 
nearest thing to a “disinterested” position, though given the structure of human 
consciousness, we are always ultimately interested in the object of thought. Pseudo-
knowledge therefore represents a kind of existential falsity, of pretending to view ethical 
and religious truths from some kind of moral high ground or God’s-eye point of view, 
which is ultimately impossible.149  
The difference between objective and subjective truth, in this regard, lies in the 
nature of the object of thought. For both objective immanent metaphysical truths and an 
objective view on actuality (via science and the humanities) a dispassionate position is 
perfectly justifiable and, indeed, often necessary. The modern scientific method, for 
example, only becomes practicable when the knower (the scientist) takes up such a 
position in relation to whatever it is that he is researching. With regards to ethical and 
                                                 
148 Training in Christianity, 183. 
149 A common theme in Christ’s teachings in the gospels. See esp. Luke 7:1-5: “Why do you see the 
speck in your neighbor’s eye, but do not notice the log in your own eye.” 
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religious truths, on the other hand, a dispassionate position is completely antithetical to 
the nature of the truths in question. The only correct way in which we should approach 
truths ethical and religious truths is to become deeply and personally passionate about 
them, to the very core of our being.150 As previously discussed, this passion is not 
emotional fervor, but rather a unification of our faculties that is only possible in and 
through a kind of apatheia, a letting go of double-mindedness and obsessive thoughts. It 
is important to note that if this passion is not passionate inwardness, but rather a religious 
fervor that takes the form of moralism or judgment of others, then we fail to grasp the 
truths in question and instead enter into the realm of pseudo-knowledge.  
 Similar to objective knowledge, subjective knowledge is a relation between the 
knower, on the one hand, and either ideality (thought reality) or actuality on the other.151 
Ideality, or “immanent metaphysical knowledge,” in this case, consists of “knowledge of 
God, self-knowledge, and ethical-religious knowledge.”152 With regards to the relation of 
the knower to ideality (our subjective knowledge of immanent, metaphysical truths) our 
self-knowledge consists of inward relation to the ethical/religious concepts of immortality 
and the notion that we have some kind of inner essence or soul, i.e., that our self extends 
beyond the purely physical. Subjective truths always have a normative dimension to 
them, according to Kierkegaard, so this knowledge needs to be appropriated and 
manifested by the knower in a particular way.153 Subjective knowledge of actuality is not 
an inward relation to a specific ideality (e.g. the concept that God exists or the 
                                                 
150 See Piety, esp. 115-31. Also, Hannay, 158-60 and CUP, 266-71.  
151 Piety, 97. 
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ontology, mathematics, and logic. 
153 Ibid., 99-113. 
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immortality of the soul) but rather an inward relation to my own consciousness. 
Subjective knowledge of actuality is what makes guilt-consciousness and sin-
consciousness possible, both of which enable us to begin to understand some of the 
causes of the misrelation of the self to itself, described by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness 
Unto Death.154  
 I will examine the issue of guilt-consciousness and sin-consciousness in more 
detail in a moment. For now, I would like to examine more closely the issue of 
justification, certainty, and the nature of what Kierkegaard calls “acquaintance 
knowledge.” Kierkegaard uses the words Erkjendelse and Viden interchangeably for 
propositional knowledge. Piety argues that he does so in an unsystematic fashion.155 On 
the other hand, Kierkegaard’s discussion of subjective, or essential, knowledge often 
involves reference to acquaintance knowledge (Kendskab) rather than to propositional 
knowledge.  
 Erkjendelse is perhaps best translated as “recognition.” The English word 
“understanding” would also apply here, though in a qualified way. “Belønne én i 
erkendelse af hans dygtighed,” for example, would mean to recognize someone’s hard 
work. Viden is knowledge proper, often used if one wants to signify expertise (“hun har 
en stor viden på det område” would be “she has a great deal of knowledge in this area”). 
Kendskab is used when one talks of knowing a person. The noun Bekendt means an 
“acquaintance.” Bekendt can also be used as an adjective, meaning that one is becoming 
acquainted, or associated with something, e.g. “gøre sig bekendt med noget” which 
                                                 
154 SUD, 13-14.  
155 Piety, 14-17 and 96. 
166 
 
means “to look into something.”156 As Piety points out, Kendskab also has the 
connotation of “drawing near to something.”157 Indeed, in relation to subjective 
knowledge, Kierkegaard uses the word Tilnærmelse, which means “approach.”158 This is 
important because, as I have noted, subjective knowledge never allows for a full 
correspondence between ideality and actuality. In “drawing near” to ethical and religious 
truths, the knower begins to manifest and appropriate these truths, little by little. This 
points to an important distinction between subjective truth and objective truth, as Piety 
notes when she writes: “A person comes nearer to ethical or religious truth, according to 
Kierkegaard, ‘in the striving for it,’ in a sense in which he cannot come nearer to 
objective truth through probability.”159 No matter how good at calculating probability we 
become, the knower is always intrinsically separated from the object of knowledge with 
regards to objective truth. The subject-object distinction, so pivotal to the development of 
the epistemological heritage of the West since the time of Descartes, belies an essential 
separation between the knower (the scientist, the academic, the speculative thinker) and 
the world that he or she attempts to know. Subjective knowledge, however, manifests a 
bridging of the gap between the subject and object, tenuous or temporary as it may be. 
Subjective knowledge, for Kierkegaard, always signifies a union of some sort, however 
imperfect or fragile.  
  Piety notes that: “Kierkegaard associates knowledge in the strict sense with 
certainty in the sense of the necessity of the correspondence of the mental representation 
                                                 
156 The suggested phrases in quotation marks for Kendskab, Bekendt, Erkjendelse and Viden are found 
in Dönsk - Íslensk Orðabók (Reykjavík: Mál og Menning, 2004). 
157 Piety, 103. 
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in question to reality.”160 This necessity is an existential one in relation to 
subjective/essential knowledge. In trying to understand what it is to be good we cannot 
help but realize that a part of the truth inherent in ethical/religious reality is a call of duty, 
a demand on us that we not only understand goodness but rather become it.  
 This relates to Kierkegaard’s notion of how we justify truth. In the case of 
subjective truth this justification takes place through the transformation of the individual 
person. Knowledge is justified by “an insight on the part of the knower into the essence 
of the object of knowledge, an insight that is generated by contact with the reality in 
question.”161 This is simply another way of saying that knowledge is justified by the 
correlation of actuality and ideality. But it is important to note that Climacus in the 
Postscript claims that actuality “is ideality.”162 Ethically speaking, this means that 
“ideality is the actuality within the individual himself.”163 Travis O’Brian writes:  
 
The intellectual individual relates ‘disinterestedly’ to possibility while the 
ethical individual relates interestedly and asks ‘am I able to do it?’ Since, 
once again, actuality and not thought is the medium of synthesis, the 
ethical ideal is not in itself an object available for contemplation, but only 
for action. Put most succinctly, the ethical ideal is the ‘eternal’ or 
‘absolute’ synthesis of thought (possibility) and being (the ‘actuality’ of 
the existing I)—but not in thought and rather in actuality—a synthesis 
                                                 
160 Ibid., 104. 
161 Ibid. Piety reference to “essence” corresponds to Kierkegaard's use of the Danish word Væsen. On 
p. 106, n28, she argues that this is primarily to be understood as “essence” rather than “being,” given the 
fact that essence was “the preferred translation in the first half of the nineteenth century.” Hannay, in his 
translation of Concluding Unscientific Postscript, tends to translate Væsen as “being.” I will primarily be 
using “being” for the reason that it corresponds more directly to both the everyday Danish usage of the 
word as well as the way in which Kierkegaard prefigures the later phenomenological tradition, especially 
via the influence of Heidegger. The epistemological implication of this distinction is that Kierkegaard never 
makes the claim that human beings can fully and absolutely know the essence (nature) of anything except 
perhaps those things that fall under objective knowledge in the strict sense (math, geometry, logic). This 
becomes especially important in relation to the possibility of knowledge of God.  
162 CUP, 325. Emphasis mine. 
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Climacus speaks of as the ‘concrete eternity’ or the ‘absolute continuity’ 
of the self.164  
 
 All of the stages of existence Kierkegaard delineates represent different attempts, 
and failures, to synthesize the poles of existence, including the aforementioned poles of 
thought and being. The philistine and aesthete are both so engulfed in immediacy that 
they fail to truly become a self. The aesthete is in a somewhat better position than the 
philistine, at least insofar as he is able to approach everyday existence with a sense of 
irony and detachment. As Vilhjalmur Arnason points out: “The aesthetic stage of 
existence is not truly a solution to the existential crisis of the philistine but rather a way to 
sustain a bourgeois (spiritless) lifestyle while being fully conscious of how pointless such 
a manner of living truly is.”165 Subjective knowledge remains minimal in both of those 
spheres given the fact that there is very little attempt made by either the philistine or the 
aesthete to align their lived existence with ethical/religious truths since there is so little 
consideration of what the telos of one’s individual existence might be. The aesthete, in 
fact, removes himself from all commitment and responsibility, and guards himself from 
all vulnerability, by never deeply considering what it truly means to be a human being, or 
to a live a “good” life (which, as Kierkegaard goes to great pains to point out, is a deeply 
personal question).  
 Subjective knowledge is, as I pointed out, ultimately self-knowledge. This is an 
important point to consider since Kierkegaard is not admonishing his readers to deeply 
                                                 
164 Travis ‘Obrian, “Being and Givenness in Kierkegaard's Pseudonymous Authorship,” Philosophy 
Today 50, no. 2 (2006). 
165 Vilhalmur Arnason, “Ad Velja Sjalfan Sig,” Timarit Mal og Menningar, no.4 (2000): 21. 
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contemplate ideality in any way apart from their lived existence.166 Rather, to 
contemplate and appropriate ideality is to live one’s life in a certain way, much of which 
has to do with self-acceptance. This is because ideality, considered in the context of 
ethical and religious truths, takes on a deeply existential meaning. In relation to objective 
truth, ideality is largely viewed in the context of abstractions that have reality as an idea 
but do not exist in “factual being.”167 In relation to subjective truths, i.e., the truths of the 
ethical and religious spheres, ideality is considered by Kierkegaard as a kind of telos that 
takes the form of a personal essence: “The ethical person chooses himself as an existing 
individual. This does not mean that one can choose oneself however one wants; on the 
contrary, the ethical decision entails that the individual chooses himself as he is and wills 
himself as he is. This means that one accepts oneself and takes responsibility for 
oneself.”168 This self-acceptance is deeply challenging, though, since it manifests the 
dissonance between who one is and who one ought to be. “God, according to 
Kierkegaard, has a plan for each individual. The difficulty is that no one’s life actually 
represents the actualization of this plan. Thus, it is not this plan that comes to be in the 
concrete existence of the person.”169 This is why subjective truth must be understood as 
Kendskab rather than as Erkjendelse or Viden. If it was one of the latter, there would be 
no hope for human beings. Ethical and religious truths cannot be fully understood or 
comprehended nor can they be viewed in terms of probability. Rather, we must “draw 
near” to them, which means that we must “draw near” to who it is that we are ultimately 
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to become. To draw near to our true self, our “spirit,” the self that God wants us to be, is 
the telos of human existence. In his collection on Hasidic mysticism Martin Buber 
recounts a quote by a Hasidim named Rabbi Zusya, who on his deathbed said: “In the 
world to come I shall not be asked, ‘Why were you not Moses?’ I shall be asked, ‘Why 
were you not Zusya?”170 This is basically the central tenet of both Kierkegaard’s moral 
philosophy as well as his epistemology. Essential knowledge is knowledge of who we 
truly are, and who we are to become.  
 
3.6 - Second Interlude: Essentialism and Existentialism in Kierkegaard and 
Maximus the Confessor 
Such an analysis of Kierkegaard’s view of the human telos as “becoming who one 
truly is” raises important metaphysical questions. It is difficult to imagine Kierkegaard, 
the progenitor of Western existentialism, as veering towards anything akin to 
essentialism. There is also the concomitant question of the status of free choice in 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy. If, after all, we are essentially created to be and live as a 
certain kind of person, to what extent can we be considered to be free?  
The philosophy of Maximus the Confessor, the (580-662) can illumine important 
aspects of Kierkegaard’s thought. Maximus’ anthropology and metaphysics center around 
the notion that union with God is the telos of human beings and that the fulfilment of this 
function can only be achieved via the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Blowers and Wilken, 
writing on Maximus, note that: 
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In Maximus’ vision of the world, the incarnation of the Second Person of 
the Holy Trinity in Jesus of Nazareth holds the secret to the foundation—
the architectural logoi—of the created cosmos, its destiny after the fall of 
created beings (the mystery of redemption), and the transcendent end 
(telos) of creation (the mystery of deification) wherein the prospect of ever 
more intimate communion with the Trinity is opened up.171  
 
Christ, the Logos, the divine, ordering principle of the entire cosmos, is manifest 
in and through the logoi of created things, the individualized, essential characteristics of 
the created order: “For Maximus the Confessor, the world – the natural world and the 
‘world of the scriptural revelation – is the broad and complex theater in which God’s 
incarnational mission is playing itself out to full completion.”172 
Maximus’ Logos theology is marked by his insistence that theological discourse 
must take place simultaneously on two levels: the metaphysical and the existential. G.C. 
Tympas, in his study on correlations between Maximus and 20th century psychotherapy, 
writes: “Maximus does not blindly support a doctrinal system remote from the psyche 
[…], but applies an anthropological view open to a metaphysical perspective, or more 
precisely to a personal God, whose characteristics are imprinted in the human soul.”173 
This binary way of doing theology is also applied to Maximus’ understanding of the 
human person. Much like Kierkegaard, Maximus sees the human being as existing within 
two opposite dimensional “poles:” On the one hand, human beings are persons 
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(hypostasis), i.e., unique and individual, but they also exist as a manifestation of an 
essence or nature (ousia). Maximus’ anthropology therefore borrows heavily from the 
Trinitarian theology of the Cappadocian fathers that was grounded in just such a polar 
tension between similarity and difference, personhood and essence.174  
Maximus, like all of the Eastern patristic fathers, understands salvation in terms of 
theosis, the transformation of the human person in union with God: “Maximus adopts the 
biblical tradition that man is a ‘composite nature’ of body and soul. According to 
Genesis, man was made in God’s image and likeness, which means that uniqueness and 
communion are present in both God and man. Man acquired not only a direct 
resemblance to God’s image but also the potentiality to become ‘God’s likeness.’”175 The 
deification of the human person, whereby we become increasingly like God, differs 
considerably from several of the Western Christian models of salvation. First and 
foremost, the Eastern patristic notion of deification, especially as it appears in writers 
such as Maximus, sees salvation as occurring not only through the soul, or a particular 
part of the soul (namely reason)—as per the emphasis in the Augustinian and Thomistic 
traditions where union with God is understood primarily in terms of the beatific vision—
but is rather understood as encapsulating the whole human person, including the body. 
Salvation, therefore, can only be manifest in and through the particular psychosomatic 
reality of each individual person. “Essence” in Maximus’ anthropology can therefore be 
understood in universal terms, as denoting the essential nature of human beings and 
certain attributes and characteristics (including our reason and free will) that make union 
with God possible, but also as the personal logos that denotes the individual expression 
                                                 
174 Ibid., 61. 
175 Ibid. 
173 
 
and manifestation of these universal attributes. The salvation offered by Christ through 
the incarnation and the resurrection is, according to Maximus, a hypostatic reality, a 
personal act of love and communion that at the same time has immense metaphysical and 
ontological implications for not only human beings but also the entire cosmos.  
But Maximus’ view of salvation also differs considerably from the Protestant 
model of personal salvation through faith alone. Much like Kierkegaard, Maximus sees 
salvation in terms of a collaboration between God and the individual human person. This 
synergy is primarily expressed through the human will, which must be synergized with 
God’s will. Tympas writes: “Maximus’ analysis of ‘synergy’ is based on the model of the 
two wills in Christ: the human will and the divine will, according to his dual nature as a 
person.”176 Similarly, the human person has two wills:  
 
The ‘natural will,’ which is man’s ability/will to act that belongs to and is 
‘disposed by nature’, and the ‘gnomic will’ that belongs to the 
person/hypostasis as a result of the way one acts or wills. […] This 
distinction cannot apply to Christ, because he is sinless and therefore 
cannot have a gnomic will opposing the will of his divine nature. 
Following the prototypical pattern of the two wills in Christ, man has to 
abide by his inner free choice/will that follows the logos of his nature, or 
the logoi-as-virtues, within which divine love bears supremacy.177 
 
Anti-Climacus, in The Sickness Unto Death, similarly situates individuality with 
the gnomic will, i.e., with our inclinations and desires that lead us to sin: “The category 
of sin is the category of individuality.”178 The conversion towards Christianity, according 
to Anti-Climacus, begins when the individual discovers that his or her own individuality, 
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what sets us apart from other people, ultimately results in despair.179 No matter how 
much we try to align the poles of existence (which, in Maximus’ terminology, would be 
to synergize the gnomic and natural wills), we will always encounter an essential 
misrelation between what we want and desire and what is truly good for us. This is why 
we must entirely “give up” our gnomic will by orienting it entirely towards eternity. In 
the Upbuilding Discourses Kierkegaard writes: “Temporality, as it is knowable, cannot 
be the transparency of the eternal; in its given actuality, it is the refraction of the eternal. 
This makes the category ‘to accomplish’ less direct. The more the eternal is in motion in 
the witness, the greater the refraction.”180  
For Kierkegaard, the aforementioned double-mindedness is the condition of 
wanting your cake and eating it too, of not wanting to let go completely of our 
obsessions, to be continually embroiled in the temporal. In the discourse entitled “What 
Happiness in Being a Human Being,” Kierkegaard sees the glory of the human condition 
primarily in our ability to choose: “A choice. My listener, do you know how to express in 
a single word anything more glorious! If you talked year in and year out, could you 
mention anything more glorious than a choice, to have choice!”181 It is the ability to 
choose ourselves by choosing God that fulfils the human telos and Kierkegaard sees this 
as a joyous thing. But this choosing only finds its fulfilment when we achieve a synergy 
with what God chooses, which is that we become who we truly are. This choice must be 
absolute. We have to be “all in” or otherwise we will always be nagged by double-
mindedness, by doubt, worry, anxiety, and despair: “The human being must choose 
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between God and mammon. This is the eternal, unaltered condition of the choice’ there 
will be no escape, never in all eternity.”182 To choose God is to choose one’s self because 
the Kingdom of God is within us.183 Authenticity, for Kierkegaard, can therefore be 
understood in terms of an essentialism but it is a highly personal essence that he is 
pointing to, the alignment of the human will with the will of God. Actuality 
(Virkilegheden) is, as Anti-Climacus puts it, the “unity of possibility and necessity.”184 
As Piety points out, Kierkegaard does not believe that anyone can achieve this unity 
completely (to do so would make them equal to Christ, i.e., they would be completely 
without sin) but he clearly believes that the spiritual life is centered on the transformation 
of the person that makes this unity increasingly possible. God’s plan (the individual 
logos-essence) for each person is an ideality that we are to actualize in our lives through 
our choices. This means that I cannot choose who the “real me” truly is, but I can choose 
whether or not to become this person. To become oneself, as Piety points out, is “the free 
appropriation of that self that it has been eternally determined one ought to become, or 
the actualization of that self that it is necessary to actualize in order to actually exist.”185 
But even if we accept that Kierkegaard’s notion of essence is grounded in 
personhood rather than a universal nature the question nonetheless remains to what extent 
we are free to choose our own path in life given this particular framework. After all, how 
delimiting is the “true self” that God has ordained me to be? Kierkegaard never addresses 
this issue directly, nor does Maximus the Confessor. The details of what exactly is meant 
by an individualized logos, when translated into personal terms, is left unanswered. 
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Perhaps wisely so, since we are touching upon one of the more mysterious aspects of 
what it means to be a human being. After all, if God’s essence is entirely unknowable and 
human beings are created after the image and likeness of this God then the essential 
qualities of the human person must also remain deeply mysterious.  
Two things do become immediately apparent when considering Kierkegaard’s 
notion of authenticity in light of Maximus’ framework of an individualized logos: First, 
Kierkegaard’s (proto-) existentialism differs considerably from the existentialist 
framework that was developed in the twentieth century by writers such as Sartre and 
Camus. For Kierkegaard, it simply is not true that existence precedes essence. Even 
though Kierkegaard revolutionized Western philosophy by shifting the focus from 
abstract metaphysical questions to the categories of individual, lived experience—such as 
anxiety and despair—he nonetheless did not abandon the Christian notion of an essential 
self or the metaphysical concept of an immortal essence or soul.  
Second, Kierkegaard’s view of the soul is a deeply personal one. The soul, for 
Kierkegaard, is always understood in terms of an eternal telos. This telos manifests itself 
in and through personal choice, which primarily has to do with our ability to freely accept 
sacrifice and pain, rather than primarily orienting our lives towards self-satisfaction. This 
means that even though our authentic (“essential”) self, our logos, is always to a large 
extent shrouded in mystery it is nonetheless at least partially revealed to us in the life of 
the Logos, the son of God. When Kierkegaard and Maximus claim that God intends me to 
become a certain person, this does not necessarily mean that God specifically ordains me 
to get married or stay single or that he wants me to have a certain profession or live in a 
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certain place. Rather, it means that God intends for me to manifest, in my own, 
individual, free manner, the life that Christ manifested to us, a life of sacrifice and love.  
Given Kierkegaard’s antipathy towards the religious institutions of his time, there 
is not a great deal of thought in his work given over to the connections between Christian 
liturgical life and the notion that the human logos is primarily manifest through sacrifice. 
Such connections abound in the Eastern Orthodox tradition. As Alexander Schmemann 
noted in his work For the Life of the World, the human telos is ultimately Eucharistic in 
nature. The offering of bread and wine in the liturgy is a way for the individual believer 
to enter into the sacrifice of Christ, the new life that Christ opens up to the human person. 
The offering of the liturgy, Schmemann writes, is: 
 
The movement that Adam failed to perform, and that in Christ has become 
the very life of man: a movement of adoration and praise in which all joy 
and suffering, all beauty and all frustration, all hunger and all satisfaction 
are referred to their ultimate End and become finally meaningful. Yes, to 
be sure, it is a sacrifice: but sacrifice is the most natural act of man, the 
very essence of his life. Man is a sacrificial being, because he finds his life 
in love, and love is sacrificial: it puts the value, the very meaning of life in 
the other and gives life to the other, and in this giving, in this sacrifice, 
finds the meaning and joy of life.186 
.  
3.7 - Suffering as a form of knowing 
I move now to a further analysis between this connection between sacrifice and 
love, love and meaning in the works of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard unequivocally says that 
self-knowledge ultimately manifests itself as consciousness of sin, which is a 
consciousness of our brokenness, of our inability to truly conquer our existential despair 
on our own steam. This kind of deep feeling of helplessness and dread only begins to 
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manifest itself in the transition from the ethical stage to the religious stage. The ethical 
stage, the stage of commitment and love and public duty, is a beautiful thing indeed, but 
given the fact that a human being has an absolute telos, is oriented towards absolute 
meaning and absolute good, despair ultimately always comes creeping back in. No matter 
how wonderful our family life, how fruitful our careers, how rewarding our artistic and 
intellectual pursuits, we are always faced with the consciousness of our death and of our 
limitations as mortal, fallible beings. “The individual that seeks to fully shoulder the 
burden of his duties with full commitment will inevitably and increasingly realize that he 
cannot do so absolutely. The demands of the ethical are so immense that the individual 
lies crushed before them. This becomes increasingly more clear the more seriously one 
approaches these duties.”187   
 Yet Kierkegaard is not promoting any kind of fatalistic determinism. In the 
Postscript Climacus writes: “The essential existential pathos relates itself to existing 
essentially, and existing essentially is inwardness, and the action of inwardness is 
suffering, because the individual is unable to transform himself [skabe sig selv om]. It 
becomes, as it were, a feigning [Skaberi] of self-transformation, and that is why the 
highest action in the world is to suffer.”188 This suffering is not an end in itself, but is 
rather the necessary component in the process of self-becoming that lies at the center of 
Kierkegaard’s spiritual anthropology: “Essentially, the religious address has [the task] of 
uplifting through suffering. Just as the faith of immediacy is in fortune, so the faith of the 
religious is in this, that life lies precisely in suffering.”189 The reason for suffering being 
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an essential component of coming-to-be is that the human person, in synthesizing the 
poles of eternity and finitude, comes to experience the dialectic between his “higher” 
rational nature and his “lower” animal nature, i.e., the passions and emotions, as 
intrinsically painful. This is what Kierkegaard calls “guilt-consciousness.”190 This is also 
why Kierkegaard obviously saw askesis as an essential element of the Christian life. 191  
 The distinction between guilt-consciousness and sin-consciousness is 
representative of what Climacus sees as the fundamental difference between religiousness 
“A” and “B.”192 The religious stage becomes manifest in an individual’s life when he 
realizes that the things of this world, no matter how committed we are to them and no 
matter how beautiful they truly are, can never provide us with eternal happiness. 
Religiousness “A” is the realization that we have an absolute and eternal telos, that our 
despair can only be overcome when we seek meaning, truth, and beauty in something that 
extends over and beyond the trials, tribulations, and joys of the everyday. This is not to 
say that Kierkegaard is advocating for any sort of transcendentalism. The move towards 
religiousness “A” and then religiousness “B” is ultimately an attempt to reclaim the 
everyday and the earthly, to transfigure it so that it enters into a dialectical relationship 
with the eternal. Abraham must sacrifice Isaac in order to reclaim him in a transfigured 
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manner. It is only after the double movements of resignation and faith that Abraham is in 
a position to fully love Isaac because his love is no longer contingent upon anything 
(upon Isaac fulfilling the promise that God gave to Abraham, upon Isaac’s role in the 
Sittlickheit of the community) but has rather become an unconditional, God-like love.  
 Guilt-consciousness then, is consciousness of the struggle between our lower, 
animal nature and the higher elements of reason. Plato’s Republic is a fine example of a 
philosophical work that deals with religiousness “A” and its concomitant guilt-
consciousness. As Climacus points out, the dialectic that occurs in guilt-consciousness 
allows for an “inward deepening”193 where the individual can harmonize these disparate 
elements of himself. Religiousness “A” is marked by a belief in the ability of human 
beings to master their condition. In Plato’s philosophy this mastery occurs through a 
combination of social arrangement and an inward, spiritual process whereby the 
individual human person is transformed.  
 Sin-consciousness, which arises as we enter upon religiousness “B,” i.e., 
Christianity, occurs when the absolute paradox of the human condition becomes apparent 
to us: Our telos is eternal and absolute, we are indeed to accomplish the actualization of 
this telos through inward deepening, suffering and pathos, yet it is ultimately impossible 
for us to do so. Just as the ethical person found himself stranded upon the jagged rocks of 
meaninglessness and despair upon realizing that everything that he strives for will 
ultimately fade and wither away, the person in religiousness “A” has a sudden realization, 
a moment of clarity, where the horrifying truth of human corruption becomes fully 
apparent. 
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 Climacus describes the move from guilt-consciousness to sin-consciousness as a 
“break,” a kind of rebirth of the human person.194 The complete breakdown of the human 
person as she is faced with the infinite distance between herself and God (the eternal, the 
absolute) becomes an upbuilding of the person. For Kierkegaard, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, to become a person means ultimately to undergo an act of kenosis 
where the self stands “transparent” before God, before “the mirror of the Word.” To 
realize that we have fallen away from God is a necessary component in coming to know 
God. The fullness of subjective knowing is ultimately revealed to be a kind of 
unknowing. “We left the religious person in the crisis of sickness,” Climacus writes, “but 
this sickness is not unto death. We shall now let him be strengthened by the very same 
conception that destroyed him, by the conception of God.”195  
 The “break” that occurs between guilt-consciousness and sin-consciousness 
creates a new paradigm of the self. The deepening inwardness of the dialectical 
relationship between the poles of existence exhausts itself and the human person stands 
completely naked and vulnerable in the face of this despair. This would, of course, be a 
terrifying concept, but Kierkegaard thinks that the realization of the “break” that occurs 
ultimately brings about the ultimate “drawing near” towards God. This is important 
because, as I previously noted, subjective/essential knowledge (Kendskab) is primarily 
understood as acquaintance knowledge, i.e., as “drawing near” to someone. The 
relationship with the eternal ceases to be an abstract one (as in a Platonic, guilt-
consciousness of religiousness “A”) and becomes a personal relationship of love. This is 
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only truly and fully possible because God draws near to human beings at the same time 
that they draw near to him:  
 
A break, in which the paradoxical accentuation of existence consists, 
cannot intervene in the relation between an existing person and the eternal, 
because the eternal embraces the existing person everywhere, and 
therefore the misrelation remains within immanence. If a break is to 
establish itself, the eternal itself must define itself as a temporality, as in 
time, as historical, whereby the existing person and the eternal in time 
have eternity between them. This is the paradox.196 
 
 It is ultimately Christ (the paradox)—the God-Man, the eternal made finite, the 
divine made man—who bridges the gap infinite gap between humankind and God. 
Kierkegaard’s religious philosophy is deeply and profoundly incarnational. Without the 
incarnation, humankind would forever be mired in full and absolute despair, unable to 
ever fulfill its telos. What is especially important here, and what I will now examine in 
full detail, is the implication that Kierkegaard sees the paradox as being a) primarily a 
deeply personal relationship rather than any sort of intellectual grasping, and b) primarily 
taking place in the context of an apophatic unknowing. These two elements of 
Kierkegaard’s epistemology place him strikingly near the epistemological tradition of the 
Eastern Orthodox Church. In fact, Kierkegaard’s philosophy of kenosis, apophaticism, 
and communion place him firmly on the Eastern side of an epistemological debate that 
reaches centuries back into the history of the Christian tradition.  
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3. 8 - Apophaticism and Communion 
One of the most seminal and influential works on Eastern Orthodox epistemology 
is undoubtedly Vladimir Lossky’s The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church.197 
Lossky’s analysis draws primarily on the works of Dionysius the Areopagite (who in the 
Western Christian tradition is often known as Pseudo-Dionysisus), the 6th century Syrian 
mystic and theologian.198 Eastern apophaticism is also heavily indebted to the works of 
the Cappadocian fathers, especially St. Gregory of Nyssa, as well as the epistemological 
developments made by St. Gregory Palamas in the 14th century.199 Eastern apophaticism 
is centered on the metaphysical distinction made between God’s essence (ousia) and his 
energies (energeia). God’s essence is completely and utterly unknowable and 
unapproachable by the human mind, both in this life as well as in the next:200  
 
All knowledge has as its object that which is. Now God is beyond all that 
exists. In order to approach Him it is necessary to deny all that is inferior 
to Him, that is to say, all that which is. If in seeing God one can know 
what one sees, then one has not seen God in Himself (since the essence 
cannot be known and is above all that which is) but something intelligible, 
something which is inferior to Him. It is by unknwowing that one may 
know Him who is above every possible object of knowledge.201 
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 One of Lossky’s primary goals is to differentiate Eastern apophaticism from the 
Western conception of the via negativa, primarily as it appears in Aquinas. Aquinas, 
according to Lossky, had attempted to merge together the apophatic and the cataphatic, 
using the former as corrective for the latter. Lossky’s point is that Aquinas, immersed as 
he is in a Western Christian epistemology that emphasizes rational comprehension of 
God, is unable to fully grasp the implications of Dionysius’ apophaticism.202 As Jones 
points out, Aquinas holds to a rational theology as sciencia:  
 
[Theology as sciencia] is able to substitute knowledge of created beings 
for a knowledge of the divine essence given the causal relation between 
God and them. That is, on the basis of a demonstration of the existence of 
God from created things, divine simplicity, and that all created things exist 
in a preeminent manner in God as first cause, we can establish a 
demonstrative knowledge of God – the divine essence – based upon the 
analogical knowledge that exists between created beings and God.203  
 
Lossky and Jones both contend that Aquinas attempts to interpret the Dionysian 
corpus in such a way that it will fit into this rationalistic approach and that this misses 
essential elements of Dionysius’ apophaticism.  
 As I have shown throughout this chapter, Kierkegaard went to great pains to 
differentiate the possibility of knowledge of God from anything resembling the 
rationalistic model presented by Aquinas (which has its roots in Augustine’s theology on 
the divine simplicity of God). Kierkegaard, of course, is decidedly silent on the 
possibility of a “beatific vision,” i.e., the possibility that human beings could somehow 
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grasp the essence of God in the next life. But given the fact that Kierkegaard thinks that 
human beings can only fully know and understand the essence of things that are 
absolutely certain (e.g. mathematical equations)204 it seems that in his epistemology God 
would effectively need to be reduced to a kind of “formula” that the human being “gets” 
for such a vision to be a possibility, even in the next life.205 Furthermore, “ontological 
knowledge”—knowledge of necessary and eternal concepts—is always hypothetical for 
Kierkegaard.206 It refers to the way objects must be if they indeed exist outside of 
thought. This is why meditations on God’s essence are always hypothetical for 
Kierkegaard; abstract considerations that have little to do with any real knowledge we 
may have of God which is always subjective.207 Kierkegaard rarely refers to the essence 
(Væsen) of God in his writings and when he does it usually refers to God’s personal 
essence, which is ultimately revealed to us in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.208  
 The fact that Kierkegaard most likely does not allow for any knowledge of the 
essence of God may have influenced the charge of irrationalism against him.209 Indeed, if 
viewed from a purely Western Christian standpoint, Kierkegaard would seem to fit much 
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205 In an unpublished portion of CUP, Kierkegaard notes that to be an existing individual (i.e., a 
human being) means that one exists in time, i.e., within finitude. Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel can be 
easily related to his suspicion of the notion that one can understand God (i.e. have knowledge of the 
essence of God). From the perspective of the eternal, there is indeed no paradox in Christianity (which 
Kierkegaard sees Hegel attempting to do, i.e., achieve the position of the eternal, with his dialectic towards 
the Absolute). But human beings cannot existentially situate themselves absolutely within the eternal, given 
the fact that we are always existing within the tension of the eternal and the finite. Even though 
Kierkegaard never muses on what the reality of the eschaton might be like one can surmise that he believes 
that the poles of the eternal and the finite are not limited to life on this earth. Any created being (i.e., 
anything that is a being) will always coexist within the spheres of the finite and the infinite (even though 
“time” will mean something entirely different in the next life). This means that human beings can never 
have full and absolute knowledge of God, not even in the next life. God’s essence will always remain 
unknown. Christianity is eternally a matter of living the paradox, as opposed to understanding it. See CUP 
II, 48-51.  
206 Piety, 67. 
207 CUP, 280. 
208 JP 3, 3262 / II C 56. 
209 See 133, n. 81. 
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more neatly into a tradition such as pietism than the more rationally oriented Roman 
Catholic tradition, especially as it is represented by Aquinas. But this may be a false 
dilemma. In fact, as I argued throughout the past two chapters and as Piety contends 
throughout her book, Kierkegaard firmly holds to the possibility of a knowledge of God, 
one that cannot be limited to a purely emotional response nor to an irrational leap of faith. 
By situating Kierkegaard nearer to the Eastern Orthodox position, as represented by 
writers such as Lossky, we can begin to understand his position in a clearer light.  
 Kierkegaard’s dialectical development of subjective knowledge reaches a kind of 
apotheosis in his incarnational theology. It is ultimately in and through Christ that 
knowledge of God becomes possible as a form of communion. Similarly, for Lossky, 
Dionysian apophaticism finds its fulfilment in the incarnation. Papanikalaou, in his 
analysis of Lossky, writes: “Divine-human communion is the center of all theological 
discourse and the central significance of the Incarnation. Lossky’s theology is thus 
Christologically grounded, but in a particular understanding of Jesus Christ as the person 
in whom is realized the event of divine-human communion.”210  
 I noted earlier that immanent metaphysical knowledge in the subjective sense, for 
Kierkegaard, primarily relates to our experience of such things as the immortality of the 
soul (which, it should yet again be pointed out, is an existential reality just as much as it 
is a metaphysical proposition, according to Kierkegaard).211 Such knowledge is always a 
                                                 
210 Papanikolaou, 14. 
211 Just as a reminder, these are categories that appear throughout Kierkegaard's works but are never 
systematized. My analysis here is based on Piety’s formulations. For a discussion of Piety's use of 
“immanent” in this context, see p. 51 and Piety pp. 99-113. Though it is strange to talk about our 
relationship to such things as the immortality of the soul as “immanent” it makes considerable sense in the 
context of an inward relation to the existential reality of immortality. Plato’s Phaedo is an excellent 
example of a discussion of the subject that is “objective” throughout much of the dialogue, i.e. treating it as 
a philosophical problem, but which nonetheless has an important “subjective” and “immanent” 
undercurrent, given the fact that Socrates is discussing the issue right before facing his own death. This is 
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kind of self-knowledge, much of which is equally accessible through religiousness “A” as 
well as “B” (Christianity). But it is only via sin-consciousness and the “break” that occurs 
in the self that we can begin to access a subjective knowledge that is not immanent, i.e., 
that we cannot gain from our deepening awareness of our own self and the despair 
therein. This is the “transcendent” knowledge accessible only via revelation, the 
knowledge only available within religiousness “B,” that reveals to the believer that he is a 
sinner and that the only way to overcome this state is through the salvation of Jesus 
Christ who is God incarnate. As Climacus so succinctly puts it in Fragments: “Christ is 
the truth.”212 
 As Piety notes213 Kierkegaard always uses the Danish word Kjendskab “or some 
form of the verb kjende, rather than Erkjendelsen or Viden or their associated words” 
when referring to our knowledge of Christ. To “know” Christ, then, is to have a 
relationship with Him. Christ represents the final end of the epistemological dialectic that 
runs throughout the Kierkegaardian corpus because Christ represents the ultimate union 
between knowledge and existence: “Only in Christ, according to Kierkegaard, are truth 
and existence combined in such a way that they are indistinguishable from each other.”214  
 Piety sees an essential gap remaining between subject and object, even at this 
height of Christian knowledge: “A person meets Christ in the moment of faith. This 
meeting is what is meant by ‘knowledge’ of Christ, hence acquaintance knowledge of 
Christ precedes genuine Christian knowledge in the propositional sense.”215 This 
                                                 
an apt example given the fact that Kierkegaard thinks that there is always a “subjective” and “interested” 
element to all knowledge, even objective knowledge, even though we sometimes pretend that this is not the 
case.  
212 Fragments, 205. 
213 Piety, 149. 
214 Ibid., 152. 
215 Ibid., 149. Emphasis mine.  
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propositional knowledge primarily consists of doctrinal knowledge, of understanding the 
Christian teaching that one is a sinner and needs Christ to be saved. Of course, as 
subjective knowledge, one must then conform one’s self to this knowledge, i.e., live it. 
There remains, though, a kind of unbridgeable chasm between the self and the mental 
representation that it attempts to conform to. All human beings, due to their sinfulness, 
are unable to conform their self perfectly to the ideal of Christian knowledge (which 
Christ Himself is able to do). Ultimately, Piety sees the appropriation of this gap 
(between the ideality and the actuality of the self) as being an essential component of 
Christian knowledge:  
 
Christian knowledge is not ‘knowledge,’ in the approximate sense, of what 
has historically been referred to as Christian doctrine, or, more 
specifically, ‘knowledge’ in an approximate sense, that the proposition 
that God became man in Christ is part of this doctrine. Christian 
knowledge proper is the mental representation of this doctrine in the sense 
of  ‘the objective uncertainty maintained through appropriation in the 
most passionate inwardness’ as well as the wise person’s insight that the 
only way one can properly relate to this ‘knowledge’ is subjectively, in the 
passion of faith.216 
 
 There are interesting parallels here between Piety’s reading of Kierkegaard and 
the aforementioned Thomistic account of the Dionysian corpus. Piety sees Kierkegaard’s 
apophaticism (his “skepticism,” for lack of a better word) as being a kind of corrective 
with regards to our ability to appropriate the doctrines of Christianity. The dual 
movements of resignation and faith are only possible insofar as we become aware of our 
inability to truly comport our life to the teachings of Christ (accomplished through our 
growing consciousness of sin) which in turn is only possible if we are deeply and 
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passionately aware of our inability to understand the Christian paradox. Whenever we 
think that we have Christ, and Christianity, “figured out” (as Kierkegaard accuses so 
many of his contemporaries of doing), the reality of the paradox comes crashing back 
into us, correcting our “kataphatic” attempts at making Christianity a speculative affair. 
For Piety, the relationship between the mental representation (the ideality) and the self 
(actuality) in Kierkegaard’s epistemology is always a dialectical one, a dance between 
subject and object where the self becomes ever more comported towards the reality of the 
paradox it encounters. This gives rise to a certain kind of epistemological certainty, made 
possible through faith:  
 
The knower’s certainty that his mental representation of Christian truth 
corresponds to reality is equivalent to his appreciation of the subjective 
necessity of the correspondence of his existence to this mental 
representation. Such an appreciation, and the certainty to which it gives 
rise, is made possible through belief in Christ. Belief in Christ transforms 
guilt consciousness into sin consciousness; this transformation is 
equivalent to the revelation of the subjective necessity of making one’s 
life an expression of Christian truth in order to obtain authentic human 
existence.217  
 
Apophatic knowledge (our inability to comprehend our own self and the absolute 
paradox) forms a corrective to kataphatic knowledge (Christian doctrine and our 
understanding that we must conform our life to it).  
 Kierkegaard’s fate on this reading is not dissimilar to the way in which the 
Dionysian corpus was received in the Latin West in the scholastic era: “For both Albert 
the Great and Aquinas, negation functioned as a logical corrective to the theological 
discourse, a ‘fine tuning’ of what fundamentally was an affirmation, thus enabling us ‘to 
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approach God with better certainty.”218 As Bogdan Bucur has pointed out, Albert and 
Thomas both saw apophaticism as an intellectual exercise, a part of a “legitimate 
scientia,” while the Eastern tradition always understood Dionysius in a much more 
radical way, espousing not a conceptual “fine tuning” of the intellect but rather an 
experiential (mystical) process that leads “beyond concepts into the darkness where God 
dwells.”219  
There is much to indicate that Kierkegaard’s apophaticism similarly proposes a 
radical union between the human self and God, one that is not limited to a dialectical 
engagement between a mental representation and the self but rather involves a profound 
experience of the self entering into the life of God. The rest of this chapter, therefore, will 
be devoted to a critique of Piety’s reading of Kierkegaard’s views on subjective 
knowledge. I will contend that even though Kierkegaard’s views on subjective 
knowledge of God include the aforementioned attempt to inwardly appropriate (actualize) 
Christian doctrine and teachings (ideality) it is nonetheless not reducible to such an 
epistemological framework. Ideality and actuality are always held in tension, in 
Kierkegaard’s framework, meaning that the human person can never fully actualize the 
ideality of Christian truth.220 Nonetheless, I will argue that Kierkegaard points towards 
                                                 
218 Bogdan Bucur, “The Theological Reception of Dionysian Apophatism in the Christian East and 
West: Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas,” The Downside Review 439, no.125 (2007): 139. 
219 Bradshaw, Aristotle East and West, 192. 
220 As I have repeatedly noted, ideality can be understood in reference to both objective and subjective 
knowledge. In reference to Christianity, an objective way of viewing Christian ideality is by understanding 
it solely in terms of a moral code or theological doctrine. Christianity, when reduced to objective 
categories, is “untruth,” according to Kierkegaard (Training in Christianity, 184). Viewed subjectively, 
Christianity represents ethical/religious ideality, i.e., the eternal telos of the human being in his or her 
attempt to acquire the likeness of God.  
To say that human beings can never fully actualize the ideality of Christian truth can be understood in 
terms of both the objective and subjective understandings of Christianity. Objectively speaking, human 
beings can never fully conform themselves to every single doctrine and moral precept that points the way to 
holiness. This is, after all, the primary theme of Christ’s teaching in the gospels, namely that blind 
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the possibility of union with God himself in and through the incarnation of Christ, a 
union that in fundamental ways transcends the epistemological categories delineated by 
Piety. Kierkegaard’s notion of “knowing” God is not just an epistemological one but 
rather an existential reality that has significant ontological implications, even though 
Kierkegaard is not focused on an ontological analysis. This reading of Kierkegaard is 
heavily influenced by the apophatic tradition in Eastern Christianity and I will now flesh 
out key aspects of the notion of “union with God” in this tradition and then relate it to 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  
 In his analysis of the apophatic tradition in the Christian East, Lossky emphasizes 
a synergy of human free will and divine grace (similar to the previously discussed 
framework of Maximus the Confessor):  
 
Grace is a presence of God within us which demands constant effort on 
our part; these efforts, however, in no way determine grace, nor does grace 
act upon our liberty as if it were external or foreign to it. This doctrine, 
faithful to the apophatic spirit of the Eastern tradition, expresses the 
mystery of the coincidence of grace and human freedom in good works, 
without recourse to positive and rational terms.221  
 
The union of human beings with God is accomplished through the appropriation of divine 
grace via the concomitant efforts of action (askesis) and contemplation. Similarly, for 
Kierkegaard, correct ascetical struggle and worship allow the believer to transcend the 
                                                 
adherence to the law is to be supplanted by the new covenant. The life presented by Christ is not one of 
religious adherence but rather a life marked by inner repentance, transformation, and love.  
But even if we do not make the mistake of the Pharisees and indeed manage to focus on this ideality 
in a subjective manner (as our personal telos) we will nevertheless never fully actualize this ideality. Given 
the fact that human beings still struggle with sin, we will never achieve a perfect likeness to God in this life 
(or, for that matter, in the next), hence the need for continual repentance and struggle. Subjectively 
speaking, it is the struggle towards actualizing the ideality that marks true Christianity rather than the claim 
that one has achieved that ideality (which is always an impossibility).  
221 Lossky, 198.  
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false dualism of grace (understood as an external force, the “ideal” to which the self must 
comport itself) and the human will.222 As Podmore notes on Kierkegaard’s epistemology 
of grace: “The struggle of prayer is actually a humble expression of the infinite 
qualitative difference in which the human and divine are brought into intimate 
relationship.”223 As previously noted, prayer is primarily a form of kenosis for 
Kierkegaard where the self becomes “nothing” before God, and in this nothingness a true 
union is achieved. The self of the believer must become “transparent” before God224 so 
that the Spirit may “illuminate him so that he resembles God.”225  
In the Western Christian tradition the emphasis on the issue of grace has 
traditionally been on the relationship between free will and grace and less of an emphasis 
on the nature of grace itself.226 The Latin tradition, following from Augustine’s influence, 
focused on the transactional nature of grace as a supernatural influence or force created 
by God in relation to his creatures in order to influence them towards righteousness and 
redemption.227 The extent to which human beings could work in harmony with this grace 
became a central facet of Western Christian soteriology. The Greek tradition, on the other 
                                                 
222 See esp. JP 2, 1472 / X2 A 198. Here Kierkegaard notes that even when we receive the grace of the 
forgiveness of sins, “grace is needed in relation grace.” Kierkegaard points to a continual dialectic of 
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hand, viewed grace more in terms of God’s immanence in the world. The 
essence/energies distinction that became central to Eastern Orthodox theology was, at 
least in part, an attempt to “defend the reality of grace.”228 The Greek Fathers did not 
view grace as a supernatural reality created by God that somehow transcends the reality 
of fallen or corrupted nature but rather as the experience of the divine energies, i.e., as 
God’s immanent presence in nature which is always suffused with the divine.229 As 
Payton notes:  
 
According to Orthodoxy, the divine energies are eternal. They are not part 
of creation, and they were not brought into being at the time of creation. 
The divine energies reside within God; better put, the divine energies are 
God. […] God brought the universe into existence through the divine 
energies and through them he continues to sustain it. The divine energies 
are God dealing with the creation. All God’s involvement with creation—
in providence, protection and salvation—is through his energies, which 
are God.230 
 
 An essential element in the Eastern Orthodox essence/energies distinction is the 
idea that the energeia in question always flow from the hypostases, i.e., the three persons 
of the Trinity, and not from God’s ousia.231 The energies are always understood in terms 
of the personal relationship and communion between the three persons of the Trinity and 
human beings. Payton writes:  
 
God is never at a distance from his creation, and he never deals with it at 
arm’s length. When he acts upon or with his creation, he is not merely 
exerting some ‘influence’ on it: he is dealing intimately with it, through 
his energies—which are God himself. This is true for all God’s dealings 
                                                 
228 Payton, 163. See Vladimir Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, ed. John H. Erickson and 
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231 See especially Basil the Great, “Letter XXXVIII,” Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series II, 
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with his creation—and certainly and especially in salvation. Thus, the 
grace in which we are deified is not some immaterial or spiritual influence 
exerted upon us from afar, or something poured out upon or into us at 
arm’s length. Grace is God himself working within us, effecting our 
deification within us.232 
 
Kierkegaard never deals explicitly with the nature of grace in his writings. Often, 
Kierkegaard views grace primarily as forgiveness and mercy.233 Much of Kierkegaard’s 
struggle with the notion of grace as forgiveness has to do with our ability (or inability) to 
accept and appropriate that forgiveness.234 This appropriation is always a matter of 
inwardness, of a deepening realization of one’s existence as a person, i.e., as an existing 
individual, and this realization only occurs in our deepening awareness of God’s personal 
relationship to us. This personal relationship is then to be extended to other human 
beings. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes: “Christianity’s view is: forgiveness is 
forgiveness; your forgiveness is your forgiveness’ your forgiveness of another is your 
forgiveness’ your forgiveness of another is your own forgiveness.”235 The grace of God, 
manifest in and through our personal relationship with him, is to flow through us to other 
people. We are to become conduits for God’s grace. But this is only possible if we 
become “transparent”, if we become completely still and quiet and allow God’s grace to 
“shine through us.”236 Even though Kierkegaard never uses the technical terminology of 
energeia he nonetheless gives an astoundingly poetic view of human appropriation of 
grace that is centered on the person’s ability to “reflect the image of God,” which can 
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only occur as one attempts to come “face-to-face” with God Himself in a personal 
encounter of inwardness and prayer.237 
This inwardness is achieved primarily in worship, according to Climacus: 
“Worship is the maximum for a human being’s relationship with God, and thereby for his 
likeness to God, since the qualities are absolutely different. But worship signifies that for 
him God is absolutely everything, and the worshiper is in turn the absolutely 
differentiating one. The absolutely differentiating one relates himself to his absolute 
telos, but eo ipso also to God.”238 In an important passage, Climacus stresses that this 
differentiation between the believer and God must involve a complete abandonment of 
our understanding of God. Apophaticism, for Kierkegaard, cannot be limited to serving 
as a corrective to the kataphatic. God’s goodness is not simply a “supercharged” version 
of human goodness but rather a mystery to be entered into: “There is no merit at all for an 
existing person in wanting to approach the equality that possibly exists for the eternal. 
For an existing person, the passionate decision is precisely the maximum.”239 
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“differentiating ones,” i.e., manifest in our actions our complete reliance upon God and upon each other. 
Distingverende therefore denotes vulnerability, openness, and communion.  
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Furthermore, when we enter into the darkness of this unknowing, we are drawing near to 
God. Worship and prayer are two primary elements in clearing the path between the 
human self and God, and this can only be done by letting go of all of our images, 
thoughts, concepts, and ideas about what God is: “The absolute distinction is equipped to 
clear the way just as a policeman does in a procession; it clears away the crush, the mob 
of relative ends, in order that the absolutely differentiating one can relate himself to the 
absolute.”240 
 I have already touched on the contemplative elements of Kierkegaard’s 
epistemology, especially his indebtedness to the nous/dianoia distinction which is so 
pivotal to the development of Eastern Christian epistemology. With regards to the notion 
of action in the spiritual life (asceticism), Kierkegaard’s philosophy again finds many 
correlations to the Eastern tradition. Climacus’ repeated warnings of the externalization 
of the Christian faith in modernity and his suspicions about monasticism in the medieval 
world241 might lead to a superficial reading of Kierkegaard’s philosophy as being a 
matter of sola fide. As I repeatedly noted in the previous chapter, Kierkegaard obviously 
had severe reservations about Luther’s condemnation of the praxis of the spiritual life 
and did indeed hold that askesis is an essential component of the path towards God.  
 In The Mystical Theology Lossky writes:  
 
The beginning of the spiritual life is conversion, an attitude of the will 
turning towards God and renouncing the world: ‘The world’ has here a 
particular ascetical connotation. […] ‘The world’ signifies here a 
dispersion, the soul’s wandering outside itself, a treason against its real 
nature. For the soul is not in itself subject to passions, but becomes so 
when it leaves its interior simplicity and exteriorizes itself. Renunciation 
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of the world is thus a re-entering of the soul into itself, a concentration, a 
reintegration of the spiritual being in its return to communion with God.242 
 
 In Training in Christianity Anti-Climacus writes that the purpose of the Christian 
is to achieve absolute “introversion,” i.e. to gather all the disparate elements of himself in 
his inner life and to focus these on living in accordance with Christ. This living primarily 
consists of self-denial and asceticism: “Endless introversion teaches a man to understand 
to the utmost what the task is (if to the utmost he is introverted), that to be a Christian is 
to believe in Christ and to suffer for the sake of this faith, in other words, that it is self-
denial in the Christian sense.”243 
 Much of Training in Christianity is a long polemic against what Kierkegaard (in 
the voice of Anti-Climacus) sees as the insipid and vapid Christianity of his age, 
especially the preaching of such figures as Bishop Mynster. In section III, Anti-Climacus 
argues at length against sermons that are intended as reflections (Betragtninger) because 
they create a distance between the believer and the teaching, i.e., they maintain a subject-
object distinction that Kierkegaard wants to overcome.244 Anti-Climacus maintains that a 
reflection is a proper attitude to have when one is looking at a painting, since it is proper 
that one, to some extent, go “out of” oneself as one observes the painting. Christianity, on 
the other hand, is like a painting that “looks back” at the observer.245 It draws the viewer 
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in and demands a kind of communion that transcends the relationship between knower 
and the object-to be-known. Anti-Climacus’ repeated admonishments that the Christian 
must learn how to suffer is not a pessimistic glorification of suffering for its own sake but 
rather an epistemological meditation on the nature of the I-Thou relationship between the 
believer and God. Both Works of Love and Training in Christianity present a spirituality 
that attempts to combine theoria and praxis by presenting kenosis as the ultimate goal of 
the spiritual life. Kierkegaard’s apophatic “unknowing” finds its correlation in Anti-
Climacus’ emphasis on martyrdom where the self enters into the life of God.  
 Many readers could indeed be forgiven for finding much of Anti-Climacus’ 
polemic as being overly harsh and off-putting in Training in Christianity. It is 
undoubtedly one of Kierkegaard’s most difficult and challenging works. Yet themes of 
union and transformation abound in the work. In explaining the distinction between an 
“admirer” of Christianity (one who finds it beautiful and true but does not attempt to 
change herself in accordance with the teaching) and a “follower” (someone whose self is 
changed via her exposure to Christian teaching and to the reality of Christ) Anti-
Climacus writes: “The admirer is not willing to make any sacrifices, to give up anything 
worldly, to reconstruct his life, to be what he admires or let his life express it […]. The 
follower, on the other hand, aspires to be what he admires—and so (strange to say!) even 
though he lives in established Christendom he will encounter the same danger which 
once was involved in confessing Christ.”246  
 In the previous chapter I discussed various ways in which Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy presents salvation as a kind of theosis, a deification of the human person. In 
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the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the doctrine of theosis is deeply connected to the 
epistemological and ontological distinction of God’s essence and energies. God’s 
essence, as has been previously noted, is completely unknowable, the “divine darkness” 
that lies at the center of so much of Eastern Orthodox theology. The divine energies, 
God’s outpouring grace and connection to humankind, are considered not as a created 
“effect” but rather as a manifestation of God Himself.247 This means that the energies 
reveal something real and knowable about God, indicating that human reason has an 
important and positive role to play in our relationship to God. The heavy emphasis on 
apophaticism in writers such as Dionysius (and later theologians such as Lossky) is not 
an attempt to turn theology into some kind of irrationalism but rather to shift the focus 
away from theology as a scientia to a view of theology as having primarily to do with 
practice, experience, and communion. For writers such as Lossky, all of these elements 
are grounded in the experience of the Incarnation: “The problem for Lossky is not so 
much the role of thought and positive theology, but the failure to recognize the limits of 
thought in the face of the Incarnation.”248  
 Johannes de Silentio’s account of the inward movement from resignation to faith, 
Climacus’ account of the “crucifixion of reason” and Anti-Climacus’ exhortations are all 
an attempt to show that Christianity, viewed solely from a rational perspective, can 
equally be seen as a “teaching” that is quite beautiful (the humanist appropriation of 
Christianity) or something that is “madness” and the “greatest horror” (the point of view 
                                                 
247 For a detailed discussion of the divergence between the Augustinian understanding of theophanies 
as created effects in the Western tradition versus the Eastern understanding of these as Christological and 
manifestations of divine energeiai see Bogdan Bucur, “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine’s De 
Trinitate: An Eastern Orthodox Perpsective,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008): 67-93. 
248 Papanikalaou, 16. 
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of one who understands, and perhaps even believes, the doctrine and the law, but does not 
humble himself in sin-consciousness and enter into communion with Christ, the one who 
forgives the sin).249 As Piety argues, Kierkegaard fully believed in both “acquaintance 
knowledge” (Kjendskab) as well as propositional knowledge of Christian truth.250 Yet the 
knower remains forever separate from the object known (meaning that it is not essential 
knowledge at all, which requires the appropriation of the knowledge in question) until the 
eye of reason “closes” and the knower realizes that God truly is “the unknown.” 
Climacus in the Fragments writes that “the individual, if he is truly to come to know 
something about the unknown (God) must come to know that it is different from himself, 
absolutely different. The understanding cannot come to know this by itself (because, as 
we have seen, this is self-contradictory). If it is to come to know this, it must come to 
know this through God.”251 
 As Papanikalaou writes: “The goal of apophaticism is not to conclude that nothing 
can be known of God; it is rather to propel the aspiring Christian to a deeper union, which 
lies beyond being and thus beyond thought.”252 Podmore sees Kierkegaard’s writings on 
prayer as being profoundly reflective of this sensibility. Human despair, the misrelation 
of the self to itself, reaches a dialectical apotheosis at the moment when we become 
acutely aware of the chasm between ourselves and God. Reason can in no way, shape, or 
form bridge this chasm. In fact, to try to “figure out” a way to God, or to overcome sin, is 
to fall ever deeper in to despair.253 Prayer for Kierkegaard (as previously argued in this 
                                                 
249 See esp. Training in Christianity, 61-62. 
250 Piety, esp. 154-60. 
251 Philosophical Crumbs (trans. Piety), 199. Emphasis mine.  
252 Papanikalaou, 18. 
253 This echoes the sentiment that sometimes appears in both the Gospels and the epistles that it is 
better to live in ignorance of the Logos than to have come to know the Truth and to turn one’s back on it 
because one is not strong enough to follow the Way. See, for example, 2 Peter 2:21: “For it had been better 
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chapter) is a form of unknowing, of silence as the drawing-near to God. Commenting on 
a passage from The Sickness Unto Death where Anti-Climacus speaks of the height of 
despair as one who says “No” to the possibility of the forgiveness of sin (which 
ultimately reflects an attempt to rationally understand sin)254 Podmore writes:  
 
If this offensive and combative speech is contrasted with the surrendering 
intimacy of prayer, it is discovered that, unlike the despair which wants to 
grapple with God but only does so by becoming qualitatively distanced, 
prayer is actually a silent waiting upon God: an unknowing expression of 
self-surrender through faith. […] Prayer signifies an act of silence: an act 
which breaks the silence of despair in the face of human impossibility; and 
the same time also a silence which listens to God at the moment when 
despair would pronounce its offence. The silence of prayer for 
Kierkegaard… does not struggle at a distance with God in its despairing 
defiance, but rather it transcends, as it were, the infinite distance by its 
submission to faith.255  
 
Lossky sees this demarcation between “struggling with God” and the apophatic way of 
union as being emblematic of the division between the Western and Eastern Christian 
traditions in the way in which they understand the possibility of union with God. The 
Western tradition, according to Lossky, emphasizes gnosis, the attempt to understand 
God (albeit noetically) with the Eastern conception of “mystical experience,” a union 
                                                 
for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than, after they have known it, to turn from the holy 
commandment delivered unto them.” This reflects Kierkegaard’s notion that despair is actually at its 
highest in the religious stage of existence, especially in that moment when one shifts from religiousness 
“A” to religiousness “B.” It is only via the existential moment (Øjeblik) of faith (which must be repeated ad 
infinitum throughout our lives) that we overcome this despair and the chasm is bridged. But when we are 
unable to do so, we are, at least to some extent, in a worse place existentially than the philistine or the 
aesthete, who at least find solace in their existential ignorance and can drown their sorrows in the sweet 
waters of immediacy. Plato echoes the same sentiment in the Cave Allegory, since the heightened 
consciousness of the lover of wisdom who escaped the cave is obviously cause of no little despair and 
suffering, compared to the blissful (though ultimately destructive) ignorance of those who are perfectly fine 
with continuing their existence within the safe confines of the shadows.  
254 See SUD, 114: “When the sinner despairs of the forgiveness of sins, it is almost as if he walked 
right up to God and said, ‘No, there is no forgiveness of sins, it is impossible,’ and it looks like close 
combat.” 
255 Podmore, 150.  
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between the human person and God that incorporates all elements (both spiritual and 
bodily) of the human being.256 The inexpressible and ineffable union of the via negativa 
in Eastern theology represents the union of “knowledge and love”257 where the mind 
ceases to understand the “what” of God and draws near to God as the beloved. For 
Kierkegaard this type of knowledge represents the height of Kjendskab, of knowing 
through communion, of union through love: “Prayer is thus the leap of faith into the 
silence of unknowing: the self-surrendering intimacy that overcomes the infinite abyss of 
offence that has served as the battlefield between God and humanity.”258  
This is an altogether deeper and more profound knowledge than what Piety 
proposes we can find in Kierkegaard, i.e., the attempt to conform the self to a mental 
representation. Subjective (essential) knowledge, for Kierkegaard, reaches completely 
beyond mental representations and becomes a pathway towards union. Prayer, 
contemplation, and asceticism (accepting suffering) are the essential components of the 
human being, in mind, soul, body, and spirit, ceasing to attempt to “figure out” either his 
own sinfulness or the gap between himself and God, instead emptying himself in the face 
of the absolute mystery (the ultimate Paradox) of God’s eternal love.  
  
                                                 
256 See Papanikalaou, 20-24; Lossky, 8, 221, 224. 
257 Papanikalaou, 22. 
258 Podmore, 150. 
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Chapter 4 – Being as Love: Personhood and Communion 
 
In this chapter I will examine Kierkegaard’s views on personhood and the self. A primary 
consideration in this chapter will be to defend Kierkegaard against two common critiques 
aimed at his philosophy: a) that his views on personhood often constitute a form of 
individualism with little or no consideration of relationships, community, and 
communion, and b) that Kierkegaard’s philosophy is largely devoid of a critical 
examination of social and political issues, especially given his critique of Hegelian 
Sittlickheit. I will argue that this negative appraisal arises out of reading his philosophy as 
falling within standard accounts of personhood found within the Western philosophical 
and religious traditions, which I contend Kierkegaard wanted to break away from. 
Though there are important differences between Kierkegaard’s view and the philosophy 
of personhood espoused in Eastern Christianity, there are fascinating parallels between 
the two that highlight the revolutionary break Kierkegaard wanted to make between his 
views of the human person and the philosophical views of the human person found in 
both the Western Christian tradition as well as in the humanist Enlightenment 
philosophies (the “speculative philosophy”) of the time. 
In section 4.1 I begin by examining Kierkegaard’s writings on the relationship 
between paradox and personhood. My focus in this first section will be on the connection 
between Kierkegaard’s epistemology (extensively discussed in chapter three) and his 
philosophy of personhood. This discussion will include an analysis of Climacus’ 
distinction between the objective truths (perhaps most clearly represented by speculative 
philosophy) and subjective truth that must be appropriated by the individual person. As 
we will see, Kierkegaard’s philosophy of personhood is primarily founded on the notion 
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of becoming a person (or “spirit”), a process that primarily revolves around our ability to 
manifest certain kinds of ethical/religious truths in ourselves. This section then proceeds 
to an analysis of personhood in Eastern Orthodox philosophy with a focus on various 
elements that coincide with Kierkegaard’s analysis. My focus will be on the notion of 
personhood as being grounded in communion, a view of the human person that dates 
back to the patristic era but which finds its clearest expression in later theological writers 
such as Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas.  
Section 4.2 will further flesh out Kierkegaard’s view of the person as a process of 
becoming, while also examining parallels between Kierkegaard’s debate with the 
Hegelianism of his time and the differing philosophies of personhood between Eastern 
and Western Christianity. It also includes an analysis of relationality in Kierkegaard’s 
writings, with an emphasis on the difference between religiousness “A” and “B” in 
Climacus’ Concluding Unscientific Postscript. This is an important consideration in any 
analysis of Kierkegaard’s writings on the person because Kierkegaard sees Christianity 
(religiousness “B”) as opening up a profoundly revolutionary view of human personhood, 
one that cannot be accessed via any other philosophical model or theory.  
Section 4.3 offers a comparative philosophical analysis of the concept of 
deification (theosis) in Eastern Orthodox spirituality, especially as it relates to the issue of 
personhood, and Kierkegaard’s view on the possibility of universal love (Kærlighed). 
This section will also offer a preliminary analysis of the social and political implications 
of Kierkegaard’s philosophy of personhood, especially when it is considered in light of 
similar socio-political concerns in the Eastern Orthodox tradition. Though time and space 
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preclude an extensive analysis of this matter I hope to at least provide a glimpse into the 
potential of Kierkegaard’s philosophy as it relates to systemic and political realities.  
  
4.1 - Paradox and Personhood 
Kierkegaard’s views on personhood have already served as the background for 
much of the preceding discussion. Anti-Climacus’ view of human personhood as 
essentially consisting of the tension between the poles of human existence; finite/infinite, 
temporal/eternal, determined/free, biological/ensouled, etc. This tension informs the 
process of personhood as a state of becoming and it informs all of Kierkegaard’s writing 
on the human self (this equally applies to his pseudonymous works as well as the 
Christian discourses written in his own name). As I discussed in chapter 2, the experience 
of both anxiety and despair reveals the basic structure of what it means to be an existing 
individual. Human telos for Kierkegaard primarily revolves around facing up to despair 
and achieving an authentic existence. The way in which this is done depends upon which 
stage of existence one is in and upon one’s ability to move closer towards the religious 
sphere (specifically religiousness “B,” i.e., Christianity). This is because Kierkegaard 
obviously believed that Christianity offered the kind of subjective truth that allows 
human beings to fully understand and appropriate their condition (sinfulness) and to 
overcome it (via the salvation made possible through the incarnation of Jesus Christ). 
Even though the aesthetic and ethical spheres offer ways in which one can face up 
to despair in various ways, they are nonetheless limited insofar as the human being within 
these spheres fails to realize the extent of the effects of sin upon his or her own self. The 
aesthete and ethical person are both attempting to lift themselves up to heaven, so to 
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speak, through their own efforts. The religious sphere, however, marks the realization 
that the human understanding simply does not allow us to save ourselves, and that we 
must therefore seek transcendence and salvation through other means. Self-knowledge is 
directly linked to coming face-to-face with the absolute paradox (the “absurd,” as 
Silentio, calls it) and deepening introspection correlates with a deepening awareness of 
our absolute dependence upon God.1  
As an entryway into Kierkegaard’s complex views on the self, I will begin with a 
discussion of how his epistemology and focus on paradox affect his views on human 
personhood. As we will see, the realization that we cannot solve the problem of the 
human self through the power of the understanding opens us up to a new kind of 
knowledge and a new self-realization, one which is primarily grounded in communion 
with other people and with God.  
One of the primary discussions of “the paradox” appears in Johannes Climacus’ 
Philosophical Fragments. Climacus differentiates between three different modes of 
trying to understand the truth: a) Speculative philosophy,2 b) Socratic philosophizing, and 
                                                 
1 This chapter presents a somewhat tricky issue in how to correctly present the concept of Guden. 
When it is clear that Kierkegaard, or one of the pseudonymous authors, is referring to the Christian God in 
the context of religiousness “B,” I have chosen to capitalize the word. When the writings refer to the divine 
entering into immediacy in the moment, especially in the context of Socrates and Religousness “A,” I have 
chosen to keep the word in the lower case. This is not just a stylistic choice but rather an attempt to allow 
the reader to situate herself more firmly in the development of Kierkegaard's (and Climacus') thought as we 
move back and forth between these two different modes of entering into a relationship with the divine.  
2 There is quite a bit of scholarly debate on exactly what this means and at whom Climacus' critique is 
primarily aimed. Stewart (Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel Reconsidered (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003)) contends that all of the pseudonymous works, as well as those penned under 
Kierkegaard's own name, are primarily aimed at his Danish contemporaries. If Philosophical Fragments are 
viewed in conjunction with the unpublished work Johannes Climacus, which details the early biography of 
the author of Fragments and the Postscript, then it becomes clear that Climacus’ aim is much broader. 
Hegel, and Danish Hegelians, may represent a certain kind of apotheosis of “speculative” thinking but it is 
obvious that Climacus’ aim is to critique objective thinking in general, i.e., the tendency to analyze reality 
solely in terms of systems, theories, and abstract arguments, which are never related back to the living 
individual.  
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c) faith. Dispassionate, objective thinking fails to tell us anything meaningful about the 
human condition because it does not take the synthesis of the poles of existence into 
account, making it impossible for living human beings to personally appropriate the 
truths of speculative thinking.3 Truth regarding the human self must be “impassioned” 
and subjective. It is “higher” because it not only expresses the synthesis but allows us to 
develop as human beings.4 Climacus calls speculative philosophy laughable because it is 
completely untethered from the earth, i.e., the lived reality of human existence.5 This 
means that purely objective, dispassionate thinking is always inherently dehumanizing, 
even to such an extent that the speculative thinker runs the risk of losing touch with his 
humanity entirely.6  
This image of the speculative philosopher is juxtaposed with Socrates who was 
constantly attempting to elevate his consciousness to the level of transcendent, divine 
truth, but who nonetheless always understood his own self and his philosophizing in the 
context of lived experience.7 Furthermore, Socrates’ philosophical quest is primarily 
characterized by a passionate inwardness, of constantly relating his quest of philosophical 
truth to his own person. This, as it turns out, is “the truth” that Climacus makes the 
primary focus of his Fragments.8 In his analysis of Cimacus’ relationship to Socrates, 
Jacob Howland writes:  
                                                 
3 This does not mean that objective thinking or speculative philosophy are without their value. As I 
discussed in the previous chapter, Kierkegaard's aim is never against academics or scientists per se, but 
rather against the inimical reductionism of the modern age that sees this manner of thought as being the 
sine qua non of understanding reality.  
4 Fragments, 56. 
5 Ibid., 124. 
6 Ibid., 50-51. 
7 The pivotal passage at 516e in the Republic where the philosopher returns to the Cave after 
glimpsing the divine eidos is central to Climacus’ reading of Socrates.  
8 Fragments, Chapter one, “A,” see esp. 9, where Climacus explicitly calls “the truth” he aims at a 
“Socratic question.”  
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In the Platonic dialogues, Socrates seeks the truth about virtue, about how 
we should live and what will make our souls as excellent as possible, and 
therefore the truth essentially embraces self-knowledge as well as 
knowledge of the good. Needless to say, this kind of truth will be useless 
to anyone who is not willing to conduct his life in accordance with it. The 
inquiry in Fragments relies on this Socratic notion of the truth, as it 
defines, at least in general terms, the goal of learning with which Climacus 
is concerned throughout.9  
 
The synthesis of ideality and actuality, which forms the centerpiece of Kierkegaardian 
epistemology, is primarily found in subjective inwardness where a person not only 
attempts to understand the truth but to actually become it. In Johannes Climacus, 
Kierkegaard sees such passionate inwardness as being the hallmark of the “old” 
philosophy, meaning philosophy as a way of life as practiced by such Greek thinkers as 
the Stoic philosophers and Socrates.10 This stands in stark contrast to thinkers such as 
Hegel whose primary aim it is to achieve an objective, impersonal, absolute synthesis. 
This explains why Climacus, throughout both the Fragments and the Postscript, is not 
primarily interested in providing logical arguments for one theory or another but rather 
attempts to provide a kind of Socratic “space” where the reader can engage with 
questions of self-identity, knowledge, and faith in a deeply personal manner.11 In the 
Postscript Climacus mentions Socrates’ arguments for the immortality of the soul in 
Plato’s Phaedo as having limited worth, objectively speaking, given the fact that it is 
impossible to give a completely successful argument for the immortality of the soul. This 
is because the issue at hand, our relation to eternity, is not an objective question but rather 
                                                 
9 Howland, Kierkegaard and Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 41. 
10 Johannes Climacus, 117. 
11 See Anthony Rudd, “The Moment and the Teacher: Problems in Kierkegaard's Philosophical 
Fragments,” Kierkegaardiana 21 (2000): 92-115; Howland, 42.   
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a subjective one. But this is exactly Socrates’ genius, according to Climacus, namely that 
he “stakes his whole life” on this question and “dares to die” as if he is immortal, 
appropriating his arguments completely into his being.12 Socrates’ aim in dialogues such 
as the Phaedo is not to give some abstract proof for the immortality of the soul (because 
such a thing is altogether impossible13) but rather to allow his interlocutors, in this case 
his friends and loved ones, to meditate on the issue in a spiritually beneficial way. The 
Phaedo represents, for Climacus, a hallmark of Socrates’ philosophical role as a 
“midwife,” i.e., as one who does not impart any teaching of his own but rather motivates 
others to engage in philosophical questioning through passionate inwardness.14  
A central theme in the Climacian texts is this difference between objective and 
subjective truths. The latter primarily consist of ethical and religious teachings, i.e., truths 
that must be appropriated by the knower in order for any kind of real understanding of 
them to emerge. But Climacus is also very interested in the spectrum that leads us from 
the ethical sphere into the religious, and in trying to pinpoint important differences 
between religiousness “A” and “B.” This theme is extensively treated by Johannes de 
Silentio in Fear and Trembling. Silentio sees the movement from the ethical to the 
religious as revolving around the relationship of the individual to the community. Silentio 
sees the ethical as revolving primarily around those aspects of the individual self which 
                                                 
12 Postscript, 173-174 and 201. 
13 It is worth reiterating Kierkegaard's concern that the problem with a purely objective mode of 
thinking and philosophizing is not primarily that it is ineffective but rather that it is spiritually dangerous. 
Kierkegaard's position is different from that of classical skepticism, where one withholds a position given 
the fact that an equally valid argument can be given for and against any given position. Kierkegaard most 
definitely sees these philosophical questions as having a definite answer, one way or another. His 
skepticism primarily revolves around the kind of truth we are trying to get at in our philosophizing, i.e., 
whether it is primarily systematic and abstract or inward and personal.   
14 See also Theaetetus, 149A-151D. 
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are commensurable with the universal.15 There are essential elements of the human self, 
though, which simply are not commensurable with the universal, represented by 
Abraham’s inability to communicate anything about his decision to sacrifice Isaac. This 
incommensurability takes the form of a paradox that becomes manifest in the life of the 
person who enters into the religious sphere: 
 
Faith is just this paradox, that the single individual as the particular is 
higher than the universal, is justified before the latter, not as subordinate 
but superior, though in such a way, be it noted, that it is the single 
individual who, having been subordinate to the universal as the particular, 
now by means of the universal becomes that individual who, as the 
particular, stands in an absolute relation to the absolute. This position 
cannot be mediated, for all mediation occurs precisely by virtue of the 
universal; it is and remains in all eternity a paradox, inaccessible to 
thought. And yet faith is this paradox.16 
                                                 
15 See especially Problema I, 83-95. Although it does not fall within the boundaries of this study, 
Kierkegaard's notion of “the ethical” differs in important ways from Hegelian Sittlickheit, though the two 
share important elements. As revealed in the dialectic between “A” and “B” in Either/or, the ethical for 
Kierkegaard is not a stage in the ultimate synthesis towards the absolute but rather an important step 
towards self-realization. The initial way in which we overcome our obsession with individualistic 
immediacy is via commitments to other people, which include our commitments to certain societal 
institutions, including marriage, family, political structures, etc. The failure of this move to alleviate 
despair, given the fact that despair can only be faced through an inward appropriation of ethical and 
religious truths, necessitates the teleological suspension of the ethical, which in no way shape or form 
suggests that the ethical is “overcome” or done away with. It is, rather, appropriated anew in the religious. 
This new appropriation includes a radical rethinking of societal structures and institutions, as I will discuss 
in the final sections of this chapter.  
16 F&T, 85, emphasis mine. This passage points out a difficult issue in Kierkegaard’s authorship, 
namely the conceptual term “paradox” (paradoks) and its varying meanings. In Fragments, for example, 
Climacus offers a dialectic of paradox, beginning with his discussion on “the ultimate paradox of thought: 
to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think” (37) and moving to a discussion of the 
paradox of “the absolute difference of sin, and positively, by wanting to annul this absolute difference in 
the absolute equality” (47). Later, Climacus identifies paradox with “the moment” (51) and with the 
qualitative difference between the eternal truth and the limits of human understanding (50ff). This 
understanding of the paradox, the basis for religiousness “A,” gives rise to the “absolute paradox,” the 
notion that the eternal (God) enters into time as the single individual (Christ) in order to give “the 
condition” to individual human beings that enables their salvation (62ff).  
One of Kierkegaard’s most interesting meditations on paradox is found in the Journals (JP 3, 3076 / 
IV A 64) where he claims that the Incarnation represents “the highest metaphysical and religious paradox” 
but not “the deepest ethical paradox.” This is because Christ was “as carefree as the birds of the air and the 
lilies of the field.” He did not have to “submit to all [of life’s] triviality.” Kierkegaard’s point seems to be 
that if Christ had become a regular Joe, a guy with a wife and kids and the usual worries of working a job 
and doing the dishes, he would have not only represent the absolute paradox of the eternal entering into 
time but also the absolute paradox of imbuing the ethical (the realm of “church and state”) with some sort 
of absolute meaning. This passage is particularly striking in light of Kierkegaard’s inability to commit to a 
“regular” kind of life. 
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It cannot be overemphasized how important it is to Silentio’s meditation that the 
movement towards the religious happens “by means of the universal.”17 The 
individualism of the aesthetic sphere is overcome in the ethical sphere through the 
absolute commitment one makes to the community (family, nation, political institutions, 
                                                 
The above passage from Fear and Trembling relates to several different conceptions of paradox, 
though presented from the point of view of de Silentio, who claims that he is not a Christian. De Silentio’s 
main claim is that there is a way in which the demands of the religious sphere, the paradox of God’s call to 
Abraham, somehow redeems our efforts in the ethical sphere. Though De Silentio does not explicitly 
address the “absolute paradox” of the Incarnation in the way that Climacus does, one can nonetheless make 
a connection between the paradox presented to Abraham and the absolute paradox of the Incarnation. In 
and through the “metaphysical and religious” paradox of the Incarnation, each and every individual must 
face up to the ethical paradox of his own life, i.e., the fact that the ethical sphere of “church and state”—of 
work and marriage and children—seemingly leads us to despair because of the inevitability of death, 
failure, and the general absurdity of human existence. Yet through faith in the Incarnation, including the 
paradoxical reality of God’s forgiveness for the individual’s sinfulness, we are able to imbue the ethical 
with meaning, to reclaim it as something beautiful. De Silentio’s description of The Knight of Faith is of a 
person who has resigned himself to the absurdity of his day-to-day life and by that resignation reclaimed it 
as something wondrous through faith. As Kierkegaard himself wrote in his journal in 1843: “If I had had 
faith, I would have stayed with Regine” (JP 5, 5664 / IV A 107).        
17 I am presenting the tension between the ethical/universal and religious dimensions in light of 
Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegelian Sittlickheit. I have not, due primarily to constraints of time and space, 
devoted any attention in this work to the difficult issue of Kierkegaard’s relationship to Kant, especially 
with regards to how de Silentio’s critique in Fear and Trembling relates to the Categorical Imperative. 
Recent scholarly work (see Ronald M. Green) on Kierkegaard’s relationship to Kant reads the two as being 
in much closer agreement than previously thought and that Kierkegaard’s view of the ethical is greatly 
indebted to Kantian morality. Some writers, perhaps most notably John E. Hare, have argued that Kant’s 
ethics is actually a thinly-veiled divine command theory that is only slightly removed from de Silentio’s 
notion of the absurd in Fear and Trembling. Though Hare’s view is problematic in many ways, he 
nonetheless makes a convincing case for viewing Kant and Kierkegaard as having many of the same 
philosophical aims in their formulations of ethical decision-making. My primary reason for focusing so 
intently on Hegel, rather than Kant, is that I fundamentally agree with the view espoused by Robert Stern 
that Kierkegaard’s critique is centered not primarily on the ethical as grounded in a transcendent rationality 
(Kant’s view) but rather on the ethical as grounded in society (Hegelian Sittlickheit). Throughout the 
Kierkegaardian corpus, Kierkegaard’s aim is to critique and dismantle the view that goodness can be 
construed as revolving primarily around our ability to accept our “station and its duties” (to use Stern’s 
phrase) since this undermines the absolute (and positively shocking) demands of true love. The 
astoundingly demanding and difficult nature of the Categorical Imperative, though fundamentally different 
from Kierkegaard’s view of goodness as love (Kærlighed), places Kant much closer to Kierkegaard’s 
philosophical position than Hegel’s.  
See Ronald M. Green, Kierkegaard and Kant: The Hidden Debt (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1992); John E. Hare, “Kant on Recognizing our Duties as Divine Commands,” Faith and 
Philosophy 17 (2000): 459-478; John E. Hare, God’s Call: Moral Realism, God’s Commands & Human 
Autonomy (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001); John E. Hare, The Moral Gap: Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, 
and God’s Assistance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); and Robert Stern, Understanding Moral 
Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
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etc.) but these commitments are not exhaustive of the human self, given the fact that they 
do not adequately address the synthesis of the poles of existence. An example of this 
tension is the fact that a human being is both mortal and immortal, both finite and 
infinite.18  Starting a family and having children, not in the unthinking manner of the 
philistine but with absolute commitment, allows a human being to reach towards a certain 
kind of immortality, given the fact that one hopes to live on in one’s children. Yet this 
immortality is not commensurate with the individual self. It is an immortality of the 
species, i.e., the universal itself, and it fails to give proper meaning, in and of itself, to the 
live of the individual person. But this does not change the fact that our yearning towards 
individual immortality is always understood in light of our earlier commitments to the 
universal, i.e., to other people, which means that our religious life should always be 
considered in light of our relationships and communion with others.  
The movement from the ethical to the religious, even though it consists of a 
highly nuanced dialectical relationship between the individual and the universal, 
nonetheless means that, at least initially, the individual will set himself in opposition to 
the universal: “But now when the ethical is thus teleologically suspended, how does the 
single individual in whom it is suspended exist? He exists as the particular in opposition 
to the universal.”19 Even though we should develop a healthy relationship to the 
universal, the universal can nonetheless take on a nefarious role when it sees true 
individuality expressed. On the isolation of the individual in opposition to the universal, 
Silentio writes: “A hero who has become the scandal of his generation, aware that he is a 
                                                 
18 I again hasten to remind the reader that these are existential categories, experienced through our 
everyday lived reality, no matter what particular religious or metaphysical views we may hold.  
19 F&T, 90. 
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paradox that cannot be understood, cries undaunted to his contemporaries: ‘The future 
will show that I was right!”20  
There is a very important distinction to be made here between Kierkegaard’s 
description of the individual entering into religiousness, and thereby setting himself up in 
opposition to the universal, and the later existentialist romanticism of the lone-wolf 
Übermensch. Silentio’s Abraham is certainly not beyond good and evil, nor is he to be 
seen as some kind of tortured, Sisyphean genius. This difference between Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy and the later existentialist tradition becomes all the clearer when one 
considers the way in which Johannes Climacus picks up the project where it is left off by 
Silentio, namely in the Philosophical Fragments where Socrates takes the place of 
Abraham as the exemplary individual who manifests the paradox in his being, the hero 
who became “the scandal of his generation.”  
   Howland points out the parallels between the young Johannes Climacus, 
described by Kierkegaard in the eponymous biography, and Plato’s Socrates. Both are 
presented as following the way of the “older philosophy,” i.e., of appropriating 
philosophical truth in inwardness that sets them apart from their contemporaries: 
“Climacus’s inwardness, however, meant that he ‘was and remained a stranger in the 
world’—much like Socrates, whose philosophical intensity gave him an air of 
‘strangeness’ (atopia) that is often remarked upon in the dialogues of Plato.”21 Unlike 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 91.Nietzsche's allusions to the “herd instinct” abound in his works. See especially section 116 
of The Gay Science. See Being & Time, 170, 177, and 254 for some of Heidegger's most pointed writings 
on “the they.” For an example of Sartre's position on “Bad faith,” see Essays on Existentialism (New York: 
Citadel, 1993), 167-69 
21 Howland, 18. The quote from JC is on 119. 
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speculative philosophers who only appropriate truth objectively,22 both Climacus and 
Socrates aim to manifest ethical and religious truths in their being.  
Yet Climacus differs from Socrates in one fundamental way: Socrates taught that 
each individual human being has the condition for truth within his or her soul via the 
theory of recollection.23 This is an essential element of Socrates’ view of himself, and his 
philosophy, as simply manifesting the space (topos) for philosophical inquiry and that 
each and every person must come to the truth through their own philosophical 
meditations. The philosopher, therefore, is primarily a mid-wife, helping the truth be 
borne into the world. Climacus, on the other hand, spends most of the Fragments 
juxtaposing this view with the Christian view that the human being is essentially 
untruth.24 Climacus himself does not hold to this view25 but is interested in exploring the 
                                                 
22 Including what are essentially subjective truths, i.e., ethical and religious teachings. In the previous 
chapter I outlined Piety's view that this mistake of viewing essentially subjective truth objectively 
constitutes a kind of “pseudo-truth,” which often manifests itself as a kind of hypocrisy or moralism. It is 
also worth reiterating that Kierkegaard did not see this mistake as being relegated to the domain of 
speculative philosophy since Christians (the denizens of “Christendom”) are often guilty of this sort of 
behavior. Also, pointing out the spiritual failure of those who view subjective truth in an objective manner 
seems to be the primary concern of Jesus Christ in all four Gospels, especially in his dealings with the 
Pharisees.  
23 Esp. Phaedo, 73c-75. 
24 Fragments, chapters 2 and 3; Howland, 30. Climacus, Anti-Climacus, and Haufniensis all analyze 
sin primarily in terms of its effects on human consciousness. Anti-Climacus explicitly states that the ability 
to understand our spiritual ailments as “sin” is already to grow closer to the truth since “sin” is a category 
that only arises when one becomes aware of existing before God. The “untruth” of the pagan is to live as if 
there is no God and it is this attitude that Socrates begins to challenge (which, ironically, leads to his death 
on the charge of impiety). Nonetheless, Socrates, as presented in the Platonic dialogues, seems to indicate 
that human beings can heal themselves and know the highest truths (the eidos) via their own steam, so to 
speak, while all of the pseudonymous voices clearly state that it is only through God’s grace that healing 
becomes possible. It is this difference that becomes the boundary between religiousness “A” and “B.” 
See SUD, 80ff. 
25 Climacus in the Appendix to Postscript denies that he is a Christian. See John Lippit, Humor and 
Irony in Kierkegaard's Thought (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 95 for a further discussion of how 
seriously we can take this claim. Whether or not Climacus is actually a Christian is not an important issue 
for my analysis in this work, though I will say that there seems to be a clear distinction made between the 
inability to believe expressed by Silentio in Fear and Trembling and Climacus’ (often ironic) remarks that 
he is not a Christian in the Postscript. It seems clear, at least, that Climacus can easily be situated within 
religiousness “A” (hence the correlations with Socrates) while Silentio stands on the precipice between the 
ethical and the religious spheres. 
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implications of these two positions, the Socratic and the Christian. After all, if the most 
important truths for human beings are ethical and religious truths, and the way in which 
these truths are appropriated depend upon one’s ability (or inability) to hold onto them in 
passionate inwardness, then this question of whether human beings have the condition of 
truth within themselves or must seek it from some external source (i.e., “the god”) 
becomes the single most important question of the philosophical life.  
Howland’s study of Fragments offers two important points that had heretofore not 
been well developed in the scholarship:26 First of all, Climacus begins his study by 
setting up philosophy and faith as essentially being in tension with each other, 
highlighted by the fact that faith is essentially an appropriation of paradox while 
philosophy aims at understanding.27 But Climacus then begins to show how the 
philosophical life as exemplified by Socrates involves a great deal of faith and paradox 
and indeed manifests a kind of precondition of the spirit that is necessary for religious 
faith.28 Conversely, faith is not diametrically opposed to philosophical inquiry or to the 
human understanding but rather represents a new mode of approaching the truth, one 
which is deeply related to the philosophical life.29 
Second, Howland contends that, far from offering a view of the human person as 
an isolated individual, the exploration of philosophy and faith in Fragments reveals a 
                                                 
26 For other analyses of Fragments, see Louis Mackey, Kierkegaard: A kind of Poet (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), esp. 168; Josiah Thompson, Kierkegaard (New York: Alfred. A 
knopf, 1973), esp. 146; Henry E. Allison, “Christianity and Nonsense,” Review of Metaphysics 20, no. 3 
(1967/2002) 39-58; Stephen Mulhall, “God's Plagiarist: The Philosophical Fragments of Johannes 
Climacus,” in Philosophical Investigations (22), 1-34. All of these authors hold that philosophy and faith in 
the Climacian writings are pretty much diametrically opposed while Howland presents a much more 
nuanced and complex view of the relationship between the two.  
27 Howland, 30. 
28 Ibid., 43-48. 
29 Ibid., 54-55. 
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philosophy of personhood that is primarily communal and ecstatic.30 This second point 
will be of pivotal importance in my analysis.  
To return to the cause of the tension between philosophy and faith, it is important 
to keep in mind the differences between the philosophical teacher (represented by 
Socrates), on the one hand, and the religious teaching (represented by Christ), on the 
other. First of all, the philosophical teacher is primarily the instigator of self-knowledge, 
insofar as the truth is available to all human beings through their own effort:  
 
Socrates advances the principle that ‘all learning and seeking are but 
recollecting.’ […] We stand in the middle ground between ignorance and 
wisdom: we neither know the truth (because we have temporarily 
forgotten it) nor are we simply ignorant of it (because we can call it to 
mind once again. It follows that all learning takes place through one’s 
independent efforts to bring the truth to mind.31  
 
Socrates’ primary goal, in the Platonic dialogues, is therefore to reveal his interlocutors’ 
ignorance to themselves by showing that they themselves are the potential condition for 
the truth. The starting point for the religious teaching, according to Climacus, also centers 
on intellectual humility, i.e., the discovery that one is not in full possession of the truth. 
But instead of then revealing to the learner that he is potentially the condition for the 
truth, the religious teaching reveals that the learner is incapable of having the condition 
for the truth, due to sin.32  
Climacus’ meditations on subjectivity are obviously deeply related to the writings 
of Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto Death. In the writings of Climacus (“John of the 
Ladder”) we get a description of how the human person can begin to “ascend” towards 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 113, 125. 
31 Howland, 43. This passage refers to the paradox in the Meno, 80d.  
32 See section chapter 2, section 2.5. 
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self-realization and authenticity by entering deeper into a relationship with the absolute 
paradox. Anti-Climacus offers a parallel analysis of the nature of the despair that is 
potentially overcome through religiousness “B.” Anti-Climacus, therefore, charts the path 
“down” towards ever increasing despair and spiritual torment while Climacus points to a 
potential way “up” out of this despair.33  
Climacus’ analysis of personhood is, at heart, negative (apophatic), insofar as it 
resists any kind of positive (kataphatic) approach towards analyzing subjectivity. But it is 
extremely important to correctly construe what is meant by “negative” in this context. It 
is here that an overview of patristic and modern Eastern Orthodox views on this subject 
can further our analysis.  
The philosophy of personhood in modern Orthodox theology and philosophy is 
primarily indebted to the works of Vladimir Lossky and John D. Zizioulas. Each grounds 
his philosophy in the patristic tradition, primarily the writings of the Cappadocian fathers. 
According to Aristotle Papanikolaou, a primary concern of the Greek fathers, as 
Christianity began to develop a theologically mature view of the Trinitarian God, was to 
avoid the influential heresies of tritheism and Sabellianism.34 In order to do this, the 
Greek fathers—especially the Cappadocians—wanted to avoid using the Greek 
philosophical concept of ousia to explain the Trinitarian nature of God. This was due to 
                                                 
33 One could view the entirety of Kierkegaard’s authorship in this light, i.e., as providing an image of 
spiritual descent and ascension. The torments of the musical-erotic in Either/or, as well as the detailed 
descriptions of despair in The Sickness Unto Death, lead to the challenge of the absurd in Fear and 
Trembling and ultimately to the beginning of true personhood (self/spirit) in the Religious sphere, as 
described in Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Kierkegaard’s authorship under his own name provides 
the height of the “ladder,” the culmination of the person’s striving for God. It is also worth remembering 
that the movement through the spheres describes a view of the human being that is increasingly personal in 
nature. The aesthetic sphere is pure superficiality and the ethical revolves around the universal. It is only in 
the religious sphere that the human person can ground herself in a manner that is lasting and authentic.  
34 Aristotle Papanikolaou, Being With God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 130.  
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the fact that focusing on ousia seemed to inevitably lead to one of the two 
aforementioned heresies. Either there are three ousia, and thereby three Gods (tritheism), 
or there is only one ousia and the persons are only manifestations or modes of the 
monistic Godhead (Sabellianism). The only way out of this dilemma was to focus on the 
persons of the trinity, as opposed to the ousia that they share in common. Yet the 
problem with this approach was that there was no robust philosophy of personhood 
available in the Greek speaking world, at least not to the extent that these Trinitarian 
considerations demanded. The Greek fathers therefore set about in developing a new 
philosophy of personhood, one that utilized the Greek philosophical concepts of 
hypostasis and prosopon.  
According to Papanikolaou, Lossky and Zizioulas differ slightly in their analysis 
of how the Cappadocian’s developed this new philosophy of the person:  
 
For Lossky there were two moves: the rejection of prosopon and the 
selection of hypostasis to express the threeness of God, since the latter was 
a synonym of ousia; and the reconceptualizing of hypostasis to express 
irreducibility to nature. […] Even though each of the three hypostaseis is 
identical to the common ousia, they are not reducible to this essence. The 
Christianizing of hypostasis protects the doctrine of the Trinity from a 
reductionistic monism.35  
 
For Zizioulas, on the other hand, “the genius of the Greek fathers comes in the form of an 
ontological revolution that unites the concepts of hypostasis and prosopon.”36 Zizioulas 
stays faithful to the apophatic tradition that forms the core of Lossky’s theology but he 
also moves beyond it in an attempt to provide some account of who God is in His 
Trinitarian being. Lossky’s focus on hypostasis and his rejection of prosopon is due to his 
                                                 
35 Ibid.  
36 Ibid.  
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immense apophatic focus and the aforementioned issue of avoiding Sabellianism.37 
Hypostasis allows for a philosophical understanding of three persons in one nature but it 
does not allow for a great deal of philosophical reflection on the “content” of the personal 
dimensions of the Trinity. Prosopon, meaning the “face” or outward projection of the 
personal reality of the individual, was and is a necessary component, according to 
Zizioulas, for Christian theology to make sense of the tripartite reality of God.  
But perhaps the most philosophically significant result of these theological 
debates in early Christianity was that this new appropriation of hypostasis and prosopon 
by Christian authors allowed for a completely new understanding of the ontology of the 
human being. As Ziziouals points out, all of the ontological “weight” of the hypostasis in 
Greek philosophy was not put on the kind of personal energeia that prosopon signified 
but rather on substance or essence. This, Zizioulas claims, was due to Graeco-Roman 
cosmology, which due to its “framework of a self-authenticating cosmic or state 
harmony” was bound to delimit both the ontological and political importance of the 
individual.38 Greek metaphysics and political philosophy were, of course, deeply 
intertwined, focusing as they did on the universal (metaphysics of eidos) and the political 
(the polis) over and beyond the particular or individual. The metaphysical and ethical 
writings of Greek philosophy largely reveal a worldview, later inherited by the Roman 
world, where the individual person is always primarily understood in terms of his or her 
function in the state while the particular thing is always understood in terms of its sharing 
                                                 
37 Papanikolaou, 91-93. 
38 John D. Zizioulas, Being as Communion (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002), 
35. Zizioulas’ claim is that harmonia forms a central theme in ancient Greek philosophy and that the 
metaphysical harmony of the cosmos is reflected in the social harmony of the polis, and vice versa. Plato, 
of course, attempts to provide a similar mirroring between the polis and the individual in the Republic, 
though he does not provide a robust philosophy of personhood in this context.  
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in a universal nature.39 This is readily apparent in the writings of Plato and Aristotle on 
the subject of human relations and love. Platonic eros, especially as described in the 
Symposium, is the yearning of the human intellect (nous) that initially is drawn to 
individual people or things but which only finds its ultimate fulfillment in universal 
forms (eidos).40 Aristotelian philia, as described in Nicomachean ethics books VIII and 
IX, is a description of virtuous love as the interplay of nature and an active condition 
(hexis) that is oriented towards the beautiful (to kalon). Yet the “beautiful” is not really 
an expression of the personal reality of the individual but simply the complex interplay of 
nature and nurture as expressed in and through virtuous actions. This is why Aristotle so 
adamantly declares that evil (“vicious”) people cannot be loved nor are they likely to ever 
change.41 What is loved is not the person him or herself but rather the beautiful nexus of 
hexis and physis which becomes increasingly solidified as we mature into adulthood. As 
Bruce V. Foltz notes:  
 
There is no love here, nor is there freedom in the personal sense, and there 
is no love precisely because there is no freedom. Bad characters will like 
other bad characters, and good characters will like other good characters, 
according to their respective natures: their goodness or badness is 
substantial. There is no inner freedom, because there is no inner ‘person’ 
over and beyond the natural and empirical.42 
 
As we shall see, the expression of love as agape proclaimed by Christ in the 
gospels, a self-emptying care for the personal (as opposed to the substantial) reality of the 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 27-34 
40 Symposium, 210a-212c. 
41 See especially Book IX, chapter 3, 1165b - 1166a on why vicious people should not be loved. On 
Aristotle's skepticism about vicious people changing their ways see the beginning of Book VII, chapter 8, 
1150b.  
42 Bruce Foltz, “Being as Communion.” 
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individual, is intrinsically connected to a new understanding of the human person, one 
that identifies hypostasis with prosopon rather than ousia. It is this understanding that 
allows the Church fathers, and especially the Cappadocians, to develop a philosophy of 
personhood that allows for both a robust Trinitarian theology but also an ontology that is 
grounded not in a deterministic sense of nature but rather in a free expression of 
communion and love. The Greek fathers, Zizoiulas contends, did this by maintaining an 
apophatic approach to any discussion of God’s essence (it being completely and 
absolutely unknowable to the human intellect) and instead focusing on God’s free 
energeia, i.e., the relational aspects of God’s personal reality: “Not only was the being of 
the world traced back to personal freedom, but the being of God Himself was identified 
with the person.”43   
It is important to note the difference in emphasis that occurs between Eastern and 
Western Christianity on this point. “The idea took shape in Western theology that that 
which constitutes the unity of God is the one divine substance, the one divinity; this is, as 
it were, the ontological ‘principle of God.’”44  
The difference between the way the Latin tradition (beginning with Albert the 
Great and Thomas Aquinas) and the Eastern tradition read the works of Dionysius the 
                                                 
43 Zizoulas, 40. Zizioulas’ terminology is not exactly a paradigm of technical precision. His use of the 
word “being” and the way it differs from “substance” or “essence” is not always clear. The primary issue at 
stake is that Zizioulas contends that communion is a primordial ontological category for the Trinity and 
“not a notion which is added to the divine substance or rather which follows it, as is the case in the 
dogmatic manuals of the West.” He goes on to say that “the substance of God, ‘God,’ has no ontological 
content, no true being, apart from communion” (17). “Being,” for him, therefore, is the “what it is” of the 
thing in question, it’s ontological reality. In the case of God, this ontological reality is primordially and 
intrinsically communal.  
44 Ibid. This critique, of course, does not solely stem from Eastern Orthodox sources. The critique of 
onto-theology, originated by Heidegger and later developed by writers such as Marion and Westphal, 
highlights many of the problematic elements of this tradition. See Jean-Luc Marion, God Without Being, 
trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012); Merold Westphal, Overcoming 
Onto-Theology: Toward a Postmodern Christian Faith (New York: Fordham University Press, 2001).    
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Areopagite, one of the most formative theological writers of the patristic era and a 
primary influence on modern Orthodox theologians such as Lossky, reveals some of the 
essential differences between the two traditions. While Western thinkers such as Aquinas 
saw Dionysius’ Divine Names as indicating a theological sciencia where apophaticism 
serves as a corrective for a kataphatic approach for understanding what God is 
(culminating in the beatific vision where the divine essence essentially becomes an eidos 
that is graspable by the human nous), the Eastern tradition saw the Dionysian corpus as 
pointing towards an apophasis that shifts the ontological focus of theology from God’s 
essence to God’s personal energies.45 Eastern Orthodox writers such as Golitzin have 
argued that the epistemology found within the Dionysian works does not focus on an 
autonomous intellect grasping God as essence or substance, which tended to be the focus 
in scholastic epistemology, but rather that works such as the Divine Names, Mystical 
Theology, and perhaps especially the Ecclesiastical and Celestial Hierarchies point to a 
profoundly negative epistemology where all intellectual grasping must ultimately cease 
so that the individual person can approach God “face to face,” i.e., in a deeply personal 
and holistic manner.46  
As can be plainly seen, the epistemological differences between the Eastern and 
Western Christian traditions are easily transposed to the divergent philosophies of 
personhood that appeared in these traditions. Since the Western tradition emphasized a 
theological vision of God that identified hypostasis with ousia—where God’s essence 
                                                 
45 See Jones, “(Mis?)-Reading the Divine Names as a Science: Aquinas' Interpretation of the Divine 
Names of (Pseudo-) Dionysius Areopagite.”  
46 Alexander Golitzin, “'Suddenly Christ': The Place of Negative Theology in the Mystagogy of 
Dionysius Areopgaites,” in Mystics: Presence and Aporia, ed. Michael Kessler & Christian Sheppard 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 8-37.  
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was considered as the locus of God’s being—the human person was similarly understood 
in terms of a fixed substance rather than in more dynamic, interpersonal terms. This in 
turn led to the development of subjectivism and the analysis of the human being in terms 
of consciousness/subject-ego (Descartes’ cogito and Kant’s categories) rather than in 
terms of relationality.47  
It is only with the advent of late 19th century existentialism and 20th century 
phenomenology that the reduction of subjectivity to a disembodied ego-consciousness 
begins to be truly challenged. Kierkegaard, of course, is a pivotal figure in this 
development, prefiguring not only the later existentialist movement but also writers such 
as Heidegger. But little attention has been paid to the way in which Kierkegaard came to 
develop such a position, many years before other influential writers such as Nietzsche 
and Dostoyevsky began to offer alternative models for considering the human person. 
Looking over the history of Western philosophy, Kierkegaard seems to pop up out of 
nowhere, a dissenting, revolutionary voice that offers a paradigm shift in philosophical 
thinking. But when viewed in context of the theological divergence between Eastern and 
Western Christianity it becomes apparent that Kierkegaard tapped into currents in both 
philosophy and theology that ran back all the way to the earliest days of the Church.  
The reason why Kierkegaard came to develop a position that can more easily be 
aligned with the Eastern, apophatic focus on the person as opposed to the more “essence 
based” view of the West48 is because Kierkegaard’s contemporaries, especially writers 
                                                 
47 Heidegger’s critique of the world Descartes presents to us, a world with its “skin off,” is an 
especially powerful analysis of this development. See esp. Being and Time 20: 132.  
48 These are, of course, generalizations. There have been several strands of both Protestant and Roman 
Catholic thought that resist the kind of “essence-based” thinking that Kierkegaard wanted to critique. 
Pietism, which greatly influenced Kierkegaard, and Roman Catholic personalism are two examples of 
“Western” attempts to combat the scholastic focus on theology as sciencia and God understood in terms of 
an ousia. Nonetheless, what I hope to show in this analysis is that there is a strain of systematization and 
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such as Martensen and Mynster, were in many ways in the intellectual heirs of the onto-
theology of scholastics such as Aquinas, though their particular brand of theology had 
been filtered through the speculative philosophy of Hegel which, if anything, made it 
much more “objective” and dehumanizing, in Kierkegaard’s view, than anything found in 
scholastic writers such as Aquinas and Scotus.   
Heiberg, undoubtedly the most influential proponent of Hegelian philosophy in 
19th century Denmark, viewed Hegelianism as the only possible recourse against the 
growing tide of nihilism and relativism in modern Europe. An integral part of this salvific 
mission of Hegelianism was its ability to usurp religion as a primary mode of accessing 
truth. Heiberg relegated religion to a secondary role behind Hegel’s Wissenschaft, writing 
that “while religion grasps the truth of the world only in terms of concrete particulars, 
thus mistakenly taking the particular for the universal, philosophy grasps the universal or 
the essential as it is in itself.”49 This emphasis on grasping the “universal or the essential 
as it is in itself” originates, of course, in Greek philosophy but would be developed in 
different ways in the Latin West than in the Greek speaking East. The scholastics viewed 
the beatific vision, the grasping of God’s essence in an activity of human nous, as a 
distinct possibility, albeit one that can only be realized in the context of the eschaton.50 
The Eastern theologians and philosophers, on the other hand, viewed the notion of the 
“universal or the essential as it is in itself” as being the ultimate mysterion.51 
                                                 
“objective thinking” (to use Kierkegaard’s terms) that is much more prevalent and dominant in Western 
Christian thought, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, than in the Eastern Orthodox tradition.  
49 Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relations to Hegel Reconsidered, 53. 
50 E.g. Summa Theologica, I, Q. 12, A. 1 and 11. 
51 E.g. Life of Moses, 163 (Paulist Press, 95); Mystical Theology I, 3, 1000C-D (Pseudo-Dionysius, 
The Divine Names and The Mystical Theology, trans. John D. Jones (Milwaukee: Marquette University 
Press, 1999), 213-14). 
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It is important to note that even though Hegel was often highly critical of the 
efficacy of religious thought, especially in comparison to the true science of philosophy, 
he nonetheless saw religion as an essential element in the unfolding of the Absolute and 
therefore as an essential topic of inquiry for philosophy. In the Lecture’s on the 
Philosophy of Religion and in the Encyclopedia, Hegel clearly states that religion, as a 
topic of scientific inquiry, must include an inquiry into the nature (essence) of God.52 
This is partly due to Hegel’s appropriation of Aristotelian teleology. If God is the end 
goal of the religious life then God himself must be understood if we are to understand 
religion.53 Danish Hegelians connected this view of knowledge of God with Hegel’s 
notion of absolute knowing. Martensen used the term to mean a priori knowledge of 
God:54 “The goal of speculative thinking [for Martensen] is to gain an outlook or 
overview of the whole and not to dwell on the individual parts. Martensen seems to imply 
that this speculative approach can come to an understanding of ‘every divine mystery.”55  
Jon Stewart makes much of the fact that Kierkegaard’s polemic against this view 
is largely focused on Danish Hegelians such as Martensen rather than Hegel himself. In 
fact, Stewart claims, much of Kierkegaard’s epistemological terminology is indebted to 
Hegelian philosophy.56 The demarcation between Hegel and his interpreters falls outside 
of the scope of my study but it is strikingly clear—especially in works such as Johannes 
Climacus, De Omnibus, and Fragments— that Kierkegaard wanted more than anything to 
                                                 
52 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Vol. 1, ed. Peter C. Hodgson, trans. R.F. 
Brown, Peter C. Hodgson, and J.M. Stewart (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1984-87), 163 (Vorlesungen, Teil 1, 72-73);The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, 
and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1991), 109-11 (Werke, vol. 8, 149). 
53 Martin J. De Nys, Hegel and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009), 61-63. 
54 Stewart, 257. 
55 Ibid., 258. 
56 See esp. 269-75. 
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retain an apophatic distance between human rationality and God. Stewart notes that 
Kierkegaard saw this project as offering an alternative to Martensen’s view, which saw 
Christianity as “purely immanent” and which viewed the divine as “being continuous 
with the human.”57 To view the incarnation in terms of the absolute paradox rather than 
in light of mediation is Kierkegaard’s way of breaking religious discourse away from a 
prevalent rationalism that extends all the way back to Augustine and which reaches its 
culmination in the writings of Kierkegaard’s theological contemporaries, whose primary 
influence was Hegelian philosophy.  
Interesting as the theological debate between Kierkegaard and his contemporaries 
may be, it is important to keep in mind the existential import of Kierkegaard’s polemic. 
Kierkegaard did not engage in these debates solely for academic or intellectual reasons, 
but primarily because he saw these issues as having essential importance for the 
possibility of individual self-knowledge and even for salvation. Even though Kierkegaard 
and Hegel may have agreed on various epistemological issues, such as the category of 
immediacy (qua Stewart58), the significance of these epistemological categories were 
entirely different for the two. Kierkegaard always views philosophical and theological 
issues in light of their significance for lived individual experience. In Training in 
Christianity, the paradox inherent in the incarnation is important not for its philosophical 
import or its relation to a system but rather because it offers an opportunity for two 
coexisting and codependent existential realities to emerge: The self’s relation to the 
absolute paradox (Christ) and the self’s relation to itself. The incarnate Christ offers an 
opportunity for the individual person to become aware of himself in a new light, to be 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 376. 
58 Stewart, 98-105. 
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reborn into a new consciousness, and it is only with the advent of this leap or change in 
the human self that the possibility for fully addressing the reality of despair becomes 
manifest. Anti-Climacus writes on the experience of coming “face to face” with the 
contradiction of the incarnation:59  
 
There is something which makes it impossible for one to desist from 
looking—and lo! While one looks, one sees as in a mirror, one gets to see 
oneself, or He, the sign of contradiction, sees into the depths of one’s heart 
while one is gazing into the contradiction. A contradiction placed directly 
in front of a man—if only one can get him to look upon it—is a mirror; 
while he is judging, what dwells within him must be revealed. It is a 
riddle, but while he is guessing, what dwells within him is revealed by 
how he guesses. The contradiction puts before him a choice, and while he 
is choosing, he himself is revealed.60 
 
God’s unknowability, then, translates into the essential mystery of the human 
person who is made in his image. As Arne Grøn has pointed out, Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy of subjectivity is also always a philosophy of negation.61 Anti-Climacus in 
The Sickness Unto Death analyzes despair in terms of a self that fails to be a self, i.e., a 
self that is essentially a non-self.62 This is, of course, in itself paradoxical. How can 
something (the self) fail to be what it is (a self)? The primary reason why this is possible 
is because Anti-Climacus does not construe the thing in question (the self) in terms of 
substance (or a fixed nature/essence) but rather as a relation.63 The primary element of 
this relation has to do with the constitution of the self in terms of a synthesis between the 
poles of existence. But there are two other relational elements that are equally important 
                                                 
59 Not to be taken literally. As discussed by Climacus in Fragments, contemporaneity with Christ is 
not necessarily an advantage in the “face to face” relation to the Absolute Paradox.  
60 Training in Christianity, 111.  
61 Arne Grøn, Subjektivitet og Negativitet (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1997).  
62 SUD, 15-16. 
63 Ibid., 13. 
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in the constitution of the self: there is, on the one hand, the self’s relation (as this actual 
or potential synthesis) to itself, and then there is the relation of this self to other selves.  
These three relational aspects of the self are all themselves interrelated. Grøn 
writes that “Anti Climacus [claims] that one is not oneself precisely because one does not 
want to be oneself.  To be a self, for Anti-Climacus, is to be the definitive (bestemte) self 
that one is. To not want to be oneself is to refuse or miss the decision (bestemmelse) to be 
spirit or a self.”64  
It is worth highlighting the use of the word bestemmelse (decision) and bestemte 
(decisive, definitive). To be one’s authentic, definitive self (“spirit”), according to 
Kierkegaard, means to choose oneself. The act of choosing oneself makes one’s self 
clearly defined, as opposed to the vague, ghostly, non-self that many people become 
settled with. Kierkegaard’s writings on the “stages” correspond to this notion of an 
increasingly defined self. The philistine is basically a non-self, an instantiation of the 
“they” (Heidegger’s Das Man) rather than an actual individual. The aesthetic, ethical, and 
religious stages represent the increasing commitment to being true to one’s self, i.e., to 
being an actual person, much of which revolves around the ability to accept suffering in 
one’s life. Paradoxically, though, increased authenticity is ultimately revealed to be an 
increase in self-emptying (kenosis). The decision to be oneself is the realization of the 
relational nature of the self. The philistine is in despair because his relation to other 
people is entirely misguided, due to the fact that his self is primarily formed in opposition 
to other people.65 The aesthete, having become aware of the despair in the life of the 
                                                 
64 Grøn, 14. Translation mine.  
65 This is not to say that these relations are always explicitly antagonistic. Rather, Kierkegaard is here 
prefiguring Sartre's notion of “bad faith,” which ultimately reveals the “other” to be a threatening force in 
my life. The philistine may want nothing more than to please people, but in doing so he creates an 
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philistine, rebels against the status quo of society and individualizes herself by drawing 
into herself.66 This is a positive response and the beginning of authenticity, an increase in 
inwardness, though it soon leads to a new development of despair.67 The ethical sphere 
consists of reclaiming and transfiguring one’s social relations through thought-out 
commitments (as opposed to the herd mentality of the philistine) which are authentic to 
oneself. One ceases to live entirely for oneself and begins to live for others. This involves 
a decision/leap that defines the self in a new manner.  
The leap towards authenticity takes place in “the moment,” a category Climacus 
introduces in the Fragments as an alternative to Platonic anamnesis.68 The moment 
represents a break or interruption in the way in which one experiences one’s life and has 
to do with a reorientation of the self (and primarily the will) towards how one sees one’s 
life as a whole.69 This is only possible in light of the self’s relation to eternity.70 If one’s 
self is in pure immediacy then one does not have the ability to understand oneself in any 
sort of holistic sense. The philistine and aesthete are thus constantly running from 
themselves because introspection seems too painful and demanding. But the eternal keeps 
                                                 
inauthentic self. It is worth reminding the reader that Kierkegaard never explicitly analyzes this 
stage/sphere of the philistine. I am indebted to Sløk’s analysis in drawing out this sphere and 
wholeheartedly agree with him that this stage is the unspoken assumption of the entirety of Kierkegaard's 
philosophical output. The reason why Kierkegaard never analyzes the philistine stage is, as Sløk points out, 
that it isn't a real self at all (Kierkegaard's Universe, 32), but rather the complete failure to be a self.  
66 See especially part I of Either/or. The “Seducer's Diary” is an especially poignant depiction of 
aesthetic inwardness and how essential it is to self-development, though it is also a frightening depiction of 
the accompanying despair, bitterness, and cynicism that results from isolating oneself in this manner. 
Dostoyevsky’s Notes from Underground is a fascinating development of this theme.  
67 See SUD, 50-60, where Anti-Climacus develops the movement from the philistine to the aesthete 
which corresponds to a deepening awareness of despair.   
68 Fragments, 11-13. On “the moment,” see George Pattinson, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard 
(Montreal & Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); Niels Grønkjær, “The Absolute Paradox and 
Revelation: Reflections on Philosophical Fragments,” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook (2004), 263-74; 
Rebecca Elleray, “Kierkegaard, Socrates, and Existential Individuality,” Richmond Journal of Philosophy 
16 (2007): 1-12.  
69 See Pattinson, The Philosophy of Kierkegaard, 71.  
70 See esp. Grønkjær, 265-68.  
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breaking through,71 causing despair, demanding that we face up to what it is that gives 
meaning to our lives (or what fails to give meaning to our lives).  
As Johannes de Silentio points out in Fear and Trembling, the reason for this 
intrusion is that the telos of human experience manifests itself in the “absolute.”72 The 
search for gratification in the immediate fails to provide any kind of absolute meaning for 
the aesthete, which leads to a deepening awareness of despair, which in turn creates a 
new moment (break/interruption/intrusion) where a decision must be made about what 
kind of life we want to live and what kind of person we want to become. The 
commitments we make in the ethical sphere are an attempt to overcome this despair by 
relating ourselves in a more profound and ethically responsible way to other people, and 
thereby to the absolute, but even this must ultimately fail.  
The reason for this failure, according to de Silentio, is that the inclosing 
inwardness that was discovered in the aesthetic sphere manifests itself in a new and 
transfigured way in the ethical sphere: “The paradox of faith is this, that there is an 
interiority that is incommensurable with the exterior, an interiority which, it should be 
stressed, is not identical with the first [that of the child], but is a new interiority.”73 My 
role as a father, husband, and a member of society (to name some of the manifestations of 
my commitments in the ethical sphere) do not allow me to fully actualize the absolute in 
my life. Despair is bound to reappear as I come face to face with my limitations, which 
                                                 
71 This is an existential category and therefore has no relation on what intellectual position we hold 
towards “eternity” as an abstract concept. An atheist is just as much forced to relate to eternity as a 
believer, though the way they deal with this intrusion/interruption on their lives will probably be very 
different.  
72 The whole book is a meditation on this subject but de Silentio's analysis of human teleology is 
primarily found in Problemata I and II.  
73 F&T, 97. De Silentio here reveals how there are essentially religious elements in the aesthetic 
sphere that need to be reappropriated as we enter into the religious sphere.  
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inevitably includes coming face to face with suffering and death in my life. In Works of 
Love Kierkegaard states that “despair is to lack the eternal”74 and de Silentio’s meditation 
in Fear and Trembling is an attempt to conceive of faith as a possible response to this 
lack. The moment, for Kierkegaard, is always deeply related to our experience of 
suffering. It either causes a person to fall deeper into despair in an unhealthy, almost 
“demonic” inwardness,75 or it creates the opportunity for transformation, for moving 
forward towards authenticity. 
As I have argued, the moment for Kierkegaard, the decision to be a self/spirit, 
always has to do with our relationship to a) ourselves, b) other people, and c) God (the 
“eternal”). These different types of relations are all deeply intertwined with each other 
and their correct interrelations are what constitute personal authenticity. Grøn points out 
that Anti-Climacus’ apophatic philosophy of personhood points towards an 
understanding of authenticity in terms of a “horizon of ideal possibilities” as opposed to 
any sort of fixed substance or essence.76 This relates to Haufniensis’ philosophy in The 
Concept of Anxiety, namely, that individual human existence consists of becoming a self 
(“spirit”) in light of personal responsibility and freedom. As freedom is appropriated 
during the development of the self, the self becomes increasingly aware of the immense 
possibilities inherent in being a self. This creates anxiety and turmoil, what Haufniensis 
calls “dizziness.”77 As he points out, anxiety is “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of 
                                                 
74 WOL, 55. 
75 De Silentio's writings on the Merman in Fear and Trembling are among Kierkegaard's most 
beautiful and incisive meditations on this issue. See 120-27. 
76 Grøn, 14-16. Grøn does a good job of pointing out how this more “existential” and dynamic notion 
of personhood is not necessarily diametrically opposed to a more “traditional” notion of a substance or 
essence.  
77 COA, 61. 
232 
 
possibility” and a “sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy.”78 In realizing 
that we can choose to be our-self, we can simultaneously realize that we can choose to be 
our not-self, which is what Anti-Climacus calls “despair” in The Sickness Unto Death.  
In Haufniensis’ account of the fall of humanity, it is only in the moment, the blink 
of an eye when eternity “intrudes” upon our temporal, day to day existence, that this 
choice becomes fully manifest. In Genesis, Adam and Eve’s “moment” is manifest in the 
prohibition to not eat of the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil.79 It is clear that 
Haufniensis sees this moment as being a poetic account of individual personal 
development. The movement (leap) from Adam and Eve’s preternatural innocence to the 
choice they make is reenacted in the life of every single human individual, as we develop 
from the innocence of childhood to becoming authentic, mature persons. This 
development, by necessity, demands a kind of rebellion. Adam and Eve in innocence are 
described by Haufniensis as having a self/spirit that is “asleep.”80 They follow God’s path 
not by their own choosing but rather out of a blind obedience, like a small child that does 
whatever her parents tell her to. But in order for that child to become an authentic person 
in her own right she needs to break free from her parents. God, similarly, wants Adam 
and Eve (humanity) to be free, to be their own people, but he also wants them to be 
authentic individuals, i.e., to be who they are created to be.81 This authenticity is not an 
acquiescence to a pre-programmed mode of being but rather the ability to manifest the 
horizon of ideal possibilities, all of which revolve around our ability to live in 
                                                 
78 Ibid., 42.  
79 Ibid., 43-46. 
80 Ibid., 35-38. 
81 See chapter 3, section 3.6, for a discussion of Kierkegaard’s “essentialism,” i.e., the notion that 
human beings are created by God to manifest a particular kind of self.  
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communion and interdependence.82 Throughout all of the pseudonymous writings, but 
especially in the works of Haufniensis and Anti-Climacus, inauthenticity is always 
revealed to be a misrelation of the self to itself where the human person views herself as 
being an isolated individual, cut off from God and from other people.83 This is why Anti-
Climacus states that being a true self is only possible once one becomes aware that one 
exists in relation to God, which ultimately means that one becomes aware of one’s 
existence as being essentially relational. As Anti-Climacus puts it, the self often makes 
the mistake of viewing God as some external reality, a kind of cosmic policeman (a view 
that Nietzsche similarly mocked), instead of understanding God as the ground of one’s 
being.84 Sin should therefore not be understood as a discrete action, or a series of such 
actions, but rather as a choice to view oneself as unable to exist as a relational being. 
Both Anti-Climacus and Haufniensis describe sin as a kind of demonic inwardness, an 
inclosing reserve, where the self is unwilling to reach out to others (to God and to other 
people) and, thereby, fails to live in any sort of authenticity or happiness.  
It is worth pointing out how incredibly revolutionary Kierkegaard’s philosophy of 
personhood was (and still is). In opposition to the prevalent view of the time (and what 
may still be considered the prevalent view today) of the human person as a discreet, 
autonomous, rational, individual, Kierkegaard puts forth a philosophy of personhood that 
is much more closely related to notions of personhood in such later traditions as post-
modern philosophy, existentialism, and feminism, a view that focuses on 
interdependence, community, and care. The difference between Kierkegaard and these 
                                                 
82 See 180, n. 221 on different meanings of “ideality” in Kierkegaard’s authorship.  
83 See especially COA, 118-36 and the description of the self in defiance in SUD, 67-74 
84 SUD, 80. 
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later traditions is that there is an ontological dimension to Kierkegaard’s philosophy that I 
would now like to explore further, one which raises many questions about what exactly 
he means with regards to our relationship to eternity and to the notion that these relational 
aspects of individual existence constitute the very fabric of our existence and human 
persons. It is here that I would like to again turn to the Eastern Orthodox tradition in 
order to better understand Kierkegaard’s position.  
 
4.2 - The Relational Self 
As I have noted, Kierkegaard’s notion of the self is relational and this relationality 
is expressed in three ways: a) the self’s relation to itself, i.e. the synthesis of the poles of 
existence, b) the self’s relation to other selves, i.e., other people, and c) the self’s relation 
to God, who is manifest not just as a self but rather as the self that grounds selfhood (i.e. 
personhood) itself. All of these relations manifest themselves in terms of a horizon of 
possibilities. As the individual relates himself to himself, other people, or God, the 
possibilities of his personhood open up. Some of these are authentic ways of being and 
doing that enable the human person to face up to anxiety and despair and to live a life 
grounded in communion and love. Others are essentially inauthentic, a refusal to be who 
one truly is.85 The double effect of despair, especially as it becomes manifest as sin, is 
that it not only causes us and those around us pain, but also that it clouds our ability to 
realize our self as a horizon of possibilities. All of Anti-Climacus’ meditations on the 
different forms of despair in The Sickness Unto Death describe varying levels of self-
ignorance, the inability and unwillingness to come to terms with those deeds, words, and 
                                                 
85 See chapter 3, pp. 56-61, 
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thoughts that are harming to oneself and others. The horizon of possibilities only 
becomes clear in “the moment” when eternity intrudes upon the immediacy of lived 
experience. Kierkegaard’s writings on what exactly constitutes the moment when the 
eternal (the god) enters into human consciousness form an essential part of his 
philosophy of personhood. Among Kierkegaard’s most insightful writings on this subject 
are the Climacian meditations on Socrates’ response to the call of the god to live an 
examined life, a response that Climacus sees as being representative of the religious 
sphere in general, though falling short of the full appropriation of religious wisdom that is 
only offered in and through a relationship with Christ.  
I would now like to turn to a more detailed examination of Climacus’ writings on 
Socrates. Climacus sees Socrates’ response primarily in terms of the three dimensions of 
relationality previously mentioned. In picking up the mantle of philosophy, Socrates 
enters into a new relationship with himself, other people, and with the god who has called 
upon him to lead a certain kind of life. His previously closed-in way of existence is 
shattered as new possibilities of thinking, doing, and being are opened up to him, all of 
which represent the most beautiful and authentic elements of his self. To help us 
understand Climacus’ meditations on these issues I will be referring back to the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition, especially the writings of Zizioulas. The Eastern Christian tradition 
has developed a philosophy of personhood that stands closest to the philosophical aims of 
Kierkegaard (though also differing from him in significant ways) and a dialogue between 
the two can highlight elements in Kierkegaard’s writings that have heretofore been 
dismissed or ignored. Most significant among these is the heavy emphasis Kierkegaard 
puts on social responsibility and interpersonal relationships in our development of an 
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authentic self. These have perhaps not received their due in Kierkegaard scholarship 
simply for the fact that Kierkegaard has traditionally been historically situated as a 
champion of a very individualized existentialism. By instead viewing Kierkegaard as 
belonging to a very ancient Christian way of understanding the human person, one that 
runs all the way back to the patristic era and which has a deep focus on mercy and social 
responsibility, one is able to get a very different picture of Kierkegaard’s philosophy.  
As previously discussed, Climacus in the Fragments notes several important 
differences between the philosophical path of Socrates and the religious stage represented 
by Christ. There is, first and foremost, the fact that philosophically speaking, we have the 
condition of truth within us, as explored in the Platonic concept of anamnesis. On the 
religious hypothesis, we are untruth, and as we come face to face with the eternal we are 
increasingly made aware of this untruth, of our essential inability to heal ourselves and 
our complete dependence upon God. As Howland points out, both of these movements 
are essentially erotic in nature, though in markedly different ways:  
 
Climacus […] presents Socratic philosophizing as a flight from 
temporality to eternity […]. Yet Socrates is always en route to wisdom, 
which is to say that he is essentially an erotic being. Driven by eros, and 
with an eye toward a truth that is always beyond his grasp, he lives in 
dialogue with others and in engagement with the life of his community.86  
 
The god grants Socrates the “space” (topoi) of being able to philosophize by jolting him 
out of his complacency, a role that Socrates will then pick up as he renders the same 
service to the city of Athens. The invitation that Socrates receives is borne out of his deep 
need to transcend his earthly condition and the suffering that it entails. It also demands 
                                                 
86 Howland, 77.  
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that Socrates utilize his understanding and philosophical faculties and engage in 
philosophical conversation with other people in order to fully manifest the eternal and 
divine which he has begun to glimpse in his life. This is ultimate an act of love on 
Socrates’ part, though it is always a love that emerges out of a mutual need between 
human beings, a manifestation of eros that pulls two people together and allows them to 
transcend their atomized individuality.  
The religious hypothesis (religiousness “B”) is quite different. God does not have 
any need of the believer, being completely and absolutely self-sufficient. The ecstatic 
movement of the God arises not from any need but out of pure self-emptying and 
sacrifice, of wanting to commune with the poor, suffering, individual. God responds to 
the need of the other by making himself vulnerable (which, of course, gives rise to the 
Absolute Paradox as the eternal, invulnerable, and all powerful becomes a finite, 
vulnerable, fragile human being). Climacus writes: “But if he moves himself and is not 
moved by need, what moves him then but love, for love does not have the satisfaction of 
need outside itself but within. His resolution, which does not have an equal reciprocal 
relation to the occasion, must be from eternity, even though, fulfilled in time, it expressly 
becomes the moment.”87  
Kierkegaard’s word for “love” here is Kærlighed, signifying the Christian notion 
of agape, a love that differs from both eros and philia in being borne out of pure kenosis 
(self-emptying).88 Eros and philia are both ways in which the individual person both 
                                                 
87 Fragments, 25.  
88 Kærlighed is used for a variety of relationships but it is the preferred word by far for describing any 
kind of spiritual or religious (and especially Christian) love. It has the connotation of a kind of reality that 
people enter into, as opposed to the more immediate, emotional expressions that the word Elskov denotes. It 
is also worth pointing out that Lighed means “equality,” “resemblence,” or “similarity” (e.g. Han har en 
slående lighed med hende - He bears a striking resemblance to her). In Works of Love Kierkegaard aims to 
show the essential difference between the nefarious, soul-crushing "equality" that occurs in levelling, where 
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transcends and reinforces the self, both a gift-love and a need-love.89 The “need” found in 
eros and philia arises out of an inequality between the lover and the beloved. 
Religiousness “A,” for Climacus, is represented equally by the Platonic model as well as 
Judaism, since on both of these accounts there remains a fundamental chasm between the 
learner and the eternal (“the god”). The love in question remains “unhappy” because even 
though the learner may bask in the glory of the divine the god does not seek his own 
glorification, primarily, but rather that of the beloved.90 Religiousness “A” represents an 
attempt on the part of the learner to ascend to the divine via either philosophy or the law. 
Yet neither manifests true Kærlighed/agape since such a love is only possible as a 
manifestation of equality, an equality that can only be brought about by the lover 
becoming the beloved. But Socrates can never become “the god,” nor can the children of 
Israel ever look upon the face of the divine, because to do so is to “die.”91  
Religiousness “B,” then, represents the possibility of the bridging of the chasm 
between the lover and the beloved. The learner does not attempt to “ascend” to the divine 
but is rather transfigured in and through God’s love. This is because God’s love, 
                                                 
one person becomes just like any other person, and the life-giving equality of Christian love that allows us 
to relate to one another in terms of our shared humanity while still retaining (and even celebrating) our 
status as unique individuals.  
Also, as I discuss in some detail in the following few pages, eros and philia at first seem more “equal” 
than agape because they describe a relationship between equals while agape has an “unhappy” quality due 
to the essential inequality between human beings and God. But the whole point of both Climacus’ 
meditations on love in the Fragments and Kierkegaard's in Works of Love is to show that agape is 
ultimately revealed to be the ultimate equality because of the incarnation, i.e., the fact that God allows 
himself to become just like us so that we can become just like him, in and through his love. Kær-Lighed is 
therefore especially apt: The love that makes us equal to the beloved.   
89 C.S. Lewis' The Four Loves is a beautiful meditation on this difference (New York: Harcourt Brace, 
1988). 
90 Fragments, 28. 
91 Ibid., 30; Exodus 33:20: “’But, he [the Lord] said, ‘you cannot see my face, for man shall not see 
me and live.’” See also JP 2, 2045 / X5 A 97, where Kierkegaard notes the difference between the Judaic 
notion of a “chosen people,” which he believes Christendom has copied, and the Christian notion of 
transformation where the emphasis is on the single individual rather than on the status of a specific group 
of people (the church, the tribe, etc.).  
239 
 
according to Climacus’ understanding of the Christian account, is not “assisting” the 
learner but is rather “procreative,” opening the learner up to a new life, a new way of 
being a person that constitutes a transformation of the human person as the old self dies 
and a new self comes alive. According to Climacus, this new self is the authentic self of 
the individual. It is who he was all along, though he had heretofore been unable to realize 
this authenticity in his being. Climacus writes: “The person who is born by dying away 
more and more can less and less be said to be born, since he is only reminded more and 
more clearly that he exists, and the person who in turn gives birth to expressions of the 
beautiful does not give them birth but allows the beautiful within him to give them birth 
by itself.”92 This transfiguration is not accomplished by the noetic ascent of the believer, 
but rather by the self-emptying of God, done purely out of a selfless, ecstatic love: “If the 
unity could not be brought about by an ascent, then it must be attempted by a descent.”93  
The transformation in question is therefore twofold: That of the omnipotent God 
becoming the lowly servant and the learner being reborn through his encounter with God. 
This process is understood in terms of authenticity, of the person in question manifesting 
his true being. God does not become something that he is not in the Incarnation. Rather, 
he reveals what he has always been: The servant, the one who forgives and suffers with 
his people. Christ, the Logos, the perfect appearance of God’s being, is the “true form” of 
the divine.94 This is why it is essential for Christ to undergo the despair of Gethsemane as 
well as the suffering of the Cross, in order for him to reveal his true personhood. 
Climacus writes:  
 
                                                 
92 Ibid., 31. 
93 Ibid., 31. 
94 Ibid., 32. 
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The form of a servant was not something put on. Therefore the god must 
suffer all things, endure all things, be tried in all things, hunger in the 
desert, thirst in his agonies, be forsaken in death, absolutely the equal of 
the lowliest of human beings—look, behold the man! The suffering of 
death is not his suffering, but his whole life is a story of suffering, and it is 
love that suffers, love that gives all and is itself destitute.95 
 
Climacus’ demarcation between religiousness “A” and “B” is especially revealing 
in light of Kierkegaard’s critique of both Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology. As I 
discussed in chapter 2, Haufniensis sees fundamental problems with the Lutheran notion 
of salvation as representing Christ’s “cloaking” the absolute sinfulness of the believer 
being covered by Christ’s sanctity. There remains a similar chasm between the believer 
and God, on Luther’s account, as there does between Socrates and the divine—and the 
people of Israel and their God—as described by Climacus in his writings on religiousness 
“A.” And even though scholastic theology points towards a fundamental transformation 
of the human nous in the beatific vision, it also fails to account for the kind of absolute 
unity-as-equality that Climacus is pointing towards in the Fragments.  
There are, on the other hand, two particularly interesting cornerstones of Eastern 
Orthodox theology that correspond remarkably well with Kierkegaard’s (and specifically 
Climacus’) views on union, equality, and love. The first is the Eastern Orthodox teaching 
on the Transfiguration, which markedly differs from the theological understanding of the 
event found in both Protestant and Catholic Christianity. The second is the connection 
between transfiguration and theosis, the notion that Christ’s ability to equally manifest 
lowliness and divinity mirrors this essential quality in human nature as a whole. This 
particular strain of theology has a long and noted history in Eastern Christian writings. 
                                                 
95 Ibid.  
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Symeon Lash, writing on theosis in The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, 
notes:  
 
Deification is for Orthodoxy the goal of every Christian. […] It is possible 
for man to become like God, to become deified, to become god by grace. 
[…] The language of II Peter is take up by St. Irenaeus in his famous 
phrase, ‘if the Word has been made man, it is so that men may be made 
gods’ (Adv. Haer V, Pref.), and becomes the standard in Greek theology. 
In the fourth century St. Athanasius repeats Irenaeus almost word for 
word, and in the fifth century St. Cyril of Alexandria says that we shall 
become sons ‘by participation’ (Greek methexis). Deification is the central 
idea in the spirituality of St. Maximus the Confessor […] and St. Symeon 
the New Theologian.96 
 
I have already made several connections between Kierkegaard’s philosophy and 
the Eastern Orthodox notion of deification. I would now like to reexamine this issue in 
light of the Eastern Orthodox teaching on the Transfiguration of Christ, especially as it 
relates to Climacus’ writings on union and love. To begin with, it is important to note 
several important differences between how the Transfiguration, as described in the 
synoptic gospels,97 has been understood in Eastern and Western Christian thought. In the 
gospel accounts, Jesus is said to have ascended a mountain98 along with his disciples 
Peter, James, and John, and to have suddenly become “transfigured” before them, his 
face and body radiant with light. The Old Testament prophets Elijah and Moses appeared 
to them and spoke with Christ, and his disciples fell on their faces, bowing before him, 
blinded by his radiance.  
                                                 
96 Symeon Lash, “Deification,” The Westminster Dictionary of Christian Theology, ed. Alan 
Richardson and John S. Bowden (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1983), 147-48. 
97 Matthew 17:1-9, Mark 9:2-8, and Luke 9:28-36. The event is also referred to in 2 Peter 1:16-18. 
98 In Christian tradition, both East and West, the mountain is often identified as Mt. Tabor, though the 
location is never specified in scripture.  
242 
 
All of the major Christian traditions view this event as being theologically 
significant, though the way it is interpreted differs according to the metaphysical biases 
of the traditions. In the Latin West, the event has been understood, primarily due to the 
influence of Augustine and Aquinas, to be an example of God using a created effect (a 
miracle) to represent his presence. In the Orthodox East, on the other hand, the 
transfiguration takes place not just in Christ but also in the disciples, whose intellect 
(nous) and senses are, at least momentarily, cleansed through divine grace so that they 
can perceive who Christ has been all along. In this tradition, most famously articulated 
and defended by Gregory Palamas, the divine light that the disciples perceive is not a 
created effect but rather God himself appearing in a true theophany, i.e., a manifestation 
of the uncreated energies of God.99  
Though it carries us slightly afield, it is important to consider some of the 
theological background for these divergent interpretations of the Transfiguration account, 
since it has bearing on the different ways Kierkegaard (and especially Climacus) can be 
understood, depending on which Christian tradition one is coming from.  
According to Bogdan Bucur, the early Christian tradition (Syriac, Greek, and 
Latin), predating the influence of Augustine, had a “tradition of interpreting the 
theophanies as ‘Christophanies.”"100 This meant that the Son himself, the second person 
of the Trinity, was manifesting himself (and prefiguring his ultimate incarnation) in all of 
the revelations to the prophets described in the Old Testament. The pre-Augustinian 
                                                 
99 The most comprehensive study of this theological divergence is Édouard Divry‘s La 
Transfiguration selon l'Orient et l'Occident: Grégoire Palamas - Thomas d'Aquin vers un dénouement 
œcuménique (Paris: Croire et Savoir, 2009). It should be noted that Divry suggest that these two 
interpretations might be reconciled by using the concept of a “hypostatic property.”   
100 Bogdan Bucur,  “Theophanies and Vision of God in Augustine's De Trinitate, 67-93. 
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tradition, therefore, saw a direct continuity between the revelations of the Old Testament 
and the miracles and grace exhibited by Jesus Christ in the New Testament, both of them 
being manifestations of the eternal Logos. Augustine’s disagreement with this earlier 
interpretation arose, as did much of his revolutionary theology, out of his engagement 
with heresy, in this case his debate with the Modalists and Homoians.101 The Homoians 
used the theophanies as proof that the Son was subordinate to the Father, since the Son 
manifested himself in and through theophanies while the Father did not.102 As Bucur 
notes: “The Homoian interpretation of theophanies relied on the following causal chain: 
in the theophanies, the Son is visible ergo mutable ergo not divine.”103 The Eastern 
Church attacked this argument via the essence/energies distinction, noting that the divine 
Logos manifests itself in and through the divine energies while the nature, shared by the 
three persons of the Trinity, remains hidden. Augustine, on the other hand, chose to 
attack the problem by “severing the ontological link, so that the species [the visible 
manifestation] is no longer ‘owned’ by the subject of the natura (i.e. God).”104 
Augustine’s point is that God uses created matter “in order to signify his presence, and to 
reveal himself in them… but without appearing in that substance itself by which he is.”105 
The Transfiguration, then, the apotheosis of the Christological theophanies, is 
viewed in the East as the revelation par excellence of the uncreated energies (which are 
                                                 
101 The former denied the hypostatic reality of the persons, seeing them rather as “modes” of the 
divine. The latter viewed the Son as being subordinate to the Father.   
102 See Bucur, p. 74. Also Michel René Barnes, “Exegesis and Polemic in Augustine's De Trinitate I,” 
AugStud 30 (1999): 43-60. 
103 Bucur, 75. 
104 Ibid., 76. 
105 It is, of course, essential in the context of Western Christian metaphysics that God not reveal 
Himself “in that substance itself by which he is” since this substance is only accessible via the beatific 
vision, qua Augustine and Aquinas. See De Trinitate 3.4.10. 
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God Himself) while in the Latin west, qua Augustine, it is considered a created effect by 
which God tries to communicate something about himself.   
Martin Luther, in his sermon on the twelfth Sunday after Trinity, focuses on the 
difference between the revelation of God to Moses on Mount Sinai and Christ’s 
Transfiguration on Tabor. Luther views the Transfiguration event primarily in terms of 
the difference it reveals between the “terror” of the Old Testament Law and the “comfort 
and joy” of Christ’s salvation. To try to live according to the law ultimately sends the 
human person careening down into the abyss of despair, according to Luther, while 
believing that Christ is God and can save the person offers immediate comfort and joy. 106 
The purpose of the Transfiguration, and indeed, of all Christ’s miracles, according to 
Luther, is to allow people to have faith in Christ as God, which is sufficient for salvation. 
This is very much in keeping with the Augustinian view on the theophanies as a method 
of communication between God and human beings.  
Climacus, on the other hand, sees Christ’s revelation as the suffering servant, 
which he considers to be the revelation of Christ’s true being (not as essence but as lived 
reality), as an occasion for personal transformation due to it essentially being an 
“offense.”107 It is the nature of the paradox as offense that opens up a new and shocking 
way for the human being to think about himself. The offense is, therefore, the moment. 
Christ’s revelation of himself to his followers, and this would presumably include the 
                                                 
106 The Law produces “naught but terror and death,” represented by Moses having to shield his face as 
he encounters God, as opposed to the grace of Christ that produces “comfort and joy,” represented by the 
shining light of Tabor. Kierkegaard makes note of this comparison in his journals, though he offers little 
commentary on it, except to say that the disciples found Christ's light to be “greatly beneficial.”  
See JP 3, 2533 / X4 A 12. The version that Kierkegaard quotes of Luther's sermons is En Christelig 
Postille, sammendragen af Dr. Morten Luthers Kirke- og Huuspostiller, trans. Jørgen Thisted 
(Copenhagen: den Wahlske Boghandling, 1828), 420ff.   
107 On God’s “essential” mode of communication as the “suffering servant,” see Fragments, 31-32. 
On the paradox as “offense,” see Fragments, 49-54. 
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Transfiguration on Tabor, is primarily understood by Climacus as opening up the 
possibility of personal transformation. This is keeping with the pre-Augustinian view of 
theophany, as well as with the later Eastern Orthodox tradition.108 As Bucur notes:  
 
Augustine’s theology of theophanies not only moves away from the 
Christological content of theophanies, but also marks a break with the 
transformative character of theophanies. Traditionally, the theophanies at 
the Lord’s Baptism in the Jordan or at the Transfiguration at Mount Tabor 
were considered a revelation of Christ’s own glory to the apostles, which 
transfigured them. For Augustine, instead, ‘what appeared in events such 
as the theophany atop Mt. Tabor was created matter being used as an 
instrument of communication by the Trinity.’ And while ‘an encounter 
with such an instrument… was an occasion for faith in God,’ it could not, 
obviously have any transformative power.109 
 
From the perspective of both Luther and Augustine, focused as they are on the 
efficacy of divine grace in salvation over and beyond any sort of personal transformation, 
the importance of the theophanies is the extent to which they can assist the 
believer/learner to achieve faith in the existence of God as savior.110 Climacus, on the 
other hand, sees little to no value in faith as it relates to whether or not God exists.111 We 
                                                 
108 It is important to note that the feast of the Transfiguration in the Eastern Orthodox tradition always 
points towards the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ. The kontakion for the feast explicitly points to 
this connection: “On the mount you were transfigured, and your disciples, as much as they could bear, 
beheld you glory, O Christ God; so that when they should see you crucified, they would know your passion 
to be willing and would preach to the world that you, in truth, are the effulgence of the Father” (Prayer 
Book – 4th Edition (Jordanville, NY: Holy Trinity Monastery, 2003)). 
109 Bucur, 80-81. The quotations within the above quote from Bucur are from Barnes, “Visible 
Christ,” 346. 
110 For a more detailed discussion of Augustinian and Lutheran soteriology see chapter 2. It is worth 
noting that Augustine did, on occasion, mention the transformative power of grace (for which, interestingly 
enough, he used the term “deification”). See Sermon 192; Enarrations on the Psalsm 49, 146. McGuckin, 
“Deification,” Westminster Handbook of Patristic Theology, 98. 
111 Fragments, 41. See especially the note on Spinoza and the ontological argument. The issue at stake 
for Luther, following his reading of Augustine, is whether or not one believes that Jesus Christ is savior. If 
one has faith, then one is saved. Christ’s role as savior for Climacus is much more difficult and complex. 
Due to the fact that Climacus, like all of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, understands the self in terms of a 
process of becoming, salvation can never be reduced to belief. Salvation for Climacus is a long and difficult 
process, one that is manifest throughout the entirety of one’s life and that is primarily understood in terms 
of personal transformation.  
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cannot help but grapple with the concept of God, and perhaps we can even convince 
ourselves absolutely that God exists simply by grappling with that concept (e.g., via an 
ontological argument of some sort). But this would simply be avoiding the problem of the 
self—of despair, anxiety, and sin—altogether, since we would be turning God into a 
philosophical problem to be solved, viewing him solely in terms of ideal being, i.e., as an 
essence. As Climacus points out, this “completely circumvents the difficulty, for the 
difficulty is to grasp the factual being and to bring God’s ideality into factual being.”112 
The whole point of the incarnation for Climacus, as well as of every single theophany and 
miracle, is its potential for transformation and healing, and this can only occur in and 
through the offense at the absolute paradox when we are confronted with “Christ’s own 
divine glory,” made manifest in a human being that suffers and dies.113  
Viewing the Climacian writings from an Eastern Orthodox perspective highlights 
important divergences between Climacus and the Lutheran tradition that he is critiquing 
in conjunction with his attack on Hegelianism. The notion of being saved through faith 
alone, for Kierkegaard and especially Climacus, simply seems much too easy, at least if it 
is presented in terms of an immediate rebirth. Christianity is a process, according to 
Kierkegaard and all of his pseudonymous cohorts. Over and over again we see 
Kierkegaard put emphasis on dynamic, existential language of movement and 
                                                 
112 Ibid.  
113 Climacus’ (and Kierkegaard’s) tendency to talk of the Incarnation, the absolute paradox, without 
any reference to Christ’s crucifixion, resurrection, and the descent of the Holy Spirit on Pentecost, marks an 
important difference between his philosophy and the Eastern Orthodox tradition. In Eastern Orthodoxy—
due to its immense emphasis on the liturgical feasts—the events of Christ’s life and their existential, 
metaphysical, and spiritual import, are always understood in terms of a trajectory. The Incarnation points to 
Christ’s baptism, which points to the Transfiguration, which points to the crucifixion, which points to 
Christ’s resurrection at Pascha, which points to the ascension, which points to the descent of the Holy Spirit 
on Pentecost.  
See Catherine Aslanoff, ed., The Incarnate God: The feasts of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary, 
trans. Paul Meyendorff (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995). 
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development as opposed to any static conceptions such as “essence” or even “salvation.” 
Kierkegaard’s soteriology is always focused on an inward, existential transformation. 
This brings me to the second point of Eastern theology that resonates in 
Climacus’ writings, namely that of deification. The beginning of the offense (the 
moment), for Climacus, is when we as human beings become aware of our absolute 
difference from the eternal, i.e., becoming aware of our sinfulness: “Just to come to know 
that the god is the different, man needs the god and then comes to know that the god is 
absolutely different from him.”114 This is the essential difference between the Socratic 
model and the Christian (religiousness “A” and “B”). In the Socratic model, the god is 
simply an occasion for bringing the learner to realize what he had known all along. The 
learner contains the condition for truth within himself and the god jolts the learner into 
remembering this.115 Socrates then takes up this service for the god and similarly seeks to 
jolt the citizens of Athens from their dogmatic slumber. This model is, in effect, the 
central facet of a great deal of spiritual and psychotherapeutic teaching. Whether we are 
                                                 
114 Ibid., 46; see also 49-51. Note that Climacus is here moving towards religiousness “B” in pointing 
to the infinite qualitative difference between the human person and God. I have capitalized “God” in my 
discussion of religiousness “B”—in order to differentiate from “the god” of Socrates—but have not 
changed the capitalization in the Hong translation.  
115 In the Fragments Climacus refers to Socrates’ “love” for the divine (24) in and through which 
Socrates was able to take up the mantle of “teacher.” Climacus makes a direct reference to Symposium 215 
d-e and 216-18. Later (31) Climacus makes reference to the “ascent” of Diotima’s ladder (Symposium 209 
e-211 b) in relation to Socrates’ status as “teacher.” Climacus’ point at 31-32 is that Socrates, bringing forth 
the truth that is inherent within himself via anamnesis, does not offer a “birth” in the same manner as the 
truth of Christianity. The “moment” of Socratic discourse is always “swallowed up” in recollection. But in 
order to overcome despair, the human person must make a “leap” away from what was previously known 
into a completely new existential reality.  
Even though Climacus does not make explicit reference to the dialogue, Socrates’ journey in the 
Apology is also working in the background of Climacus’ discussion. Socrates’ journey is always centered 
on self-discovery, of finding truths inherent within the self. Even the katharsis described in the Phaedo 
(64d–65a) is an attempt to unveil what the soul has been all along. Christianity (religiousness “B”), on the 
other hand, represents the realization that there is no truth within that can save us. The realization that we 
are untruth, that we are in sin, is a realization of supreme helplessness. The absolute paradox, Christ’s 
Incarnation, is the only proper response to this situation, since it allows God to enter into human existence 
not as sovereign lord (as in the parable of the King and the maiden in Fragments) but as our equal.     
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talking about Socrates, Zen Buddhism, or Sigmund Freud, there is a common thread that 
connects them all, namely the belief that human beings have the capacity within 
themselves to transform from one condition (ignorance, pain, neuroticism) to another 
(wisdom, happiness, health). The Christian model, on the other hand, presents the God 
Himself as the teacher, and the God’s appearance in the moment as the teaching. The 
absolute paradox reveals to us that even though we are made in the image of God, we are 
nonetheless infinitely different from God, that the poles of existence have been torn 
asunder through sin, but that Christ has somehow managed to bridge this gap in his 
person and now seeks to enable us to do the same. While the Socratic learner grows 
deeper and deeper in wisdom and introspection, the Christian learner is shocked to realize 
that his understanding will never fathom the absolute paradox. The learner can never 
understand the paradox but he can, according to Climacus, come to an understanding with 
the paradox:  
 
[This] occurs when the understanding and the paradox happily encounter 
each other in the moment, when the understanding steps aside and the 
paradox gives itself, and the third something, the something in which this 
occurs (for it does not occur through the understanding, which his 
discharged, or through the paradox, which gives itself - consequently in 
something), is that happy passion to which we shall now give a name… 
We shall call it faith.116  
 
On the one hand, then, we have the model of the Socratic learner who, through the 
instigation of the god, finds the condition of truth within himself and ascends towards the 
divine. On the other we have the kenosis of faith where the Christian learner must empty 
himself of all pretensions of understanding and mastery and come to rely on the power of 
                                                 
116 Ibid., 59. 
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the paradox. It is only in and through the absolute paradox of Christ that a human being 
can begin to overcome despair, according to Climacus, and this cannot occur unless the 
understanding is “crucified.”117 As I will argue, Climacus sees the first model as 
undermining the full authenticity of the person while the second is ultimately 
empowering.  
In Climacus’ discussion of the King and the maiden, the King is only able to 
make the girl “forget” herself. He can make his own glory shine upon her, blotting her 
out, and in this way unite the two of them. But this is not the King’s (the teacher’s/God’s) 
desire. He seeks not his own glorification but that of the maiden (learner/disciple). The 
union he seeks is one of equality, of partnership, but he can only do this by being what he 
is (the King) and what he is not (her equal) at the same time. This is the paradox that 
Christ ultimately manifests.118  
On the Christian model, then, the self-emptying of the learner is ultimately 
revealed to be empowering, because in forsaking one’s ego one is able to open oneself up 
to accepting the absolute paradox of God becoming human, becoming one of us, and 
thereby allowing us to stand face to face with the God.119 Climacus over and over again 
in the Postscript points to how important it is that we correctly contextualize this event. 
In “crucifying” the understanding we achieve a “higher” understanding. But we have to 
be very careful not to view this “higher” understanding in terms of some kind of genius 
or brilliance:  
                                                 
117 CUP, discussion starting on 564.  
118 Fragments, 29-30.  
119 This is another place in the Climacian writings where the notion of synergy between human free-
will and grace seems to ground the discussion. Climacus and Kierkegaard always emphasize the role of 
grace in this process but nonetheless always point out the absolute necessity of the human person accepting 
the realization that is afforded us via grace, namely that we are sinful (sick) and that we need help from 
God in order to heal our condition. 
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The same thing happens with faith’s crucifixion of the understanding as 
with many ethical qualifications. A person renounces vanity—but he 
wants to be admired because he does it… Because an individual in faith 
relinquishes the understanding and believes against the understanding, he 
should not for that reason think poorly of the understanding or suddenly 
ascribe falsely to himself a splendid distinction within the total range of 
the understanding; a higher understanding is still, of course, also an 
understanding.120 
 
Here, again, is an important distinction between the Socratic path and the 
Christian (between religiousness “A” and “B”). Plato’s divided line, especially with its 
demarcation between dianoia and nous,121 suggests a noetic apprehension of spiritual 
truths that transcends dianoia altogether.122 Even though there is a mystical dimension to 
Climacus’ view that the crucified understanding is resurrected in a “higher” form of 
understanding, the difference is that on the Christian model, this understanding must 
always be grounded in humility as self-emptying. This is because the higher 
understanding is ultimately a kind of “acquaintance knowledge” (Bekendelse) having to 
do with our ability to love a person rather than an ability to grasp any kind of universal 
truth or reality.123  
                                                 
120 CUP, 564-65. This is one of the more striking quotes that show decidedly that Climacus is not an 
irrationalist or anti-rationalist in any way, shape, or form. Given the fact that the Climacian writings 
represent a cornerstone of Kierkegaard's epistemology, I would venture to say that the same can be said of 
the Kierkegaardian corpus as a whole. For a more in-depth discussion of this topic, see chapter 3.   
121 The former representing abstract rationality and discursive reasoning (contemplation of 
“mathematicals,” i.e. formulas, equations, proofs - in short: scientific thinking) and the latter representing a 
direct, intuitive apprehension of the highest spiritual realities. See discussion in chapter 3, esp. 11ff.  
122 This, of course, depends highly on one's reading of the divided line. It is at least clear that dianoia 
is an essential “step” towards reaching noesis, as is shown in Socrates' insistence that the Philosopher Kings 
must study mathematics before they are able to enter into the mysteries of dialectic. See 537c-d and 522c-
531d for the discussion of the importance of mathematics and 537d-540a and 531e-535a for a discussion of 
dialectic. All of this, as it turns out, is training for the political arts, given the fact that the philosopher must 
return to the Cave and put his education for use for the good of the people (see also 539e-540a).  
123 CUP, 565-66. It should be noted that Climacus' views on Socrates himself are always presented in 
a kind of dialectical mode and often suggest that he sees Socrates as traversing the line between 
religiousness “A” and “B.” On 566 Socrates is presented as someone who always returns to “ignorance,” as 
always emptying himself again and again in order to achieve a deeper knowledge of the god. This being 
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It is particularly illuminating to consider this personal emphasis of Climacus’ 
epistemology in light of the Eastern Orthodox teaching on deification, which also 
emphasizes the highest kind of knowledge in terms of a personal union. In The Pillar and 
Ground of the Truth, a pivotal theological work in 20th century Russian Orthodoxy, 
Pavel Florensky writes: “Knowing is a real going of the knower out of himself, or (what 
is the same thing) a real going of what is known into the knower, a real unification of the 
knower and what is known. That is the fundamental and characteristic proposition of 
Russian and, in general, of all Eastern philosophy.”124 Florensky sees this event taking 
place only in and through faith which, much like Climacus, he characterizes as an event 
where dianoetic reasoning is transcended in a moment of communion: “Knowing is not 
the capturing of a dead object by a predatory subject of knowledge, but a living moral 
communion of persons, each serving for each as both object and subject. Strictly 
speaking, only a person is known and only by a person.”125  
Kierkegaard’s epistemology and philosophy of personhood are intrinsically 
intertwined, much as they are in Eastern Orthodoxy. For both Kierkegaard (and 
especially Climacus) and the Eastern Orthodox theological tradition, communion 
represents the highest form of knowledge, but it also represents the essential nature of 
authentic personhood. Throughout Kierkegaard’s writings he uses the term “build up” 
(opbygge) to signify the development of the person towards authenticity. In Works of 
                                                 
said, it is obvious that Socrates was unable to come face to face with the God in the same way that a 
Christian can, since the Logos had yet to be incarnate in the person of Jesus Christ. Climacus’ discussion of 
Socrates in relation to the two modes of religiousness nonetheless raises interesting questions about the 
possibility of Kierkegaard holding to a Universalist view of salvation.  
124 Pavel Florensky, The Pillar and the Ground of the Truth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1997), 55. 
125 Ibid., 55-56. 
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Love we see that love represents not only the highest form of knowledge, for Kierkegaard 
(as discussed in chapter 3) but also the essence of upbuilding towards authenticity:  
 
Building up is exclusively characteristic of love… This quality of building 
up has the essential characteristic of giving itself up in everything, of 
being one with all - just like love. Thus one sees that love with its 
characteristic quality does not set itself apart or pride itself on 
independence or self-sufficiency in relationship to one another but 
completely gives of itself. The characteristic is just this that it exclusively 
has the attribute of complete self-giving.126   
 
In the Eastern Orthodox tradition, the process of deification is largely understood 
in similar terms, i.e., with regards to a person’s ability to open him- or herself up to 
communion and love. This is, indeed, the basis of the Eastern Christian conception of 
heaven and hell, viewed as they primarily are in terms of the existential reality of the 
human person and the extent to which we are able to love one another. Kallistos Ware 
writes: “Love cannot exist in isolation but presupposes the other. Self-love is the negation 
of love… Self-love is hell; for, carried to its ultimate conclusion, self-love signifies the 
end of all joy and all meaning. Hell is not other people; hell is myself, cut off from others 
in self-centeredness.”127 In Dostoyevsky’s Brothers Karamazov the Elder Zosima says: “I 
ask myself: ‘What is hell?’ And I answer thus: ‘The suffering of being no longer able to 
love.’”128 
Deification, theosis, being made like God, is then the process of an increase in 
love and communion, the ability to enter ever deeper into the circle of love that is the life 
of the Trinity. This is made possible through Christ’s Incarnation, crucifixion, and 
                                                 
126 WOL, 202.  
127 Ware, The Orthodox Way, 28.  
128 Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, 322. 
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resurrection. Love is the ultimate expression of freedom and freedom represents our 
ability to live in a manner that is not reducible to the determinate, biological necessity of 
our nature.129 This tension also lies at the heart of Kierkegaard’s anthropology, as I have 
noted time and time again, the dynamic relation between the poles of existence as 
detailed by Anti-Climacus in The Sickness Unto Death. To live as spirit,130 to be an 
authentic person, is to overcome the negative effect the poles have upon each other and to 
enter into a new state of being through their synthesis. This can only be done via the 
absolute paradox, where these poles of existence (eternal/historical, divine/human, 
free/determined) become fully and absolutely manifest in the person of Christ.131 
Kierkegaard’s existential emphasis echoes the Eastern approach to Christ’s Incarnation, 
centered as it is on his hypostatic manifestation of divine and human realities. As 
Zizioulas points out: “In the West, as is apparent in the Tome of Pope Leo I, the starting-
point of Christology is found in the concept of the ‘natures’ or ‘substances,’ whereas in 
the Greek Fathers, for example in Cyril of Alexandria, the starting-point of Christology is 
the hypostasis, the person.”132 This emphasis on the hypostasis is essential if we are to 
make sense of the way in which the human person can enter into the absolute freedom 
that is communion and love, especially when we take into account the detrimental aspects 
of sin: “If, in order to avoid the consequences of the tragic aspect of man… the person as 
                                                 
129 This does not mean that the facticity (to use Heidegger’s term) of our biological makeup is ever 
“overcome.” Freedom, in this context, means to be able to express ourselves fully and authentically as 
embodied beings. None of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms, least of all Climacus, ever advocate for any kind of 
angelism or Gnostic dualism.  
130 SUD, 13, where Anti-Climacus beings to use “spirit” and “self” interchangeably. Again, this is not 
indicative of dualism but rather that the authentic self is inherently “spiritual,” i.e., attuned to the eternal 
telos of the human person. Manifesting this telos nonetheless takes place in the here and now, in the body.  
131 See especially the discussion in CUP, 208-10 regarding the necessity of the “eternal truth” coming 
into existence as a historical reality.  
132 Zizioulas, Being as Communion, 55.  
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absolute ontological freedom needs a hypostatic constitution without ontological 
necessity, his hypostasis must inevitably be rooted, or constituted, in an ontological 
reality which does not suffer from createdness.”133 Echoing Kierkegaard almost exactly, 
Zizioulas writes: “The perfect man is consequently only he who is authentically a person, 
that is, he who subsists, who possesses a ‘mode of existence’ which is constituted as 
being, in precisely the manner in which God also subsists as being.”134  
Deification, then, is to exist authentically as God exists, as completely free and 
open to the other. The “sickness” described by Anti-Climacus, despair and sin, is the 
exact opposite of communion, namely an “inclosing reserve” where the human being 
becomes increasingly closed off from himself, other people, and God. This is because in 
existing in immediacy, the person is stuck in a continual cycle of self-obsession, guilt, 
and shame.135 The aesthetic mode of existing attempts to overcome the despair of 
immanence by embracing it fully and consciously (the philistine does so unconsciously), 
though this can only keep the immediate, superficial effects of despair at bay for a short 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 54. 
134 Ibid., 55. Italics in original. It should be noted that Zizioulas, much as Kierkegaard, is pointing 
towards Christ with his reference to “the perfect man.” Nobody else is able to fully and absolutely achieve 
the life of God in immanence except for Christ. This being said, Zizoulas and Kierkegaard both seem to 
think that the purpose of the Christian life is to live as closely as possible to the ideal represented by Christ.  
135 For Climacus’ most comprehensive discussion of the category of “immanence,” see CUP, 572ff. 
Immanence is the “here,” both the everyday reality that we live and breathe in but also what is accessible to 
us through the methods of modern science. Immanence is always juxtaposed with the eternal, the 
“hereafter,” the transcendent elements of reality that lie outside our reach. The various stages on life’s way 
are attempts to “interpret” reality in such a way that the “here and hereafter” can be harmonized. All of 
these fail, leading to the absolute “break” between the two in religiousness “B” where the two are no longer 
synthesized but rather kept absolutely separate, even as the eternal enters into immanence.   
It is important to note the difference between immanence and immediacy. Immanence is an essential 
element of human existence (or a “pole” of existence). There is no way for human beings not to exist in the 
here and now. We are always immersed in the everyday, no matter how religious or “spiritual” we may be. 
Immediacy, on the other hand, is a category associated primarily with the aesthetic. It is an attempt to deal 
with immanence by completely embracing it. Immediacy is refusing to consider the eternal, what is over 
and beyond immanence, even though this is ultimately impossible, given that the eternal is just as an 
essential facet of human existence as immanence. Immediacy is therefore a willful ignorance, though it can 
take on surprisingly sophisticated forms, as is evident in the aesthetic descriptions of Either/or.   
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period of time.136 The ethical person begins to feel the tension of immanence but attempts 
to overcome it through “self-assertion,” by putting himself in opposition to the negative 
aspects of immanence. Even though this manner of living may lead to a great deal of 
good, it may ultimately end up recreating the negative conditions of immanence it sought 
to fight against because it has no higher ground to stand from, no ability to break from the 
effects of despair.137 Religiousness “A” creates a condition where a person can exist in 
opposition to immanence and to the evils of the age, though it does not allow one to break 
free of these completely.138 Religiousness “B,” the “paradox-religious,” offers a break 
with immanence. It is not an attempt to somehow bring immanence and the eternal into 
communication (as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle sought, i.e., as represented by 
religiousness “A”) but rather that eternity enters into immanence, making it possible for 
people to live their day to day lives in light of the eternal and absolute because one’s 
eternal happiness is now based on a historical event.139 
The “birth” that occurs in the moment is both a “break,”140 i.e. a discreet event, 
and also the beginning of a process. Both Climacus and Johannes de Silentio emphasize 
                                                 
136 The use of drugs, alcohol, sex, and entertainment as a reprieve from the mundanely of the everyday 
is a good example of this. All of these work rather splendidly to begin with, but they ultimately end up 
making the everyday even more painful than it was before if they are allowed to dominate our lives. No 
matter how bohemian one may attempt to be, there is still the ugly matter of getting through a Wednesday 
afternoon when there is nothing on TV and the Jim Beam has run out.  
137 An example of this would be a political activist who fights against social injustice or the rebel who 
attacks a corrupt government. But if this person were to succeed he or she runs the risk of bringing about 
similarly corrupt circumstances in a new guise. The communist revolutions in Russia and Cuba are a good 
example of this. Just and righteous as they may have been, the people who were the victors of those 
revolutions ultimately became guilty of horrendous atrocities. Kierkegaard's point is that any attempt to 
create utopia on earth, to overcome despair in immanence, is bound to fail.  
138 Socrates railing against the evils of the Athenians, though still so deeply connected to the laws and 
traditions of Athens that he would rather die there then leave to save his life.  
139 The preceding paragraph is an attempt on my part to explain the passage in CUP, 572-73 in light of 
the analysis in this chapter. Again I hasten to remind the reader that the “break” between immanence and 
the eternal in religiousness “B” does not mean that immanence is done away with. It is only in religiousness 
“B” that immanence can be comfortably experienced, hence the description of the Knight of Faith by 
Johannes de Silentio in Fear and Trembling, esp. 38.  
140 Or “leap,” a sudden movement from one way of being to another. See CUP, 576. 
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that faith in the absolute paradox (the absurd) must be made manifest in our lives over 
and over again through the existential movements of faith and resignation. De Silentio 
emphasizes the difference between resignation and faith (which corresponds a great deal 
with the difference between religiousness “A” and “B”) by pointing out that in 
resignation we leave the temporal behind in our ascent towards spiritual truths while in 
faith we “grasp the whole of temporality on the strength of the absurd.”141 This is only 
possible because the absurd is a description of a temporal event, namely the incarnation, 
the eternal Logos entering into time and assuming flesh. Kierkegaard himself, as well as 
the pseudonymous authors, describe this as the prerequisite of true authenticity, true 
individuality, which paradoxically only becomes fully manifest in a newfound ability to 
love people in a deeper, more profound way than has heretofore been possible. Silentio 
writes: “Faith’s knight knows… that it is glorious to belong to the universal.”142 In the 
story of Abraham and Isaac, Isaac represents the universal, the community, other people, 
which Abraham can only fully love as a true, authentic individual if he is able to let go of 
(resign) Isaac. The idea is that if we love people in a purely worldly manner, according to 
the precepts of the ethical sphere, then we will never be able to love them as persons but 
only as manifestations of the universal. This is echoed in Dostoyevsky’s tragic character 
Ivan Karamazov who rails against God’s injustice against “people” and “children” but 
who finds himself unable to love the person (the neighbor) in front of him. Ivan 
represents the righteous indignation of the political reformer and the social activist, which 
Dostoyevsky sees as noble inclinations indeed, but which are doomed to result in nothing 
but anger and self-righteousness if they are not connected to a more profound, personal 
                                                 
141 F&T, 77. 
142 Ibid., 103. 
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love. Similarly, the character of the Grand Inquisitor in the book is willing to go to any 
lengths to “help” people to have bread and comfort, but at the cost of their freedom and 
their personhood, both of which threaten the utopia that the Inquisitor seeks to create.143 
In Eastern Orthodox anthropology, deification is understood in terms of an 
authentic communion, of the human person who lives in the fullness of communion. 
Olivier Clement in his Spiritual Anthropology writes: “Between the first and second 
comings of the Lord, between the God-man and the God-universe, between the fallen and 
transfigured states of being, stands the Church, as a boundary and a crossing-place.”144 
The Church, effectively, constitutes the manifestation of “the moment” on earth, the way 
in which the Incarnation is continually made manifest in and through the sacraments.145 
This moment signifies the self-emptying of the person, the death of the ego, and the 
opening up of human life to the fullness of communion. Clement continues:  
 
The Body of Christ is not only unity but interchange, by which the 
‘movement of love’ of the Trinity is conveyed to humankind. This 
movement in which each effaces himself in order to give, is the transition 
                                                 
143 Brothers Karamazov, 236-64. Huxley's Brave New World is an equally profound meditation on this 
issue.  
144 Olivier Clement, On Human Being: A Spiritual Anthropology (New York, London, and Manila: 
New City Press, 2000), 115. 
145 Kierkegaard, of course, wrote preciously little on the sacraments. His most sustained dialogue on 
the issue is found in “The Discourse at the Communion on Fridays,” (CD, 247-300). In the journals he 
connects an unhealthy, obsessive attitude about the Eucharist to objective thinking (JP 5, 5047 / XI1 A 
556). See Plekon, “Kierkegaard and the Eucharist,” Studia Liturgica 22 (1992): 214-36; Jack Mulder Jr., 
“The Catholic Moment? Apostolic Authority in Kierkegaard and the Catholic Tradition,” in Kierkegaard 
and the Catholic Tradition: Conflict and Dialogue (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2010), 98-125.  
Many of Kierkegaard's criticisms are aimed at the institutional nature of the churches and his 
sacramental reticence reflects this. That being said, the theological drive of the Climacian writings is 
centered on the eternal being made temporal, i.e., the manifestation of holiness and grace in our immediate, 
lived experience. This focus is, in and of itself, profoundly sacramental, even though Kierkegaard may have 
been hesitant to use such terminology, given the critical nature of his project. I am certainly not suggesting 
that Kierkegaard would have viewed the Orthodox Church, or any church for that matter, as the primary 
manifestation for how individuals enter into the moment and face the absolute paradox. Rather, I am trying 
to view his writings from the perspective of Orthodox Christianity, and find that he is in much more 
agreement with sacramental traditions such as Catholicism and Orthodoxy than what is often presented in 
the scholarship.  
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from individual to person, a growing to maturity certainly, but only 
achieved by means of a succession of deaths-and-resurrections, in the 
course of which we are stripped down and recreated. We become unique, 
escape the repetitive character of sin, only in proportion to our achieving 
unity. In coming to completion, the personality is shaped by its various 
tendencies of inclusiveness and discrimination, self-giving and letting be, 
and by the effects of love […]. No longer do we jealously guard our share 
of humanity, our own joys, our separateness. We give so that we may 
bring to life. Giving our life, we receive all lives into ourselves.146 
 
This communal nature of salvation is one of the more distinctive elements of 
Eastern Christian thought. Individual salvation, in the context of Eastern Orthodox 
anthropology, is an oxymoron. As Georges Florovsky notes: “Christianity means a 
‘common life,’ a life in common. Christians have to regard themselves as ‘brethren’ (in 
fact this was one of their first names), as members of one corporation, closely linked 
together. And therefore charity had to be the first mark and the first proof as well as the 
token of this fellowship.”147 This does not mean that deification means the shattering of 
the unique, personal self, or that we become engulfed in some sort of Platonic universal. 
Rather, it signifies the manifestation of authentic, unique personhood. Florovsky goes on 
to note that the community in question is not a “society” or a collective which threatens 
the status of the person as a single individual. Rather, the community in question is a 
manifestation of communion, of love: “Christians are united not only among themselves, 
but first of all they are one—in Christ, and only this communion with Christ makes the 
communion of men first possible—in Him.”148  
                                                 
146 Clement, 50. 
147 See Georges Florovsky, Bible, Church, Tradition: An Eastern Orthodox View (Belmont, MA: 
Nordland Publishing Company, 1972), 59; Zizioulas, Being as Communion, especially 145-49.  
148 Ibid. 
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This emphasis on communion also forms a central aspect of Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard writes: “As Christianity’s glad proclamation 
is contained in the doctrine about man’s kinship with God, so its task is man’s likeness to 
God. But God is love; therefore we can resemble God only in loving, just as, according to 
the apostle’s words, we can only ‘be God’s co-workers in love.”149 
Kierkegaard’s distinction between the “public” (Offentligheden) and 
“community” (Menighed) is important to consider in this regard.150 In the journals, 
Kierkegaard writes:  
 
“In the ‘public’ and the like the single individual is nothing; there is no 
individual; the numerical is the constituting form […]. In community the 
single individual [den Enkelte] is; the single individual is dialectically 
decisive as the presupposition for forming community and in community 
the single individual is qualitatively something essential and can at any 
moment become higher than ‘community,’ specifically as soon as ‘the 
others’ fall away from the idea. The cohesiveness of community comes 
from each one’s being a single individual, and then the idea; the 
connectedness of a public or rather its disconnectedness consists of the 
numerical character of everything. Every single individual in community 
guarantees the community; the public is a chimera. In community the 
single individual is a microcosm who qualitatively reproduces the cosmos; 
here, in a good sense, it holds true that unum noris, omnes. In a public 
there is no single individual and the whole is nothing; here it is impossible 
to say unum noris, omnes, for here there is no one. ‘Community’ is 
certainly more than a sum, but yet it is truly a sum of ones; the public is 
nonsense—a sum of negative ones, of ones who are not ones, who become 
ones through the sum instead of the sum becoming a sum of the ones.151 
 
                                                 
149 WOL, 74. 
150 Menighed is the word that is primarily used for religious communities in Danish. It can mean 
“congregation,” though “fellowship” is a much better translation. Kierkegaard sometimes uses the word to 
mean “community,” but only in the context of the Christian life, and usually in juxtaposition to the 
inauthentic reality of “the public.”  
151 JP 3, 2952 / X2 A 390. 
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Kierkegaard’s repeated emphasis on the individual over and against the public 
does obviously not mean that he does not appreciate the essentially communal and 
communitarian nature of the Christian life. On the contrary, in Works of Love, 
Kierkegaard calls our need for communion “essential” and says that “the most important 
thing” is “to understand oneself in one’s longing for community.”152 In fact, Kierkegaard 
states that in order for Christ to be have been fully human, he would have needed to 
experience this need for love and companionship.153 Kierkegaard also states that 
community must function as a “middle term” between the individual and God.154 Finally, 
de Silentio’s analysis of Abraham’s teleological suspension of the ethical shows that it is 
only by passing through the ethical that we can begin to enter into a religious manner of 
living, a movement that is analyzed by Climacus in the Postscript.  
The important distinction between “the public” and “community” in 
Kierkegaard’s works has not always been recognized in the literature, resulting in the 
charge of individualism against Kierkegaard.155 In the next section I will further examine 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the communal aspects of the Christian life and look at 
possible social and political dimensions of such a view as understood in relation to 
Eastern Orthodox social thought.  
  
                                                 
152 WOL, 153.  
153 Ibid., 154. 
154 JP 2, 1377 / IX A 315. 
155 For a representative view, see Roger S. Gottlieb, “Kierkegaard’s Ethical Individualism,” The 
Monist 62, no. 3 (1979): 351-67.  
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4.3 - Social and Political Dimensions in Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodoxy  
In examining the social dimensions of Kierkegaard’s philosophy and of the 
Eastern Orthodox tradition, we must first consider how their vision of spiritual 
communion differs from the more secular (and certainly more prevalent) models of 
globalization and intercultural tolerance.156 Second, it is worth considering to what extent 
such a vision of persons in communion includes considerations of political and systemic 
realities.157 If Eastern Christians are serious about viewing salvation in terms of a 
deification that is largely understood in terms of our ability to relate to our neighbors 
within the community, does this not by necessity mean that the political dimension of the 
human person needs to be transfigured and sanctified? Similarly, given Kierkegaard’s 
view that an authentic relationship to the community is an essential element in our 
relationship to God—as outlined in Works of Love and Fear and Trembling—a proper 
understanding of the structure of said community seems essential, especially given 
Kierkegaard’s differentiation between the inauthentic reality of “the public” and the 
authentic reality of true community. 
                                                 
156 In Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theology, spiritual communion includes the communion 
of saints. Kierkegaard, of course, never discusses communion or community in the context of saints or 
martyrs.  
157 The words “politics” and “political” are to be construed in the most general Aristotelian sense, i.e., 
as politikos; having to do with the things that concern the citizens of the state. I am basing much of the 
following discussion on the principle that human beings are political animals, that our well-being and 
flourishing necessarily includes considerations of governance and distribution of resources. The central 
claim of this section is that Kierkegaard, and important influences in the Eastern Orthodox tradition, have a 
great deal to say about the political dimension of human life.  
The thorny issue of the relationship between Christianity in general and the political sphere falls 
outside the boundaries of this current discussion. For a recent overview, see C.C. Pecknold, Christianity 
and Politics: A Brief Guide to the History (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010). 
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Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos, in his work Facing the World, offers a 
critical view of the difference between the secular vision of a “global community” and 
the spiritual principle of persons in communion:  
 
The current trend toward unification does not spring ‘from within,’ from 
spiritual maturity and a loving desire to learn about other people; on the 
contrary, it has been imposed ‘from without,’ by purely material factors, 
as a form of behavior. People who are brought together through this kind 
of unification remain strangers or are only united because of their common 
economic or political interests.158  
 
We are brought back to the spiritual crisis of Ivan Karamazov when considering 
the secular model. It is easy to love “people,” or to care for “the poor.” But when we are 
faced with flesh and blood human beings who demand our attention and care, the 
neighbor right in front of us, our prejudices, desires, and ignorance often outweigh our 
political and societal ambitions. The ideals of openness, inclusivity, and equality that 
marked so much of post-war Western Europe have in recent decades increasingly given 
way to far-right nationalism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and pure racism as people are 
confronted with the difficult realities of having to confront the other. Anastasios suggests 
that without some kind of personal, spiritual transformation, political ideals will have 
little efficacy in the face of such challenges: “Taking Christian principles as our starting 
point, it is our belief that the real problem is how we can advance from being merely a 
community to becoming a communion of love—or, to use the Greek word, a koinonia, a 
                                                 
158 Archbishop Anastasios Yannoulatos, “Toward a Global Community,” in Facing the World: 
Orthodox Christian Essays on Global Concerns (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2003), 21. 
The recent breakdown of the Eurozone and the possibility of Greece’s exit from the European Union at the 
time of writing are interesting manifestations of Yannoulatos’ point.  
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‘communion, society, communication, interconnection’ of love—with our fellow human 
beings, with the entire universe, and with the Supreme Reality.”159  
Basing personhood on the communion of the persons of the Trinity obviously has 
significant implications for how the Eastern Orthodox tradition views the political 
dimension of the human being. Similarly, if the fall is viewed in terms of personal and 
interpersonal fragmentation, and salvation is considered in largely therapeutic terms,160 
spiritual considerations will be inherently social and political.  
A word on the distinction between the categories of “social” and “political:” For both 
Kierkegaard and the Eastern Orthodox tradition (in both teaching and praxis) political 
(structural/systematic/political) realities arise out of social (interpersonal) considerations, 
i.e., the fact that the human self is structured in an inherently social and communal 
manner. The Eastern Church, especially during the Byzantine era, played a pivotal role 
throughout the Orthodox world in addressing many of the fundamental societal and 
political ills of the time. Even though theology that was explicitly focused on the political 
and systemic dimensions of human existence remained scarce the Church often involved 
itself in political issues, especially when they related to the welfare of the most 
disenfranchised portions of society. In the following section I will examine various ways 
in which the Byzantine heritage has informed social and political dimensions of Eastern 
Orthodox theology.  
In relation to Kierkegaard, my hope is to at least point out the political and structural 
implications of his works. Most of Kierkegaard’s direct references to political issues are 
relegated to his journal entries and he certainly never attempted to deal with such issues 
                                                 
159 “Toward a Global Community,” 21.  
160 See chapter 2.  
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in a longer work. There are, nonetheless, issues raised throughout the Kierkegaardian 
corpus that can only be described as being political in nature, i.e., as having a direct 
relation to how societies develop policies and institutional responses to such issues as 
poverty, education, and even immigration. Even though it falls outside the scope of my 
project here to address these issues in any substantive way, I at least hope to point 
towards a way to read Kierkegaard as a philosopher whose writings include a highly 
important political dimension.161 It is in light of this consideration that I offer a 
comparative view of Kierkegaard’s philosophy in light of Eastern Christian views on 
these issues. 
As I have already noted, the Eastern Orthodox views on the social dimension of 
the human person are always: a) centered on the notion of koinonia, communion and 
interconnectedness, and b) incarnational in nature. Anastasios writes: 
 
[The Incarnation is] an event that is both the basic focal point for unity in 
the universe and the crucial factor in restoring the divine koinonia of love. 
This event, put succinctly, was when ‘the Word became flesh and dwelt 
among us, full of grace and truth’ (Jn: 1:14). The incarnation of the Word 
of God is the critical impetus that was needed to move us toward a 
koinonia of every human person with all other human beings and with the 
entire natural world.162 
                                                 
161 The view that Kierkegaard was an apolitical writer who championed individualism in one form or 
another was a prevalent view of Kierkegaard in the early literature. Interest in the social and political 
dimensions of Kierkegaard’s works have grown increasingly in the past two decades. The most important 
contributions to the growing consensus that Kierkegaard has a great deal to say about politics and 
community include: Barry Stocker, Kierkegaard on Politics (London: Palgrave Pivot, 2013); Armen 
Avanessian and Sophie Vennerscheid, ed., Kierkegaard and Political Theory: Religion, Aesthetics, Politics 
and the Intervention of the Single Individual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); Jon Stewart, 
ed., Kierkegaard’s Influence on the Social Sciences (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2011); George Pattison and 
Steven Shakespeare, ed., Kierkegaard: The Self in Society (London: Macmillan Press, 1998); George 
Connell and C. Stephen Evans, ed., Foundations of Kierkegaard’s Vision of Community: Religion, Ethics, 
and Politics in Kierkegaard (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1992).  
My main purpose here is to provide a connection between Kierkegaard’s spiritual anthropology and 
his more explicitly social and political writings. I will argue that a comparative analysis between the 
interplay of the individual and social dimensions of Eastern Orthodox soteriology and Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy is an excellent way to draw out these aspects of Kierkegaard’s writings.  
162 “Toward a Global community,” 26-27. 
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This understanding of salvation and deification in terms of the communal has its 
roots in patristic thought. Three figures loom especially large with regards to this 
emphasis on societal change: Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian, and John 
Chrysostom.163 These three pivotal figures in Eastern Christian religious thought all 
emphasized the correspondence between inward, personal transfiguration and the 
deification of the social sphere. Anastasios notes that these three teachers constantly 
preached “human equality, referring to homotimia (that all people are of ‘equal value’) 
and to isotimia (that all people are entitled to ‘equal privileges’). They find the basis for 
this equality in the very essence of humanity’s nature, and any departure from this 
equality is understood unconditionally as injustice.”164  
An especially important element of their preaching was the belief that issues of 
inequality and injustice need to be addressed on a societal and even political/systematic 
level. Charity and compassion are not reducible to individual acts of piety, nor is poverty 
reducible to any sort of individual failure. John D. Jones notes this emphasis in the 
homilies of Chrysostom:  
 
A compassionate response to assisting those who are poor is in principle 
critically sensitive to attitudes and policies that seek to blame the poor 
entirely for their poverty. One need only read St. John Chrysostom’s many 
homilies dealing with poverty to see how often he caustically rejects 
claims by parishioners that the poor did not deserve assistance since they 
were to blame for their condition.165 
                                                 
163 Basil 330?-379, Gregory 329-390, Chrysostom 354-407. 
164 “The Dynamic of Universal and Continuous Change,” 157. See Basil the Great, On the Holy Spirit, 
20 (PG 32:161; New Advent, accessed 9/10/2015, http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/3203.htm); Gregory 
Nazianzen, Ethical Verses, 34.59-60 (PG 37:950); John Chrysostom, On Lazarus, 2.6 (PG 48:992; On 
Wealth and Poverty, trans. Catherine P. Roth (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1984), 39-
57).  
165 John D. Jones, "The Church as Neighbor: Corporately and Compassionately Engaged," In 
Communion (Winter, 2013): 22.  
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The three hierarchs viewed the model for Christian life not only in the lives of 
individual saints but in light of specific communities, namely the monasteries. Basil the 
Great, in his Rules for Ascetic life, writes: “I call that manner of communal life perfect in 
which private property does not exist, contradictory opinions have been eliminated, all 
turmoil, rivalry, and discord have been set well out of the way, and everything is shared 
in common.”166 Such communities represent the communal nature of deification, of 
transformation that consists in growing in likeness to God’s Trinitarian life, which is 
perfect communion.167 This is an inward change that manifests itself in each person’s 
unique personhood but which is not relegated to individual acts of piety or mercy, which 
are often based on capricious emotional responses: “Humanity has been called upon to 
proceed toward radical transformation and change. This is not merely external or 
superficial change, but a change in the nature of our very existence, one that can 
transform all of creation. It is a change that takes place with a profound awareness of the 
unity in the cosmos. It is a change whose end lies in deification.”168 
Kierkegaard’s Works of Love provide a similar focus on personal uniqueness that 
is expressed in universal love. A central theme of the work is the distinction between 
                                                 
166 Basil the Great, Rules for Ascetic Life, 18.1, (PG 21:1381C). See Yannoulatos, “The Dynamic of 
Universal and Continuous Change,” 161.  
167 There are three critiques that come to mind with regards to Basil’s use of the monastery as an ideal 
for communal life: First, similar to using Christ as a model for individual deification, the monastery may 
represent an unattainable ideal in relation to the possible deification of the community. Second, there is an 
element here of Glaucon’s critique of Socrates’ “City of Pigs” in the Republic, namely that the life of the 
monastery is not only unattainable in the context of the polis but also unattractive for those who are not 
drawn to that kind of life (given that life outside of a monastic setting represents a different manifestation 
of how people strive to realize the eternal telos). Third, Basil’s idealized view of the monastery is, 
obviously, pretty far from the truth. Monasteries are, at least in my experience, pretty far from being filled 
with nothing but harmony, self-emptying, and love. They are, like any other community, replete with all the 
usual drama, neuroses, and wonderful nonsense that accompany the human condition.  
168 “The Dynamic of Universal and Continuous Change,” 177.  
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“erotic” love (Elskov) and Christian love (Kærlighed), roughly corresponding to the 
Greek concepts of eros and agape.169 Much of this distinction rests on how to correctly 
love oneself and how that love can be transferred onto other people. As Kierkegaard 
notes, Kærlighed “does not seek to teach a man not to love himself but in fact rather 
seeks to teach him proper self-love.”170 Similarly, the point is not to do away with erotic 
love, i.e., the preferential love between friends, spouses, or family, but rather to 
transfigure that love in and through the experience of the universal love of Kærlighed.  
At the beginning of the work, Kierkegaard shows that Kærlighed revolves around 
becoming a neighbor171 to all, which in turn primarily revolves around loving oneself in 
the correct manner. This, Kierkegaard believes, is the primary element of the 
commandment to “love thy neighbor as yourself:” “To love oneself in the right way and 
to love one’s neighbour correspond perfectly to one another; fundamentally they are one 
and the same thing. When the law’s as yourself has wrested from you the self-love which 
Christianity sadly enough must presuppose to be in every man, then and then only have 
you learned how to love yourself.”172 This, in turn, means that to acquire true “neighbor-
love” centers on becoming a neighbor: “The one to whom I owe a duty is my neighbor 
(Næsten), and once I have completed my duty I reveal that I am the neighbor.”173   
                                                 
169 For an overview of Kierkegaard's discussion of this distinction see the introduction to the 
HarperPerennial edition of Works of Love by George S. Pattison (vii-xvii) and D. Anthony Storm's 
commentary on the work at http://sorenkierkegaard.org/works-of-love.html.  
170 WOL, 35. 
171 It is important to note that Kierkegaard often uses the Danish word Næsten in Works of Love 
instead of the more common Nabo, even though he often utilizes the latter word in other works to refer to 
the “neighbor,” in a scriptural sense. Nabo literally means “near-dweller,” usually referring to someone 
who lives close by. Næsten means “brother” or “fellow(-man).” Næsten has the connotation of universal 
kinship and is the word used by Kierkegaard for the Greek plésion (the word Christ uses for the Good 
Samaritan in Luke 10:29-37).   
172 WOL, 39. 
173 WOL, (SKS 9, 30). Translation mine.  
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As George Pattison has pointed out, Works of Love, is the book people most often 
point to in order to defend Kierkegaard against the accusation that his philosophy is 
inherently individualistic.174 That being said, this view is far from representing a 
consensus, as many still read Kierkegaard as always heralding the individual at the cost 
of the communal in order to overcome the dangers of the Hegelian universal.175 There is 
undoubtedly a tension that runs throughout the work between the individual person’s 
passion towards a relationship with God and the person’s care for the world. This tension, 
in fact, runs throughout all of Kierkegaard’s works. But the main thrust of Works of Love 
is to offer an alternative to the secular mode of Being-with-others, to use the 
Heideggerian phrase, which allows us to relate to one another as true equals. This 
“divine” equality is an important issue for Kierkegaard because it offers a way to 
overcome the oppressive pseudo-equality of secular levelling. As Pattison points out:  
 
It is only through such an absolute and inward ‘levelling’ that we realize 
the radical nature of the demand to see each and every one of our fellow 
human beings as a ‘neighbour’ in the Christian sense… Kierkegaard 
regards the modern preoccupation with levelling in the external sense (the 
removal of external distinctions by political and economic strategies) as 
fundamentally denying this underlying common humanity. Such attempts 
at social engineering are trapped in way of thinking that see the external 
differences as having a decisive significance for human life.176 
                                                 
174 See George Pattison, Kierkegaard and the Crisis of Faith, 109. 
175 See, Malantschuk, 322-26 for a rather individualistic reading of Works of Love. Martin Buber’s 
sensitive and nuanced criticism of Kierkegaard's focus on the individual's relationship to God to the 
exclusion of the individual's concern for the world can be found in Between Man and Man, 71-89. For a 
critical discussion of Levinas’ famous critique of Kierkegaard on this front, see Jeffrey Dudiak, “Religion 
with an Impure Heart?: Kierkegaard and Levins on God and Other Others,” in The Hermeneutics of 
Charity, ed. James K.A. Smith & Henry Isaac Venema (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2004), 185-96.  
On the theological front, Niebuhr in Christ and Culture (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 
Incorporated, 1956), 243ff and Bonhoeffer in Ethics, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New York: Macmillan, 1965), 
197-98 see Kierkegaard's philosophy as being largely relegated to individualism. 
176 Kierkegaard and the Crisis of Faith, 110. It should be noted that one can find plenty of references 
in Christian ethics, both East and West, to grounding our ethical thinking in considerations of physis. The 
difference between the Christian and secular approaches to appealing to universal considerations (and this 
is what I take Kierkegaard to be highlighting) is that the “divine equality” of human persons in Christian 
thought does not undermine human personhood (including the value and worth of the individual) but rather 
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The social aspects of Kierkegaard’s philosophy echo the primary concerns laid 
out in the aforementioned writings of Bishop Anastasios. Kierkegaard was an 
astoundingly prophetic writer, one who could read the writing on the wall with regards 
some of the major social and spiritual trends of the coming twentieth century. Among 
these was his skepticism regarding a purely secular basis for national and international 
communities. Though Kierkegaard was in many ways a progressive thinker (of which I 
will have more to say in just a moment), he nonetheless firmly believed that there had to 
be a spiritual basis for community and interpersonal relations. 
  Even with the socio-political undercurrent in Kierkegaard’s writings there is 
nonetheless a highly understandable tendency in the scholarship to focus on the tension 
between the individual and the community in his writings. The inwardness of the duty to 
love can easily be seen as existing in opposition to socio-political realities and strategies. 
This tension is inherent in Anti-Climacus’ existential analysis of the poles of existence in 
The Sickness Unto Death. What is individual and unique in us (freedom, spirit, the 
eternal) always manifests itself in tension with our lived reality as an instantiation of a 
universal (as a finite, mortal, member of a species that has a deterministic nature). This 
tension between the particular and the universal, the individual and the essence/nature, 
was a much-discussed topic in patristic thought.177  
                                                 
supports it. Many “secular“ attempts to develop a purely universal approach to ethical thinking seem to 
offer such an abstract account of personhood that the value of the individual becomes seriously 
undermined. Utilitarianism and deontology are the most famous examples of this tendency. The alternative 
offered by Kierkegaard (and, as I am arguing, by the Eastern Orthodox tradition) has interesting points of 
contact with later critiques of post-modern ethics and feminist ethics of care.   
177 John Zizioulas, Communion and Otherness, ed. Paul McPartlan (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 56, 
n. 129; Basil, Ep. 236.6 (PG 32, 884A); 38, 1;5 (PG 32, 325f); Amphilochius, Frg. 15 (PG 39, 112C-D); 
Maximus, Ep. 15 (PG 91, 545A); John Dam., C. Jacob. 52 (PG 94, I461). See also Daniel Buxhoeveden, 
and Gayle Woloschak, ed., Science and the Eastern Orthodox Church (Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 
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 The conflict between the particular and the universal manifests itself in various 
ways, of course, but a primary instance of this tension is the struggle of the individual to 
manifest his or her uniqueness in some kind of harmony with the well-being of the 
community. This is, of course, a central issue at stake in de Silentio’s Fear and 
Trembling where the individual is unable to find ultimate value in his experience as a part 
of the Sittlickheit.  
 In Eastern Orthodox thought, the ecclesia is seen as a primary way in which 
human beings navigate the tension between the particular and the universal. It is in the 
context of the divine liturgy that the human being finds harmony between her hypostasis 
and ousia insofar as we open ourselves up to a form of communion that respects and 
validates our unique individuality while at the same time manifesting a profound form of 
solidarity and interconnectedness. This interconnectedness manifests itself both in the 
relationships and communion of members of the community (the Church) as well as in 
the relationship between the faithful and God. The Eastern Orthodox liturgy is always a 
communal event. There are no private masses in the Eastern Orthodox Church as the 
liturgy must always be celebrated by a priest and at least one other person, to signify the 
communal nature of the event.178  
Even though Kierkegaard never made the kind of explicit connections between 
liturgy and communion that one finds in Eastern Orthodox theology he nonetheless also 
saw the Christian experience as offering a profound alternative to secular attempts, via 
economic and political systems, to harmonize the relationship of the individual and the 
                                                 
2011), esp. 137ff for a discussion of Maximos’ the Confessor and his views on the relationship between 
grace and natural laws.  
178 See Alexander Schmemann, Introduction to Liturgical Theology (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s 
Seminary Press, 1975). 
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community.179 It is with an eye to this proposed harmony of the one and the many that I 
will now look at ways in which the Eastern Orthodox Church and Kierkegaard have 
addressed these issues. 
It should first of all be noted that a great deal of Eastern Christian views on the 
political dimension of human beings was developed during the Byzantine Empire, a time 
when the sacred and the secular were most deeply intertwined in the history of the 
Orthodox faith. According to Demetrios Constantelos in his study of social justice in the 
Byzantine world, there was “no development of systematic ethics as we understand the 
concept today.”180 There were two reasons for this lack of systematization: First of all, 
the distinction between the individual and the social dimensions of the human being were 
not nearly as entrenched as they had become in Kierkegaard’s time (and certainly not in 
comparison to the modern tension between these spheres). The Byzantine conception of 
the human person was inherently social, much like the anthropology presented in Greek 
antiquity by Plato and Aristotle. Second, philanthropy was not considered a distinct virtue 
in the Christian life, something that one did in addition to other activities. Rather, 
philanthropy was seen as an “all-encompassing attribute.” The Christian life is 
philanthropy, or so the Byzantine’s believed.181 The God of the New Testament, the God 
of the Incarnation who appeared among us to heal and save us, was seen as being 
essentially philanthropos, the lover of mankind. The Church was seen as an extension of 
this salvific activity, not the manifestation of judgment or legalism but rather a “hospital 
                                                 
179 In chapter five, which serves as an epilogue to this project, I will explore Kierkegaard’s views on 
liturgy and communal worship.  
180 Constantelos, Poverty, Society and Philanthropy in the Late Medieval Greek World (Rochester, 
NY: Aristide D. Caratzas, Publisher, 1992), 39.  
181 See Constantelos, 39-52. On the relationship between philanthropia and agape, see Constantelos, 
“Origins of Christian Orthodox Diakonia: Christian Orthodox Philanthropy in Church History,” website of 
International Orthodox Christian Charities, accessed 7/23/2015, http://www.iocc.org/. 
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for the healing of sick souls.”182 The ecclesia was seen as a whole, as one, the cure 
against the fragmentation that was the inevitable result of the Fall. As Constantelos notes, 
there was no “drastic separation between the earthly Ecclesia and the supernatural 
community, because both constitute the whole of God’s creation and there is no division 
between the sacred and the profane.”183  
Yet this is not to suggest that the Byzantine Empire somehow manifested a 
perfect harmony and union between secular authorities and the life of the Church. The 
Church often took on a critical role in its relation to secular authorities and believed one 
of its main functions to be the protection of the poor and disenfranchised.184 The 
patriarchs of the late medieval Greek world saw the emperor as “the representative of 
God on earth, not for private gain but for the benefit of God’s people.”185 This did not 
make the ecclesiastical hierarchy subservient to the emperor or fully supportive of his 
political actions. On the contrary, the role of the emperor as God’s representative was 
seen as an ideal that often stood in tension to the lived reality of bureaucracy and 
aristocracy, both of which the Church hierarchy vehemently critiqued when they failed to 
live up to the ideal of God-as-philanthropos, especially when the empire failed to respond 
to the needs of its poorest and most disenfranchised citizens.186 
                                                 
182 Constantelos, 40. 
183 Constantelos, 49.  
184 It should be noted that one of the most striking differences between the pre- and post-Protestant 
eras in European history is the social attitude towards the poor As Max Weber outlined in his The 
Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism, it is only with Protestantism that poverty become as vehemently 
vilified as it is today, associated as it is with moral failing, a concept that was completely alien to both 
Greek and Latin Christianity in the late medieval world.  
As Constantelos notes regarding the Byzantine empire (70): “most people attached no shame to the 
fact of poverty.” 
185 Constantelos, 72. 
186 Constantelos, 73. 
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This is not to say that the Church, especially in its inevitable role as an earthly 
institution, always lived up to its own ideals. The church hierarchy undoubtedly validated 
and reified the secular hierarchy of the time and the clergy of the Byzantine era often 
received criticism for their extravagant lifestyle. The writings of John Chrysostom 
provided an ascetical critique of these issues and aimed to both instigate reform within 
the Church and inspire social awareness among the faithful.187 John McGuckin has noted 
that the Orthodox churches throughout the Byzantine era were in a constant struggle with 
both secular authorities and themselves in their formulation of a healthy relationship 
between the ecclesia and the political hierarchy.188 The relationship between the Church 
and the ruling authorities was primarily marked by the extent to which the political class 
followed the moral tenets of the Christian faith.189 
Kierkegaard’s political writings are similarly marked throughout by his critique of 
Christendom and what he sees as the unnatural marriage between the sacred and the 
secular via the Danish Lutheran Evangelical Church and its status as a national, 
governmental institution. But unlike those who see Kierkegaard as thereby advocating for 
a pietistic, individualistic Christianity,190 there is much to suggest that his aim was much 
more in keeping with the ideals represented by the Byzantine model where the unique 
individuality of the person coheres with the social and political spheres. Elisio Pérez-
Álvarez, in his study of the economic and political implications of Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy, writes:  
                                                 
187 See Chrysostomus Baur, John Chrysostom and his Time, trans. Sr. M. Gonzaga (Westminster: 
Newman Press, 1959), and John D. Jones, “John Chrysostom and the Problem of Wealth,” In Communion 
(May 9, 2009), accessed 8/1/2015, https://incommunion.org/2007/05/09/st-john-chrysostom-and-the-
problem-of-wealth/. 
188 McGuckin, The Orthodox Church, 380-396. 
189 Ibid., 382. 
190 See 257, n. 175. 
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Kierkegaard was not pursuing a kind of rejection of mundane policy. On 
the contrary, he was struggling for the preservation of the Christian 
message as a critical instrument within society. Instead of escaping from 
the world, he was denouncing the manipulation of religious speech. 
According to Kierkegaard, what lies beyond the doctrine of the church are 
the Hegelian philosophy and its ideology that privileges the status quo of 
the aristocracy.191  
 
Works of Love, Two Ages, and Training in Christianity present Kierkegaard’s 
attempt at distinguishing clearly between Christendom, a Christianity that supports and 
accommodates an unjust (economic and political) status quo, and the true Christianity 
whose political function was deeply Socratic in nature, i.e., to be a vexing gadfly, 
stinging the culture and thereby waking it up to its societal failures.192  
Pérez-Álvarez notes how the writings of Kierkegaard’s later years were deeply 
influenced by the economic changes occurring in Denmark, especially following the 
agrarian reforms enacted by prince Frederick VI in the 1840’s.193 The rise of a new, 
bourgeois middle class also created the conditions for a disenfranchised, oppressed lower 
class of peasants (“cottagers”) who suffered greatly in the economic reforms of the era. 
Kierkegaard was deeply affected by their plight and these economic policies provided a 
great deal of inspiration for his critiques of Danish society.194 As Pérez-Álvarez notes, 
                                                 
191 Elisio  Pérez-Álvarez, A Vexing Gadfly: The Late Kierkegaard on Economic Matters (Eugene, OR: 
Pickwick Publications, 2009), 37. 
192 This is not to say that Christianity’s political function was reducible to just this facet though it 
seems that Kierkegaard believed it to be the primary political dimension of Christian life. Kierkegaard, for 
example, talks about his Christian philosophy in relation to education (JP 1, 782 / II A 4; JP 1, 788 / X1 A 
647) but never suggests that Christianity could provide a systematic alternative to the one already in place. 
Christianity’s primary purpose is to transform individual persons who live in communion with one another. 
It thereby should (though it often fails to) affect every aspect of human existence, including education, 
economics, and politics.  
193 Pérez-Álvarez, 38.  
194 Pérez-Álvarez, 38-40 and  Kirmmse, Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark (Bloomington, IN: The 
Indiana Series in the Philosophy of religion, Indiana University Press, 1990), 12-20. 
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this is an important factor to take into account when considering the socio-political 
elements of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, especially in works such as Works of Love:  
 
Some scholars assert that Kierkegaard loved his neighbors not because 
they were lovable in themselves or because of a special intrinsic 
characteristic, but due to God’s transcendent commandment: ‘thou shalt 
love thy neighbor.’ But it is easy to miss Kierkegaard’s point in Works of 
Love: in loving the neighbor one is rejecting the bourgeois ideology and 
seeking the Kingdom of God and its justice.195 
 
Kierkegaard’s attacks were equally aimed at secular authorities as well as the 
institutionalized church; not surprisingly given the nature of a national church 
functioning largely as a government bureaucracy. Michael Plekon notes that 
Kierkegaard’s aim was to return to the spirit of “original,” orthodox Christianity, much as 
Luther had wished to do.196 But Kierkegaard’s critique was not an attempt to salvage 
Lutheranism but rather to offer a radically new way of viewing Christian life, one 
focused on personal transformation and action rather than institutional allegiance: “Like 
Bonhoeffer much later, he found fault with an exaggerated emphasis on faith and grace in 
the Lutheran tradition to the detriment of the imitation of Christ, of Christian praxis.”197  
In his rejection of the Lutheran church, Kierkegaard attacked the primary 
theological voices of his time and place but also the very notion of the church as the 
“corporate body” of Christ and the traditions and rituals it claimed to manifest.198 
                                                 
195 Pérez-Álvarez, 39.  
196 Plekon, “Protest and Affirmation: The Late Kierkegaard on Christ, the Church, and Society,” 
Quarterly Review, (1982): 50. Plekon notes that “[Kierkegaard’s] published works and journals confirm 
that he constantly returned to traditional sources such as the church fathers, Luther, and other theologians” 
(50). As I discussed in chapter 1, Kierkegaard certainly drew a great deal of inspiration from patristic 
sources but his access to original texts was often limited and in some cases his research was limited to 
interpretations of the original texts found in the textbooks of the Danish Lutheran seminary.  
197 Ibid.  
198 Ibid.  
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Kierkegaard’s critique of Lutheranism echoed Martin Luther’s critique of Roman 
Catholicism in many important ways.199 
There is some question as to the extent to which these critiques were aimed at the 
very concept of ecclesia per se. Again, there is undoubtedly an emphasis on the 
individual’s relationship to God in Kierkegaard, especially since he saw the corruption of 
the Danish Lutheran church as representing yet another manifestation of the Hegelian 
universal that threatened individual well-being. But this does not mean that Kierkegaard 
saw no value in the church as a community. 
Works of Love is an example of Kierkegaard’s attempt to formulate a notion of a 
community that is bound by something deeper and more profound than the Hegelian 
Sittlickheit. It is a work that is not offered as an alternative social ethos to that 
propounded by secular humanism or the prophets of Christendom but rather a radical 
view of Christianity as an ecclesia in the most basic sense of the word, those that are 
“called forth” to engage in a specific kind of activity. In Works of Love, this activity is the 
full expression of Kærlighed, the manifestation of self-emptying and selfless loving that 
allows human beings to be free, authentic persons.200 This is never more apparent than in 
the fascinating section of Works of Love entitled “The Work of Love in Remembering 
One Dead.” Here Kierkegaard speaks of love for the dead as being the most faithful and 
freest love available to us: “In order properly to test whether love is entirely free, one 
eliminates everything which in some way could constrain a person to an act of love. But 
                                                 
199 For more on these parallels, see chapter 2.  
200 In the Roman Catholic and Orthodox traditions, this activity is primarily manifest in the sacrament 
of the Eucharist. Kierkegaard is, of course, famously reticent to speak of sacramental matters, though there 
are fascinating implications between his notion of “the moment” and the Eucharistic realism inherent in 
Roman Catholic and Orthodox theology. For a consideration of the Eucharistic implications of “the 
moment,” see Marcus Pound, “The Assumption of Desire: Kierkegaard, Lacan, and the Trauma of the 
Eucharist,” Journal for Cultural and Religious Theory 9, no. 1 (2008): 67-78. 
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precisely this is absent in the relationship with one who is dead. If love nevertheless 
remains, this is the freest love.”201  
One way of reading this baffling passage would be to reduce Kierkegaard’s 
Kærlighed to pure deontology. Indeed, Kierkegaard throughout Works of Love calls free, 
Christian love a pure duty. But there is much to suggest that we are here far removed 
from any kind of categorical imperative. Throughout the work, Kierkegaard emphasizes 
that the duty in question does not arise out of any sort of rational or social ethos but rather 
out of a profound solidarity, one where psychological idiosyncrasies or national bonds 
are transcended and we reach a universality based not on any sort levelling or abstraction 
but rather on the mutually shared love of unique persons.202 In this light, death and the 
experience of dying encapsulate central elements of Kierkegaard’s view of the human 
person as being in communion. Death is always entirely our own, as Heidegger would 
later note, a hallmark of inescapable authenticity.203 Yet it is also the universal 
experience, the common ground, the settling of dust to dust. As Hugh Pyper notes: 
“Death is profoundly solitary. We can only die our own death, and in its grip we pass 
beyond the claims and possibilities of the human. […] Yet death is also profoundly 
social. […] Such solidarity as we have is in the common life of the grave.”204 The 
Christian, furthermore, is conscious of a different kind of death, the sickness unto death, 
                                                 
201 WOL, 322.  
202 This is an important point to consider, one that sometimes gets glossed over in discussions of 
Kierkegaard's focus on the individual, namely that his philosophy is equally a critique against faceless 
commonality as well as against the post-Enlightenment view of the individual. Kierkegaard's anthropology 
of the person does not focus on rational, autonomous agents with specific rights and duties but rather on 
human beings who exist in interdependence, though their relationships with themselves and other people 
are often shattered by the reality of despair.  
203 Being & Time, H. 250-254.  
204 Hugh Pyper, “Cities of the Dead,” in The Joy of Kierkegaard: Essays on Kierkegaard as a Biblical 
Reader (Sheffield & Oakfield: Equinox, 2011), 74-75. 
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the fullness of the reality of sin and despair: “The sickness unto death is to be perpetually 
dying and yet not able to die.” 205 Piper notes: “As despair, so Kierkegaard claims, is 
universal, so all of us must be dwellers in cities of the perpetually dying.”206 
Yet the Christian also understands death in a profoundly hopeful sense, both the 
physical death of the body as well as the spiritual decay of the soul. Salvation is 
understood here as a community of love where all distinctions are erased, even between 
the living and the dead, a community of spiritual equality and communion. Love for the 
dead, therefore, is love for the living: “Love for the physically dead teaches us how to 
love those who are spiritually dead. It also teaches us a signal lesson in the love of the 
self. If salvation depends on dying to the self, the love of the self must be love of the 
dead. Only if we are able to love ourselves as dead can we claim a Christian self-love.”207 
Kierkegaard’s vision for a church, then, is completely catholic, i.e., universal. 
This universality cannot be institutionalized but must be realized in the mystical union of 
unique persons who love one another. As Hilarion Alfayev writes about the Orthodox 
view on the ecclesia: 
 
The church is one, for it is constituted in the image of the Holy Trinity and 
reveals the mystery of unity in essence, while being differentiated in 
hypostases. […] The unity of the human race once destroyed by people is 
now restored in the Church, where neither national nor linguistic 
distinctions are made. Rather, each person is granted a ‘new tongue’: the 
language of faith and prayer, of unity of mind and love.208  
 
                                                 
205 SUD, 6. 
206 Pyper, 74. 
207 Ibid., 75. 
208 Alfeyev, 100 and 102.  
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 Kierkegaard viewed this vision of true equality as being profoundly political and 
the failure of the institutionalized church to manifest it as an example of the pure 
hypocrisy of Christendom. In his journals Kierkegaard wrote that “It is very moving to 
preach on Sundays about Christ’s associating with sinners and tax-collectors—but on 
Mondays it is a crime to speak with an ordinary man, with a servant girl.”209 
Kierkegaard’s vision of the Church, the ecclesia, the universal love of believers, stood in 
stark contrast to the failures of the institutionalized church to live up to this vision:  
 
The definition of “Church” found in the Augsburg Confession, that it is 
the communion of saints where the word is rightly taught and the 
sacraments rightly administered, this quite correctly (that is, not correctly) 
grasped only the two points about doctrine and sacraments and has 
overlooked the first, the communion of saints (in which there is the 
qualification in the direction of the existential). Thus the Church is made 
into a communion of indifferent existences (or where the existential is a 
matter of indifference)—but the ‘doctrine’ is correct and the sacraments 
are rightly administered. This is really paganism.210  
 
Kierkegaard was obviously highly critical of the concept of an institutional 
church. His criticism can be applied equally to all denominations of Christianity. Indeed, 
many of Kierkegaard’s criticisms of the church as an institutionalized, hierarchical 
authority can be applied to the Orthodox church of both past and present. Kierkegaard 
saw himself as a corrective to the corrupting influences of Christendom that undoubtedly 
appear in every religious setting, i.e., superficiality, hypocrisy, and spiritual values being 
replaced by secular comfortability. But this does not mean that Kierkegaard advocated 
for an individualistic religiosity. His view of the Christian faith is highly communal. As 
                                                 
209 JP 1, 1011 / VIII 1 A 314. 
210 JP 1, 600 / X4 A 246. In his commentary on this passage, Pérez-Álvarez writes that Kierkegaard’s 
point is that “contrary to the early church, we converted the Eucharist into the real body of Christ and the 
Church into the mystical body” (93). 
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an Orthodox Christian reading Kierkegaard, I cannot but be struck with how closely his 
vision of the ecclesia aligns with the vision of patristic Christianity, with the idea of the 
Church as a critical counterpoint to secular complacency and as offering a form of 
communion that is much deeper and more profound than what is offered through 
national, political, or social communities, which are always exclusivist in nature.  
There is an especially striking connection between Kierkegaard’s emphasis on 
Christian praxis, on action that is inherently social in nature, and between the later 
Byzantine view of philanthropia as being the primary hallmark of the Christian life. Even 
though these elements have not always been fully realized by the Orthodox churches, 
such a theological emphasis casts Kierkegaard’s philosophy in an interesting light. Pérez-
Álvarez writes:  
 
What counts for Kierkegaard is ‘the correspondence or no-correspondence 
of my life or thine’ with the teaching of the church, and not the calculation 
of scholarly correspondence between the different dogmatic declarations. 
What come first are the transformed lives that reconcile weekends with 
weekdays. Within this train of ideas, Kierkegaard articulates his concept 
of idolatry, which has to be addressed at the level of practice more than at 
the theoretical level.211  
 
Similarly, the Orthodox church always viewed its relation to secular authorities 
primarily in terms of how well they managed to live up to the praxis of the gospel, rather 
than the extent to which these authorities proclaimed allegiance to any particular 
doctrine.212 A primary consideration for the church was whether the secular authorities 
                                                 
211 Pérez-Álvarez, 153. 
212 McGuckin, The Orthodox Church, 382: “As far as the church was concerned it never lost its 
commitment to the principle that the emperor ruled under the eye of God; and only as an icon, or type, of 
Christ’s loving dominion of his world. If the emperor departed from the ‘Charter’ of Christ (the Gospel and 
the church canons) his rule was never sanctioned by the church leaders, and both he and those clergy who 
were his sycophants, invariably came to grief.” 
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respected the dignity and freedom of human persons in their rules and systems of 
government. McGuckin, in his analysis of the relationship between the Byzantine church 
and the political authority of the time, writes:  
 
The Creation ordinances of God show how much he has elevated human 
will and enhanced human freedom. The conciliar and canonical principles 
of church government show how much the church has always sought to 
protect the legitimate liberty of the Christians. Christianity is not an enemy 
of human freedom. Although there have been many instances in the past 
where ecclesiastical authorities have seemed to be in league with the most 
repressive and reactionary forces in society, the church has never lacked 
monastic and simpler leaders (those still in touch with the cry of the poor) 
who have pointed out the freedoms the Gospel has enshrined for all men 
and women.213  
 
Kierkegaard’s critique of both the present age as well as his attacks on 
Christendom are similarly informed by the fundamental Christian teaching of the human 
person’s inherent value, dignity, and freedom. Kierkegaard saw the rise of capitalist and 
materialist philosophies and values in his time as a direct attack on Christian principles. 
He bemoaned the increasing competitiveness and acquisitiveness of society as a hallmark 
of both bourgeois values and Christendom, i.e., the failure of the Church to offer an 
alternative teaching to these developments and even its direct and indirect support for 
materialistic values.214 Kierkegaard saw many of the developments in the modern 
world—the rise of capitalism and consumerism, obsession with technology and 
entertainment, the focus on comfort and pleasure—as seriously threatening human 
dignity and freedom. Worst of all, Kierkegaard thought, was that these values were 
                                                 
213 McGuckin, The Orthodox Church, 383. 
214 Pérez-Álvarez, 55-67. For Kierkegaard‘s views on business and competitiveness, see esp. JP 1, 
233 / VIII 1 A 368; JP 6, 6188 / IX A 134; JP 1, 235 / IX A 387; and JP 2, 1787 / X3 A 347 n.d., 1850. For 
the relationship between bourgeois values and the gospel preached in the Danish Lutheran church, see JP 3, 
2767 / VII 1 A 77. 
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increasingly being associated with Christianity. In Judge for Yourself! Kierkegaard 
writes: “We have made the finite and the infinite, the eternal and the temporal, the 
highest and the lowest, blend in such a way that it is impossible to say which is which, or 
the situation is an impenetrable ambiguity.”215  
The prosperity gospel preached in Kierkegaard’s time was an especially egregious 
example of this.216 Kierkegaard always viewed true Christianity as a form of dying to 
oneself in order to help others, of voluntarily accepting suffering and pain in order to live 
in imitation of Christ. As such, true Christianity is diametrically opposed to a gospel of 
comfort, wealth, and luxury,217 even though the church repeatedly failed to live up to this 
ideal. Pérez-Álvarez writes that one of Kierkegaard’s primary objectives in his attack 
upon Christendom was: “To make Christianity possible again by means of rejecting the 
reduction of the gospel to pecuniary interests and, above all, by repudiating the practice 
of absolutizing money in the name of the interest of Christianity.”218 
 
4.4 - Conclusion 
One advantage of reading Kierkegaard in light of the Eastern Orthodox tradition 
is that it allows for an extremely holistic reading of the Kierkegaardian corpus. 
Throughout the years, scholars have fought to put Kierkegaard into one camp or another 
and in doing so have downplayed certain aspects of his writings while highlighting 
others. Reading Kierkegaard in light of the East allows us to bring together elements of 
                                                 
215 JFY, 123.  
216 JFY, 123-130. 
217 “The greater the advantages the more difficult it is to become a Christian.” JP 1, 991 / X3 A 714. 
See also FSE, 201: “To suffer for the doctrine, to will to suffer for it—not accidentally to happen to suffer 
for it—well, that kind of Christianity has become obsolete.” 
218 Pérez-Álvarez, 146; JP 3, 2773 / XI2 A 363. 
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his thought and writing that heretofore have often seemed diametrically opposed, or have 
at least stood in considerable tension to one another. Primary among these is the 
relationship of the individual to the community. Kierkegaard’s focus on the individual 
and inwardness has caused many commentators to downplay the essentially communal 
and social aspect of his writings, especially with regards to his views on personhood. The 
Eastern Orthodox tradition, with its focus on the harmonization of the communal and the 
individual, highlights how Kierkegaard managed to dialectically engage the opposite 
poles of community and individuality in subtler ways than he has often been given credit 
for. Kierkegaard’s primary aim was always to save Christianity from itself, to nudge his 
readers into thinking of how incredibly revolutionary the gospel message truly is. To do 
this he engaged in a rhetoric that is at times astoundingly revolutionary and radical. The 
political and economic dimensions of Kierkegaard’s works were informed by his 
philosophy of personhood, which echoes many of the central characteristics of patristic 
and Eastern Orthodox anthropology. First and foremost among these was Kierkegaard’s 
view of human personhood as being essentially relational and his view that human 
dignity and freedom can only be fully expressed via the Christian commandment of 
neighborly love.  
Even though an examination of Kierkegaard in light of the Eastern Orthodox 
Church cannot lay claim to revealing the “real” Kierkegaard—an objective which must 
always be bound to fail, give the indirect method of communication that lies at the heart 
of Kierkegaard’s philosophy—it nonetheless reveals many fascinating elements of 
Kierkegaard’s authorship that may otherwise go unexamined. Just as with comparative 
approaches to Kierkegaard from the Roman Catholic or even Zen Buddhist traditions, the 
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Eastern Orthodox tradition offers a new point of entry into Kierkegaard’s philosophy. An 
examination of Kierkegaard’s soteriology in light of the Eastern Orthodox tradition draws 
out the extent to which he attempted—and perhaps managed—to break away from the 
traditional Augustinian account of original sin that became prevalent in Western 
Christianity. Kierkegaard’s epistemology, when viewed in light of the East, reveals 
fascinating layers of apophaticism and an emphasis on relational knowledge. It also 
brings out important elements of Kierkegaard’s notion of passion (Lidenskab) when 
examined in light of the notion of apatheia that played a pivotal role in the formation of 
Eastern Christian spirituality. Finally, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on love and communion 
reveals interesting parallels with the Eastern Orthodox emphasis on the communal nature 
of salvation and the relational nature of human personhood.  
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Chapter 5 – Epilogue: Concluding Unscientific Remarks on the 
Ecclesiastical Event  
 
As I have repeatedly noted, points of contact between Kierkegaard and Eastern 
Orthodoxy stem not from Kierkegaard’s explicit attempt to craft an “Eastern” philosophy 
but rather from his attempt to connect to certain root principles in Christian thought and 
worship, many of which date back to the patristic era, which forms the core of Eastern 
Orthodox theology. My point here has not been to argue that Kierkegaard is some kind of 
pseudo-Orthodox but rather that viewing him from an Eastern Orthodox viewpoint 
highlights important aspects of his philosophy that may not be immediately apparent 
from either a Protestant or Roman Catholic perspective.  
 But a comparative analysis of Kierkegaard and Eastern Orthodox philosophy and 
theology cannot be considered complete unless we look at what is perhaps the most 
essential element of Eastern Orthodox spirituality, namely the central role of liturgical 
worship. The brief, concluding remarks that follow are an attempt to look at 
Kierkegaard’s complex views on liturgy, sacraments, and collective worship in 
comparison to Eastern Orthodox liturgical theology. My aim here, as in all the preceding 
chapters, is to shed a new light on Kierkegaard’s writings on this particular subject, one 
that has not received a great deal of attention in the literature.1  
 This chapter is not an attempt to offer an in-depth analysis of Kierkegaard’s views 
on collective worship or on Eastern Orthodox liturgics. It is, rather, an attempt to point 
                                                 
1 Recent work by Carl S. Hughes on this subject has moved the discussion forward a great deal. 
Hughes’ work is greatly influenced by Henning Fenger who attempted to connect Kierkegaard’s writings 
on aesthetics and religion in innovative ways. See Carl S. Hughes, Kierkegaard and the Staging of Desire: 
Rhetoric and Performance in a Theology of Eros (New York: Fordham University Press, 2014); Henning 
Fenger, Kierkegaard, the Myths and their Origins: Studies in Kierkegaardian Papers and Letters, trans. 
G.C. Schoolfield (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 
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the way forward towards a further comparative analysis between Kierkegaard and the 
Eastern Orthodox Church. It therefore serves as an epilogue of sorts to the preceding 
analysis and suggests some ways in which the project can be further developed.  
I will begin with a brief overview of Kierkegaard’s views on the role of collective 
worship in the spiritual life, including a look at his views on the sacraments. I will then 
examine Eastern Orthodox liturgical theology and examine the central role that the 
liturgy and the sacraments (most importantly, of course, the Eucharist) play in Eastern 
Orthodox spirituality. I will then conclude with a comparative overview of Kierkegaard 
and the Eastern Orthodox Church on these matters, as well as providing a few closing 
statements on the project as a whole.  
 
5.1 – Sacraments and Worship in Kierkegaard 
Kierkegaard, especially towards the end of his life, had a great deal of criticism 
for public worship. But these criticisms were almost always bound up with his 
(increasingly vehement) attacks on the Danish Lutheran Church. In his later writings 
Kierkegaard calls it a “great guilt to participate in public worship as it is at present.”2 
Kierkegaard sees Christ as directly admonishing the kind of “Sunday worship” that has 
been developed in contemporary Lutheranism: “The worship service you want to hold is 
hypocrisy and equal to blood-guilt. What the pastor, along with his family, is living on is 
that you are a hypocrite, or on making you into a hypocrite and keeping you a 
hypocrite.”3 In his work The Moment, Kierkegaard suggests that a state church, where the 
pastor is paid to deliver sermons about Christianity rather than revealing the Christian life 
                                                 
2 “The Moment” and Late Writings, 131.   
3 Ibid., 135 
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in and through his or her inward appropriation of the gospel, is bound to be an exercise in 
hypocrisy.4 “True worship,” Kierkegaard says, “quite simply consists in doing God’s 
will.”5 But the function of the church in its current manifestation (i.e., the 19th century 
Evangelical Lutheran Church of the State of Denmark) did not provide an opportunity to 
do God’s will but rather the opportunity to conform oneself completely to societal 
standards. Kierkegaard is especially scathing in his remarks on how the church has turned 
participation in the sacraments into bourgeois institutions. This applies especially to 
baptism, confirmation, and weddings, i.e., those occasions where the Christian life is 
turned into a “festivity” and a “joke,” a public spectacle celebrating conformity and 
“pleasant family festivities.”6 
 Yet Kierkegaard often spoke with great reverence of the sacraments when he 
discussed them outside of the context of institutionalized religion. Kierkegaard viewed 
the Eucharist as the “original true center in the church.”7 He viewed his decision to 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 226. 
5 Ibid, 245.  
6 Ibid., 243ff. I can imagine that American readers may think that Kierkegaard is being hyperbolic, but 
anyone who has grown up in any of the Scandinavian countries knows exactly what he is talking about. 
When I was confirmed in the Icelandic Evangelical Lutheran Church (also a state church) it was taken for 
granted that one was participating in the ceremony primarily to reap the benefits of the family festivities 
afterwards, with their necessarily accompanying gifts and pastries. Children were (and many still are) 
pressured by their family and society to be confirmed but anyone who took the religious elements of the 
proceedings seriously was considered to be more than a little strange. After all, actually believing in God 
might give the smørrebrød following the ceremony a rather bitter taste. And nobody wants that.  
7 JP 5, 5089 / I A 60 May 28, 1835. This section of the journals contains one of the very few instances 
where Kierkegaard mentions contemporary Eastern Orthodoxy, in this case the Greek Orthodox Church. 
Kierkegaard is commenting on a debate between H.N. Clausen and N.F.S. Grundtvig on whether the bible 
is sufficient in and of itself as a basis for Protestantism or if tradition plays an essential role in the life of the 
church. Kierkegaard agrees with Clausen that any literal interpretation of sola scriptura is unsustainable, 
primarily due to the fact that human interpretation of scripture is inevitably varied and complex, even if we 
grant that scripture itself is divinely inspired. On top of this, Kierkegaard notes, is the fact that most 
Protestants use one translation or another of scripture, which are often highly ambiguous and problematic. 
Kierkegaard’s point is that if one were to take sola scriptura seriously one should only read scripture in the 
original Greek, as the Greek Church does. He notes that the Greek Orthodox Church “differs in its creed 
from the others.” This had caused Gruntvig to declare the Greek Church a “withered branch” but 
Kierkegaard points out that this would only be true if we “concede a miracle with respect to translation,” 
which Kierkegaard dismisses by saying that nothing warrants such a position. Interestingly enough, 
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receive communion again with a great deal of fear and trembling and struggled with 
notions of whether one could ever be considered “worthy” of receiving the sacrament.8 It 
is only in relation to the sacraments that Kierkegaard ever speaks positively of an 
“objective” element in Christianity:  
 
We ordinary human beings do not have a direct or spontaneous God-
relationship; therefore are not able to express the unconditional, and we 
always need grace beforehand, because even the most sincere beginning is 
always imperfect compared to the demand of the ideal—consequently it is 
like a new sin.  
 Thus grace in the first place.  
 But then once more the need for the objective is felt still more 
deeply. And this is offered in the sacraments, in the word, yet not 
magically.9  
 
Kierkegaard saw the possibility of the objective elements in Christianity, including the 
sacraments, as being used to diminish inwardness, especially in relation to imitation 
(Efterølgelsen).10 Kierkegaard, especially towards the end of his life, thought that the 
sacraments were increasingly being used as an excuse for people to feel comfortable and 
happy in “the cheapest way possible.”11 Kierkegaard’s criticism of the sacraments is most 
often in connection with the failure of Christendom to take the commitment of 
sacramental life seriously: “Christendom’s Christianity takes Christianity only as a gift. 
                                                 
Kierkegaard seems to be suggesting that if Protestants were true to their word in wanting to base their faith 
on the fundamentals of scripture then the creed that they profess should be like the one professed in the 
Greek Orthodox Church. Even though Kierkegaard does not explicitly refer to the debate, he is 
undoubtedly referring to the addition of the filioque in the Latin creed.  
8 JP 2, 1494 / X5 A 103. 
9 JP 2, 1493 / X5 A 101.  
10 JP 2, 1905 / X4 A 366. Kierkegaard in the journals often refers to external elements in Christian 
worship as “objective” elements. Though somewhat different from his epistemological use of the word, it 
nonetheless bears obvious relations to the notion of “objective” knowledge, as discussed in chapter 3.  
11 JP 4, 5047 / XI1 A 556.  
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That is why it is so busy with the sacraments (superstitiously) and pretends ignorance of 
any commitment in relation to the sacraments. This defrauds God.”12  
Yet Kierkegaard also saw the sacraments, when viewed authentically, as essential 
to the Christian life. In the journals, Kierkegaard quotes Pascal who writes of the paradox 
of hiddenness and revelation in Christianity, of how God makes himself “more 
knowable” by becoming “invisible.” The deepest hiddenness, the deepest mystery of God 
is “in the sacrament.” Kierkegaard sees this as representing the dialectic of Climacus in 
the Postscript: “A revelation, the fact that it is a revelation, is recognized by its opposite, 
that it is a mystery. God reveals himself—this is known by his hiding himself. Thus there 
is nothing of the direct.”13 The Eucharist, therefore, represents the ultimate manifestation 
of the paradox.14  
 Interestingly enough, Kierkegaard sees the church, the living body of Christ, as 
being the element that safeguards the sacraments from becoming pure objectivity, i.e., 
empty ritual. Yet Christendom has destroyed the notion of the church as communion 
(Samfund), as the manifestation of Christ’s love on earth.15  
 It is this lack of the Existentielle that lies at the root of Kierkegaard’s critique of 
both collective worship and sacramental life. It is not the mass (or liturgy) itself that is 
the problem, but rather the disposition of the worshipper towards these things. The 
categories of “subjective” and “objective” knowing16 are not meant to categorize 
particular things but rather certain kinds of epistemological and spiritual orientations. We 
                                                 
12 JP 3, 2919 / XI2 A 387. 
13 JP 3, 3110 / X3 A 626.  
14 It is worth mentioning that the sacraments in Eastern Orthodoxy are officially known as “the holy 
mysteries.” The Orthodox Church does not have the kind of systematic analysis of sacramental theology as 
one might find in Roman Catholicism, e.g. in the doctrine of transubstantiation.  
15 JP 1, 600 / X4 A 246.  
16 See chapter 3,151-61. 
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can view the liturgy and the sacraments in a purely objective manner, seeing them in 
terms of “right” or “wrong” belief or ritual, or we can approach them with the passionate 
inwardness that is necessary for our appropriation of the truth and healing that they may 
potentially offer.  
 Throughout this work I have pointed out how Kierkegaard’s philosophy—
whether viewed in terms of sin and salvation, epistemology, or personhood—is always 
driven by two primary considerations: The need for self-emptying (kenosis) as a path 
towards authenticity and healing and the need to overcome the spiritual and existential 
isolation that has become the default state of the psyche of modern man. Kierkegaard’s 
writings on liturgy and sacramental life echo these primary considerations.  
 Vigilius Haufniensis in The Concept of Irony associates “the demonic,” the break-
down of the self and the falling into despair, with isolation and individualism: “The 
demonic is unfreedom that wants to close itself off… The demonic is inclosing reserve 
[det Indesluttede] and the unfreely disclosed.”17 The demonic, for Haufniensis, represents 
the inability of the human person to live up to her freedom, to manifest and appropriate it, 
as well as the breakdown of communion, the central facet of human personhood. 
Commenting on this passage, John Panteleimon Manoussakis writes:  
 
In contradistinction to the ecstatic movement of the prosopon, the 
demonic remains withdrawn in this lonely prison made up by the 
fragments of a mirror that reflect back the selfsame images of itself. 
Condemned to this monotonous existence, we should not be surprised by 
Kierkegaard’s apt observation that monologue and soliloquy are the 
modes of demonic expression and that the discontinuity of the sudden—
always the same, without memory or expectation—becomes the form of 
its manifestation. A last but telling point: the demonic does not “partake of 
communion” (communicere), which means that it does not communicate, 
                                                 
17 COA, 123. 
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but also (and it is Kierkegaard himself who invites us to think of this 
sense) that it does not receive communion.18 
 
The significance of the sacraments, according to Kierkegaard, is that they bridge the 
chasm that opens up between the human person and God (and, thereby, the chasm that 
opens up between human beings). The Eucharist, for Kierkegaard, is another 
manifestation of the paradox of Christ’s incarnation, a way for the believer, who is 
always far from God (due to sin), to draw near to Christ’s love, to stand face-to-face with 
the Word. In the journals, commenting on the gospel passage on the tax collector and the 
Pharisee,19 Kierkegaard writes:  
 
The tax collector stood far off by himself and did not even dare lift up his 
eye, but said: God, be merciful to me, a sinner.  
 You, however, are now closer—you are now about to go up to the 
Communion table, even though you are still far off. But in a sense the 
Communion table is the place where one is closest to God. 
 (In margin): In the inwardness of the consciousness of his sin (and 
this inwardness determines the distance) the Christian stands still further 
away—and yet at the foot of the altar he is the closest to God that it is 
possible to be. This being far off and near, whereas the Pharisee in his 
presumptuous forwardness was near—and far off.20 
 
The Eucharist manifests the moment (Øjeblik) where we can relate to ourselves in light of 
eternity. The moment is always connected to the dialectic of hiddenness and unveiling.21 
Haufniensis writes that “a blink is a designation of time, but mark well, of time in the 
fateful conflict when it is touched by eternity. What we call the moment, Plato calls tó 
exaiphnes [the sudden]. Whatever its etymological explanation, it is related to the 
                                                 
18 John Panteleimon Manoussakis, God After Metaphysics: A Theological Aesthetic (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2007), 26.  
19 Luke 18:9-14. 
20 JP 4, 3933 / X1 A 428.  
21 Heidegger’s analysis of aletheia is undoubtedly indebted to Kierkegaard’s writings on the moment.  
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category of the invisible.”22 Luther, in his first German translation of the Bible, chose the 
German word Augenblick to translate St. Paul’s phrase “in the twinkling of an eye,” a 
reference to the way the eschaton cannot be understood in terms of chronological time.23 
Kierkegaard’s connection between the Øjeblik of the eschaton and the Platonic notion of 
exaiphnes, and his belief that the sacrament of the Eucharist somehow manifests the 
difference between the two, is an important part of Kierkegaard’s views on liturgy and 
worship.  
 Manoussakis notes that the philosophical notion of the Moment is connected to 
two distinct conceptions of time: 
 
Time does not exhaust temporality. The Greeks knew of two different 
phenomena of temporality that have come down to us as chronos and 
Kairos. Chronos is time seen either as sequence or duration—invariably 
constituting a chronology: every minute passing by is accumulated in 
those layers of dead time that compile the chronicle of our lives. Chronos 
represents what Heidegger calls ‘the vulgar understanding of time’ or 
‘inauthentic present.’ […] If chronological time is seen in a horizontal 
way, that is, as sequence and duration, Kairos could be represented as 
vertical and dis-continuous. If chronos is measured in seconds, minutes, 
hours, and years, Kairos cannot be measured at all, since it occurs only in 
the Moment. What is called here ‘the Moment’—that is, as we will see, 
the Augenblick or the exaiphnes—is characterized by this dis-continuity 
through which, according to Heidegger, the world is dis-closed and Dasein 
is faced with his or her de-cision.24 
 
It is in the kairon that human transformation takes place, according to Kierkegaard. 
Haufniensis writes that in Plato’s notion of the exaiphnes “the moment becomes the 
category of transition, for Plato shows in the same way that the moment is related to the 
                                                 
22 COA, 87-88. 
23 The reference is from 1. Cor. 15:52. See Manoussakis, 65. 
24 Manoussakis, 59. 
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transition of the one to the many, of the many to the one, of likeness to unlikeness, etc.”25 
In his journals Kierkegaard speaks of the Eucharist in light of this transformation, where 
Christ’s love becomes manifest to the human person and “covers the multitude of sins.”26 
Kierkegaard, writing on Christ’s appearance to the apostles in Luke 24:31, writes:  
 
The very fact that he became invisible to me is the sign that I recognize 
him; he is indeed the object of faith, a sign of contradiction, consequently 
in a certain sense must become invisible when I recognize him. He is the 
prototype, must therefore become invisible so that the imitator can be like 
him.  
 At the Communion table he is invisibly present, and yet in verse 30 
it truly says that it was when he blessed the bread and broke it, and gave it 
to them that they recognized him.27  
 
Carl S. Hughes has noted that Kierkegaard’s views on transformation, especially 
as outlined in his Eucharistic discourses, are easily tied in with his aesthetic appraisal of 
the liturgy. Writing on Kierkegaard’s Eucharistic discourse on the woman caught in sin, 
Hughes notes that Kierkegaard connects the story of the woman’s transformation to the 
services he attended at Vor Frue Kirke in Copenhagen:  
 
Kierkegaard locates his Eucharistic Discourses amid this aesthetic and 
ritual setting in order to further the process of transformation that he sees 
in the story of the Sinful Woman and in the practice of the Eucharist itself. 
At the altar, an outcast woman becomes a welcome guest, and Christians 
take her place at Christ’s feet. A minister says the words ‘This is my body’ 
and offers bread and wine as Christ’s body and blood.28  
 
Kierkegaard, though always critical of the passionlessness and apathy of 
Christendom, which he sometimes connected to sacramental and collective worship, 
                                                 
25 COA, 84.  
26 JP 4, 3963 / X2 A 50.  
27 JP 6, 6495 / X2 A 40. Emphasis mine.  
28 Hughes, 131.  
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nonetheless saw the Eucharist (and, indeed, all of the sacraments), as well as liturgical 
practices, as playing a central role in the existential appropriation of the paradox, i.e., the 
spiritual life of each and every Christian. Hughes has noted that Kierkegaard, in his 
emphasis on personal transformation and development in his Eucharistic discourses, 
offers an alternative vision of salvation than the standard Protestant account of 
atonement, whereby Christ’s sacrifice is not seen as a one-time, metaphysical act but 
rather a relational reality that each and every individual person can enter into through the 
rituals of sacrament and liturgy.29 As Hughes notes, this is due to Kierkegaard’s view that 
Christ’s salvation is understood in term of the kairon, the Moment when past, present, 
and future all collapse in upon themselves and eternity enters into time. Noting 
Kierkegaard’s language in relation to humankind’s salvation through Christ, Hughes 
writes: “Kierkegaard’s use of this language is different from that traditional dogmatics 
because his motivating concern is not to theorize Christological substation as a one-time 
event that affects God, but to promote it as an ongoing process that can transform human 
beings today.”30 
 
5.2 The Ecclesiastical Event and the Healing of Time in the Eastern Orthodox 
liturgy 
The liturgy, according to Eastern Orthodox theology, is a manifestation of the 
kairos. In his study of time in the context of Orthodox theology, Brandon Gallaher writes:  
 
Christ heals our time (chronos), and indeed, the time of the invisible 
creation (aeon), by making it His time of opportunity for our salvation in 
Him (kairos). Time, as Christ’s time, becomes a means to our perfection 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 150-53. 
30 Ibid., 153. 
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in Him rather than the ultimate expression of our rejection of God’s grace. 
Through Him, in His Body the Church, we come to partake in the mode of 
being of the invisible creation, creaturely eternity; but this eternity or time 
of the invisible creation becomes wedded with our sensible time, remade 
for an embodied being like man, through participating in the everlasting 
life of God. Time is, therefore, remade and renewed in the Church as the 
Kingdom of God, and we have a foretaste of this renewal in the liturgy.31 
 
Gallaher notes that, according to Orthodox theology, our experience of time (chronos) 
has been corrupted due to the fall. We experience time as meaningless repetition, the 
ticking of the clock inching us ever closer to oblivion. “We experience fallen time as 
constant change or ceaseless movement in a cycle of death that can be seen cyclically in 
the seasons, which move in a circle like a snake swallowing its tail. Winter follows 
Autumn and Spring follows Winter just as death follows old age and old age is not the 
end, for out of our death comes the birth of our descendants. Thus all of time is perpetual 
repetition of death.”32  
 It is this corruption of chronos into meaningless repetition that sends the aesthete 
into such panic and despair regarding marriage, commitment, and life in general, 
according to Kierkegaard.33 Repetition manifests the meaninglessness of life, the ultimate 
in despair, and one must thereby avoid it at all costs by constantly rotating one’s crops, 
constantly moving on to new adventures and experiences. Yet, as the dialectic of 
Either/or points out, this is an impossible proposition, since the meaninglessness of 
repetition is only heightened by trying to escape from it. Each new drug and every new 
                                                 
31 Brandon F. Gallaher, “Chalice of Eternity: An Orthodox Theology of Time,” St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Quarterly 57, no. 1 (2013): 15.  
32 Ibid., 17-18. 
33 See esp. “Rotation of the Crops,” Either/or, 285-300. The Spidsborger is in an even worse state 
than the aesthete with regards to repetition since he enters into it without even realizing the frightening 
effects of repetition. The aesthete is at least acutely aware of how painful commitment can be and thereby 
shuns it. It is only in the ethical stage that repetition becomes transformed, a process that can only be fully 
realized in the religious sphere.   
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sexual conquest simply becomes a reminder of the inescapable fact that we are all going 
to die and that there is no escaping the existential realities of anxiety and despair. Judge 
Vilhelm offers the first glimpse of how repetition might be transfigured through an 
existential leap whereby our commitments become a way to achieve authenticity and true 
inwardness. Constantin Constantius continues this discussion by associating repetition 
with the moment:  
 
Recollection’s love, an author [A in Either/or] has said, is the only happy 
love. He is perfectly right in that, of course, provided one recollects that 
initially it makes a person unhappy. Repetition’s love is in truth the only 
happy love. Like recollection’s love, it does not have the restlessness of 
hope, the uneasy adventurousness of discovery, but neither does it have 
the sadness of recollection—it has the blissful security of the moment.34 
 
Kierkegaard’s writings on repetition and the moment offer an alternative approach to 
anamnesis from the standard Platonic account. Instead of viewing anamnesis in terms of 
overcoming the temporal (chronos/the body/earthly existence) through eternity (the realm 
of the forms) one begins to see it in terms of eternity entering into time, of kairos 
transforming chronos. Past, present, and future all collapse in upon themselves in 
repetition. The moment points backwards in recollection yet also looks towards a future 
horizon of possibilities. As John Manoussakis points out, this is also the paradigm that 
lies at the center of Christian eschatology: “Whereas Judaism and Islam have one 
eschatological center, fixed in the future (messianism), Christian eschatology unfolds as 
this tension between two eschatological nodal points: between the already of the 
                                                 
34 Repetition, 185. 
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Incarnation and the not yet of the Parousia. This tension finds expression the formula of 
the Fourth Gospel: ‘the hour is coming and is now here’ (John 4:23, 5:25).”35 
 This connection between eschatology and repetition is a central facet of the 
Eastern Orthodox liturgy.  
 
At the very beginning of the liturgy, then, the kingdom is proclaimed as a 
reality and not as an expectation. It is this bold experience of the kingdom 
that enables the celebrant to say during the anaphora, that is, the 
consecration prayer: ‘Remembering thus this salvific command and 
everything that was done for us, namely, the cross, the tomb, the 
resurrection after the third day, the ascension to heavens, the sitting at the 
right hand of the Father, the second and glorious coming.’ Here logic is 
violated and history is left behind. How could it be that we remember the 
‘second and glorious coming’? 
 To remember the future, to have already experienced what is still 
to come, this is something that goes against our protological categories of 
thinking. The Eucharist is thus more of a prolepsis than anamnesis, since 
the events that we recall lie, from the historical perspective, in the future—
a future made present in the Eucharist and by the Eucharist. 
 
Kierkegaard’s notion of repetition was directly aimed against Hegel’s view of synthesis 
and progress, of leaving the past behind (destroying it) as we move on to a new category 
of thought and being.36 Repetition, on the other hand, encapsulates both past and future in 
the present. Gallaher notes a similar view of temporality in the structure of the Eastern 
Orthodox liturgy: 
 
In Christ, as the Lord of Time, is realized the ingathering of all moments 
in one moment of what we might call an ‘eternal temporality’ […] that is, 
the co-inherence or co-presence of each part of time to each other in the 
present happens in Jesus Christ. Christ is Himself the Lord of Chronos or 
time proper because He is the Kyrios Kairou, Lord of the appointed time 
of our salvation. In Him, our broken mode of temporality, chronos, is 
renewed and sanctified. […] When He returns to us in His Body and 
Blood in the liturgy, which is both our ascent to God and his descent to us, 
                                                 
35 Manoussakis, 61. 
36 It should be noted that this is Kierkegaard’s reading of Hegel.  
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we see that our new mode of time, eternal temporality, is something 
radically new to creation, sensible and spiritual at once, as it has partaken 
of the very mode of God Himself as everlasting Trinity.37 
 
This notion of Christ as the Lord of Time, as the union of the kairos and chronos, was 
developed by Maximus the Confessor (who himself was greatly influenced by Gregory of 
Nyssa). In Ad Thalassium 60 Maximus writes:  
 
Because of Christ—or rather, the whole mystery of Christ—all the ages of 
time and the beings within those ages have received their beginning and 
end in Christ. For the union between a limit of the ages and limitlessness, 
between measure and immeasurability, between finitude and infinity, 
between Creator and creation, between rest and motion, was conceived 
before the ages. This union has been manifested in Christ at the end of 
time, and in itself brings God’s foreknowledge to fulfillment.38 
 
Christ, the eternal God, unites himself with the temporal and human. The liturgy, 
especially in the celebration of the Eucharist, manifests this union by creating the 
ritual and sacramental space (topos) whereby the believer can enter into the reality 
of this paradox and appropriate it in an existential manner.  
 
5.3 – Concluding remarks 
Though Kierkegaard was highly critical of the state of collective worship 
and of sacramental participation in the Lutheran church of his time, he 
nonetheless viewed ritual and sacraments as core elements of Christian 
spirituality. The essential hiddenness of God becomes his essential un-veiling in 
                                                 
37 Gallaher, 23-24. 
38 Ad Thalassium 60, On the Cosmic Mystery of Jesus Christ, 125. On Maximus’ indebtedness to 
Nyssa, see Paul M. Blowers, “Maximus the Confessor, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Concept of ‘Perpetual 
Progress,’” Vigilae Christianae 46, no. 2 (1992): 151-171.   
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the Eucharist. Repetition, the continual progression of the human person towards 
deeper commitment and authenticity, manifests the union of chronos and kairos, 
the “blink of an eye” where eternity enters into time and the human being, as the 
synthesis of the poles of existence, is able to orient herself towards her eternal 
telos. As I have argued, many of these elements form core components of Eastern 
Orthodox liturgics. The liturgy represents the passageway into a new way of 
being and a new way of experiencing time where the determinism of fallen 
chronos is overcome and life takes on its inherent beauty and meaning in the 
kairos of the resurrection.  
 Throughout this work I have strived to show that Kierkegaard offers a 
striking alternative to many fundamental doctrines in the Western Christian 
tradition, perhaps especially in relation to how we view human salvation. 
Kierkegaard always strives to avoid legalistic and juridical language, choosing 
instead to view sin and salvation in terms of existential development. This 
development is always understood relationally, primarily as the relation between 
God and man but always also in terms of how human beings relate to one another. 
Kierkegaard was, first and foremost, the poet and philosopher of love. Even 
though his writings delve deep into the abyss of human despair, fear, and 
trembling, his brilliance lies in illuminating the rays of light that break through the 
darkness, the hope of resurrection and heling in and through the brokenness of the 
human condition.  
 Western Christians have, for the past century and a half, gained 
immeasurable insight and spiritual solace (as well as challenge) from 
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Kierkegaard’s writings. Roman Catholics and Protestants alike have wrestled with 
his works and thoughts and benefitted enormously from this encounter. The 
Eastern Orthodox engagement with Kierkegaard has been extremely limited up to 
this point, but it is my sincere belief that both scholars of Kierkegaard as well as 
Eastern Orthodox Christians can gain immense insight into the Christian life by 
engaging in dialogue with each other.  
 As a final note, I would like to say that the most surprising thing about this 
project was the way that Kierkegaard managed to highlight for me the most 
beautiful aspects of my own tradition. Like all practitioners of a religious 
tradition, I have moments of extreme doubt and despair where only the most 
superficial and fundamentalistic aspects of that tradition come to the fore. 
Orthodoxy, much like Protestantism and Roman Catholicism (and, indeed, all 
religions), is easily corrupted in its practice, devolving as it can into religiosity 
and obsession with objective elements of ritual and belief. Yet all of these 
traditions contain treasures of beauty and truth that have echoed through the ages 
to us since the time Christ walked the earth with his disciples. I owe Kierkegaard 
a great deal of thanks for allowing me to rediscover these treasures and for 
challenging me, and all of us, to consider what it means to live a life of 
authenticity and selfless love.  
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